A SURVEY OF POSSIBLE SOVIET ACTIONS WITH ATTACHED COVERING MEMO

Created: 6/7/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

L INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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MEMORANDUM FOR TBE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Attached Meaorendun for the Director,urvey of Possible Soviet3

The attached Memorandum for the Director is forwarded for your information.

JOSEPH SELTZER Executive Officer National Estimates

INUS

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1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassIf1cation

J1QII

CSUTRAL IHTELblQBKCH AOEHCI CFFTCG CF KATICUAL ESTJHAIES

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HEMOtAHEfJM FOR THE DTRECTCS

SUBJECT: urvey of Poosible Soviet Actions

1. At the recent BATO neetings in Ottawa tbe viev vas cx-

preaacdut&ber of participants that vc ought to expect the

relative immobility which has choracterized Soviet policy since

the Cuban crisis to bo ended soon by Gomo nuv aggressive initiative.

ecent HIE the USTfl concluded as follows t

"In the present phase, ve think that tbe Soviets oreeither to Bake serious attempts to resolve cold-war tensions or toigorous new offensive against noc-Cccnunlot positions. Instead, tbey seen to sea tbe present period aa one which con beat be used to build up their strength end to fortify ex toting positions ln preparation for future opportunities.11

Tbe IttB pointed out, however, that this did not haply Soviet policy

vould bo paosivo, end that tbe Soviets would be alert to search

out new opportunities and western vulnerabilities for profitable

exploitation. It further worned that Khrushchev probably felt the

* , "Main Trends ln Soviet ForeignatedECRET.

GROUPfron0 itond

dcclasaificat1on

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need to register an advance vhlch vould reverse tho trend of adversity that has besot hto policies In the lost year or so. Ue could not exclude, therefore, tbe possibility of same new and audacious aove. It is tbe purpose af this awaaoranduo to consider what noves of this kind tho Sovietsundertake, if they were disposed to do so, though It renal ns our viev that no cccrocclvc netionrofcoble.

Soviet Initiatives

2. Berlin, Cuba, and Laos are the cost conspicuous areas vbere CooBuniet ventures could pose bard choices for Western policy. Since Laos and Cuba are the subject of clooo current scrutiny and reporting they will not bo covered here.* Berlin, however, has been quiet and tbe Soviets and East Germans hove given the Inprcaolon that Ccexsunlst policy la to accept the status quoine. This Is also our general estimate. In LVrtln the Soviets are leno hampered by third party interest than in Cuba and Laos, and arc oapable of acting without nueh preparation and without giving varalng signals to tho West. Moreover, in Berlin tbe Soviets

Two forthcaaing KIE's are relevant to these problems:Situation and Prospects inIEThe Inpoct of theoviet Dispute on North Viet nan and its Eollcies."

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retain sane Important tactical advantagea. it may be that after Adenauer's retirement Koeccv will decide to test the mettle of the new Erhord government, perhaps adzing the occasion of oomo step, in connection with the MU? plane, toward West Germany's farther participation in tbe nuclear armeaent of UATO. est night tell the Soviets something about tho durability of tho Bonn-Paris alignment under Erhord, and It might appeal to the Ccainunlsts as an offsetting counterstroke to the President'6 visit to Berlin.

3- There are still come moves open to the Soviets which Infringe on western political interests but do not necossatllyull-dress crisis. East Berlin has yet to be formally incorporated into East Germany, and various other "vestiges" of four pover rule remain as potential targets: tho Berlin Air Safety Center, Spandcu Prison, the Soviet Var Memorial in Vest Berlin, Western military patrolling In East Berlin, contacts between the Soviet Casoonder in Germany and the Western commandants in Berlin, and the Allied Military Missions in Potsdam. ore dangerous level, of course, there is the question of both civil end military oceans to Berlin, which the Soviets end East Germans could harrassariety of vsyo.

