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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on North Vietnam and its Policies
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
n by rh* UNITED STATES INTEIUGENCE BOARD Ai indicated ov*rl*af3
The Control Intelligence Agency and tho intelligence organiiotiont ol theo' Store, Dalenw, tlie Army, ihehe Ai' lorce, ond Tho Joinl S'off.
Cvecior ol Intelligence ond Research, Deportment ol Slo'e Direcior, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chie' ol StoH for Intelligence, Oeportmenl of I'io Army
Atshionl Chiel ol Navol Operotlonseportment ol Ihe Novy
Assistant Chief of Slerfl, Inielligence. USAF
Direcior for Intelligence, Joint Staff
Oireetor of the Noilonol Security Agency
Abstaining:
SwSBH
The Atomic Energy Commission Reproseniorive to the USlS, ond the Assistant
PfcOSRAM oi
Cer.^ra-Agency.
RP ^7
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on North Vietnam and its Policies
THE IMPACT OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON NORTH VIETNAM AND ITS POLICIES
THE PROBLEM
To analyze the position of North Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet dispute and the effect this has upon Communist policies and actions in Laos and South Vietnam.
CONCLUSIONS
Vietnamarge measure of independenceCommunist Bloc, and it has avoided committing itselfside in lhe Sino-Soviet dispute. We believe that itto continue avoidingommitment. (Paras.)
spite of its independent position, Hanoi hastoward certain of Peiping's positions in theits neutrality has recently shifted somewhat towardHence, if Hanoi is moved to commit itself further,probably be in the direction of fuller support todevelopment of an open, formal break between Moscowor the death of the influential Ho Chi Minh wouldthe pressuresorth Vietnamese commitment.Hanoi will almost certainly attempt to keep as great aof independence as possible, and to maintain ties
almost certainlyore sober view thanand Hanoi of the riskS intervention, andmore stress on political meansommunistLaos. For their part, the Chinese and North Vietnamesequicker victory through the application of miliiary as wellpressure. Nevertheless, at the present level of activity.
and Chinese policies are in no essential conflict, and Hanoi has considerable initiative and freedom ofrastic change of the situation in Laoshe threat of large-scale US intervention) might exacerbate Soviet-Chinese differences over policies to be pursued in southeast Asia. However,risis showdown with the US, we cannot assume that Moscow would fail to support Peiping and Hanoi. )
2
DISCUSSION
I. SOURCES OF NORTH VIETNAMESE CONDUCT
The announced objectives of the Government of North Vietnam (DRV) are: (a) "socialisteconomic and political consolidation of the territory controlled by the DRV: nnd (b)ace-ful unification" of allucioiy in the Hanoi-directedin the south. Hanoi wants the support ol both Communist China and the USSR in thc pursuit of these objectives.
North Vietnam's internal problems aie many nnd serious,the pressures of rapid population growth against limitednd ot an ambitious developni<:ntmwith an exlreme shortage of skilled and framed personnel.production Is not fully adequate io meet lhe domestic needs of an expanding population, letld an exportable surplus. Although North Vietnam appears to be reasonably well endowed with mineral resources, it lacks the technological competence to exploit ihem efficiently. Industry is rudimentary and Inadequate to meet many consumer needs.esult, North Vietnam Is dependent on its Communist Bloc partners, principally Moscow and Peiping, forin virtually every sector of the economy. This dependency limitsonsiderable extent Hanoi's power of decision over the pace and nature of its own economic development.
Hanoi's leaders would like to sec Vietnamese hegemony extended over all the states ot former French Indochina. For the moment, their ambition appears to be focused primarily on taking over South Vietnam. Hanoi must move with circumspection in this effort, exercising care lo consider the views of its senior Communist allies. Moscow and Peiping, and remaining alert to the danger of situations which might lead to drastic US action. This fearajor military confrontation with the US places an upper limit on the scale and tempo nf Hinoi's militancy in Soulh Vietnam and Laos.
4 Another basic factor Shaping North Vietnamese conduct IS the dcsiie toaximum amount of independence within the general framework of thc Communist movement Like Yugoslavia andChina, the North Vietnamese ComniunUts came lo powerard-won victory by their own forces, and in Ho Chi Minh theyespected revolutionary leader and national founder In the mold of Tito and Mao. Hanoi has the self-confldcnce which comes with this heritage. Long oppressed by imperial China, thc Vietnamese remain fearful of and resistant to renewed domination by the Chinese, or, for lhal matter, domination by any othci alien powet. So far Hanoi has
3
:
egree ol auionomy that Is uncommon in the Communist Bloc. It has accepted aid Horn both Moscow and Peiping, and it has prevented either Iromreponderant influence In its affairs.
II. NORTH VIETNAM'S POSITION IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
orth Vietnam's jealousy of its independence nnd its desire for support from both Moscow and Peiping have been the primaryof Hanoi's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute Hanoi desires the military and political backing of asoalition as possible and is shaken by the prospectplit or disintegration of the Communist Bloc. The DRV feeli that the poliUcal support and military backing of both Communist China and the Soviet Union aie essential to the maintenance of its Integrity and as sttalcgic supports for its foreign policy.
