REPORT ON FRENCH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROJECT

Created: 5/13/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

u-J-

APPROVED FOR BIILASE1

t SHtT>arrcx>

3

REPORT ON FRENCH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROJECT

1. After the initial appropriation for the French gaseous diffusion plant was made inlane for construction of tho plant at Picrrelatte on the Rhone River were first announced formally at the Second Geneva conference At that time, they proposed having thia plant in operation, producing low enriched material2 and fully enriched material Estimates at that time, based on opinions. scientists who saw the pilot facilities at Saclay and upon information providod by tbe French were that production of low enriched material could begin2roductiong/day of fully3 and capacity production ofg/day Technical difficulties in producing adequate compressor seals and unforeseen difficulties in barrier development and production have delayed this plant until it is now estimated that top-product will not become available This date of availability has recently been confirmed by Pierre Meesmer, the French Minister of Armed Forces,

0c-n

-SECHB-

APPROVED FOR RELEASE IRTUUIIMI

he French grossly underestimated theof Pierrelatte. Byhe estimated total costtoillion, several times the original estimate, notcost of the high enrichment section of Pierrelatte, withoutweapon gradean be produced. If the cost of thisthe plant bears the same relationship to the total as inthe total cost of Pierrelatte would be approximately

illion. During budget debates in the fallhe situation was officially summarized as follows: "Pierrelatte exists. Itarge undertaking, and it is necessary toeans of rendering the costshis sentiment undoubtedly is one of the causes of French exploration of possible German and/or Italian financial and technical assistance in completing Pierrelatte.

have been numerous reports concerning possibleand more recently Franco-Italian, technical andin areas associated with nuclear weapons. contributions would certainly be helpful, technicalbe of more immediate benefit. The West Germans havein industrial seal research and development which could be

2

ArrROWfDFOBRELIflSI MTLiHtMl

used effectively to help solve the problem of adequate compressor seals for use in the Pierrelatte plant, German scientists have no major backlog of experience in gascoua diffusion separation. However, their general research capabilities and ample numbera of technical personnel could, if so appliod,ignificant factor in the solution to other technical problems encountered at Pierrelatte, Including development and fabrication of satisfactory barriers.

4, The French0 were considering the use of ultra-centrifugesupplement to gaseous diffusion for uranium enrichment. There iside nee that this proposal was adopted, nd the present status of development of this process in France and elsewhere does not make it attractive. Its use would involveproblems in addition to those they face in the gaseous diffusion process. imited French effort in ultracentrifuge research has been reported. Tho Germans areood position to provide assistance in the ultracentrifuge field should the French seek it. However, German ultracentrifuge developments have lost impetus since their program was classified, and they would probably require two years or more of priority development effort to achieve an

a

economically practical technology.

BPPBOVID FOR RELEASE IAItlUI?Ml

Protocol to the Brussels treaty imposes no prohibition on West Germany other than that no atomic weapons or associated weapons materials may be manufactured on German territory. This does not preclude the possibility of German assistance) financial or technical, to non-German nuclear weapons programs nor of their obtaining nuclear weapons from such sources.

In conclusion, from the reports available and for tho reasons given above we believe that French officials have in fact broached the subject of aid for Pierrelatte with the West Germans and possibly the Italians. We do not know the precise terms of the French requests,mounts of aid requested, or the quid pro quo being offered by France. Paris at present will probably not be disposed to offer Germany any meaningful degree of control or partnership in the French nuclear program. On the other hand, the Germans will probably not be disposed to provide aid unless they are given some control or partnership, and this German position would be strengthened by U. S. pressure. In the longer run, however, stronger pressures for French-Weet German cooperation on military applications of nuclear energy ar* likely to develop and, as the costs of the French program continue to mount, the French may become more willing to giveodicum of control in order to get aid.

uLunci

vpitvuniiEUAu

UTLIll till

The Germans, for their part, may come increasingly to regard

participation in the French programay to get around the

treaty restrictions mentioned above, anday for German industry to improve its position in the nuclear technological race.

Original document.

Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: