TOP OCCHCT
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
3
This estimate supersedes
This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, which is composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. The representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained, tho subject being outside his jurisdiction.
TOP OlXRCr
TOP SCCRCT TABLE OF CONTENTS
I'age
THE 1
PRINCIPAL 1
SUMMARY 4
DISCUSSION
I, ORGANIZATION OK THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGYas
II. NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM
Research and Testing
Nuclear Electric Power
Marine Nuclear Propulsion Systems
Aerospace
MATERIALS PRODUCTION
Uranium Ore
Uranium Feed
Plutonium-Equivalent
Other Nuclear
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
Nuclear Weapon Rearch and Development
Weapon Development Program
Low-Yield41
Theromonuclear Weapon Developments
High Altitude
Nuclear Weapons and Systems
Delivery Systems
Weapon Production und Stockpiling45
National Assembly-Stockpile Sites47
Operational Storage Sites
Military Regional Depots 48
I RDM/MRBM
ICBM Support
Naval Nuclear Weapon49
Page
Soviet Nuclear Weapon Storage in the European
Command and
V. FUTURE WEAPON DEVELOPMENT ANDSI
VL SOVIET TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES IN SCIENTD7IC FIELDS
RELATED TO NUCLEAR53
ANNEX A: EVALUATION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR5 December 57
LIST OF TABLES
Page.
TABLE n. Estimated Soviet Fissionable Materials7
TABLE III. Soviet Research Reactors and Reactor4
TABLE TV. Soviet Nuclear Power Stations and ExperimentalW
TABLE V. Estimated Characteristics of Soviet Nuclear20
TABLE VL Soviet Heavy Water39
LIST OF MAPS
Page
FIGUREuclear Weapon Research and Test 7
FIGUREuclear Materials Production Sites21
FIGUREoviet Nuclear Electric Power Reactor
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the current status and probable future course of the Soviet atomic energy program to
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
Nuclear Tosting and Technology
I. The Sovietsighly developed nuclear weaponwhich differs in design philosophy and emphasis from that of the West. They have tested thermonuclear devices in very high yields (up toegatons) well above any in Westernand in this range have achieved an outstanding yield-to-weight performance. They have also shown an excellentin thermonuclear devices of lower yields, down to about two megatons. In the submegaton thermonuclear class, their yield-to-welght performance has improved considerably but has not equaled that of the West
,he Soviets have conducted many tests belowilotons.
]
Weapon Slockpiloi
mall number of individually produced weapons for interim use could be fabricatedew months after device testing.
SCCREE
ew weapons with very high yields of upT could now be available. However, we believe that the Soviet time lag between nuclear testsevice and initial stockpile entryerially produced weaponized version is about two years at aOn this basis, some of the new devices tested1 could be entering stockpile during the latter part3riority development is assumed. It is estimated, however, that this could be done onlyimited scale, and that, in general, the devices testedould be stockpiled4e believe that weapons currently stockpiled are derived primarily from devices tested8 or earlier; these weapons range in yieldew kllotons upegatons.
Requirements for Further Testing
oviet nuclear weapon technology appears to be highly sophisticated and adequate for present delivery systems, but significant advancements can still be made Uirough furtherand testing. Probably one of the strongestis in the area of high-altitude effects of nuclear weapons. Tlie Soviets conducted several such tests, butneed additional tests to obtain weapon effects data pertinent to antimissile development and countermcasures. They also lack direct information on effects of high-yield weapons on hardened ground targets and on the effects of lower-yieldon deep underwater targets. The Soviets probably also have requirements to conduct further tests to improve yield-to-weight ratios particularly in the lower weight range and to develop new weapon capabilities such as light-weight thermonuclear warheads for smaller missile systems, and very small weapons for tactical employment
believe that the Soviets areigorousresearch and development program, and that they area posture to resume nuclear testing promptly if amade.
Fissionable Materials Production
estimate theumulative Soviet productionmaterials at0 kilograms of plutonlum
Ton
equivalentilograms ofhese quantities are somewhat lower than previously estimated fors the result of further analysis and additional evidence- Theare continuing to expand their fissionable materialcapabilityignificant rate. We estimate that byumulative production will amount tof plutonium equivalentilograms.
Reactor Development
oviet research reactor development continues to bein most areas and is uniqueew. However, theunrealistic Soviet nuclear electric program has beenand they are now proceeding with one which is morewith their economic requirements and the state of their reactor technology. Moreover, the Soviets liave encountereddifficulties with the nuclear propulsion of the icebreaker LENIN, and there is considerable evidence of similar difficulties with Soviet nuclear powered submarines. Soviet work on ion propulsion and nuclear auxiliary power supplied for spaceis continuing, and we believe that theyrogram to develop materials suitable for nuclear rocket motors. Theaircraft nuclear propulsion program appears to have been delayed and may have been cut back or even canceled.
'See pace I) tor the ttewx ot tbe Aulstuit Chief ot Nml OperaUoni.
SUMMARY
SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONoviet Nuclear Test.
1
ests which brings the total number of detected Soviet tests. (Seendabulation of tests to date ls as follows:
Year
8 42
1H1
. 8S
Gary
Novaya Shaean-Ka-
Zemlya pustln Yar
l
11
low-yield tests haveest operationshave included grounddrops, and tower shots; some of thesedesigned to determine the effects ofdetonations on arrays ot militaryOnly two underground tests haveboth nearand one in
tor severalIn the Kapustln Yar and Saryall high-yield tests7 haveat Novaya Zemlya. In addition,been some lower-yield air-bursts atZemlya test areas near the centerIsland, and several low-yield detonationsunder the sea off the southern coast. Wethat the majority of alrbursl tests In the Novaya Zemlya area were delivered by medium and heavy bombers. In addition. Sovietand various Intelligenceumber of12 Novaya Zemlya tests probably Involvedmissile systems.
tests ln1onducted at high altitudes.5 ET shot was conducted nearYar rangehead; It probablysurface-to-air missile warhead.t Kapustln YarT warhead; It probablyto provide data on effects atIn addition, five very highwere conducted on the KapustlnShagan missile test ranges, two Inthree1 tests1 KT each, whereas two of theyieldedT. and the2 MT. The test devices weremediumissilesthe Kapustln Yar rangehead. Wethat these tests provided basic higheffects data and other data applicableantimissile problem.
Weapon Development Program
WeaponS, theests of low-yield0 KT)
he Soviets had developed Implosion warheads ranging In yield fromT.
fission tests in
nd
J2 test series, where the majority of fission tests wereT or under, j
a
Thermonuclear Weapon Developments.5ests of full-scale thermonuclear devices were held byariety of yields fromTT. Over two-thirds of the tests wereT.
Ofests oferies,ere thermonuclear devices with yields rong-
^ ing fromilotons toegatons.
1 Wethat yield-to-weight ratios of some of their nuclear devices have been substantially improvedn addition, new weight classes appeared with yields rangingegatons, which permit theof weapons with yields up
two largest Soviet detonationsandT) were both cleandevices.ormalegaton device couldThe Soviets alsoewdesign at yieldso 25
]
Weapon and System*
small number of individuallyfor interim use could bea few months after devicea few weapons with very highT could now be available.wc believe that the Soviet time lagnuclear testsevic* andentryerially producedversion is about two years at aOn this basis, some of the1 could be entering stockpilethe latter part3riorityis assumed. It is estimated,this could be done only cn aand that. In general, theould be stockpiled4
future Weapon Development and Testing
The status of Soviet nuclear weapon technology, while highly sophisticated and In most respects apparently adequate for their present delivery systems, is such thatadvancements can still be made through further development and testing. Such advances can be made In at least four areas: (a) adaptation of present designs to meet the needs of future delivery systems; (b) development of very small weapons for tactical employment; and (c) improvement In yield-to-weight ratios.
Probably one of the strongestfor further Soviet nuclear testing is in the area of high-altitude effects of nuclear weapons. The Soviets have notarhead in the vicinitye-entering missile nosecone, nor do we have firm evidence that the Soviets have placed Instrument pods near their high altitude bursts. Wc also have no
knowledge of Soviet activities in providing Information on effects upon hardened missile launch sites. Other areas where the Soviets require additional effects information may exist; in particular, the Soviets lackwith very deep underwater bursts.
believe the Soviets arca vigorous weapon researchprogram and arc In aresume nuclear testing promptly If ais made.
Orgonixalion and Facilities
The Soviet atomic energy program Is directed by two organizations recently placed under the supervision of the newly created Supreme Council of the National Economy. One of these, the State Production Committee for Medium Machine Building. USSR, isfor the overall direction of the atomic energy program Including theof fissionable materials and nuclearThe Ministry of Defense participates with this Committee In the development,and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. The other organization, the State CornmiUee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, is responsible for nonmllitary applications of the program and all official contacts with the atomic energy programs of foreign countries.
The USSRubstantialof control over the atomic energyof the Soviet Bloc nations throughassociations of lop Soviet personnel and by means of bilateral agreements and the Standing Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of the Council for Mutual Economic Aidhis relationship is such that tho Soviets have precluded theof an independent nuclear military capability by the other participating nations. Communist China, an observer ratherember of CEMA, has proceededwith its own nuclear program since the withdrawal of Sonet technical aid In
oldest Soviet center specificallywith nuclear weapon research,development Is located at Sarovamiles cast ofecondresearch and development center,In the Urals, probably becamelatelthough thewhich is quite similar to Sarova, Issmaller than that center,ajor addition to the Sovietweapon development potential. Therethat thereesearch andestablishment, probably concernedweapon systems development atairfield In the Crimea.nuclear weapon program has alsoby research conducted at aother Institutes In the USSR probablythe Institute of Atomic Energy,the Physics Institute. Obninsk;Institute. Sukhumi; andInstitute of Chemical Physics, Moscow.
Weapon Fabrkotian Sites
weapon fabricationbeen identified in the Urals atand atossible thirdIs located in Central Siberia nearNational reserve stockpile siteswith these compleics.
Woopon Stockpile Situ
Soviet nuclear weapon logisticIncludes (a) National Reserveat Interior locations;tockpile sites located nearconcentrations; andnd Operational storage sites utbases for the direct support of
C
1he USSRa total oftockpile sites ofOver the next three years at leaststockpile sites of aU classesbringing the total tondhis expansionthe growing nuclear capabilitySoviet strategic bomber force whichrapidly converting lo jet aircraft, anddevelopment of nuclear capabilityand Tactical Aviation andand naval forces as well Sincethird stage of rapidly acceleratedconstruction has coincided with theof strategic and tacticala nuclear capability, and with aof nuclear weapons amongforces. In this period, the USSRIncreased the capacity ofof the previously existingand has more than doubled theof stockpile
he National Reserve Stockpiles and the National Assembly Stockpile facilities are characterized by Isolation, extreme security, hardened bunkers (either earth-mounded or underground) and self-sufficiency in housing and other services required by the permanent cadres.
storage facilities. Soviet ground forces may have field storage facilities in addition to the regional depots which probably serve them. Some nuclear storage probably Is required by
r
and regional militarysites now positively Identified include three generations of airfield sites, sites at two staging bases in the Arctic, regional military depots resembling In design the thirdairfield sites,aval site usedto support mIssue-carrying submarines. These sites are typically situated apart from other facilities at their associated base, and are characterized by stringent physicaland by hardened storage bunkers.
Wo believe that nuclear warheads are available to all operational ICBM. IRDM. and MRBM complexes either on-site or at nearby
L
J
Naval Aviation for its BADGER-delivered alr-lo-surface missile. We have no evidence of nuclear storage facilities at surface-lo-airsites. No nuclear warhead storagehave been identified In European satellites nor is there definitive Information that nuclear weapons have been deployed to any of the Soviet forces stationed there.