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h. erlin crisis is the moot direct form of pressure against tho Weetem alliance, but there are other tension-raising moves of

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a general kind which the Soviets night moke. Tho USSR might resume nuclear testingsunner. Simultaneously, they might break off tho Geneva disarmament discusslonoy perhaps chargingemonstrative manner that NATO nuclear policies involving West Germany madediscussions meaningless. They might also aggravate tensions by boycotting the current special Lii General Assembly meeting on finances. pecial pressure point, the Soviets could become more aggressive on the RATO flanks, in Scandinavia or Greece-Turkey. Action against those areas vould probably only be In tbe nature of verbal nenace, but tbe possibility of specific demands on Finland for defense cooperation cannot bo excluded. Finland, in addition to Berlin, is an area wliere tbe Soviets canressure against Western Interests ln retaliationurther buildup of Vest German military strength. President Kckkanen has lately been apprehensive enough of some new pressure In Northern Europe that he took the precaution of coming outuclear free zone in that area. Just In case the Soviets raise demands for militaryfrom Finland.

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Soviet initiatives need not be United tooviet attempt to interfereS satellite is Tbey would be more likely to dcnon3trate theirond military proveso In on enterprioo which carrleo loss risk

I of engagement vlth tbe Vest. For example, if nuclear testing resumed, tbe Sovioto might explode very high yield weapons. Or the Soviets might test an orbital nuclear weapon which is probably within their near-term capabilities.*

Soviet Opportunities

vlthout Buch Soviet initiatives, there arcin the world where situations could develop eveninitiative, cut into which tbey night Inject themselves

In an Southeast Asia end the Middle East are currently oreon of instability and tension which could be turned to the Soviet advantage. Soviet support end encouragement of en expansionist and belligerent Indonesian policy could be explosive, particularly oo the Malays lea oltuatlon movoolimax. Political opportunities for tbe USSR In tberld are maaerous

This possibility will be discussedorthecaine paper,, "Soviot Capabilities and Intentions to Orbit Huclear Weapons."

SG

end range from the mora traditional, form of penetration through

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economic end military aid, shaping up currently in Algeria, to thesensitive situations such as Arab-Israeli tensions, further buildup of the Soviet military presence ln Semen and the political incitement of the Kurds.*

T While thereumber of such situations, in tbe post the major openings for Moeccv have been largely the unanticipated turn of events, ouch as the Congo, Cuba, tho Iraqi revoltuinea, and Ghana, At the present time the incipient revolts In the Portuguese colonies, the racial tendons in Central Africa, and tbe border disputes ln East Africa hold some premiseoviet intrusion and exploitation.

and Bloc Developmelits

8 VThat initiatives the Soviets might take or hov they vould respond to opportunities could be greatly affected by changes in the top leadership or decisive developments In the crisis incommunism. Our current Judgment is that Khrushchev's essential authority remains intact, although ho vaa apparently under

A much fuller discussion is givon in: Our Memorandum for the Director, "Principal Opportunities for tbe USSR in the ArabECRET.

ooae pressure from his colleagues in recent months end some restraints may hove been placed on his freedom to arbitrarily decide policy questions. It is possible that vc have underrated tho tensions in the Kremlin. If eo, Khrushchev might cock some foreign political coup to strengthen his dominance in the leadership.

9- Probably the most pressing current issue for Hoscov is the forthcoming negotiation with the Chinese Communists. We do not foresee any resolution beyond the most fragile compromise and ve doubt that cither side vould make important concessions to achieve even this modest settlement. Ke strongly doubt that the Soviets vould undertake now, risky ventures merely to placate China, mainly because the Soviets have probably concluded that such concessions have little long-term effect on the course of tho dispute other than to whit tbe Chinese appetite for power and influence in the Cctanranist world. In the maneuvering which is bound toortracted discussion betoreen tbe two parties and within the movement, the Soviets might raise the level of anti-Western! em to strengthen theirin the talks, or the Chinese

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might QgEruvatc some issue (the offshore islands, Sino-Indlen

border, Leoe) to confound the Soviets.

FOR THE BOARD CF RATIONAL ESTIMATES:

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SHEBMAH KERT Chairmen

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