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COORDINATION DRAFT CIA MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: President Bosch and Internal Security In
tbe Dominican Republic
SUMMARY
President Juan Bosch rightly considers that heopular Mandate to bringadical transformation of political, econoatlc, and social conditions in tho Dominican Republic. He hopes to acconpllMh this purpose by measures compatible vltb the Alliance for Progress, notably by Increased private foreign investment (in preference to US governmental kid) and by regulationsore equitable distribution of earnings than has been the caae hitherto. To privileged elements in Dominican aoclety, Bosch's program seems dovnrigbt communistic.
With reason, Boscb bollcves that theinnedlate threat to the accomplishment of hie mission is the constant possibilityeactionary coup. In those circumstances, be has beentolerant of the organisational and agitational activities of Communistlong as they
BPPnomoFOflRnwsi
DATE IUHI001
have not been directed against him. He argues that to crack down on these activities would onlya campaign of urban terrorism and guerrilla resistance like that in Venezuela, which would
binder the accomplishment of his constructive pur-
poses.
understands that the security ofdepends ultimately upon continuedestraint upon the At the same time, he isand astutely aware of tbe politicalof appearing toS puppet. he is not readily amunable to USbis policy with respect to Communist
Communist danger in tbeis not immediate, but potential. Itthe less serious. Given present freedomand agitate, the Communists willprepared to exploit some futurethrough administrative ineptitude, Boschto satisfy the expectations of tbeor if he should be overthrownbe Communists will be ln position to seize
the leadership of the popular revolutionary movement.
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DISCUSSION President nd His ParpDse.-.
Bosch has spent most of his life An early foe of the Trujillo regime,closely associated with the Caribbeanthe "Democraticncludingof Venezuela, former presidentsCosta Rica and Arevalo of Guatemala, andMarin of Puerto Rico. He spent most of bis
i in.i' in exileoacher and writer, but was also actively engaged ln various conspiracies against tbe several Caribbean dictatorships.
political attitudes arethis background of experience. It hasto function as an eloquent protagonist, butan efficient adninlntrator of public affairs or
olitician adept ln tbe accommodation of various political interests. Boschrofessedagainst the traditional order ln Caribbean society. He isrofessedas is the case with many new rulers in countries which have never known representative government, hisof democracy is mass support for bis one-man leadership. In the light of bis own experienco of
Caribbean intrigue, he If nut only deeply suspicious of any nnnlfestatloo of political opposition, but even indisposed to share power with colleagues of any stature.
rlgbtly considers tbat be has ato bringadical transformationeconomic, and social conditions inRepublic. ree election held he won nearlyercent ofvote, wo-to-onehis principal opponent,onservative. the Partldo Revoluclonario Dominlcanooverwhelming control of tbe legialatore. as the electoral process confersree hand to accomplish his purposes. of bis position is that he does notpersonal control over the armed forcos
and the national police.
principal accomplishment ofdays" has been the formulationew constitution. In keeping withpurposes, the tenor of ibis documentvery disturbing to the traditionallyin Dominican society. Tbe Church, for
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example, has been offonded by omissions and provisions in effect separating Church and State. Provisions of tbe original draft on proprietary rights and worker-management relations have been modified inay as to leave tho specifics to future legislation, but the implication of an impending "syndicalist" development remains.
9. Bosch has shown hostility toward special concessions to foreign corporations wblcb he deems to bo an Impairment of Dominican sovereignty, but nevertheless hopes to accomplish economicand social amelioration primarily by attracting foreign private investment. He considers tbat US governmental aid should bo merely supplemental to such investment, an attitude quite rare in Latin America. He hopes to attract private Investment by balancing the budget, by paying off existing foreign obligations, androgram of public works to be financedew line of creditonsortium of US and European firms. In this Bosch has been greatly aided by the current high price of sugar in the world market.
