CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
TITLE: Book Review: oviet Embassy
REVIEWER: Matthew N. Caslon
VOLUME:
7
IN
INTELLIGENCE
A collection ol articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, end theoretical aspects ot intelligence.
-
All sMiements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the content* should be construed as asserting or implying US Government, endorsement of an amide's factual statements and interpretations
INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE KAZNACHEEV
s;aruIr Koxnacheeo. dited, with an Introduction, by Simon Woiin. and New York: J. B.
intelligence operations officers generally tend to discount books and articles published byfor goodAll too often the defector's story (frequently preparedpy-conscious publicack writing ghost) is lostelter of self-justification or Is so embroidered andas to be completely worthless to the serious reader. The veteran case officer, whether out of real expertise or pure cynicism, is likely to view the defector's accountighly expurgated version of the real events or evenereploy which he can use without being himself taken in by it. In the words of one CIA chief of station withEuropean experience.ule, defectors are great when you're chasing them; but once they have come over and gone through the mill and are ready for resettlement, they become for theery large headache, theirore."
To thisin particular to the generalization that defectors write more fiction than fact, more trash thanKaznacheevhopper of an exception At the ageresh out of Moscow's Oriental Institute, an embodiment of the heralded "New Soviete was sent in7unior Foreign Service probationer to the USSR's embassy in Rangoon. As the only Burmese-speaking member of the embassye was soon recruitedhort trip back to Moscow) for Soviet Intelligence; and from then untilhen he walked into the USIS Library in Rangoon, heising youngsort of co-opted Junior Officerthe huge Intelligence complexby the KGB in Burma.
II
Booh; Koznocheev
oviet Embassy chronicles Kasnachccvs own tt perlencestudent Intelligence officer. That he learned his lessons well Is evidenced both by his promotion lo aturb* rank-Ironically, on the very day he made up his mind lo delby the wealth of operational data he Includes,unconsciously, in recounting the circumstances which led to that defection. Hiselatively pimple story, recitedinimum of melodrama and without attempting to Inflate the author's ownhat la more. Kama-checv wrote tt entirely by himself, In English, editorialand organisation obviously came from Simon Wolin but the style Is unmistakably that of Karnacheev, and Its very simplicityuality some of his Western counterparts might do well to emulate. Forense the book is really aof contactIt were an operationalalthough notertain appeal to the lay reader, can be savored fully onlyase officer or operations chief. Ittory of the personalities and personal relationships which are central to ninety percent of the daily routineield operator In any service.orm'seye view, It neverthelessairly accurate and realisticof the then current Soviet situation in Rangoon, by an unusually gifted observer.
In his very unpretentious way. Aleksandr Kaznacheev hasascinating and informative report, worthy ofstudy by case officers concerned with operations in Southeast Asia, particularly in neutralist countries such as Burma where the Soviet stake is equal to. If not greater than ours. We can allow him the moderate amount of cold war philosophizing probably insisted upon by his publishers His remarkable achievement is lo have given us an intimateof Soviet Intelligence lifeevice too seldoma series of well-related episodes documenting the develop ment and training (as well as the disillusionment)unior Intelligencenot incidentally, to have provided considerable insight into an operational system which, pro-
1 Also note KMnacheev's tesUmony before the Internal Security Sub committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Some* JnW'-gmc*M. Hearing,and Condition! InSoviet Union, Hearing0
Ilaorn'ozooeheov
though it may have been, was exceptionally cumber -some and inept
As seen by Kaznacheev. Burma during theasarticularly happy place for the Soviets. Their aid pro-para. In the face of Burmese bureaucracy, was poorlyand seldom appreciated; their position as the spokes-nan for all progressive forces was being undercut daily by the Chinese; theiru's government were never cordial; and. toward the end of Kaxnachecv's tour, theyumber of propaganda blows (one being Kazna-cheev's own defection) which brought Soviet prestige in Burma to its lowest point In postwar years. Morale in the embassy was non-existent; tho clique-ridden atmosphere, punctuated by frequent squabbles between the ambassador and the KGB units, made life. In lUinachcev's words,abnormal andan. none of theever really liked Rangoon. The crowded livingworse, if anything, thanunbearable heat, and the inability to communicate with the Burmese or even any non-Bloc diplomats combined to create an environment in which the major preoccupation for the Soviet officerthe regular, rapid achievementtate of absolute Inebriation, and the next morning to count up once again the days remaining before rotation back to Moscow.