Command and Control
In the USSR, the Presidium of the Party Central Committee exercises ultimate control over nuclear weapons, and itsgovern their use. storage, movement and issuance.ar situation, control would be exercised by the Presidium Clialr-man In his capacity as Supreme Highwho, through the Ministry ofwould authorize the principalof the forces directly concerned to use nuclear weapons,
We believe that the national stockpile storage sites ore administered by the State Production Committee for Medium Machine Building, and operational storage sites by the Ministry of Defense. The Committee for State Security (KGB) is responsible for the security of nuclear stockpile facilities,their guard force and Is responsible for escorting movements of nuclear weapons to and from national stockpile facilities anddepots. There is some evidence that responsibility for the management offunctions, such as storing, maintaining and delivery of nuclear weapons in support of military operations has been assigned tooperating in direct support of the major force components of the Ministry of Defense.
The flow of orders from the Supreme High Command is arranged so as to achieve maximum control and minimum delay inIn the Strategic Rocket Forces, fororders pass through the Commander and his main Staff directly to regimentsfor nuclear fire. In the case of Theatre Forces, once employment of nuclear weapons has been authorized, responsibility for alerting forces and ordering execution of nuclear fire Is delegated to major Joint service commanders at the Military District, Group of Forces, or Front Level. The Commander at this level may allow his subordinatedown to Army level some discretion in authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, but It Is evidently rare for commanders below that level to have any such discretion. In the case of special nuclear attack groups of tactical missiles and artillery, the JointCommander evidently issues the order to prepare and execute nuclear fire directly to the units concerned, and their Immediate superiors merely supervise execution of the order. Presumably Long Range Aviation, the Naval Forces and the Air Defense Forcesin similar fashion.
is abundant evidence thatwas seriously preoccupied withof Improving Its command andprocedures for nuclear weaponsthrough atheof strategic ralssUts hadproblem of central control and hadrapid response an urgent necessity.forcesf
J under field conditions many of the logistical practices and proceduresthe Issue and servicing of nuclear weapons were cumbersome and operationally Impractical. Some streamlining of thesystem has probably occurcd by now.precise details are not yet known.
have no evidence toor not the Soviets have eitheror installed mechanical or electronic
topM.-r-
In their nuclear weapon control procedures (such as permissive links).
II. FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION (See Figuro 2)
Uranium Oro Procurement
Soviet Bloc uranium reserves areat several hundred thousand tons In medium grade ores and an even greaterin low gradeumber of well-designed ore concentration plants0 metric tons capacity arc currently in operation, and active prospecting fororcbodles continues
We estimate that the annualof uranium ore by the Soviet Union is0 metric tons of recoverable metal equivalent and will gradually increase0 metric tons per year over the next five years. The cumulative recoverable metal throughs estimatedetric tons and throughetric tons. These amounts of ore, which could be higher or lower by ns much, are believed to be sufficient for thematerial production estimatedandubstantial stockpile in addition.
Uranium Fmo* Molrric/i
metal and other feedarc produced at Elektrostal, nearat Glazov, Just west of the Urals;Novosibirsk In Central Siberia. Theof these facilities and the processdetailed in the Sovietsuggest that the USSR hasfeed materials plant capaclLy forestimated herein.
Piufoflium-FquivaJenl
major pliiton!um-equivalentsites have been identified In theearliest and largest Is located near
Kyshtym in the Urals, the second Iswithroduction complex at the atomic energy site north of Tomsk in Central Siberia, and the third Is located witliln the large atomic energy site northeast of Krasnoyarsk In Central Siberia. Review of all available Information led to thethat there are no other majorreactor sites In operation in the USSR.
We estimate thatovietplutonium-cquivalent production is0 kilograms. Interpretation of available data wouldroduction estimate as largo0 kilograms; however, lt is almost certain that actualumulative production Is not less0 kilograms.
It Is estimated that annual plutonlum-equlvalent production will Increaseate consistent with performance during the. resultingumulativeproduction of0 kilograms bySec Tableven with an extremely high priority effort, the cumulative plutonlum-equlvalentwould not0 kilograms bylternatively, the minimum likely cumulative production by that date will not be less0 Itltograms.
Highly irradiated plutonlum will be producedyproduct of the nuclear power and propulsion programs of the USSR in amounts gradually Increasing toilograms per yearnd has beenin Table II This production could be used in weapons by mixing with plutonlum produced at considerably lower irradiation levels and would have other uses.
roduction
large gaseous diffusioncomplexes capablep to weapon-grade productionoperation in the USSR; one at Verkh-
Ncyvuisk ln the TJrals, one north or Tomsk ln Central Siberia, and the third at Angarsk in the Lake Baykalourth large gaseous diffusion complex is undernorth of Zaozerniy near Krasnoyarsk. We believe that no undetected large gaseous
Table n
ESTIMATED SOVIET FISSIONABLE MATERIALSCumulative ProducUon In Kilograms
oss
...
...
...
0
..
.
0
..
0
...
...
. ..
..
plant is currently in operation. Continued construction of large gaseousplants in tho USSR suggestsroduction by other means such as the ultracentrh*uge is unlikely.
Early Soviet gaseous diffusion plantefficiencies are derived fromsupplied by Oerman scientists who worked on the programater plant operating efficiencies have been extrapolated from this base primarily on advances incompressor technology and changes In process building design. Changes in process building design Indicate tho use of an improved barrier startinghe efficiency of this barrier can only besince there are no data on Itscharacteristics.
Our estimateroduction Is based upon estimated electric poweravailable site data, and on estimated plant operating efficiencies. Estimates of the growth of electric power supplies taken in conjunction with available site data indicate that therogram Is stillsignificant expansion. It is believed that the current program of expansion will not be completed
Our estimate of total Soviet cumulativeroduction is presented inn terms of cumulative production of uranium enriched toontent Ittheercent equivalent of material produced at lesser enrichment. Estimated expenditures for weapon tests and non-weapon uses have been subtracted from the value ofroduction to give ourof equivalentvailable for weapon use.
It is estimated that theroduction for
ion scene,
* It is unlikely that actual Soviet cumulative production inould be less0 kilograms or moreilograms. We estimate that theumulative production willilograms and that thewould not be lessilograms or moreilograms.
O'hor Nuclear Maierlalt
Thoriumoderatein the procurement of thorium ores was noted during62 period. [The only certain evidence of the productionrom thorium Is the single appearancen5 in theweapon test
Lithium. Lithium ores have beenprimarily from three areas in the USSR Soviet nuclear weapons tiave probably been using lithium enriched In the lithium-6sincehe locationssotope separation plants have not been positively identified, but could be located In certain facilities at the Nizlinaya Tura and Novosibirsk atomic energy sites.
]wc arc unable to determine which of the Soviet reactor sites is used to produce tritium or the amount of tritium produced.
'The Assistant Chief of Naval Opera lions (In. lelllgenccl. Department of Uie Navy, believes that the lower limit of the estimated value for theproducUon of IMJ5 Is the more nearlyHe beUeves that Uie evidential base Isto support the producUon efficiencyigher cumulaUve total would require.
Zirconium-niobiumused to clad fuel elements for theof the icebreaker LENIN and bytho nuclear submarine cores.zirconium-niobium production capacity
Is believed available for the needs of theatomic energy program.
Beryllium. The USSR processes large reserves of beryllium ore at Izumrud in tho Urals, and established, in the pre-warombine there to manufacture beryllium' copper and other alloys. Returned German scientists have reported interest in beryllium metal shapes at the Elektrostal feed materials plant as earlyufficient quantities ot beryllium ore and metal producing facilities are believed available to support both nuclear weapons and reactor programs of tbe USSR.
Potonium. Reactor-produced polonium has been available for use in nuclear weapons Initiators since at least as early
Heavy water.5 Uie USSR has operated heavy waterroduction plants atocations, using alifferent processes. All the plants are relatively small, but it is believed that cumulative production has been adequate for Soviet needs. Wethat the current annual production of heavy water is aboutetric tons per year and the cumulative production throughetric tons. Trie actual production could be upore than that estimated if hydrogen distillation processes were adopted at all plants, or if an unknown large additional facility exists.
III. NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM
Reteorch and Toiling
Soviets have constructed, andoperating.esearch reactors oftypes within the USSR,oreign countries with(See Tablehile Inthe Soviets have adopted theand cooled IRTas their general purpose researchhave alsoew researchunique design which have proved to be
u
sccncr
See*
*
fill* I
ilillliiljil^iiiiiis
Jiii iflffll!)
* 2
1
S3
a -o
9 =
-
5a
1
Ill'
ill
* i
o o
top occnlt
!
*
Tab* III
Reactor Designation
Thermal Power Neutron FIuj Thermal (mUoi* (KW) tin'
Feel
Moderator
Dal* Critical
Here aril
M. Isolopc UnknowD-PoaMbly
R-5Re- Obninsk
A.E.
73 VVR-Ta
a or
l)
0
Water
Water
Sam*as
ull poww
&
Pre*.
Experimental facility (or production ef Isotopes.
ickel re-fleeter.
adios hectical research reactor.
The firr* oegaaie cooledeactor in the Soviet Galon.
FmI Zero Obninsk Critical Aeaembly (BfB)
1 Beryllium Physl- Obninsk estBFR)
mI Re- Obninsk MM
Pi eied
lls*.
(fast)
Powar Reactor Ki peri gents Nowperation nc&aes
No Longer in Operation
Beryllium metal enriched U
ru-i:
ft- Beryllium metal HehedU
Mercury
Aug.
O
T
to study large dl-luted readers
2ero-power critical bare 4
Uranium reflector. to make
M-
Probably dismantled.
valuable experimental facilities. Thesea pulsed reactor whichurst of neutronseriod oflutonlum fueled, sodium cooled,0 megawatt, intermediate fluxtrap reactor.
Soviet series of fast reactorsused in the development offor the production of electricIt is believed, in connection with theof compact propulsion reactorand/or as an auxiliary power source.
Nuchar Electric Power
Following the successful operationlectrical megawatt (MWe) nuclear electric power station at Obninsk Inhe USSR announced plans in6 for the installationWe of nuclear generating capacity by the endhis ambitious program was cut back considerably8 and has consistently been slippingsubsequently revised schedules. Soviet officials have stated that their nuclear power program was reduced for economic reasons, since their nuclear reactors are not yetwith conventional power sourcesin special locations. However, lt is also certain that Soviets underestimated thedifficultiesajor nuclear power program. (See Table IV and
We estimate that, Including the dual-purpose reactors In Siberia, the USSR will haveWe of nuclear generating capacity Installed by the end3 and0 MWe by the end
Soviet research on controlledreactions (CTR) began about the same time as the US. Both programs have been proceeding at about the same pace. It is estimated that the USSR will notseful controlled reaction within at least theears; and consequently will not attain useful power from nuclear fusion within the next decade.
Marine Nuclear Propulsion Systems
Three different classes of nuclearsubmarines are known to have beenIn the USSR and identified instatus. We estimateourth class will be completed and undergo trialsear or two and will probably have an Improved propulsion system.
It Is estimated that the Soviet Navy has aboutuclear submarines. The Northern Fleet lias under its command aboutuclear submarines in operational or near operational status composed of ballistic missiles-carrying submarine of the "H" class and attack" class) submarines, while the Pacific Fleet Is currently operating six cruise missile typeTe believe that the Soviets can fabricate at least the number of reactors needed lo support the estimated construction programouclearper year. (See
The reactor systems used on the nuclear icebreaker, LENIN, and the nucleararo of Uie prcssurizcd-water type. It Is believed that many of the designand the performance of the LENIN Power Plant are reflected in the submarine propulsion system, particularly for the early submarines. In general, the design andof propulsion system components Is poor compared to US standards and limits the reliability of their nuclear submarines. On at least five occasions In the past four years, propulsion plant failures have necessitated towing nuclear-propelled submarines back to base. We continue to estimate that Soviet technical and operational experience with pressurlzcd-water reactor propulsion systems is limited in comparison to US experience.
Tabic IV
SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL CENTERS
pressure vessel
c- in !i. .irnt:rn
Annual Con-sump-
-
Pu
of
ol
actor
Type
icacion in var-
metric tetcta
to b*
o!
natural I)
by and
power)
nt
Wa.
ad water cooled,*
UOft
Unit a
raetrle Ionsetal
at
5 at and
nuclear soperhsai. Eat. sehedale:rljJ-naily plannad.
VoroMth
. t! '
water-cooled
metric lone% UO, %
to
alloy clad fuel element*. lgi-
planned.
0,1
031
US ems*
Unit 2
I Craphite-raoder-nud, water cooled, pressure lube
etric ton* of natural0etal
g of
3
days
1
o.s
assumed
I package powerwater-cooled, press ere toI
Flrat Soviet nuclear power elation.of Deloyarsksedforas well aa power production.
Assembled for tailing at Oboinek
||
Ill
II! '
;
* |
No installations concerned with annuclear propulsion (ANP) program have been identified in the USSR, and there is no evidence that the Soviets havelying test bed experiment. The ANPappears lo have been delayed and may have been cut back or even canceled. In any event, we do not believeilitarilynuclear powered aircraft could appear prior
There Is no specific evidence that the Sovietsuclear ramjet missile or arocket under development.the Sovtet scientific literature Indicates that an extensive research program exists which is capable of developing the materials and establishing the technology required. We estimate that the Soviets will nottatic test ofuclear rocket or aramjet enginet the earliest.
An extensive effort appears to beIn the Soviet Union touclear electric propulsion system for space vehicles. The contact ion engine program is the most advanced of the various electrical propulsion systemsractical sense. If no major difficulties are encountered inuitable nuclear power source, lt is estimated that the Soviets could flightull-scale ion propulsion system operatingower of aboutWe as early4 or more.
here Is substantial evidence that the Soviets are conducting research fundamental on the development of nuclear space power supplies capable of producing on the order of several hundred watts. Wc believe, that they coulduitable thermoelectric device capable of generatingilowatt ofpoweror higher power systems, we believe that the Soviets will probablyurboconvcrsion type nuclear power supply ofWe andystem of this size could be flight tested as earlyhe Soviets have conducted extensive research on thermionic phenomena and theof suitable high-temperature materials.ystem would permit the directof heat to electricity. We estimatehermionic nuclear power supply willavailable towards the end of this decade.
v
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINES
type
Length Purftct
Overall Beam meat In Speed
IK) (ft) too* (knot.)
Kntieaf Ion
tocpadosub manor
'1
aeed abort about SO
ISO 0 bp. probably
aunindreactor
Mliaile 33 surfaced aboct 30
O0
IS.0OO hp. probablyreactor.
Missile Finns
s.ooo
i"ri'."'
about 30
hp. probably pr.-alee reacUn
f
DISCUSSION
ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
The Soviet atomic energy program is directed by two organizations recently placed under the supervision oi the newly created Supreme Council of the National Economy: the State Production Committee for Medium Machine Building. USSR, and the Statefor the Utilization of Atomic Energy. The State Production Committee for Medium Machine Building. USSR, was, prior tohe Ministry of Medium Mnchlnc Building. The Chairman of the Committee, Ye. P. Slavskly, has retained his rank ofUSSR. The Committee is responsible for the over-all direction of the atomic energy program including the production ofmaterials and nuclear weapons. The State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, still headed by Andronik M. Petro-syants. Is responsible for non-militaryof the program and officialwith the atomic energy program of foreign countries.
We believe the Ministry of Defensewith the State Productionof Medium Machine Building, USSR, in the development, testing, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. The weapon research and development centers are probably under the administrative control of the StateCommittee, but there is undoubtedly direct military participation at these centers. The nuclear weapon proving grounds are probably under military operational control with technical direction provided by the Slate Production Committee. The Ministry ofis believed to control operationalweapon storage facilities located atbases.
We believe that the State Production Committee will remain organized along the customary ministerial lines, with its over-all activities subject to technical reviewollegium composed of outstandingand scientific leaders both from within and without the Committee. In addition lo its mining and production enterprises, the Committee has several factories which make specialized equipment The Committee has Its own supply elements and its own design and constructionesignof the Stale Committee Is located In Leningrad. Construction directorates of the Chief Directorate for Capital Construction and elements of the Chief Installationare responsible for the construction of all Installations. Finally, the StateCommittee also has laboratoriesits direct control probably including the nuclear weapon development centers atand Kasll.
The State Production Cornmlttec and Its Installations are operatedystem of rigid security. Installations as well as classified shipments are guarded bytroops or members of the Counter Intelligence Directorate of the Committee of State Securityxtensive physical security around atomic energy Installations Is prevalent and Includes the compartmenta-tion of installationsumber of fenced and guarded Internal areas. Almost allconcerning the atomic energyistate secret and Isto various security classifications and accesseed-to-know basis.
The State Committee for theof Atomic Energy is concerned with non-military applications of atomic energy within
TOP SCCRCT
USSR and also cooperation between tho USSR and other countries In the non-military uses of atomic energy. It Is involved with the Introduction of atomic energy Into Indus-try and the coordination of research lntechnology for peaceful uses. In the non-military field lt has concerned Itself with the production and supply of radioactivethe transportation of radioactiveand with problems of radioactive waste disposal There is very closebetween the State Productionand Uie State Committee for Uieof Atomic Energy. The StateCommittee appears loertain amount of control over Uie InstallaUons and activities of the State Utilization Committee.
he USSRubstantialof control over Uie atomic energy ac-Uvitlcs of the Soviet Bloc Nations through interlocking associations of top Sovietand by means of bilateral agreements. Uranium mining in these countries Isdirected by Uie State ProducUonThe other atomic energy acUviUes are coordinated through Uie Standingfor Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA) under the Chairmanship of V. S. Emelyanov. Emelyanov iseputy Chairman of Uie State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energyember of Uie Board of Governors of theAtomic Energy Agency. The long-range plan of Uie CEMA Committee is toingle integrated atomic energy program by dividing tasks in atomic energy among Uie Satellite nations. This type of inter-country collaboration ls probablyby Uie Soviets to preclude theof an Independent nuclear military capability by the oUter participating nations.
_iaQ_rrcntl_
II. NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM Research and Testing, Reactors
The Soviets have constructed and are currently operatingnown researchotifferent types within the USSR. (See Table ILL) The US has In operationesearch, testing and teachingofozen different types. The Soviets have suppliedoreign countries with research reactors of the tank of swimming pool type (VVR-S, IRT andheeactors0 MW heavy-water moderated reactors designed specifically for China and Yugoslavia. We have noof the construction of reactors ot thisin the USSR Most Soviet researchfacilities are usedariety ofFor instance, they are used for nuclear training of personnel as well as for extensive studies of neutron physics, materials testing and development, radlochcmlstry. isotopeand new reactor concept*.
The variety of research reactorsindicates an excelleni capability In this field. While In recent years the Soviets have adopted the IRT swimming pool type as their general-purpose research reactor, they have also designed andew research reactors of exceptional originality. Forthe IBR, merry-go-round type of pulsed reactor at Dubnaursteutronseriod oficroseconds. However, this pulsein the one kilometer tlme-of-flighttoeutrona/em'-sec so that the actual usable beam strength Is quite small
At Obninsk, the BR series of fastis used not only for the development of breeder-type reactors, but also for theof compact reactor systems for future propulsion systems. For irradiating materials under highO megawatt, intermediate flux trap type reactor (SM) with unperturbed thermal flux In the central trapeutrons/cm*-sec has been built at Melekess. Its major aim is theof small quantities ofrobably for researchW organic moderated and cooled transportable reactor Is also located at Melekess. Theeactor located at Kiev Is also being used to produce materials for transuranium research.
Sovietseed for highsuitable for testing largesystems under Irradiation.has begun at Melekessaterials test reactor withand water moderation. It is similarRFT reactor now being rebuilt at theof Atomic Energy in Moscow.reactor is expected to
Nuclear Electric Powar Program
Following the successful operationlectrical megawatt (MWe) nuclear electric power station at Obninsk inhe USSR announced plans in6 for the installationWe of nuclear generating capacity by the endhis ambitious program was cut back considerably8 and has consistently been slippingsubsequently revised schedules. Soviet officials have stated that their nuclear power program was reduced for economic reasons, since their nuclear reactors are not yetwith conventional power sourcesin special locations. However, it Is also certain that Soviets underestimated thedifficultiesajor nuclear power program. (See Table IV and
Tlie US Atomic Energy Commissionto the USSR3 noted that the
lOP GCCfiCI
at the experimental reactor site near Melekess in the Ulyanovsk Oblast isat the reduced rate suggested by Soviet unofficial statements. TheWeboiling water reactor station at this site was under construction and is expected to be completed
We portable nuclear powerwhich was nearlng completion at Obninsk8 probably began operationt is mounted on four heavy trailers.
Two large nuclear electrical powerare now under construction in the USSR, one at Novo-Voronezh which willWehermal megawatts (MWT) pressurized water reactor, and another at is do-yarskWe will be producedWT graphite-moderated pressure-tube reactor. Both arc expected to be completed late
Expansion of the Novo-Voronezh stationecond unitWe, and the Belo-yarsk stationecond unitWe is underwaylanned completion date of.
The USSR is assisting the governments of Czechoslovakia and East Germany in the design and construction of nuclear power plants. The station at Bohunlce indesigned toWeas cooled heavy-water-mod era ted reactor, is scheduled for completionheat Neu-Globsow in East Germany Isa one-third capacity copy of the Novo-Voronezh station and is reportedly to produceWeressurized water reactorWe beUeve that it is unlikely that this station will be completed
A recent study of the Tomsk sitethat the two dual-purpose reactorsidcntilied there can be modifiedhermal power of0 MW.
Longer range plans currently favorof pressurized water and fastreactors. The Soviets seem to beon very largo units whore over-allis more favorable than with smaller ones. Calculations have been made on the designressurized water reactor which generates supercritical steam and iscapable of0 MWe. In the fast neutron reactorower stationapacity0 MWe is being studied but will not be constructedsmaller mobile stations are not being completely neglected. An organic moderated and cooled reactor is under, construction at Melekess, In2 lt wasin "Pravda"We was to be built for use in the permafrost region.
In summary, we estimate that,the dual-purpose reactors at Tomsk, the USSR will haveWe of nuclear generating capacity installed by the end3 and not more0 MWe by the end
Marine Nuclear Proportion Syjiemi
NucUar Icebreaker LENIN. Extensive modifications of the icebreaker LENIN'spropulsion system were required at the end of her first operational season Inhese modifications were completed in1 after which the LENIN completed1 seasonoderately successful voyage into the Par North.
Nuclear-Powered Submarines. Three different classes of nuclear-poweredare known to have been constructed in the USSR and identified in an operational status. The estimated characteristics of these nuclear submarines are given in Table V, Recent information indicatesourth class Is under construction. We estimate that
submarines of this class will be completed and undergo trialsear or two, and will probably have an improved propulsion system.
