Our present policy is aimed at the identification and supportiable alternative to Duvalier and the ultimate dis lodgement of the Duvalier regljne is favor of such Our present target date for the completion of this operation is next May, at which time Duvalier's first "elected" term of office expires. (We have never recognized the second "election" at which he extended his term.)
Among the reasons we feel it necessary to dislodge Duvalier are the following:
1. Some of the key people around Duvalier are ultra-nationalist,. and have communist backgrounds. There is every indication that their influence ls increasing. We also believe that they are quietly, and under the very severe limitations of Duvalier's ingrained suspicions of everyone, trying to increase their authority within the government, militia,oping to take over when Duvalier goes. The longer that he hangs on the more likely they may be to succeed.
2- There Is some indication of increasing communist acitivity in the country. There is no doubt that the longer this repressive regime continues the greater the potential communist strength.
Our support of Duvalier, inevitably strengthens the hands of those elements of the opposition which are anti-DS in orientation.
We are convinced that it is hopeless to try to work with Duvalier. He is indifferent to the social and economic welfare of his people, Intoxicated with brutality and repressions, unaware or indifferent to the possibility of ultimate communist rule, and hostile to our guidance or advice. All efforts to work with him have met resistance and there seems to be no realistic hope that things will get better in the future.
A US role in dislodging Duvalier would, of course, help us with other democratic forces in the Caribbean area and be another significant step in upsetting the old "friendly to dictators" picture which atill prevails although lessened by the DR events*
I ,U'I>rovki> for MANDATORY REVIEW
I OCT# NLK- n
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD WE TRY TO DISLODGE DUVALIKRAIRLY CLEAR IDEA WHO WOULD REPLACE HIM.
we must use the next year to Identify the alternative.
The CIA, FBI and INR haveossier of promising Haitian exiles and visible resistance figures from which we are trying to select those most likely to be capable ofuccessor government.
We. are trying to substantially increase our intelligence on Haiti.
ird as it is to believe, we know far less about Haiti under Duvalier than we knew about the Dominican Republic under Trujillo.
3. Identification of an alternative ls the primary mission of our Embassy.
While this is going on we will be publicly cool toward Duvalier and conduct normal personal and private contacts. We are most anxious not to do anything which will precipitate his departure before we are ready. On the otherool public posture, with occasional mild acts of hostility, are essential if we are to encourage the tentative emergence of an opposition and make them willing to be in touch with us.
If we are ready next May it Is probable that we will be able to get rid of Duvalier. We are studying plans for this now. The most promising approach would be the withdrawal of recognition at the time when his term expires. Thisuridical base and we could probably get some other countriesenezuela and Colombia) to go along with us. Thissevering of relations on the part of the US and others would make his fall almost Inevitable.
I want to stress that this isrobing operation. We do not intend to move decisively unless and until we feel Chat we have reasonable control over the future course of events.