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TITLE: tudy In Indications Methodology
VOLUME: 7
7
IN
INTELLIGENCE
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i fast experiment tn quarU:fying Ou relevance of indicator patterns lo different types of hostile action.
A STUDY IN INDICATIONS METHODOLOGY Diane M. Ramsey
Mark S. Boerocr
The Intelligence mission of the National Indicationso provide strategic warningossible attack upon the Doited States from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Strategic warning differs from tactical warning both In timeliness and InTactical warning re lies exclusively upon mechanicaldevices and could not be given until the attack bad been set In motion, thus providing no moreewand probably muchD. S. forces to react Strategic earning, given before the strike Is launched. Is derived from etumating enemy intentions as well as actions, and while It Is to some extent dependent upon signals from mechanicaldevices. It also Involves the analysisreat deal of other data less easily quantified and correlated.
Because the indications officer attempts to determinefrom observed actions, he must rely heavily uponThe basic inferential structure used by the NIC IsIn its revised Indicator list, whichypes of actionino-Soviet Bloc country might take if Itto wage war. The specific occurrence of one of these mdlcators Is called an indication, as the indicator "Activeby aircraft, submarines or surface vessels" was wanted as an indication In last winter's overflight of the VS. carrier Constellationoviethe list covers Tirtually all phases of Bloc activity (with emphasis on the Sovietnd all the assets of the intelligencecan through It be brought to bear upon the task ofthen when andBloc plans to launch an attack.
Jj0>hTT
hdizatior
Alternative Hypotheses
Historically, the NIC has been principally concerned with giving warning of premeditated surprise attack on the United States by the Soviet Union. Although other possible coursej of hostile action have been considered from time to time, there appears to have been no consensus as to what the range of alternatives might be. Tbe present study, which became an experimenterns, originated as an ,
nent aspects of these alternative hostile actions with the same precision that bad been applied to definingarning Indicators.
Seven general hypotheses of actions hostile to the United Slates were postulatedirst, rough approximation of an possible alternatives:
surprise attack
attack
(limited war to general war)
war
warfare
crisis with no military intentsuppression of internal conflicts
Each ofndicators might or might not have aon the acceptance or rejection of any one ot these sewn hypotheses as the true explanationeries of observedIn order to represent this conceptystematicwo-way chart was prepared with the sevenof hostile action across the topelected sample of Indicators listed down the left-hand side. (It was decided to workample rather thanndicators because it was notriori whether this sort of approach would yield usefulbe sample consisted ofIndicators considered to be highly important andof the three sectors of Soviet activity covered by thelist. Six were chosen from thenearini on intercontinental strike force capability, thirteen from thef the general military Sector B. and nine from theod-cemed with civilian activities in Sector C. These are WW" ln Table 1.
TABLE 1
INDICATORS USED IN THE WEIGHTING EXPERIMENT
Ale Deployment olB Mi and associatedto satellite nations. All Rapid Increase in number ol orbiting earth satellite
A2i" Major deployment of tankers and long-range bombers to forward bases.
AM Intensive maintenance activity at submarine
A3g" Expanded submarine barrier operations.
Blf Cancellation of leaves or marked restriction.
elease or delivery to combat units of speciallyweapons and equipment
B3c' Widespread appearance of new cryptographic or transmission systems.
xtensive interference with key Western
bnormally large maneuvers at inter-army level or higher.
B4c' Tightening of military security, such as new travel
restrictions, Abnormally high levels of activity in airborne forces
units.
B5d Withdrawals of significant naval surface units from
Black and Baltic Intensive naval active defense* Major standdown in TAF for maintenance. Bfte General alerting of Soviet air defense Increased Intelligence collection efforts against key
targets.
ctive reconnaissance by aircraft, subs or surface vessels.
Cla Progressive reduction in size of Bloc missions incountries.
Cle* Consultation by regional Satellite leaders withand Pelplng. > Increased belligerency in official Sovietand propaganda.
am footBou ai csd of utu
noWof.oni Study
Ccmlmued)
Sudden shifts, especially in crises, to softer prop,.
gajida themes. Imposition of abnormally heavy censorship measures Widespread construction or expansion of shelters Evacuation of government, military and technical personnel.
roduction from^^*
CGc-
Cancellation of scheduled visits by Soviet scientists outside the Bloc or their recall
The agreement among the five judges was very close on many ol thendicators. Sometimes one judge might he consistently conservative ln fixing indicator weightsarticular hypothesis, avoiding the strong weights both positive and negative,econd would weight in the same direction but use the extremendmore often.
the level of agreement gave some general basis for confidence la the rating procedure as an experimental tool.
umber of indicators, however, there was little orgreement among the five Judges. In an attempt to reconcile or adjudicate these differences the judges were asked to set down their reasons for assigning the weights they had. From these explanations It could be seen that although someof opinion were deep-seated and not reconcilable, others were caused by divergent interpretations of the terms used in defining the several hypotheses. Once the ambiguity was resolved, new weights were assigned which eliminated much of the earlier discrepancy.
This exercise of attempting to locate and explain thedisagreement proved to be extremely useful. Itpointed up the need to go back and redefine theof possible alternative courses of hostile actionmore detail and precision. The discussions showedto define each hypothesis with respect to atcomponent features. An effort was made to listcomponent all admissible possibilities that cameThe elaborated taxonomy for defining hypothesesaction appears
of surprise
surprise attack
attack
unconcealed attack
attack
An Indication,
attacked
United Statespossessions and basesformal allies
countries not formal US alliesnations
UnionChinaSatellitesSatellitesBloc -oriented nations
employed
missiles
air forces
naval forces
missiles
air forces
naval forces
forces
forces
agents
used
explosives
bacteriological, or radiological
V.1
fj, Indications Study
attackedinstallationsol military forcescentersproduction and support facilities
. . :
restrictions
This formulation cannot of course be considered all-Inclusive or necessarily complete. It could be expanded to cover additional components as well as to list additionalwithin components. The "Other" listing allows tor the inclusion of an unusual circumstance that does not fit into the more conventional alternatives, for example thewall In the "Weapons used" component. The generalused to express an hypothesis in terms of the seven components Is as follows:
Sndafter or accompanied
In order to test the suitability of this formula forhostile action, several past periods of International crisis were subjectedorresponding analytic breakdown. The following statements show how two of these, the Pearl Harbor attack and the outbreak of the Korean War, would be denned by this technique.
Pearl Harbor: S, on Va byemploying, and using W, against(after or accompanied by
Indication,
Or in expanded form:
A premeditated surprise attack onpossession bases by Japan employing strategic air and, and using high explosives against military isistaul^mmary forces, and key production ant' support faculties (following negotiations in Washington with Japanese envoys on the Far Eastern situation)
alter or accompanied.
Or:
A premeditated surprise attack on South Korea by North Korea employing ground forces, tactical air and naval forces and clandestine agents and using high explosives against military installations and eventrations offorces (following several propaganda warnings of an attack).
After the formula proved reasonably successful hipast hostile events. It was appliedlausible hypothesis of potential Soviet action against the United States.to substantiate this particular hypothesis is extremely difficult to detect, and for this reason it Is of major concern to those charged with strategic warning.)
World War HI:onby A, employingand, against
Or expanded:
A pre-emptive attack on the continental United States and its possessions and bases by the Soviet Union em-ploying strategic strike forces (missiles, air, and navy) and using thermonuclear and nuclear weapons against military installations and concentrations of military forces.
Excluding the open-ended "Other" category in thetaxonomy, several hundred thousand hypotheses could be generated through permutation and combination of the alternatives under the several components. Althoughfewer than fifty of these are plausible, the number of conceivable related warning patterns is staggering, tot t
rariety of combinations ofndicators is relevant to each hypothesis and Individual weighting of the Indications fromtoaises their number to its power of five. It is this high order of complexity of events in the real world wluch, until the development of electronic digital computers,mathematical simulation of any but trivial war prob-
Hypotheses by Indicator Profile
One possible approach to evaluating Indications would be to construct the patterns of indicators and weights most likely to occur under particular plausible hypotheses. In the event, say, that the USSR was going tourprise attack on the United States, the patterns would presumably differ from those to be expected if It were preparing toimited war. Probably yet another set of combinations would be likely to appear If the USSR were simply taking steps to defendThese various groups of general warning patterns could be compiledarning outline, which could then be used by indications analyststandard against which toaccumulating Indications information. Indicationsdo employ subjectively such comparison techniquesbut the warning pattern used as the standard Is not expressly stated and may change frequently, even for the same analyst.
Following this line of reasoning, the next step in the study was to investigate whether it is possible to differentiate among the various hypotheses by their patterns of indicator weights, and if so which Indicators are of primary significance In this discrimination. If the weights assigned to certainshould be highly similar for two or more hypotheses It would be difficult to use these indicators as criteria forone of the hypotheses over the others, and otherwould have to be Identified to give the necessaryamong them. But if the patterns of indicator weights assigned for different hypotheses are quite distinct, theyeans for deciding whether to accept orarticular hypothesis on the basis of indications data
Andr
In order to Illustrate this concept, let usmDu example. Suppose we had only three Indicators, la) and only three hypotheses of hostile actionH,. Let us say the three hypotheses have the followingf average Indicator weights:
h 1.