Is believed that the Soviet Navy2fi nuclear submarines Innear operational status. Thehas aboutuclear submarinescommand, including ballistic missilesubmarines of the "H" class and("N"ubmarines. Tlieis currentlyruisenuclear"ethat the Soviets can fabricate atnumber of reactors needed to supportconstruction programosubmarines per year.
arinc Reactor Technology.both the urgency and the scope of thenuclear submarine program Is theduring the period mid-lOM todesigns of atifferent classessubmarinesuclearundertaken (all probably using thereactor) before any operationalwas obtained. The reactor systemthe nuclear icebreaker LENIN is atype. We believe that theIs used on nuclearomewhat modified form In orderthe spacelimited conditions. Bothwere probably designed by theIn about the same tunc period.is believed that many of the designand the performance of theplant are reflected in thesystem, particularly for the
he LENIN reactor was designedressuretmospheres^
] Information obtained at sei-cntiiic conferences and during visits indicates that the Soviets have experienced sticky valves and excessive leakage in the primary system of the LF,WLN.
he over-all propulsion plant layout of the LENIN Is poor and provides Inadequate accessibility to equipment and piping toeasy repair. The shielding concept of the LENIN was to place the entire primary system (Including all three reactors)ingle shield compartment. Such an arrangement has the advantage of minimizing the shield weight but it prevents maintenance of primary equipment during operation. Although inimal shield was also placed around each of the reactors, enough neutrons pass through the reactor shield to induce secondarywithin the compartment. Repairs in this area, therefore, have to be delayed until this secondary radiation has decreased lo alevel. If this shielding concept isin the submarines, their ability to op-crate under conditions when repairs arcin the primary circuit is Indeed limited. On at least five occasions in the past four years, propulsion plant failures havetowing nuclear-propelled submarines back to base. We continue to estimate that Soviet technology and operational experience with pressurized water reactor propulsionls indeed limited in comparison with US experience.
A org (pace Applications
trcrajt Nuclear Propulsion. The key problem in any aircraft nuclear propulsion (ANP) program is the development ofmaterials for structural components for the reactor system which operates In anatmosphereemperature ot. Soviet literature indicates that the development of high-temperature reactor fuels
and cladding (includingnd the use of liquid metals, monatoraic gases, and fused salts as coolants, were underwayyhe Soviets believed they wereosition tothe Initial experiments leading to the development of an atomic aircraft engine and made an announcement to this effect.In the falluring exchange visits between the US and USSR in the atomic energy field, the US group was told that the Soviets had abandoned the beryllium oxide development and were directing their efforts toward highly-purified, temperature-resistant metals or their alloys and that no flight was contemplated0 Q
1 indicates that, as ofhe Soviet Navy was considering theuclear-powered aircraft for low-level reconnaissance and attack missions. To date, there has been no evidence that thehavelying test bedThe ANP program appears to have been delayed and may have been cut back or even con celled. In any event, wc doilitarily useful nuclear powered aircraft will appear prior
fVucZear Ramjets. There Is no specific evidence that the Sovietsuclearmissile under development. The Soviet scientific literature contains several articles on optimum parametersuclear ramjetwhich arc probably sections of astudy. If the Sovietsuclear ramjet program, it is not expected that they willuclear ramjet engine0 at the earliest.
Nuclearoviet nuclear rocket program has not been Identified to date. From the scientific literature it Is apparent that an extensive research program exists In the USSR which Is capable of developing tlie materials and establishing the technologies required by an advanced nuclear reactorsuchuclear rocket engine. Inresearch has been noted Involving the development of refractory metal carbides which are suitable as erosion resistanton graphiteigh temperature, non-oxldlang atmosphere, as found tn nuclear rocket engines using hydrogen as theA recent study of Soviet progress In cryogenics indicates that their cryogenic tanks do not appear to be suitable for long-term liquid hydrogen storage. There is no evidence of development of Urge-scale liquid hydrogen production.ery competentprogram in cryogenics exists in the USSR. On balance, wc estimate that thewill nottatic testuclear rocket enginet the earliest
Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems for Space Applications. Electric propulsion using nuclear energy sources offers aforow-thrust, high specific impulse system suitable for outer space and InUr-orbital applications but would be useless for take-off. The most promising types of electrical propulsion engines appear toontact cesium Ionlasma engine,hermal arc Jet engine
The contact Ion engine program Is the most advanced of tho various electricsystemsractical sense. Theprogram which began8 appears to be centered at the Physics-Energeticlocated near Obninsk. The appliedprogram conducted here receivessupport from various basic researchhroughout the USSR. These groups are providing the fundamental data andof the phenomena.
The development of tho In-fiiglitfor an ion propulsion system to operateower range ofW was to be completed at the State University lmenl Shcvchenko located In Kiev byhis may Indicate that the contact cesium ion
TOP MCRCr-
was expected to be available by that time.
esearch which is applicable to the developmentlasma engine has been ob served in the USSR Tbe effort seems lo be confined to one or two research groups at the (loorgian Physics Institute at Sukhumi and the Ukranian Physical Technical Institute at Kharkov. Then- major Innovation has been to develop techniques of forming and shaping plasma boundaries so that high currents can be extracted and focused from large plasma surfaces. The resultant Soviet duoplasma-tron Ion source performance Is considerably beyond that attained by US ion propulsion researchers.
developmental researchthermal arc jet engine has notin the USSR Recently, however,have indicatedesearchbeen formed in this electrical
is not feasible to reproduce theconditions of operationpacepropulsion system in thethere remain problem areas suchneutralisation,perationcommunications interferencebe studied onlyrue spaceFrom the contact cesium enginetime schedule, it isthe Soviets could have conductedtests as earlyariousexperiments, such as the COSMOSgive no indication of ion propulsionIf no major difficultiesinuitablesource, il is estimated that theflightrototype ionoperatingower ofs early4 or more
Nuclear Auxiliary (Non-PropuUlon) Power Supplies. There Is substantialthat lhe Soviets are conductingfundamental to the development of space nuclear auxiliary power supply systems1 However, the exact status of their efforts can only be estimated, since their programto bo classifiedajor extent.
Soviet scientific literature describes the design of radioisotope batteries, but we have no evidenceadioisotope type power supply has been used in the Soviet space program. Nevertheless, we estimate that the Soviets can certainlyower source of this type capable of producinghundred watts.
ydrogen moderated thermal or cpithermal reactorast non-moderated reactor can be made small enough to befor space use The Soviets havemetallic hydrides such as zirconium hydride, capable of operating in the rangeoderationcomparable to water. However, most of the desirable systems require temperatures
ao -
in excess of this range. It is believed,that the initial reactor develciped for space use will probably beast neutron type. This permits selection of fuels which have extremely high temperature capabilities resultingeactorigh specific power. The Physics-Energetics Institute at Obninsk, the center of the fast reactorin the USSR, has been identified asengaged In the developmentesium Ion engine. It is believed tliat this Institute Is probably engaged in the developmentast reactor heat source for spaceInformation obtained at the Corrosion Conference held in Vienna2 indicated that the Obninsk Institute Is studying the use of liquid lithium containediobium loopossible reactor coolant system. However, it Is estimated that the Soviet ex: perlcnce with theast research reactor will probably dictate the use of liquid sodium for the first space prototype reactor.
Thermoelectric generators for space power conversion offer the importantof static operation. This property permits simplicity in design and givesigh intrinsic reliability.development of thermoelectric materials has been well substantiated and is beingprimarily at the Leningrad Physical Technical Institute. It is estimated that the Soviets arcar with the most advanced nations In the West In the development of thermoelectric generators and coulduitable thermoelectric device capableilowatt of electric power
The lurboelectric conversion system has the advantage of high efficiency whicheduction In the size ol the radiator and Is most suitable for high power systems on the orderWe. It Is believed that the Soviets will utilize an indirect liquidturbo-conversion system for their first large nuclear power source. Based primarily on thexperience and equipment, and assuming the development of suitable turbo-pumps, turbines and alternators, wc estimate that this type system could be flight tested as early
The Soviets haveidespread Interest In thermonlc energy conversion which permits heal to be directly converted to electrical energy by thermal excitation of charged particles at the surface of anExtensive studies on thermalphenomena have been noted at several institutes, including the Obninsk Institute. The Institute for Ceramics and Special Alloys of the Latvian State University haveto the Obninsk group the highmaterials suitable for use in areactor. Wc estimate that apower supply will become available toward the end of this decade.
The heat rejection system for space power suppliesajor weight Item in high-power systems. The various power Institutes of the USSR have been conducting studies on radiant heat transfer and the effectiveness of various configurations. Soviet weightin space vehicles are currently less stringent than those of the US, therefore, the Soviets probably can afford to use somewhat larger radiators. This in turn suggests that the Soviets may be able toeactor-radiator system composed of more common materials.
III. FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION (See Figure 2)
Uranium Ore Procurement
State Production CommitteeMachine Building procuresfrom mining combines directly subordl-
nate to lt within the USSR and from contract operations probably under its supervision in the Bloc (except China, Albania, andA variety of deposits arc exploited, including veins, sandstones, oil shales,subbltumlnous coals and iron ore slags. The US Geological Survey estimates that the Soviet Bloc has reserves of several hundred thousand tons of uranium Ingrade ore deposits and an even greater quantity in low grade deposits. No large-reserve deposit similar in grade to theLake deposit in New Mexico or the Blind River deposit In Canada has. lo our knowledge, yet been discovered in the Soviet Bloc. The significantly lower gradedeposit* In Thurlngla arc the closest analog. Thus, mining and ore concentration costs are high because of the relatively low grade of the ore bodies which the USSR has found to date.
There are three main uranium mining and ore concentrating areas In the USSR, the Central Asian area, the Krivoy Rog iron ore district in the Ukraine, and the Caucasus area. Most of the other producing areas are small operations, with the ore being shipped to concentration plants located In the main producing areas, or being shipped directly to feed materials plants for upgrading.
Ore concentration plants arc welland have substantial0 metric tons of ore per day. although several plants have largerFor example, the recentlyconcenlraUon plant at Scelingstadt. Thuringia, in East Germanyeakcapacity0 metric tons of ore dally. The newer plants arc using modem Ion exchange recovery methods; however. Bloc production of appropriate ion-exchange resins has apparently been inadequate both in quantity and quality to meet the entire needs of the Soviet atomic energy program. Concentration plants had previously been Identified at Dncprndzerzhinsk and Zholty Vody in the Ukraine; Leninabad. Mally Say, Kadzhi-Say. Min Kush. and KarabaUy inAsia; and Pyatigorsk in the Caucasus.
is estimated that the USSR isprocuring uranium ore at theetric tons per year inrecoverable melal and that this raleincrease over the nextetric tons per year. Aboutthese amounts are estimated to comethe USSR itself. Themetric tons of recoverablethroughnd thetons estimated througho be sufficient for the fissionableproduction estimated herein, andvery substantial stockpile throughoutof the estimate. Valuesbe higher or lower.
Uranium Feed Materials
metal and other feedare produced at Elektrostal, nearat Glaxov, just west of the Urals;Novosibirsk In Central Siberia. Thesealso contain oreas well as facilities at one or morefor the production of the metallicused in the Soviet uranium metalprocess. The lack of visible oreand the general correlation whichbetween estimated uranium oreand estimated amounts of fluorineIn terms of otherwise unused acidsuggest that surplusemi-finished product suchtetrafluoridc or bulk uranium metal.
Tlit' extcnslvo warehousing adjacent to the Novosibirsk plant supports this thesis.