Opposition on the Hi|;ht
10. Juan Busch came late to the Dominicanscene. While he was safe in exile, other men,
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at tho risk of their lives, endured the Trujillo tyranny, overthrew it, and made possible the free election which brought Bosch to power. Such men naturally rosent their own displacement and Bosch's authoritarian tendencies. Moreover, many of them arc sincerely concerned about the political trend ln the Dominican Republic.
opposition presents noto Busch's position. Tbe Right wasin2 election. TheUnion Civica Macionalapparently breaking up as the result of abetween its right and left wings. to Bosch from the right is that be doeseffective personal control over theand the national police. ilitary movehim might be instigated by disaffectedsee their vested interests threatened byprograms, or by the personal ambition of
a military leader. The principal deterrent toove is tho well-known attitude of the US inof the duly elected constitutional govornment.
the present, Bosch appears to beterms with the military high command. He bas
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pledged himself to respect their control of the armed forces, and their porquisites, and they In turn have engaged thenselves to respect bisposition. However, neither party to this agreement can be fully confident of tbe other; the relationshipary and uneasy one. Bosch's tentative approach toward tbe developmenton-sant ailltla must have stirred some militaryand suspicion. moreover, it is uncertain whether the military high command is capable of controlling its subordinates.
The national police are controlled by General Antonio Imbert, one of tho assassins of Tru-jillo andational figure in bis own right. Several times Imbert has moved tentatively toward seizing power for himself and has beenonly by strenuous US representations. Boscb greatly fears Imbert's ambition, but dares not to remove him.
There is currently underampaign to discredit Boscb by charging that he is himself
a crypto-Communist engaged in establishing adictatorship, or else that his ineptitude will leadommunist seizure of power in the Dominican
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Republic* There is in fact no evidence that Bosch is himself acharge isatter of tenuous inference from tho alternative charge, to which Bosch is indeed vulnerable (see below). The recent concerted propagation of this theme, however, eliberate effort to win US sanctionilitary coup against Bosch.
Bosch and the Communists
taking office. Bosch hasreturnonsiderable number ofexpelled from the Dominican Republic byregime, the interim Council ofhas allowed these trained and dangerous men froedom of organizational andlong as their attacks weretbe old regime and not againstcases he has actually facilitated these activities,
of his own popularsees no threat to his regime ln this He may consider that his tolerancetbls strength and the democratichis rule. Re probably welcomes any assistancethe traditional society and anyinossible military coup. His
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own explanation of hia remarkable tolerance is that to crack down on prcsont harmless Communist activities would only provoke urban terrorism and guerrilla resistance like that in Venezuolaistake"), to the great hindrance of bis constructive program, the success of which will defeat the Communists. However, when some Communists ventured totrike of government workers, Bosch's reaction was immediate and effective.
Communist strength in theis not formidable. There aro fouror quasi-Communist political organization*:
(1) the Partldo Socialists Popular Domlnicano he orthodox Communist party; the Partldo Hacionallsta Kevolucionarlo (PNR),eterodox Communist party; the movemiento Popular Domlnicanoommunist-dominated pro-Castro party; the Agrupaclon Politlca Catorce do Junlo (APCJ,h ofommunist-Infiltrated pro-Castro party. All told, these four groups haveembers. An effort is being made to combine themnited front, but so farh of June group has avoided close identification with the others.
Bosch understands thatof his regime depends ultimately upon US
support, particularly estraint upon thothat his tolerance of Communist activities ensitive issue. At the same time, his is nationalistic, egotistic, and astutely aware of tbe political inexpediency of appearing toS puppet. Consequently, be is not readily amenable to US advice rogarding his policy with respect to Communist actlvltos. Although be may accommodate to US demands in Incidental natters, be is not likely to proscribe all Communist activities unless and until convinced that theyirect and immediate threat to bis regime.
19. Tbe Communist danger in the Dominican Republic is not immediate, but potential. It is none tbe less serious. Given present freedom to organize and agitate, the Communists will become hotter prepared to exploit some future opportunity. If, through administrative ineptitude, Bosch should fall to satisfy the expectations of tbe Dominican masses, or if he should be overthrowneactionary coup, the Communists will be in position to solzo tho leadership of tbe popular revolutionary movement.
Original document.
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