5
B
weattern or profile of the Indicator weights for each hypothesis, the three would look like this:
Figure I
From these profiles we can seelance that H, and H> are similar but H, is quite different from the others. We might further observe that I, provides no basis at all for tmgulshlng H,raphic display techniquesoffer considerable assistance In summarizingdata and may reveal relationships which are notwhen there are large amounts of data; perhaps It would be useful to represent the profile information in geometric form. TO portray geometrically more than two of thehowever, would force us Intoimensional space which is beyond our ability to represent easilylat If we therefore take onlyrom the
(sample and graph their weights with respect to the three hypotheses, the result is this:
h
2 -r-
l 4-
-2
-2
Figure 2
Even though this geometric representation has lost thecontributed by Indicatort still makes clear that H, Is remote from Hi and Ha, which are comparatively close
It was basically to this sort of statistical analysis that the study subjected the Indicator weights assigned by the five Judges. Because more complex computations were planned, however, tbe number of Indicators had to be reduced once more to keep the experiment within reasonable time limits. Thendicators previously chosenepresentative sample of theere carefully studied and eight of them selected for this analysis, as follows:
Major deployment of tankers and long-range
bombers to forward) Expanded submarine barrier operations, Widespread appearance of new cryptographic or transmission systems.
i
Ttghlenlng of military security such as new
travel restrictions,) Major standdown in the Tactical Air Force for
maintenance.
Consultation by regional Satellite leaders with Moscow and Peiping.
) .Si
Cancellation of scheduled visits by Soviet scientists outside the Bloc or their recall.
The seven original hypotheses were all retained. Anwas taken of the weights assigned by the five Judges to each of the eight indicators with respect to each hypotheses. Seven profiles of the average weights were then drawn, one for each hypothesis. They are shown inhrough 9.
Of these profiles It can be seen thatand H.ndre the most highly similar of all. reflecting the logical similarity between the situations of limited war and guerrilla wax. Hg and H,ndlso have some, lesssimilarity and thus corroborate our intuitive feeling that diplomatic crisis with no military intent should hare many aspects in common with military suppression of internal conflicts. The other three hypotheses (premeditated surprise attack, pre-emptive attack, and escalation) appear to have unique profiles. These results appear to support theof indicator pattern analysis to discriminate among hypotheses.
Graphic Discrimination
In order to show geometrically all of the informationin these seven profiles it would be necessary to use an eight-dimensional space, which Is impossible to represent clearly in two or even three dimensions. Fortunately,powerful statistical technique1 permits one to transform the
"The use of canonical varlates.ull explanation of the nlque see C. R. Rao's Advanced Statistical Methods in Bwmetr Research (NY: Johnons,chapterspecUW pp.O.
eight axes of this spaceew set of eight in whicha linear combination of all the original ones. Thiseach of the original Indicator weights Is representedof the eight new dimensions. It is now possible totwo most significant of these dimensions as the axesgraphically in one plane most of the
This statistical transformation having beenomputer, the resulting eight new dimensions
called variables Zt througho distinguish them fromIndicators l.he two
were seen to account togetherf the information In- in the set of seven profiles, Zthe nextccounted for. All ariables together contributed less than
With Za and Z. accountingittle more than three-fourths of the Information In the profiles. It becomesto graph the relationships among the seven hypotheses using them as axes This two-dimensional plot is shown In
Here the positive and negative signs do not signifyand improbability respectively, but the position of an hypothesis along each axis Is determined by the pull of the positively and negatively weighted Indicators that arein the axis. On Z, the positively weighted indicatorsull to the top of the space and the negativelyull downward. On Z. the positivelyull to the right of the space andull to the left.
On the vertical axis Z, there are large positive coefficients for indicators, andnd the largest negative coefficients are fornd S. On the horizontal Z, the only large positive coefficient is for Indicatorut there are fairly large negative coefficients for indicatorsndhese in-
'The mathemaUcal expressions for the two are as follows:
8.
sinter*
Indicof
dicators with important positive and negative coefficients are tbe following.
Positive Coefficient* (U Major deployment of tankers and longrangt borcben to forward bases, Consultation by regional Satellite leaders vrtUi Moscow
Uorav
OJ ^Cancellation of scheduled vtdt* by Bovtet ft) ConsultaUoD by raetonal and Pelplng.
NcgaUve CoeffleleriU C: ajor standdown In tbe Tactical Air Force tor mamie-. nanI Tightening of military security such a> new travel rabicUooa. lubmarlne barrier opcraUon*
ft) Suddenspecially In crises, to softer propaganda
Widespread appearance of new cryptographic or trao> mUslon system*.
Examination of Figureistinct cluster of the three hypothesesimited war situation (liroited war. guerrilla warfare, and military suppression of internalhe distance between this clusterourth hypothesis, diplomatic crisis with no military intent, is less
DM
.
r
than the distance between any pair of hypotheses outside tbe cluster. The diplomatic crisis hypothesis might therefore br linked with the limited war clusterconfined crisis" category.
There is only one indicator which can have pulled thistoward the positive end ofloc consultation It seems consistent with Bloc activities in a
Jtgaa^a'tta'
boos on the left and limited war situations on the right can be more fully explained, however, by noting the threewhichtrong negative pull along the horizontal axis These are expanded submarine barrier operations,appearance of new cryptographic or transmissionand sudden shifts, especiallyime of crisis, to softer propaganda themes. The expansion ofelatively unambiguous action which wouldSoviet ability to wage general war. The Introduction of new cryptographic systems couldrotectivefor surprise attack but by Itself la susceptible of aof other Interpretations. The sudden shift in propaganda could be an attempt to lull the United Statesosture of reduced alert. The element of deception contained in this last Indicator mayufficient explanation for theIn position between the hypotheses of pre-emption and premeditated surprise attack on the left and that ofabout midway between them and the limited war cluster on the right.
Along the vertical axis, escalation and pre-emption are at opposite ends and premeditated attack lies approximatelybetween them. The indicators operating negatively which apparently favored pre-emption and rejected escalation are tbe tightening of military securityajor stand-down In the Tactical Air Force. An Increase ln militaryone of the more difficult Indicators to identify,act be more likely to accompany pre-emption thanA standdown in the Tactical Air Force does not seem to argue strongly for pre-emption, but It seems to explain the negative position on the Z, axis of the limited war cluster,tactical rather than strategic air forces would probably be usedimited action.
5conci
An fndicoiVoni Slug>f
? Tit ch8 Pu"k.ni the
major deployment of tankers and long-range bombers lo for ward areas. Communist Bloc consultation, and cancellation It scheduled visita by Soviet scientists outsidec Si
^TjLKfS?on the reru-
cal axis to the most difficult to explain; It was expected that
r he twothe Z, axis, but evidently the
S?7indicators on
Pen the hypothesisremeditated surprise. Its central position on the Z, axis mayeflection of the ambivalence of the Judgesthe role of deception in this situation. The cleaner polarl-
ZZHXlSnambiguous distinction between limited war and general war.
Critique
The encouraging thing about this analysis Isotally objective and dispassionate statistical arraying of theamong the seven hypotheses of hostile actionour Intuitive explanation of the roles played by the various Indicators ln distinguishing among them.oth surprising and reassuring to discover that the Independent asfflfmment of Indicator weights by the five Judges,ack of full consensus, disclosed so much Information.
The sources of ambiguity in the experiment may beas follows:
The use of indicators rather than indicationsoccurrences of indicators, means that the time factor was not precisely stated, quantities of troops, equipment,ere expressed in general terms such as major, heavy,nd the geographic areas involved were not specified.
fndieofions Study
; sute of international relations was not described the 1 general strategic setting was left to the Judges'The present world situation might best have been explicitly assumed-Each indicator was considered by itseU. whereas few if any
Tteustof indicators was incomplete. It is economical toa sample for experimental purposes, and theused here may have been valid; but the reader should recognize thatortion of the problem was under study.
No attempt was made in this first trial to'account for the probability of occurrence and the likelihood of detection of each indicator. These characteristics have beenfor the entire Indicator list and they form anpert of the complete indicator definition the indicators should be grouped according to the casTwith which the Bloc can manipulate them. Another possible classification scheme wouldhronolog.cal listing broken down by probability of occurrence. Terms likely to occur In describing indicatorsheses were not standardized by any authority such as theof VnUed States Military Terms of Joint Vsage. It became clear during the process of adjudicating weights that many of the original differences resulted fromamong the Judges* definitions of key concepts.
Now that the validity of this approach seems to have been established, the statistical analysis should be done with the entire setndicators and the elaborated statement of hypotheses. If the eight Indicators used before were truly representative of the total setnd if the seven hypothe-ses usedeasonable generalization of the elaborated statements, the full analysis shouldonfigurationto that ofut it should have more precision and reflect more subtle nuances in the roles played by the
An Indications Study
chief indicators.omplete portrayal of the assocu-tions among alternative hypotheses In relation to the fuii complement of indicators could, one may hope, serveasis for the development of more sophisticated anddecision models.
Original document.
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