SPECIAL REPORT - JAPANESE LABOR'S TREND TOWARD MODERATION

Created: 6/7/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

SPECIAL REPORT

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

JAPANESE LABOR'S TREND TOWARD MODERATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

APPFOVIC FORPElfASE

JFKIf

CONTAINS LNFORMATION.AW^KCT-IKGQNAI, DEFENSE OFJHEJJ^fTTO STATFS WITHIN THEr^SPIONAOE LAWS.SC.THEORJifiWrrTTATION OP WmCHTl^-AJ^MANNER TO Ail-OT^AUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBrTTW-BYLAW.

SECRET

73

JAPANESE LABOR'S TREND TOWARD MODERATION

During the past three years the federationthe largest segment of Japanese organized workers, the General Council of Trade Unionsas gradually shiftedore moderate course than that followed in Its first decade. While Its leaders continue to use doctrinaire Marxist and Its fundamental policies have not been formally revised, Sohyo activities have been taking an increasingly pragmatic approach concentrated on economic problems. Thla trend shows signsermanent transformation.

Pounded0 with US encouragement to fight Communism in the Japanese laborSohyo was rapidlyby Communists who soononsiderable measure of control. The secretaryduring the, pro-Communist Mlnoru Takano, argued that Communist China and tbe USSR were the great "forces for peace" with which Japan should work.

Sohyo tended to accept the Communist claim that the Japanese worker faced two enemies, aonoply capitalism and American It leaned strongly toward the World Federation of Trade Unions, and worked closely with the Communist Party as well aa with the Socialist parties on inflammatory popular issues. Sohyo regularly coupled thespring drive for wagewith political demands, and frequently seemedwith political struggles unrelated to the workers' day-to-day problems.

Moderate elements won their first significant victory5 when socialist Akira Iwal ousted Takano from the secretary generalshiparrowmargin. Sohyo moderates nevertheless continued toong with Communist tactics ofilitant political line, and during the next five years the pro-Communistspopular issues such as the Japanese-US security treaty In efforts toominant position. Over-all, however, economic considerations became increasinglyshift which favored the.

Two events0 pushed the trend definitely against the militant pro-Communists. The excesses ofgainst the security treaty touched off an adverse public reaction, and awakened labor's rank and file to the adverse consequences ofpoliticalrolonged and unsuccessful

strike against modernization in the coal industry also cast doubt on the wisdom offor fruitless causes and inclined the leadership toward actions that had some prospect of winning practical benefits* In0 Sohyo'sleadership repudiated the previous policy of united action with tbe Communist Party-

Move to the Right

0 theof moderate control was registered in elections in both constituent unions and in the parent body. ora body of fence sitters ln the national Railway Workers Union joined moderates to give them an unprecedented three-fourths majority at their This year the moderates in the teachers'largestof overercent of the delegates at an extraordinary convention. 1 the moderates have heldf theeats on Sohyo's Central Executive Committee, and five of the six bureau chiefs elected2 are of the same group.

Beginning1 political issues wereshift formally acknowledged ln Sohyo's annual policy document, "Basic Guidelines fort the same time Sohyo sought to differentiate Its approach from that of the Communists, and moved closer to the JapanParty <JSP). During this period it has followed the majority of its component unions

in endorsing the JSP alone, Secretary General Iwai and many of the other leaders support the JSP's view that through "structuralather than revolution, Japanesesociety can be adjusted more to the benefit of the

The Coal Miners Union, which experienced the0 strike, has advanced the Idea that workers can Improve their lot within capitalism by pressing the government to pursue pro-labor policies. This now has ripenedet of long-range "labor plans" to deal with the growing problem of modernization of industry, automation, and the resultant layoffs. In addition to the coal miners, the postal, telecommunications, and railway workers* unions have begun to draw up such plans. Thisis assuming greaterfor Japanese labor than the continued lip service paid to the traditional concept of class struggle.