Of more than passing interest is Kaznacheev's appraisal of the Soviet political action program. Surprisingly enough, the Soviets had not had the degree of success In Burma with which most Americans are likely to credit them. Despite theof Communistic parties and Individual pro-Communists there (Itark of distinction among many Burmese intellectuals to befellowmadeprogressive" without absolutelyone to eitherhe Soviets were never able to weld all the leftist groupsingle effective mass org am-latlon. Kaznacheev gives an interesting reason for this: the men who staffed the KOBs Political Intelligence Unit simply refused to believe that any Burmese Communist was loyal enough to be trusted with anything more than the overt Moscow line. The aura of mutual suspicion which pervaded the embassy itself was projected in an even greater suspicion
:
the Reierentura's Intelligence personnel was reflected in Kaz-nacheev's instructions from his superior to be careful of
This reviewer had on several occasions opportunities to talk with Burmese politicians who hadnd in some*cases still are) active in Communistnvariably, whenever the subject came up, the Soviets in Rangoon vera roundly criticized, not for their over-all policy, but for their hostile attitude "toward thehat Is their lack of empathy and support for Burma's progressive forces. Curl' ously, the Chinese Communists were never regarded with quite the same dislike, although they were even more inaccessible to Burmese leftists.
One very bright and capable young Burraan. more candid than most, confessed that in the course of several years'to Marxist indoctrinationember of an extremist youth organization he had been sincerely ambitious ofa full-fledged member of the Communist Party and doing more for the Soviet cause. After some difficulty heIn getting In touch with Ivan Rogachev. whom Kazna-cheev describeseading KGB officer in Rangoon during the late fifties. Then thereong drawn-out series of meetings during which Rogachev assiduously pumped his young acquaintance for "Information" but never bothered to establish any real operational, letersonal,Afterear, the Burman grew tired of what he felt was only casual interest and drifted away. He was looking for guidance, for development,hance to assist the Communist movement in any way his mentor mightAll he got. in his own words, wereishy eyeot of bloody questions they could have answered well enough themselves."
To Aleksandr Kaznacheev this incident would not have seemed unusual. The Soviet intelligence officers he knew had very little understanding of their indigenous targetsurprising lack of concern for classic agent development.vetting procedures in the Referentura were both clumsy and unreliable, and this, combined with the ever-
Booii: Kaznocheev
present fear of provocation, frequently inhibited them from asking important operational contacts. In the age-oldbetween security and effectiveness, the Sovietsopted for security, and they applied it inigid and stultifying manner that it was often counterproductive.reports could of course be gathered from the host of fellow travelers who openly reported to the embassy. The lack of real communication wiiivine Burmesearshaling of the elements In Burma that could have been of Invaluable assistance.
Since Kaznachocv'sood many changes have occurred in the Soviet Union's Rangoonew and dynamic ambassador with an Intelligence background. Andre Ledovsky, took the place of the bumbling, ineffectual Schiborln. Many officers are now permitted to live outside the Soviet compound. In Kaznachocv's own place there are now four or five Burmese-language officers, some of them In the upper echelons. Intelligence operations, too. havebeen redirected. The intelligence personnel, although just as distinctive by their mode of living and cliquish behavior as they were in Kaznacheev's day, are now assiduouslykey personalities at all levels of Burmese society.
oviet Embassy has been termed the Sovietof The Ugly American, and there is, whether byorimilarity in the attitudes and personal! Ue* described In the two books. And just as authors Lcderer and Burdick caused an agonizing review of the type of American serving overseas, one can assume that Aleksandr Kaznacheev has been at least partially responsible for an outwardlychange in the Soviet method of conducting Intelligence operations. It is hardly likely that any future probationer will be able to fabricate intelligence reports and receiveon them from Moscow, as Kaznacheev did; with Andre Ledovsky in charge, it is doubtful that code clerks like Viktor Kabin will continue to insult their ambassadors; one can only speculate on the future effectiveness of Soviet black letter operations, the texts of which were formerly prepared In Moscow and mechanically disseminatedingle change by the Rangoon Referentura.
Recent Booh: Ko^he*,
This Iseep book, and it would be too much to say that it shouldtandard reference work for professionals. Nevertheless, it is highly useful for an understanding of the atmosphere in which the opposition had to conduct ItsIt isook that can be enjoyed, if for no other reason than to give the case officer the feeling that the other side can be just as frustrated and confused as he may be. With respect bolts author, it offers ample testimony that he was an able student of intelligence operationseenot the modus operandi that gave those operations their peculiar Soviet imprint.
N. Caslon
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: