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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR Division
SUBJECT: Plan for Informing: Soviet Intelligence Services. Concern for Oleg T. Penkovskiy.
The following plan is designed not only to assure that word reaches many GRU and KGB ears. Intelligence is concerned about those who collaborate with us and who may be caught but also to grasp whatever slim opportunity there nay be to saveife.
On tbe first point, there Is no doubt that many GRU and KGB officers realize that CIA was able toighly successful operationrofessional manner. Theirrespect for CIA must have gone up. They do not know what interest CIA has for the security and well-being of anyone who collaborates with CIA. If indeed word should be spread about. Intelligence Is trying to savelife, this is bound toremendous impact on many in
the ranks. Tbe need for other Oleg Penkovskiys, as the Director expressed to you recently, is now greater than ever. Ve nust do all we can to achieve this.
3. There is no question in our minds that the impact of the Penkovskiy compromise and trial villeleterious effect upon any Soviet citizens. In or out of the HIS ranks, who may have entertained thoughts of either defection or working in place. Following the trial, Yuri Znukov,for PRAVDA stated "CIA does notoot about the fate of thoir agents. All the promises they made to
been broken. The spy is caught and
be has been written off tbe books." This is the sort of Soviet action that the proposed plan vlll counter.
4. The plan envisages four identical letters to be delivered to two KGB rezidents and two GRU residents in Bonn, The Hague, Copenhagen and Rome. ocal indigenous person can be paid toealed envelope containing tbe nessage to the Soviet Embassy in each city. The reason four points were chosen was from our point of view to insure that delivery is made, tbat the message Is not thrown outrovocation since the letter states that three other Identical messages are being simultaneously delivered in three other Soviet Embassies and particularly to assure that by word of mouth that atinimum number of Soviets who see tho letter will pass the word around to their associates without
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
a im to
raising In Soviet mindslooding of many Bnbassles with such messages wasIA propaganda ploy. Not only toona fide with the Soviets but also to worry thorn regardingopy of the photograph of Penkovskiy with Chief. Varentsov will be included.
6. The question of whether Soviet authorities would surface this message to embarrass us is considered to be most unlikely since publication would only serve to further our Interests. There in, despite our optimism on this point, no genuine nttributabillty which the SovietB would gain by surfacing.
The four cities were chosen because the fact that they are ln NATO countries may have the proper Impact on the Soviets, and have bad no past relationship with the Penkovskiy operation, and the remote chance of any flaroback would have minimal effects in these particular countries.
It is suggested that the Soviets be directed to respondost Office box in New York, which could be laid on by Security, In the eventlap, the Post Officecould easily deny the true identity of tho holder
of the box.
8. Should the Soviet authorities respond to the message, an analysis of the nature of their response would dictate our next moves. Certainly the negotatlons in the beginning stages could be prolonged and vague. There will obviously be feeling out by the Soviets ns to the nature of the "stick" nnd the "carrot".
8. It is recommended that this proposal. If accepted, be carried out without any reference to the British, ln the light of the Soviet statement that "CIA does notoot about the fate of their agents". In no way, does the plan envisage the problem of Wynne and Lonsdale.
Should tho Soviet authorities refuse to respond, lt is recommended that we carry out our threat by the appropriate publication in appropriate places of certain materials which Penkovskiy gave us relating to Sovietabroad and to Soviet subversive planning and warlike views of the Soviet Government. There la much CA grist which can and ahould be pulled out and exploited by the Went.
The Soviets will recognize this. proposal andoint Americnn-British proposal. This should in noilMPlans the British havl forith the Soviets for the release of Wynne.v J ^
Original document.
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