PARTY PRIMACY IN PEIPING'S ARMED FORCES

Created: 6/7/1963

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PRIMACY IN PEIPING'S ARMED FORCES

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73

PARTY PRIMACY IN PEIPING'S ARMED FORCES

The question of party supremacy over the armed forces is still beingit has since the formation of the Red Array inthe "mostmilitary question in Communist China. Despite intensive indoctrination and new control mechanisms set up when the minister ofove to emphasizeat the expense of political orthodoxy, the morale and ideological dedication of both officers and men areatter of party concern. Some military officers appear to believe that political controls hamper their effectiveness in meeting the demands of modern warfare. Dissatisfaction apparently also exists, particularly In the air force, over the slow pace of military modernization.

Party-Military Relations

Ever since the army's days, Uao Tse-tung has insisted that "the party directs the guns." Efforts to enforce this dictum, particularly since the Chinese Communists achieved power, have led to persistent party-army strains. These following the Korean War,rogram of modernizing the army stimulatedrofessional officer class more inclined than the officers of the revolutionary past to resent party interference in military affairs. At the same time, political reliability in the rank and file was diluted by the steady demobilization of old revolutionary veterans and the mobilization of young recruits who had not been steeled instruggle.

The strains apparently reached seriousarathon conference of high-level military leaders

from May to July was followederies of articles in the official army newspaper strongly critical of the growth of "purely military views" in the armed forces. These articles, for the first time, charged that some officers "openly advocatedof party leadership in the armed forces. In October, General Su Vu was replaced as chief of the General Staff by General Huang Ko-cheng,ove probably designed to underline the party's point that it was in complete control of the armed forces. At the same time the officer corps probably wasto increase itsto party will.

Military Affairs Committee

Even more serious troubles were developing within the ranks of the Military Affairs Committee, the party organ which formulates military policy subject only to assent by Mao Tse-tung and the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

SESsRET

it alt Mao's trusted old-line military leaders, including most, if not all, of tho ten heroes of the revolution who have been honored for their outstanding contributions by being madeof the armed forces.

This group scored many elli-tary victories over the years while accepting Maoist precepts of party supremacy. one of its leading members, Minister of Defense Peng Te-huai, apparently spearheaded an attempt9 to "regularize" the armed forces by emphasizingin the officer corps at the oxpense of political orthodoxy.

This challenge to party hegemony was beaten back by Mao and the other top leaders. The general and histhe new chief of staff Huangremoved from their Jobs. Direction of the committee was turned over to Marshal Lin Piao, who stood

higher ln party rank andcloser to Mao than his predecessor. Lin was also named minister of Defense.

At the same time theAffairs Committee took steps to bring activities of lower echelons under more direct Committee members were charged with the specificof military programs which the party regarded as especially important.

Faced with the prospect that natural attrition will soon begin to remove these old-time revolutionary zealots from the committee, Peiplng has done what lt can to expand andtheir influence. at all levels are given to understand that they should model themselves and pattern their careers on the example of the present committee membersalong with all other senior generals, have been specif ically excluded from mandatory retirement regulations.

General Political Department

Following the Peng Te-huai purge the party also attempted to bolster the armed forces' General Political the only militaryspecifically mentioned in the party constitution. The constitution entrusts it with taking charge of the partyand organizational work ln tbe army and stipulates that it will operate under the direct leadership of the central In fulfilling this role,

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department runs the military propaganda and educational It has an important say In military personnel matters.

Since theof the General Political Department has been in the hands of Lo Jung-huan, an army marshal with extensive experienceolitical officer and much closer to Mao than his predecessor. Hisman, and theleading public spokesman, has been General Hsiaoounger officerackground in political work within the armed forces.

Under this new leadership, the department has workod bard to reinforce the politicalprogram throughout the military forces. Thiswas pressed primarily through the system of theofficers or commissars which the General Politicalassigns to all military units down through the company level. These officers take their direction only from the General Political Department and their powers extend far beyond political indoctrination. Por example, they must approveorders before they can be carried out, except ln the most extreme combat conditions.

Party Committees

The political officer is only one of thethrough which the party operates in the armed forces. Party committees in all military units maintain close relations with the equivalent civilian

LO JUNG-HUAN party committees in their area. The party committee in adistrict headquarters, for instance, receives guidance from the local provincial party committee. This gives theegree of horizontal control over the military to supplement the vertical control provided by the political officer.

At the regimental level and above, both the military commander of the unit and the political commissar are generally members of the unit's party committee. When difficulties arise inan order, the committee is called together to discuss the problem andolution.

New Party Controls

Despite this dual system of political control, Peiping apparently considers its Inadequate in the upper military echelons. Recently

regulations covering political work in tbe arced forces were revised and codified. The texts of the new regulations have not been received in the West, but press treatment of them suggests the party is creating stillcontrol mechanism. *ork organs" are being established in all military units down through the regiment. These organs, lt is Intimated, will work with the unit politicaland party committees to direct ideological and political work.

Tbe new regulations provideontinuation of Peiping's efforts to strengthen partyin tbebasic "combat unit." There have even been suggestions that reeu-lar party units be extended down to the platoon level.

Political Training

Political indoctrination sessions ln tbe armed forces have received particular emphasis since the Peng Te-huai purge. Today nearly half of tho total time used for military training Is devoted to political subjects.

Not content with its system of day-to-day ideologicaland control, tbe party has been trying toand expand its politicalschools in the armed forces. The premier institution in the system is tbe People's Liberation Army Political Academy in Peiping. This establishment trains senior political andofficers, Including some

general officers, in advanced ideological subjects.

Strains Persist

Despite vigorous efforts by the party to tighten its control apparatus in theestablishment during the recent past, Peiplng hasnot achieved its goal. Since last October,of various military bodies have beon summoned to an unusual number ofwork" conferences Inn part, these meetings were devoted to discussions of the new political work regulations. Subsequent propaganda has held political education to be the "foremost" task at present in the armed forces. The military is repeatedly urged to see that party directives are "truly

Some of the ideas of the purged Peng Te-huai seems still to be harassing tbe orthodox party leaders. Officerscontinue to argue that the "suddenness and complexity" of modern warfare renders the party committee system in the armed forces dangerously cumbersome and Inefficient. Th* partythat officers holding such views "estrange themselves fromnd regard tbe armyhing above class and above politics," Even in the present era of military dependence on technology, the party declares, it is possible for all military plans to be fulfilled byon tbe traditional Communist officer's "courage, self-confidence,

fighting ability, and esprit de corps." Today's Chineselt concludes, mist stillMilitant revolutionary" who subordinates himself to the party and relies for inspiration and practical guidance on thedoctrines expounded in the works of Kao Tse-tung. peech by General Hsiao Hua in February was heavily larded withto the military to "arm Itself" with Mao's thinking and "look up" to the party's central committee.

Slow Pace of Modernization

Beyond resentment over the party's many-sided control mechanism, there appears to bo dissatisfaction in high military circles over the slow pace ln modernizing tbe armed forces. Although these feelings probably

are not uncommon among senior officers, they have apparently gained greatest currency ln the air force, which has beenhard hit by theof Soviet help. Some air force elements have been reported tooliticalwith Moscow to gain aof 3oviet military aid. Two of the recent political work conferences were convened for air force.

Little hope is held out by Peiplng for an early speed-up

ln armed forces modernization. It was made clear at tbe recent military conferences that modernl< zation could not be putrash basis. Officers and men ln the armed forces were urged to be "patient ln anticipation of further Improvement." Thus the military organization has in effect been told by the party leaders that the weaponsavailable will have to suffice until China's owncan provide lt withand other advanced weapons.

Outlook

In the near future, party-army strains ln China nay beby differences over the pace of military Resentment amongmilitary officers will probably also continue to be stirred by the party'sto strengthen politicaland Ideological training in the military forces. Over the long pull, tbe balance of party versus military Influence ln the army may well depend on the nature of the demands levied on the military to support the party's foreign and domestic policy. Greater participation by the armed forces could result in a larger role for military leaders in top policy-makingrowing measure of from party.

Original document.

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