Pit/lonium-Equivalerrf Production
Three major plulonlum-equivalent producUon sites have been identified in the USSR. The earliest and largest Is located near Kyshtym in Uie Urals and the second Is collocated withroducUonat the atomic energy site north of Tomsk In Central Siberia. The third Is located within the large atomic energy site northeast of Krasnoyarsk In Central Siberia. Review of all available information leads to thethat there are no other major pluto-nlum-equivalent producUon sites in operation in the USSR
Kyshtym. Very little specificis available on the plutonlum producUon reactors at the Kyshtym site. Construction began at that site shortly after World War U,mall producUon reactor wentthers have been added since, but little information is availabletheir number, type, and size. The entire site is serviced by Uie nearby Argayash electric power plant and is also connected to the Urals electric powerajor addition to Uielectric power supply In57 periodajor expansion at that time, such that thetotal reactor thermal power is estimated to be0 megawatts.
An estimate of plutonium-cqulvalent production at Kyshtym has been made from an analysis of available evidence regarding the site, and resultsumulative availability from this operation of0 kilograms. The data permits Uusavailability to rangeigh0ow0 kilograms as ofurrent annual production ofat Kyshtym Is estimated to be00 kilograms.
7 photography of Uiecomplex at Uie Tomsk atomic energy site shows one plutonlum producUon reactor which we believe became operational5 and two dual-purpose reactors underwhich probably became operational8lso under constructionarge chemical separations plant. The two dual-purpose reactors are currentlyto be operatingower level of0 megawatts, and Uie earlier single-purpose reactor at0 megawatts.
Plutonium-equivalent producUon from Uie Tomsk reactors is estimated on Uie basis of cooling water availability from waterfacilities taken ln conjunction withanalysis of interior photographs of the first dual-purpose reactor installation,at the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Knergy. It Isthat the probablelutonluin-equivalcnt producUon from Tomsk0 kilograms. The data permits this cumulaUve producUon estimate to rangeigh0 kilogramsow0 Idlognuns as ofurrentproducUon of plutonium-equivalent at Tomsk is estimated to beilograms.
Krasnoyarsk. The construction of the large atomic energy site near Krasnoyarsk began9 and|
was still not In operation by
fabrication and stockpiling facilities were under construction as wellarge river water intake at Uie footill containing many tunnels and shafts The earliest date for significant reactor operations consistent with available information Is the first halfS. Additional reactor facilities wereadded ineriod. Current
electric power availability at the siteotal reactor thermal power of0 megawatts. Tills resultsrobableumulative plutonlum-equivalent production from the site of0 kilograms, although the data permits values as high0 kilograms and as low0 kllogrnms. Current annualat Krasnoyarsk is estimated to beilograms.
Fur we Production. Availableincluding projected increases inpower availability in the Tomsk andareas, indicates probable significant increases in reactor capabilityt Is thus estimated that future annualproducUon will increaseoderate rate consistent with performance during the82 through newincreasing Uie power levels of existing reactors, andy-product of the nuclear power and propulsion reactors. This latter source (included In Tableillin amounts Increasing toper yearhis could be used in weapons by mixing with plutonlumat considerably lower irradiaUon levels and would also have other uses.
It Is estimated, on the basis of Uie factors discussed above, that future annual Plutonium-equivalent production will increaseale consistent with performance during Uie82 and result ln aplutonium-equivalent production0 kilograms byven with an extremely high priority effort theplutonium-equivalent stockpile would not0 kilograms bylternatively the minimum likely cumulaUve production by that date will not be less0 kilograms of plutonium-equivalent.
Production
large gaseous diffusioncomplexes capablep lo weapon-grade product are in operation in the USSR; one at Vcrkh-Neyvinsk in the Urals, one north of Tomsk in Central Siberia, and the third at Angarsk in the Lake Baykalourth large gaseous diffusion complex is undernorth of Zaozemly near Krasnoyarsk.
Twe believe that no undetected large gaseouslant Is currently In operaUon. Theconstruction of large gaseous diffusion plants in the USSR suggests that significantroduction by theand other methods ls unlikely.
The electrical efficiency of Uie Soviet gaseous diffusion process2 wason the basis of informaUon from German scientists who had worked on Uie program, and on the basis of estimates of electric power and barrier material Uien available. The value obtained was consistent with reasonable assumptions of compressor and motorand was supported by theof Soviet gaseous diffusion plants given to an Austrian scientist as Uie performance with which he had to compete in his gasdevelopment work in the USSR.efficiencies have been extrapolated from this base, considering advances in Soviet compressor technology and changes In process building design and utility supplies observed in aerial photography to Indicate the time, nature and magnitude of improvements.
Changes in process building design parameters indicate the use of an improved barrier startinghe efficiency of this barrier can only be approximated, since no data on its operating characteristics have been received. The resultant estimatedand other assumed processare, however, similar in many details and order of magnitude to values used by the Soviet physicist A. M. Rosen0 com-
putaUon leading to hia callmite of theof US gaseous diffusion plants.
[
"[However, such data must be combined with Information on plantcharacteristics that Is less well known. Compressor and interstage flow parameters are chosen to be consistent with SovietIn other Industries and are not based on actual practice atlants.data on feed materials concentrations Is about six years old and may well have only rough correspondence to practice in later years. Thus, production estimates8 must contain an Increasing probable error dominated by these uncertainties on plantcharacteristics.
Eye witness reports, publishedon the electric power industry and aerial photography have provided the basisetailed chronology of buildingand of the growth of the Soviet gaseous diffusion program. However, we now believe that the current pace and magnitude of the expansion Is somewhat less thanestimated, resultinglightrevision In cumulative production values.
Verkh-Neyvinsk. This Is the oldest of thelants. Constructionhere early6 and production ofegancontinued8 when the plant consisted of five separate areas (each containing severalts electric power was supplied principally by the nearby Verkhne Tagil Power Plant Tlie remainder of the power was supplied by other Urals power stations throughV Urals electric power grid.
Additional generating capacity was completed int the Verkhne Tagil Power Plant which Is directly connected with the Verkh-Neyvinsk plant Since theelectrical consumption at Verkh-Neyvinsk was accomplished without additional cooling water faculties or building construe-
Published power transmission lineimply that the Beloyarsk nuclear electric plant will also supply Verkh-Neyvinsk and there is current Information on theexpansion of the Urals electric power grid. It ia therefore estimated tliatconstruction will occur at the Verkh-Neyvinsk gaseous diffusion plant which will start drawing electric power
Tomsk. Construction started on thisomplex in9 and7 there were four operating buildings. Power was supplied by an on-site thermal plant with backup from the main power plant in Tomsk city.
Ashe on-site power plant was being expandeduclear-electric power station was being added.he site was also connected to the Siberian power grid through Tomsk City. New construction
atlant [
lis teueved to have been finished early2 with the completionixth building. It Is estimated tbat installation of an improved barrier in the four olderwill take place byhere Is no indication that future additions tolant are Intended, although available water supply would permit at
Eyewitness reportsconstruction of the Angarsk atomicsite commenced4 andart of the first building was oper-
atlng and the shellecond building liad been completed. The plant now containsuildings each0 feet long, with the fourth building not completely in operation.
The plant Is supplied electric power from an on-site power plant, from the Irkutsk Hydroelectric Plant and from the Bratsk Hydroelectric Plant.
Zaozemiu. Construction is proceeding on at least twouUdings at the Zaozernly site. Partial operation of the first building is expected. The "Irsha-Borodlno" thermal power plant is under construction near the site. The site will be connected in3 or4 to the grid running from Naxarovo to Bratsk.
Our estimate of totalroduction is presented in Table IX in terms ol cumulative production of uranium enriched toIt Includes theercent equivalent of material produced at lesser enrichments. Estimated expenditures for weapon tests and non-weapon usesspecially forpowered submarines have beenfrom the value ofroduction to give our estimate of equivalentvallablc for weapon use.
Margins ol Error. It Is estimated that the Sovietroduction forSec Tablet Is unlikely that actual Sovietroduction could be less0 kilograms or more
Assistant Chief of Natal Operationsepartment of the Navy, believes that the lower limit of the estimated value lor cumula-productiona the more nearlyUs believes that the evIdenUal baae Uto support Lhc production efficiencyigher cumulative total would require.
kilograms. It Lt estimated that theumulative production wiUand we believe,air degree of confidence that theroduction would not be lessilograms or moreilograms.
Table O
ESTIMATED SOVIET FISSIONABLE MATERIALSCumulaUve I'roducUon In KUograms Rounded)
AvaaUatxrtM PurroKTM
Mte-vear
osr.
-
..
.
..
AW
. .
...
.
...
. ..
.
or lew highly enriched uranium li included as cqulealent quantmesaterial.
- Noa-weapon uses of plutonlum are expected to be neEliglWe during the period of this estimate.
"Seeor view ol the Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUonaepartment of the Navy.
-Our current and future estimates of eumolaUve production of fissionable materials represents some decrease from those estimated Inhen changes are Uie result of further analyses and the aequUlUon of addluonal InformaUonit should be noted thai the Esanjto of error tn-Tolved In any one year's ealue of cumulativeis larcor than the magnitude of these changes.
Other Nuclear Materials
horium,. The Soviet* showed moderate Interest In the procurement of thorium-bearing minerals6uantities of rare earths were processed at the Experimental Plant of the Stateof Rare Metals at Podolsk, especially the lanthanum chemicals required by the early Soviet plutonlum separation process.
only evidence ofrom thorium
land its utilization ln small quantities as reported ln the open Soviet scientific
Tlie main sources ofln the USSR are Zavatinsk near Shilka IOblast, the Tadzhik SSK, and theSSR The Soviet literature alsodiscovery of lithium-bearing orethe Kola Peninsulaut theirlocation is unknown.
c
1
ample ofercent lithium-6from Uie USSR contained mercury in amounts consistent with its manufacture by Uie mercury amalgam isotope separationThe locations of Sovietsotopo separation plants have not been positively identified but could be located in certainat the Nlzhnyaya Tura and Novosibirsk atomic energy sites.
C
3
irconium. Soviet research on the developmentrocess for producinggrade zirconium (Hafnium-free) began2 and was intensified In Uies. There Is strong evidence that Uie Sonetsurification process based on the electrolysis of fused salts followed by theof Uie zirconium as an Iodide. This zirconium is then alloyedniobium to improve corrosion resistance and its mechanicallant for Uie production of reactor grade zirconium, whose location is not known, is believed to have been completedirconium-clad fuel elements are used In the nuclear reactors of the icebreaker LENIN, and by Implication in the nuclear submarine cores. It Is believed that adequate capacity is available ti> meet the needs of Uie Soviet atomic energy program. The Sovietsajor deposit of zirconium ore near Zhdanov in the Ukraine.
Beryllium. The USSR possesses large reserves of beryllium ore at Izumrud in Uie Urals and established, in the pre-warombine there to manufacture beryllium-copper and other alloys. It is believed that sufficient quantities of beryllium ore and metal producing facilities arc available toboth Uie nuclear weapons and reactor programs of Uie USSR
Returned German scientists haveInterest in beryllium metal shapes at the Eloktrostal feed materials plant and atomic energy Research institutes earlyf the Stale Institute of Rare Metals was involved72 In Uie producUon of beryllium oxide bricks for reactor research at Obninsk.8 physicists from the Ukranlan Physics Technical Institute, one of the leading nuclear physics research laboratories in the USSR, published on the preparation of pure beryllium in Industrial quantitiesacuummethod.
Heavy Water.he USSR has constructed heavy water)
tion plants at some eight locations (see Figuresing atifferent processes.plant capacities are believed to beto produce aboutetric tons oJ heavy water per year. II Is believod cumulativehas been adequate for Soviet needs.
tartingiquid hydrogen distillation units for the production ofwere installedlant in the USSR using hydrogen derived from water-gasunits.0 the USSR has startedrogram to replace electrolytic hydrogen producUon by natural gasource ofin its nitrogen combines. If these plans are carried out, some additional heavyseparation units must be installed in order to maintain current annual production rales.
The estimated annual and cumulative producUon of heavy water is shown in Table VI with an estimated cumulative producUon throughf0 tons of heavy water. The actual producUon could be upore than that estimated if the hydrogen distillation process were adopted at allexchange plants in the2 period or if an unknown but large additional facility exists such as Uie possible one atngarsk.
Tliis estimate indicates that sufficient heavy water was produced by2 totho stocking of the first heavy water mod-crated production reactor, believed to have been put into operation in this period at the Kyshtym reactor site withons of heavy water. In addition to other usage, two additional heavy water moderated reactorsons heavy water each could have been installed by the end8 (possibly athe total estimatedcorresponds reasonably withproduction.
IV. SOVIET NUCIEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM (See Figure 1)
Nuclear Weapon Research and Development Installations
Sarwa. The oldest Soviet center specifically concerned with nuclear weapon research, design, and development is located at Sarovailes cast of Moscow.
Photography has revealedarge, elaborate, heavily secured installationlaboratories, industrial-type structures suitable for the fabrication and machining of explosive and non-explosiveumber of high explosive (HE) test points,allistics test facility.
econd nuclear weaponand development center, near Kasli In the Urals, probably became operational latehe complex, while similar, issmaller than Sarova.
Supporting Institutes. The Sovietweapon program has certainly also been supported hy research conductedumber of other institutes In the USSR probably
eluding the Institute of Atomic Energy,the Physics Institute, Obninsk; Physical-Technical Institute, Sukhumi; and especially the Institute of Chemical Physics. Moscow.
Kerch/Bagerovo. The Soviet research and development establishment at Kerch/Bag-erovo Airfield has probably been concerned since its establishment with nuclear weapon systems development, particularly thoseaircraft. It has probably provided the drop aircraft and crews for nuclear devices tested by airdrop.
Nuclear Weapon Test Areas. Thehave used two primary nuclear weapon test areas: the Scmipalatinsk Proving Ground in Centralests) and the Novaya Zemlya area in the Westernn addition, they heldests at the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range (KYMTR) In Central Asia and. onheyilitary effects test (JOEn conjunction with military maneuvers near Totskoyc,of Kuybyshev In the eastern European section of the USSR. Ofuclear
Scmipalatinsk. The Scmipalatinsk Proving Ground Is located in northeastern Kazakhstaniles west9 through7 the majority of Soviet tests were held here. Since then, only low-yield tests have been held in this area.
Aerial photography prior8 hasariety of test operations Including ground bursts, air drops and tower shots, as well ns tests combining one or another of the foregoing methods with arrays designed to test effects of nuclear detonations on military equipment and probably.ew Instances, on entrenched personnel as well. Large scalo grids to the west of the usual detonation area probably were constructed to studyeffects from one-point safety tests, but may possibly have also served for the testing of radiological warfare devices. Although we liavc no specific evidence, we believe that ground tactical systems have probably been proof tested at Scmipalatinsk.
On1 andhe Soviets held their first knowntestahile these two tests are Included In the generalof SeniinaUtlnsk tests, they were notal the proving ground Itself, butugged hill area aboutiles to theThese tests probably permitted theto evaluate undergroundtechniques for obtaining diagnosticdata and to study seismic data obtained from the teats in connection with underground test detection problems.
Missile Test Range9 photography disclosed the existence ofnuclear handling facilities at the range-heads of the surface-to-air (SAM) and surface-to-surface missile areas of the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range and at the Sary Shagan Antl-MlssUo Test Center (SSAMTC).
to the endheUiree. probably four,tests at the Kapustin Yar MissileJOEn7 andandy surface-to-air missiles InJOE
Iwos probably also lounched fromYar. but Is believed to have been the testarheadm ballistic missile rather thanAM. During the
r
lest scries, the Soviets continued their SAM warhead development with tlie test ol JOEeptember anderies of high-altitude tests which they continued2 probably lo collect data relevant to their anti-ballistic missile problem.
have no evidence of anytests; however consideringof the Soviet ICBM program, wcthat extensive warheadhas been undertaken for thesewe believe there has beentesting in connection withdeployed missile systems having acapability.
Zemlya Nuclear Testlocations within the Novayahave been usedS forMys Sukhoy Nos on the westbeen used primarily for high-yieldthe southwestern coastal watersfor air bursts and surface andtests; and the eastern coastlineProllv Matochkin Shar for air burstsvariety of yields. We believe that theof Uie air burst tests were deliveredand heavy bombers and thatlikely staging base for thesebe the LRAF airfield near Olen"yaKola Peninsula which has nuclearfacilities.
he Soviet Ministry of Defenseof Uie closure of Uie Novaya Zemlya area issued before12 test series were unique in thai they Indicated that the Rocket Forces as well as the Air Force and Northern Fleet would participate in the coming exercises. On the basts of these announcements
Iwe believe that some of12 Novaya Zemlya tests involved operational missile systems;
Weapon Development Program flow-Yield Device*)
itMonSS.he Soviets conducted numerous tests of fission devicesariety of yields, compositions and physical sizes. [
son
Jsome fission weapons were designed with several yield options ranging fromT. We believe these were different yields of the same weight warhead, f
"^nuclearyieldingoT In diameters suitable formm mortar, and other delivery vehicles arc In the Soviet stockpile. [
3
ow-Yield. Of thetests inT yield
TOP flCCBCT-
2 test series, where theor the low-yield tests wereT or under, Included the development of warheads of very low kUoton and possibly sub-kiloton yield.rj
2
(Thermonuclear Weapon Developments)
ho geophysical signals from Soviet thermonuclear tests generally give moreyield values than are obtained for* low-yield tests. L"
est Series. Oftests[
thermonuclear devices with yields ranging fromilotons to1 series therereponderance of tests Inegaton region and an absence of tests betweenn2 series the tests were rather evenly distributedilotons toegatons, with more emphasis than1 on the submegaton range and onegatons. Analysis of these tests Indicates that the Soviets haveighly competent thermonuclear weapon technology which, in some areas, differs from that of
hermonuclearS8. Be-
]
he two largest SovietT andT) were both clean thermonuclear devices, f
3
x>wer Yield Thermonuclear
ntermediate yield Testsf
r
3
]etonatedaslean test ol the muchT weapon, and was similar In many ways to.
(High Altitude Tests)
JOE1 was the test5 KT warhead probably deliveredetonation altitude ot0 feeturface-to-air missile, since its detonation point was in the SAM area of the KYMTR.
JOEas the high altitude testT warhead over the KYMTR, and is Iwlleved to have beenat an altitude somewhereeet.f
igh-Yield Tests 3 Megatons) Two) and twoT tests) were held
3
3
!
1
fnd1 andfndctober2 werenuclear detonations near the Sary Shagan Anti-Mlssile Test Center (SSAMTC) of devices carried by missiles from the KYMTR. These complex tests were apparentlyto obtain both basic high-altitudedata and data applicable to the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) problem.
ach Involved tlie firing of. ballistic missiles from the Kapustin Yar rangehead approximately two and one-half minutes apart; the firstin each case probably carriedT nuclear payload.as detonated at. altitude andtorissile whichtopectrometer device was fired verticallyointautical miles above the detonation point and subse-
quently descended through the nuclearissile, possibly an ABM, was probably launched about (our minutes alter burst time,econd vertical firing through the cloud occurred about half an hour after burst time. In theperation, two possibly down-range firings were noted.
2 hlgh-altltudc tests.nctober.nctober, andovember, resembled thoseut appeared to be more complex. All three involved the firing of0 run. missiles from the Kapustin Yar rangchcad; tn each case the second missile was launched about fifty seconds after the first, and the third about six minutes after the first Ashe nuclear payloads are believed to have been carried by the first missiles.
.ach had yieldsT. The former was detonated at anofhe latter, al anof about.
3 For
theissile, wlUch probablyurpose similar to the first vertically fired missile of theperation, was firedown range location.
T yield and was detonated at an altitude of abouto. Unlike the other high altitude tests,as not one of an obvious pair of devicesIdentical yields but tested at differentThe yield ofas similar,to that of the2 STARFISHT). above Johnston Island in the Pacific It is noted that Soviet scientific expeditionary ships were positioned both in the vicinity of Johnston Island and in the conjugate area probably to collect data from STARFISH. We believe that. which was detonatedovember
, could have served along with STARFISH to give the USSR some data on high altitude effectsairT tests at different altitudes.
unique feature of allests was the apparent planneda satellite to collect basic physicalXI passed over the burstithin minutes of the detonation;at the antipodal point for thethe time of detonation; and lt was nearconjugate point of theat time of burst There Is somewhether COSMOS XI was stillat the time of.
Nucloar Weapons and System!
small number of Individuallyweapons for interim use couldew months after deviceHowever, the time lag betweendevice and initial stockpile entry ofweaponized versions is aboutatthis basis somenew devices tested1 could bestockpile during the latter part ofa priority development requirement IsItestimated, however, thatonly be doneimited scale, andgeneral, tbe devices tested Inbe stockpiled4
Delivery Systems1
that the warhead assigned to the tactical SS-la missileield spectrum ofilotons.f
liata from which the warhead yieldassociated with other Soviet tactical missiles in thond SS-2can be generally derived. There Is evt-
clear warheads for Soviet tactical missiles and
TOT bfct_Ktl
rockets are designed with both air-burst and ground-burst fusing options.
o( the newer air dcrenseexpected touclearair-to-air missiles with improvedradar hewing systems andwith substantially largerare deployed. However, there Isthat such later generation AAMsyet been deployed to operational airunits.
are numerous references^
Jto naval torpedoes with nuclear applications In the Soviet test program, theT device detonated at the traditional naval proving area south of Novaya Zemlya ons acandidate for torpedo warhead
Weapon ProducUon and Stockpiling Sites
The Soviet nuclear weapon logistic system includes three general classes of sites: (a) National Reserve Stockpile facilities with associated weapon production plants atlocations; (b) Nationalsites located near major order-of-battlc concentrations; and (c) Operational andstorage sites at military bases for the direct support of military operations.
The Soviet stockpile program hasIn three rather well defined stages. Expansion has continued in each class ofsites and addition of new sites hasIn its Initial program the1otal oftockpile sites of all classes. In Uie second stage, covering approximately Uie next three years, at leastdditional stockpile sites of all classes were activated bringing the total to aboutt Uie endhis expansion was primarily toubstantial increase in Uie nuclear capability of the Soviet strategic bomber force which was then rapidlyto Jet aircraftimitednuclear capability in Naval andand probably Ground andaa weli.hird stageaccelerated construction has beenIt has coincided with Uiestrategic and tactical missiles with acapability, andidernuclear weapons among SovietWe estimate that In this period,has substantially increased thepreviously existing stockpile sites. InIt hasinimum ofnew stockpile sites of all classestotal to at leastites.
National Reserve Stockpiles associated with weapon producUon facilities and theAssembly-Stockpile Sites are probably administered by Uie State Productionfor Medium Machine Building. Thesefaculties have been consistentlyby isolation, extreme security,bunkers (either earth-mounded orand self-sufficiency iu housing and other services required by the permanent cadres. Some changes ln detail of structures in the operations areas has been evident in Uie assembly stockpile facilities constructed after
We believe that Operational andmilitary storage sites associated with military bases are operated by Uie Ministry of Defense. Most are located apart from other base facilities and are characterized by stringent physical security measures. [
SECRET
esult of these developments the USSR nowomprehensive system of hardened stockpile facilities extending back in successive echelons from forwardstorage sites at military bases loreserve facilities at remote interiorThis system seems clearly designed to support more than an Initial strike.