G. Accordingly, the North Vietnamese have avoidedlear-cut stand In favor of cither parly and have continually worked to bring the two together Ho Chi Minh pursued the role of mediator, with at least superficial success, al0 all-party conclave In Moscow, and has persisted in his efforts to heal the breach Ho's skill and his prestigeenior Communist statesman, an associate of both Lenin And Stalin, has contributed to North Vietnam's ability lo avoid committing itself when all other Bloc parties have done so.
There are longstanding rivalries and Jealousies within the North Vietnamese leadership, and facUons have formed around various key personages. However, the associationeaderactionpro-Moscow"pio-Pelping" line is more likely lo be based onof Vietnamese national inlciests lhanesire loHanoi with ono side or the other in lhe Sino-Soviet dispute.
Wc believe Lhat Hanoi's self-interest willontinuation of this attitude for as long as possible. We must keep in mmd, however, that ardent Communist sectarians do not always follow the course which seems to us clearly in their best interest. Pelping's costlyto Moscow0ase in point Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that Hanoi may decide or be forced to come down off the fence
Two contingencies would makeevelopment more likely. The death of Ho woulderiod of jockeying for power within the DRV leadership and lhe impulses toward Bloc unity and toward remaining aloof from the Sino-Soviet dispute would be weakened. During this period also. DRV actions toward Laos and South Vielnam might be lessefinite break between Moscow and Peiping would lead both parlies lo be more forthright and aggressive in seeking allies, and each would bring increased piessuie upon Hanoi to commit itself.
lthough Hanoi deplores lhe Sino-Soviet polemic and seeks to mitigate its bitterness, the DRV line on particular substantive issues more frequently corresponds to thc Chinese than to the Soviet position. In general. Hanoi shares Pciping's views on how the world Communist movement should be run. Hanoi's desire to preserve its freedom of action leads it. like Peiping, to oppose Moscow's demand that the movement observe the principle of "democratic centralism"submission to the decisions of the majority, which is controlled byanoi's Irredentism loward South Vietnam, like Peiping's toward Taiwan, leads it to oppose devotion to "peaceful coexistence" and to object to disarmament efforts exceptevice to "expose the insincerity of theanoi also joins Peiping inmaximum "struggle" and support of "liberation" movements.and racial affinities also incline the North Vietnamese toward the Chinese rather than the Russians and the overwhelming power of China is closer at hand. Hence, we believe that Hanoi, if moved la take sides, would throw Its support to the Chinese.
If this came to pass. Hanoi would have lo face the possibilityurtailment or termination of Soviet economic and military support. But unless the scope of DRV military moves is considerably increased. Soviet military assistance Is not vital. Moreover, it seems likely that Hanoi, In conducting Its operations at current levels in Laos and South Vietnam, does not rely very heavily on thc Soviet deterrent. In the economic field, both Chinese and Soviet aid programs arendithdrawal of Soviet assistance would cause inconvenience and some damage to DRV development schemes, it would not be critical; much of the slack would probably be taken up by expanded Chinese assistance and by purchases in the Free World.
It should be emphasi2cd. however, that support of Peiping on the issues of the intra-Communist dispute does not automatically entail cither Hanoi's subservience to Peipingefinitive severing of Hanoi's ties to Moscow. Therereat variety of Intermediate stages, and thc DRV would strive, probably with considerable success, toarge measure of independence and an effective connection with Moscow as well as with Peiping.
III. INTERACTION OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE AND COMMUNIST POLICIES AND ACTION IN IAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM
The Silualion in Loos
he primacy of Hanoi's interest in Laos is almost certainlyby Moscow and Peiping. However, both of them would exert considerable pressure to prevent North Vietnamese actions which an-
'A brief description Of thc Soviet and Chinese economic aid proarams lathe '
pcarcd to imperil broader Chinese? or Soviet interests At present levels of commitment and activity. Hanoi appears toelatively Iree hand within Laos, where lligh degree of conlrol over the Pathet Laothe Communist military force in Laos--and Ilscounterpart, the Nco Lao Halt Xat (NLliX) Within theof political and military objectives laid down by North Vietnam, the PL/NLHX appears to exercise some degree of independent activity. Peiping appears lo have some direct conlncl with the PL/NLHX, though Moscow does not.
considering overall strategy in Laos, the Soviets almostsee their interests as best servedontinuation of theachieved in2 Geneva Conference on Laos; iheystill expect that Communist objectives would be eventuallywholly without risk, through penetration and subversionSouvanna Phouma's coalition government The Sovietsmilitary pressures should be controlled so as lo promote this aim.
For their part. Hanoi and Peiping almost certainly believeommunist takeover can be accomplished more quickly and more directly. Moreover, they may fear lhat the Soviet-preferred method would significantly delay, and perhaps prevent, this achievement by allowing thc Souvanna regime to become stabilized and, given USstrengthened. In Iheir view, the way to win Is throughapplication of military and political pressure, capitalizing on quick, limited military victories and eroding the enemy's determination to fight. Thus, the Pallet Lao and the North Vietnamese have acted lo debilitate thc neutralists by all available means, but particularly by limited military action to exploit Souvanna'a weakness and iiidecisiveness.
In any event, Moscow, Peiping. and Hanoi almost certainly agree on the classic principle of combining military and political action, with the differencesatter of degree and emphasis. