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73
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN BERLIN
The most striking feature of the USSR's tactics in Berlin proper for the past ten months has been its attempt tooothold in the Western sectors. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Berlin Koramandatura last August, the Russians haveariety of direct approaches to West Berlinleaders, tradesmen, and cultural figures. Moscow's purpose is to undermine the Allies'in Berlin, cut political ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, and lend substance to the notionfree city" of West Berlin.
In Soviet Allied Contacts ln BerlTn
Onugust the East German bordor guards fatallyould-be escapee, Peter Fechter, and left hia to die within sight of West Berlin bystanders. Confronted byAllied demands that the Soviets restrain the Ulbrichtrom further outrages along the Wall.and, In effect, exercise the responsibility for day-to day Berlin developments which they had steadfastly denied having, Moscow answered bydissolving tbeof Soviet commandant in Berlin. This action killed the four-power Kommandatura set up5 to govern occupiedhad
For all practical purposes, relations between the Soviet and Allied commandants had already been suspended the previouswhen East German guards at Friedricbstrasse demanded identification from nonuniformed advisers accompanying the US commandantrearranged raeetinc with the Soviet In an attempt to solve
this impasse, the US and Soviet commandants subsequently met outside Westat Soviet headquarters ln Potsdam and then at the US MilitaryMission In the same town. However, the Soviets claimed they had no responsibility for the discrimination which had been shown against the US commandant's official advisers and maintained they had no jurisdiction over the "sovereign" East German guards.
Stopgap Measures
Having cut off contact with the Allied commandants, thetransferred Sovietfor Allied access to Berlin "temporarily" to the commander in chief, Group of Soviet Forces Germanyocatediles outside tbe city. This left the Soviets with only three "official positions" in WestPrison, the Berlin Air Safety Centernd the Soviet War Memorial in the British Sector. The first two are remnants of the old quadripartite control apparatus ofvery machinery which Moscow has maintained no longer exists. The War Memorial
n
Soviet War Memorial In Wesr Berlin
the only uniquelyinstitution in West Berlin.
Moscow thereupon began to step up efforts tourther "Soviet presence" ln West"presence" which would support its claimed right to share with the Allies ln governing West Berlin. Although Moscowrecognizes that what it calls the "occupation regime"hree-power affair, it clings to the pretense that the USSR holds some vague, undefined rights in West Berlin underquadripartite agreements.
The attempt to invest the GoFG commanr'er in chief--General"temporary" responsibility for Berlin was not altogether successful. The Allied CINCs in West Germany persisted in forwarding communications from General Yakubovsky to the Western
commandants for reply andhim that orehandling of Berlincould be had by dealing directly with the top officers in Berlin.
Not long thereafter,onthly luncheon at Spandau, the Soviet prison warden, Lt. Col. Lazarev, Intimated that he would do whatever he could to facilitate good relationslocal US and Soviet authorities. Thisto obtain tacit Alliedin his role as anSoviet liaison channel ln WestIgnored.
Harassmenturpose
Almost immediately Soviet authorities began to seize upon irregularities or seemingin Western access
secret-
procedures to remind the Allies that "free" access depended on Communist sufferance. Oneparate occasionsebruary andhe Soviets and/or Bast GermansIn some way with Allied rail or vehicular Movement en route to or from Berlin or within East Berlin.
Onarch the East Germans succeeded in getting the British ambassador. Sir Prank Roberts, to flash his identification whento Veat Berlinall at tbe Soviet Embassy in East Berlin.
The most serious incidents involved the processing of Allied freight trains. Beginninghe Sovietsto tho US and UK practice of dismounting armed guards to patrol alongside trains stopped in the Marlenborn yards forThey did not object to having guards dismount at other stops inside East Germany but maintained that was Soviet territory and was protected by Red Array troops.
Tho Soviets seemed to be setting the stage for ameeting lnmeeting between tbe Allied CINCs in Vest Germany or thoand General Yakubovsky or someone acting for him. The Soviet officers to whom Allied provost marshals protested the train incidents generally were courteous and reasonable. Several times they intimated that such minorcould be avoidedour-power discussion of the problems involved. he Marlenborn checkpoint commander actually proposed such
a meeting. At another luncheon at Spandau, Lt. Col. Lazarev volunteered that be couldfor tbe US commandant to visit East BorllD.
A Change in the Embassy
Onoscow badew ambassador to East Germany, Pyotr Abrasimov. However, in line with the general Soviet position that allrights had ended, his credentials failed to list any "residual" authority to act as successor to tho one-timehigh commissioner forcomparable to that vested ln all throe of the Allied ambassadors and in his predecessor, Pervukhin. This omission waa to complicate later Soviet attempts both to open discussions directly with the Vest Berlin Government and to reopen on-tho-spot contacts with the Vest.
Abandonment ofettlement Deadl ir.e
Onanuary,peech to the Socialist UnityD) congress, Khrushchevconceded that the USSR
was unable toerlin settlement which would meet even minimal Soviet demands and intimated that the Berlin question was not as critical in Soviet policy considerations as lt had been at the time of the8 speech in which he firsteadlineerlin settlement.
At the same party conclave, Ulbricht professed to find the Berlin issue still negotiable, allowed that "prestige factors" made it difficult for the West to concede to the bloc on Berlin, and theneven-point program aimed at "establishing the prerequisites for objective and normal relations between the two German states."
Overtures to West Berliners
following the dissolution of tho Soviet commandant's office, Soviet officials had sought to establish contact with West Berlin governmont, trade, educational, and cultural leaders and toase in West Berlin for quasi-officialas TASS, No-vosti, and SOVEKSPORT. These efforts have not been successful.
West Berlin officials balked at according Soviet Embassy offlcors special consideration, and local business leaders proved no more amenable. At the urging of tho 3enat, West Berlin's executive, they pointed out that the Sovietaccounts forercent of lest Berlin's totallittle to offer in return for their products.
Finally, tbe Allied Travel Office would not grant residence permits to Soviet nationals. Earlier, lnhe British hadAS3who had taken upresidence in their sector.
Attempts to Deal With Tho Berlin Senat'
Moscow tried to capitalize on3 bombing of the Iotourlst offices in West Berlin to bypass thecommandants and dealwith the Senat. Two Soviet military officers drove into West Berlin on the morningebruary to inspect the In-tourist offices. The following day junior officers from the embassy "acting on behalf of the Soviet High Commissioner in Germany, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the GDR, P. A.isited the Senat protocol chief, who agreed to listen to their demand that West Berlin authoritiesand punish the bombers.
Tbe Allies decided that tbe appropriate replies should be signed by the Berlin At first, tbeirmilitary liaison missions
were rebuffed when they attempted to deliver the letters to GSFG headquarters. But less thanours later, the missions were advised by phone thatYakubovsky's chief of staff henceforth would acceptfrom the commandants.
A New Beginning
A week or so later, the protocol officer of the Soviet Embassy called at the US Mission andetterhim as an emissary of Abrasi-aov who, it said, was entrusted with maintaining relations with US, UK, and Frenchln the German Federal Republic "on questions concerning Germanyhole resulting from the decision of the fourthe authority Abrasimov's initial letter to tbe Allied ambassadors had failed to mention!
The Lure of Trade
The Soviets clearly are determined to do what they can to further acceptance of the notion of West Berlin as an entity separate from West To this end, Moscow had protested the clauses including Berlin in the Franco - Westtreaty, and bloc negotiators threaten to refuse to sign with West German traders commercial agreements which extend to At the same time, other Soviet and bloc economichold out to West Berlin businessmen the prospect of lucrativeat the expense of West Berlin's ties with Bonn.
During the last week in April the Soviet Embassy's trade counselor Invited approximatelyrominent West Berlinto an East Berlin meeting at which they were offeredand were asked to servepecial committee to study the possibility of expanding trade between their city and the USSR. eek later, West Berlin Economics Senator Karl Schiller characterized the soviet offer as unrealistic. eport to the Senat, Schiller said that the products offered by theoil, pit-wood, furs, crabmeat, caviar, andof no interest. Onpril, the Senat advocated "in principle" the expansion of trade with the bloc; but it insisted that any increase be effected within the framework of agreements between the bloc states and the Federal Republic. It is unlikely that Moscow will agree to such an arrangement.
' The Russians reportedly plan to open an export office ln West Berlin and are trying to obtain residence permits for TASS, Izvestia, and NovostiNone of the Allies has comparable facilities in East Berlin. Reuters does maintain an East Berlin office; but its correspondent commutes from West Berlin. The British areto anything which might jeopardize his activitiesn tbe Allied Travel Office and quadripartite meetings elsewhere, are inclined to favor the granting of West Berlin residence permits to the TASS and Novosti staffers, if no others. They admit that to grant such permits to one or
rs
III
Soviet nationals would make lt extremely difficult to deny other applications and probably wouldore lenient policy generally on such requests.
At the present time, the Russians reportedly are using the existing Intourist and SOVESSPORTFILM offices toWest Berlin firms, while attempting toegular listing with the West Berlin Trade Register. The SOVEK-SPOKTi'ILM studio has been used for film premiere parties to which Polish and Czech military liaison mission personnel and non-Allied diplomats, such as the Swedes and Swiss, in the Western sectors have been There are reports that officers from the Soviet Embassy again have approached the Senatiew to scheduling the appearance of Russian cultural groups in West Berlin and have offered to arrange for the exchange of "technical-level" delegations with Moscow.
US officials ln Berlin have noted that many of theof the Westased Polish and Czechoslovak military liaison missions, all of whom formerly resided in East Berlin, have within the year transferred their households to the Western sectors. This transfer probably is designed to forestall any retaliatory moves against the Czechs or Poles by the Allies in the event the East German regime incorporates East Berlin into the GDR and seals off the
city sector border to all Allied personnel.
The Immediate Future
ecetr^renuirk^byKbxushche v
suggos^tha^theiSovie^iea^Ss harbor few illusions aboutwith an Erhard Moscow appears to be marking time until furtherchanges in Bonn encourage greater flexibility in theAllied position ora direct Soviet approach to the Federal Republic. Moscow has yet to reveal any details of its proposals of six months agoUN in Westnd for tbe moment seems content to pursue relatively low-level objectives in Berlin.
Among these, obviously, is the reinstitutlon of military contact with the Alliesegular dally basis in Berlin, ultimately includingegular liaison staff in West Berlin. Another is the expansion of nonmilitary trade and cultural outlets in the Western sectors. It is doubtful that Moscow expects such outlets to result in any economic benefits. Rather, such tactics appear directeduture situation in which the USSR couldirect role in West Berlin affairs. To that end it is concerned with building up the image of an independent West Berlin which deals with foreign governments on the basis of equality and exercises all of the
other prerogatives of sovereignty. Anything Moscow can do tosuch an image serves to strengthen tbe credibility of its proposalsfroe city"the OS SB claims would be able to establish Itself as an independent trading partner with both Bast and feat.
Further, Moacow continually seeks to derogate the concept that Allied rights ln Berlin
derive from tho unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. The establishment of Soviet economic and culturalin the midst of the "occupation regime" would help to support tho Soviet contention thatears after the end of World War II the status of West Berlin is anachronistic or, as the Russians are fond of saying, ^nomalous^^jaCliriPiilFriAfc NP
Original document.
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