In the future the expansion most likely to occur will Involve an increase ln the number of missile-related storage facilities (although the pattern of warhead storage for missiles is not yet clear) and some increase In theof field sites directly supporting tactical air units. We are uncertain as to how fully the requirements of Naval Submarine andForces and of Air Defense Forces have been met but believe that some increase to nuclear weapons storage facilities for these forces will occur.
Nuclear weapon fabrication complexes have been identified to tho Urals at Nlzhnyaya Tura and atossible thirdis located to Central Siberia nearNational reserve stockpile sites ore collocated with these three complexes.
Nlzhnyaya Turn. The firstcomplex constructed in the
USSR is located near Nlzhnyaya Tura In the North Central Orals. We believe tbat the first facilities of the complex began operation to the latter halfome construction and expansion of the enterprise wasat least
]lhls complex is probably thenuclear weapon production center In the USSR It contains faculties suitable for the fabrication of explosive and non-explosive components for nuclear weapons and for the final assembly and storage of the weapons. The site and the remote location of the high explosive (HE) test facility, which Is probably used primarily for quality control. Indicate that complete assemblies of HE may be tested
here.
ew area which was underin9 stands outeparately staffed underground Installation with its own support facilities. Although Its precisehas not been determined. It appears to be an additional nuclear weapon fabrication and assembly Installation, possibly producing weapons.
uryuzan. Another nuclear weapon fabrication-stockpile complex to the Urals Is located near Yuryuzan,un south of Nlzhnyaya Tura. We bcUeve tliat the complex probably became operational5lthough the Yuryuzan complexto be similar to the Nlzhnyaya TuraIts producUon facUlaes are estimated to be smaller, while its stockpile capacity isgreater than that of tho latter.
rasnoyarsk. The atomic energynear Krasnoyarsk to Central Siberiaa probable national stockpile facility.uclear weapon fabricationhas not been definitely identified, afacility at this location would logically support the eastward expansion of the Soviet nuclearlogistic system. Certain
r
3
RBM Support
that al the launch sites there are storagefor the missiles, nose cones, and fuel, and have emphasized that an important part of the prelaunch procedures Is nose cone checkout It is assumed that any necessary checkout of the nuclear warhead occurs at that time. The facilities to be used for this checkout have not been identified.
ICBM Support
he basic pattern of nuclear support at Soviet ICBM complexes Is probably similar
to tbat of the MRBM/IRBM sites, and we would expect at least some of the ICBMto hare on-base facilities for nuclear warheads.
Naval Nuclear Weapon Storage
robable nuclear weaponhas been recently Identified In aSc-
vcromorsk on the Kola Peninsula.^
]Thc function of these buildings has been determined. We believe the facility
i
nusl also Includeecure area well back from the dock area. The naval complexthe nuclear facility is associatedwith Soviet missile carrying submarines which it evidently supplies with missiles and probably with nuclear warheads
lis the first apparent nuclear storage to be identified for either theor surface forces of the Soviet Navy. We feel certain, however, that other nuclear storage facilities exist to support Soviet naval forces, and will be identified In due course.
believe that Soviet Groundfield storage facilities In additionregional depots already Identified, thatrequires storage sites for its AS-2missile-carrying BADGERS, andnuclear storage may be required formissiles of air defensehave been unable, however, to identifythese storage areas.
Sovi'ef Nuclear Weapon Storage in the Ewopean Satellites
have no firm evidence thatstationed in the Europeanacquired nuclear weapons. However,of Soviet Forces in Germanyacquired short-range rockets and the GSFG have simulated nuclear weaponduring maneuvers.
1
o nuclear warhead storage facilities have been identified in East Ocnnany. nor is there definitive information that nuclear weapons have been deployed lo the GSFG. If no permanent nuclear storage facilitiesin East Germany the rocket and missile-equipped units which have been assigned adelivery role probably would have to be suppUcd_fronj_ forward stockpile sltc^
a>t"
sites near Lhc western
Dorder of the USSR.
Logistics
The Weapon Fabrication-Reserveinstallations are all located within the interior of the USSR and can operate as self-sufficient complexes. However, because ofand transportation limitations, these installations apparently are not Intended topecific grouping of forces on an Immediate operational basis Thus, theof weapons at these sites probablya national reserve to be employed during the later phasesuclear conflict.
The national assembly-stockpile sites, though incapableery rapid deployment of weapons unless airlift of weapons by hell-copter is employed, provide direct support totrategic reserve for tho operational sites. Inorward base, such as Dclyatin, can provide direct support to the Soviet forces In the Satellite countries.
Theare located so that they can provide support to strategic missile launch sites and to the free rocket and tactical missile units in their specific areas. Thus It appears that the weapons stored in these facilities represent an operational reserve to be sent to forward areas as required-
The airfield storage sites represent an operational capability (or use by the Long Range Air, Naval Air, or Tactical Air Forces at their associated airfields. In addition there Is usually sufficient storage to provide support'for other forces located in the area or for restrike missions by the forces based on the airfield.
The system of on-base storage sites to support LRAF and also probably NAF units Is probably now about completed, although some increase In the number of sitestactical air unltsjnay occur. The systemconstructed near regional military depots and at certain airfields to provide second echelon operational supportegional basis nowather substantial logistical backup forSoviet nuclear forces in the crucial border military district of Western USSR, and although the number of such units mayto increase we believe that the expansion will be quite gradual. The expansion in the system of national assembly-stockpilenow underway in the Western USSR is expected largely to satisfy the Sovietfor sites of this type for the immediate future. We have seen no evidence to indicate that the number of national fabrication-stockpile facilities will increase in thefuture.
he Soviets have shown an Increasing interest in developing an airthat nuclear weapon storage sites should be situated near airfields so that their weapons can be transported rapidly by air to wherever they are needed. Helicopterto advance positions of simulated nuclear weapons for tactical systems, as well as of other supplies, has. in fact, occurred in Soviet military maneuvers.
Other evidence of Improved handling procedures7 is apparent^
]
Command and Control
that the stockpiling, movement,and use of nuclear weapons In thesubject to Initial authorization of theof the Central Committee of theParty, probably upon the advice ofMilitary Council.^
lindicated that command isby Chairman Khrushchev through the Supreme High Command and implemented by the Minister o( Defense and General Staff. The Supreme High Command,shadow" organization in peacetime, has the primary responsibility for the allocation of strategic nuclear strikes and for the overall planning and direction of the strategicattack. It also has direct control of certain reserves of nuclear weapons and forces to be committed in support of both strategic and tactical operations.
The flow of ordersSupreme High Command is arrangedto achieve maximum control andIn action. In the Strategicfor Instance, orders pass throughand his main Staff directlyresponsible for nuclear fire. Inof Theatre Forces, once employmentweapons has been authorized,for alerting forces andof nuclear fire is delegated tojoint service commanders at theGroup of Forces, or Front level.at this level may allow hiscommanders down to Armydiscretion in authorizing the use ofweapons, but It is evidently rare for
commanders belowre! lo have any such discretion. In the case of special nuclear attack groups of tactical missiles andthe Joint Service Commander evidently issues the order to prepare and executefire directly to the units concerned, and their immediate superiors merely supervise execution of the order. Presumably Long Range Aviation, the Naval Forces and the Air Defense Forces operate in similar fashion.
onfro* of Nuclear Weapons.ultimate authority resides withof the Central Corrunlttee ofParty, national stockpileboth types arc under the direct controlState Production Committee forBuilding. The Ministry ofbelieved to control operational stockpilelocated at military bases. Theof State Security (KGB) isthe security of all nuclear stockpileprovides their guard force and isfor escorting movements ofto and from national stockpileand military depots. There Is somethat responsibility for thelogistical functions, such as storing,and delivery of nuclear weaponsof military operations has beento organizations operating inof the major force components ofof Defense. For example, it hasthe Chief
Artillery Directorate is responsible for the storing and supplying of both tactical missiles and their associated warheads. These arc stored separately and brought together for mating and use only on proper authorization by higher authority. [
1 warheads andallocated for use by Ihe Strategic Rocket Forces were held separatelyatherstage of an alert had been authorized through the Chief of Strategic Rocket Forces.
We have no evidence to Indicate whether or not the Soviets have citheror installed safeguards in theirweapon control procedures (such aslinks).
Sign: of Innovation. There isevidence that the USSR was seriously preoccupied with the problem of improving Its command and control procedures for nuclear weapons9 and through athe introduction of strategic missiles had complicated the problem of central control and had made more rapid response an urgen necessity. In addltionj Soviet theatre forces^
j under field conditions many of the logistical practices and procedurestlie issue and servicing of nuclear weapons were cumbersome and operationally Impractical. Some streamlining of thesystem has probably occurred by now,precise details are not yet known.
V. FUTURE WEAPON DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
The status of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, while lughly sophisticated and In most respects apparently adequate for their present needs, is such that significantcan still be made through further development and testing. We believe that the Soviets are continuing an aggressive weapon-development program. In the course of this program the Soviets will certainlytrong motivation to conduct further nuclear tests.
Weapon Effects. Probably one of the strongest requirements for further Soviettesting is in the area of high-altitude effects of nuclear weapons. Previous Soviet high-altitude tests, while highly sophisticated in their rrussile Involvement and probably well instrumented (judging from their location near the Sary Shagan Anti-Misslle Test Cen-
pparently lacked some of thewhich would give them detailedon warhead kill mechanisms and on communications-blackout effects. Forthe Soviets have notarhead in the vicinitye-entering missilenor do we have firm evidence that the Soviets placed instrument pods near their high-altitude bursts, although we may not have detected such pods.
We have no knowledge of Sovietparalleling that of the US in providing information on effects upon hardened missile launch sites. The Soviets have had no near-surface testing experience at high yieldst is likely that they have aforigh-yield test.
Other areas where the Soviets require additional effects information may exist; in particular, the Soviets lack experience with very deep underwater bursts.
Weapon Development. If tlie Soviets have requirements for significantly larger yields for their present delivery systems than are availableesult of their recent tests, they will probably require further testing to obtain such yields. They could adopt present designs to meet the needs of future delivery systems, but might, judging from pastrequire nuclear proof tests of theseSignificant improvements in yield-to-wclght ratios would require further tests.
We believe the Soviets haverequirements for tow-yield weapons. They conducted many low-yield tests12 which must have addedto their knowledge of low-yieldalthough their progress is difficult to define. Only preliminary analyses2 tests are now available and. In any case,of low-yield tests are subject touncertainties. To the extent that their requirements have not been satisfied, the Sovietseed for further testing in this area.
Test Status. We believe the Soviets are currentlyosture to resume nuclear testing soonecision is made.indicates continuing weaponactivity In the Soviet nuclear weapon development centers. There Is no evidence that the Semipalatinsk Proving Ground is not being maintained in an active status and we estimate that testing, either In theor underground, could be resumed there on short notice. Of Interest is theof an unusual site at Semipalatinskto an AMM site at Sary Shagan. This suggests that AMM nuclear systems tests may be intended. The Arctic Proving Ground at Novaya Zemlya is not maintained on aactive basis. Instead, testing isthereask force basis, and all the indications are thathort build-up is required for test resumption. The main test period in the Arctic Is normally in the late summer and fall.