SECRET

Fora1go Policy

Parallel shifts havein foreign policy In discarding Takano's old theories, Sohyo has adopted cbairaan Ota's "third force" concept which calls for Japan to follow "positive neutrality" in the cold war and toloc of nooallgned countries working for peace. The shock caused by the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing in1 aided this shift, and the Slno-Soviet dispute has also aroused doubts that thecountries possess tbeformula for peace and

Sohyo's relations withChina, in particular, have cooled considerably. rogram of labor exchanges with Communist Chinaisit there byproposed for earlybeen repeatedly Ota has spoken out against linking China and Japan as common foes of US Top leaders franklytheir preference for the Kremlin's "peaceful coexistence" line over the bellicose threats from Pelping.

Although visits to the bloc are still popular, Sohyo has shown increasing interest in ties with the free world, and the number of delegationsthe United States alone is almost as large as those going to tbe bloc. ew years ago they were four to one in favor of the bloc. While stillcommitted tobetween the WFTU and the anti-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Sohyo has in practice moved closer to the latter. 2 Sohyo broke with theJapan Council for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensulkyo) and is striving to reconstruct the anttnuclear movement without allowing the Communists to run the show.

Rival Influences

One factor encouraginghas been the growth of distinct groups within Sohyoless militant policies. Moat recently, the formationovement labeled the

SOHYO

(Gnrol

ZfNRO

(Track Union GnnMt

MEMBERSHIP OF JAPANESE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

ilcMSYrs IU1

if OOMllCinorol

Fsaeralton ol labai

SEORET

Policy

Parallel shifts bavela foreign policy In discarding Takano's old theories, Sohyo has adopted chairman Ota's "third force" concept which calls for Japan to follow "positive neutrality" in the cold war and toloc of nonaligned countries working for peace. Tbe shock caused by the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing ln1 aided this shift, and the Sino-Soviet dispute has also aroused doubts that thecountries possess theformula for peace and

Sohyo's relations withChina, in particular, bave cooled considerably. rogram of labor exchanges with Communist Chinaisit there byproposed for earlybeen repeatedly Ota has spoken out against linking China and Japan as common foes of US Top leaders franklytheir preference for the Kremlin's "peaceful coexistence" line over the bellicose threats from Peiping.

Although visits to the bloc are still popular, Sohyo has shown increasing interost ln ties with tbe free world, and tbe number of delegationsthe United States alone is almost as large as those going to the bloc. ew years ago they were four to one in favor of the bloc. While stillcommitted tobetween the WFTU and the antl-Communlst International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Sohyo has in practice moved closer to the latter. 2 Sohyo broke with theJapan Council for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensulkyo) and Is striving to reconstruct the antlnuclear movement without allowing tbe Communists to run tho show.

Rival Influences

One factor encouraginghas been the growth of distinct groups within Sohyoless militant policies. Most recently, the formationovement labeled the

SO"YC

(Gtt-rol Gwwll ef Trad* CWoni)

ZIMIO (Trodr Unto* Ctyy

MEMBERSHIP OF JAPANESE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

(III

SE^Rsfl

n ol DOMfl KWCIo.Tn.1Gw*relotor Unfami

rs ISI

OTA

National Democratization Liaison Council, made up of unions both inside and outside of Sohyo, has placed th* federation'sunder proving pressure to speed the trend to the right or risk significant defections.

Nevertheless, aminority remains active, and Sohyo's leadership still finds it expedient to cooperate with the Communist Party on an ad hoc basis. It avoids openly taking issue with the WFTUof the continued desirabll ity of appearing neutral and to avoid evoking protests from tbe extreme leftists.

Sohyo's weak rivals,Zenro in the right-wing trade union grouping, Domel Kalgi, charge that the apparent drift to the right is nothing moreactic to undercutand represents no real change. This argument Isby Sohyo's ambiguity on many points, and the fact that its official dogmaasic substratum ofMarxism.

Nevertheless, thore is much to indicate that whatasefensiveshift to the rights nowundamental policy Chang* along lines followed by labor movements ln Western Europe. eriouswidespread dismissals,rave international crisis that threatens to plunge Japan into war, Sohyo has taken so many different steps ln the diroction of moderation, and has found so much support for its rlgbtward swing, that it would find it difficult to reverse its course. ^VrTFTnf'M _

-Till )

Original document.

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