VI. SOVIET TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES IN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS RELATED TO NUCLEAR ENERGY
Chemistry. Soviet chemical research relating to their atomic energy program has continued to advance, but remains generally behind the United States in scope andSoviet chemists are emphasising the preparation, study and analysis of lugh purity substances useful ax nuclear reactorand construction materials. Theiron the separation and identification of transuranium compounds, although not as extensive as that of the US. appears to be on about the same level of technology. They have developed satisfactory ion exchangepatterned after earlier USfor separating pure rare earth oxides from ores. From these oxides they areand studying pure rare earth metals and compounds for possible applications In nuclear science and technology, such asmaterials for reactor control rods, shielding, and burnable poisons. Wldlc the Soviets so far are not known to have developed these materials to practical use in advance of the United States, their Intensive studies could result In original achievementsew years. Their use of ion exchange techniques, however. Is hampered by their Inability to provide many of tho more useful resins.
Ceramics, with special nuclear and high temperature properties, such as silicon carbideoron carbide, and beryllium oxide are under continued study. Special materials such as light weight, porous beryllium oxide ceramics are being developed, possibly for applications in advanced nuclear reactors.
Electrochemical studies are underway to determine the corrosion resistance ofstainless steel, aluminum and zirconium alloys in water at the high temperatures and pressures encountered in nuclear reactor heat exchangers. The corrosive effects of molten sodium, lithium, and fused salts on metals are also being examined In this connection. The published Soviet experimental work oncontinued to be empirical in nature and does not appear to exploit the excellenton the theoretical aspects ofdone in the USSR.
Radiation etTects on many materials are also under study, and work has been done to develop radiation resistant materials forapplications. Attempts are being made to Improve the activity of catalysts forand petroleum processes by uradiation. and to utilize radioactivityirect source of polymerization. Radioactive isotopes are also used extensively in the USSR in chemical analysis, chemical tracer techniques, and in laboratory as well as chemical process control instrumentation.
Nuclear MetaUurgy. The extractive techniques necessary for obtaining nonferrous metals and alloys of nuclear importance are adequately known In tbe USSR as are methods of metal fabrication; however, there are no indications that Soviet processin these areas have resulted Inadvances over those of the West. The USSRomprehensive program of alloy systems Investigations In force which may exceed that of the West in extent and is closely comparable in terms of quality. Theirou the more advanced materialsthe refractory metals and theirIs receiving strong emphasis, but Soviet programs of practical alloyand evaluation generally arc believed to follow the Western lead.
Soviet applied research involving the actual applications of special alloys foruse in reactor construction is estimated to be making substantial progress but
lems of corrosion, including corrosion in welds ot stainless steels and corrosion due toeffects, continue to cause difficulties as they do in the West. In addition, the Soviets have continuing problems in the technology of fuel elements. The number of well-trained, experienced engineers available for this work is estimated to have increased substantially during the past several years, resulting inSoviet competence to meet the current metallurgical requirements of their nuclear program,
Computers., KIEV, BESM I. BESM n, ORAL, and STRELA models are typical of the computers the Soviets used to solve problems In nuclear energy research projects,0 being the most advanced model mentioned in these applications.these computers are less advanced than Western production models used forapplications, they appear to be adequate for the usual types of computation required in scientific and technicalide range of electronic analog computers,large high precision models like the Sovietre also available to SovietLarge-scale, very high speed digitalcomparable to the most advanced Western models have not yet been revealed in the OSSR but the Soviets may have such advanced models under construction or in use In classified work especially for nuclearcalculations.
Instrumentation. The Soviets haveariety of instruments andequipment for use in their nuclearprogram. On the basis of different kinds of instruments which have beenat various exhibits, the Soviet devices appear to be adequate for stated applications but arc considerably less sophisticated than tlie devices used for similar applications in the West. Soviet Instrumentation for reactor control systems also appears to be lessand easier to design and construct than that in the US.
Low Energy Nuclear Physics. Within the last fewumber ofm cyclotrons have been installed Inand research institutions scattered throughout the OSSR Several heavy ionare now in operation, the newesta two-meter cyclotron at Dubna capable of accelerating Ions of carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen to an energy5 Mev perigh flux, impulse reactor instrumentedilometer timc-of-flight neutronhas also recently been completed at Dubna.
Soviet physicists are competent in the standard laboratory techniques employed in nuclear spectroscopy and have developedand novel apparatus and techniques. Their research effort on the physics of heavy ions is intensive and highly competent.the Soviet effort In experimental lownuclear physicshole still lagsbehind that of the OS, with the main deficienciesrequent lack of high quality research equipment and an apparent inability to attract the necessary quality of Soviet physicists into this field.
High Energy Nuclear Physics.1 the OSSR hadev synchrocyclotron0 Bev protonatev protonin Moscow and several electronat various locations, of which threeev each are of quite high quality. Attempted operation ofndev proton synchrotronsumber of engineering difficulties such as poora lack of randomization of themagnetic fields in the structural ironotally inadequate proton injection system.
The USSR is continuing an intensive construction program. Most of the engineer-
sncttti
ing and construction problems encountered with their large proton synchrotrons have beenev electron synchrotron is nearing completion in0 Bev proton synchrotron being constructedite near Serpukhov Is scheduled to be completed5 and will be the largest high energy accelerator in the world.
S Atomic Energydelegation reports the existence of2 Bevev linearew site north of Kliarkov.were Judged torestigewill be used to study interactionof these linear accelerators Islo be completed
Although the Sovietigh priority and has adequate funds and personnel, the experimentsin the program are. In general,
The USSRery strong theoretical program In high energy physics, but it seems apparent that the experimentalists often do not follow the research published by theThisack of coordination of ideas and efforts'between the theorists and experimentalists, although the poorof some of the accelerators may beus. Soviet over-oilin high energy physics has generally been Inferior to that in the West.
ConrroUed Thermonuclear Reactions. Soviet research on controlled thermonuclear reactions (CTR) began at about the same time as In the US, and this early work was declassified at Genevauringhe Soviet program grew rapidly but now has leveled off to an annual growth rate of. Except for the older machines. OGRA and ALPHA, the Soviets have notfull-scale machines, as has the US, but rather they have concentrated on small experimental devices to explore the basicphenomena of plasmas. At the present time the status of CTR research in the USSR Is roughly comparable lo that in the West. It is estimated that the USSR will notseful controlled reaction within at least theears and consequently will not attain commercially useful power fromfusion within the next decade.
The Soviet theoretical plasma physics and CTR program Is extensive, both inand scope, and has attracted some of the best Soviet theoretical physicists. However, the Soviet theorists appear to have veryaccess to electronic computers and alack of contact with the experimentalists. Thus little effort is made by the theorists to design practical experiments or to correlate and Interpret, experimental data.
In experimental research on CTR the Soviets have obandoned foal pinches and are concentrating on magnetic compression,Into cusps, and radio-frequencyand confinement. In plasma diagnostics, the Soviets have emphasized optical andspectroscopy. They currentlyto prefer the concept of pulsed fusion reactors rather than the steady-stateused in some of the United StalesThe guiding philosophy expressed by the Soviets In this field is to concentrate over the next few years on basic plasmausing relatively small experiments in the hope of finding some way of suppressing or avoiding the inherent Instabilitieslasma confinedagnetic field.
adiobiology and Medicine.here has been an increase in Sovieton the industrial uses ot radiation and on studies of the resulting biomedical effects Radiobiology Is one of the major fundamental areas of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, and an Academy-wide scientific council has been
established for coordination of this research. The major biological institutes Involved are: the Institute of Biological Physics, theof Radiation and Physico-chemicaland the Biology Division of the Institute of Atomic Energy imeni Kurchatov. The last installation has recently acquired newfacilities and the size and type ofand excellent equipment Indicate that it could become one of the betterresearch centers in the world. On Uie other hand, clinical research andpertaining to radiation are less advanced. The Soviets need more and better-trainedand equipment such as thehas been slow in coming into research and therapeutic use in the USSR. Betatrons now, or about to be. In use (at the Tomsk Medical Institute. Institute of Roentgenology and Radiology, Moscow; and Central Scientific Research Institute of Medical Radiology, Leningrad) are outdated, relatively crude In design and Improperly shielded. Soviettechniques for the use of radiation forand treatment are often outdated.
adioisotopes are widely used inand Industryation-wide safety program for their transporation, use andhas developed. Soviet rules forpermissible levels of ionizing radiation and concentrations of radioacUvc substances in air and water now closely followCommission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommendations. Within Uie next three years it is expected that revisions will include even lower permissible exposure rates and times of exposure. Radiation safetyconcerning construction andof particle accelerators, are similar lo but not as strictly enforced, as those found ln the US.
The USSRrogram for air sampling to detect natural and artificialpresent in the external environment and Inside work premises. The Soviet Unioneport on its "fly-paper" fall-out program lo Uie United NaUons Scientificon Effects of Atomic Radiation. The program as set forth In the reportoor one by US standards and Uie Soviet Union subscquenUy withdrew its report. Although they have carried out several well-planned and well-executed studies on oceanographicpertaining to radioactive waste disposal In oceans, the positions taken by the Soviets ln the UN on this subject have apparentlypolitical rather than scientific
Detailed studies are underway on changes in resistance after Irradiation in plant and animal cells and micro-organisms.working hypotheses for estimating factors which influence primary potential damage and recovery effects approach current views expressed by Western investigators; but in general, the Soviet approaches have notanything new with respect toor therapy of radiation Injury. Their apparent hope for Uie ultimate development of chemical substances for protection against radiation or treatment of radiation Injuries, does not appear justified.
n general, the Soviets arc following published US findings and procedures with respect to protection from radiation effects of weapons. They are engaging in sometraining, planning, stockpiling and target area preparations relative to medical defense against nuclear warfare. Special weapons defense in the USSR also includes specific preparation against various types of radiological-biological warfare combinations.
-
sfcn&r-
At.nn A
EVALUATION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS (HMO-lOW
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No.
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I* Deerrai 34 IS 87 KV
11
33
4
37
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Mirpr0 Apr 57
AprAut 57
7 Sep 57
57
S*m,
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Air
Air
Surface
Unknown
<30
1 41
ep 57 NZ
2flSepct0 Oct 57
w
Underwater
0
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Jen 58
48 ta 48
Feb
eb
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14
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Air Air
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Mar
m
ar
ar
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Oct
Oct &B NZ
Nov 58 KY
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No! Subaui-
ttm
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Sep 61
Sep 61
Sep 61
Sep 61
Sep 61
Sep 61
61
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Sep 61
Sep CI
Sep 61
:
Sep 61
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M Sep 61
ep 61
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Sep 61
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Oct 61
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Oct 61
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Annex A
JOK
I
Ho. (ft)'
Dec0O0
DeoDee
Dec000
io.oou
'Se<nl^8cmipalalin*k;apu*lla Var; NZ =Zcralya;aluaa ol bunt beigM aad yield are beat raJwaa- (Trap-
ange o( values have been reported Uiey air written aa minimum/maximum. ^'Grealee than:atareaent, amount* aot known; ".
1 Alternate' value. Aoalreie based on this assumed yield.
rop sccrct
wmm
c AulManl Chief of Slaff'forofy, forDeportment ol tha'Army :'-
aV AnlKanf Chief of Naval Operation*or' th# Department
Chief ol Stafl. Intelligence. USAF, for lhe Departmenl of tho Air .;
force
of Intelligence, AEC. for the Atomic Energy AivlHoni Director. FBI. for lhe Federal BuieouSA, lor the Notioool Security Agency
l Assntanl DreOor fot ScientificA. forr Deportmrrt or
This documenl may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable securityr returned 'O the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with lhe Office erf Centrol Reference, CIA.
When ihli document is disseminated overseas, tho overseas recipients may retain
ileriod not in excess of ono year. Al the end ol this period, the document shouldbo destroyed, telutned lo the forwarding ogency, or per minion shouldof lhe forwarding ogency lo retain if In accordance,"
he title of ihis documenl when used separately from
: otarial Securirv Council '
iomk Energy' Commitslon*Federal Bureau of
Original document.
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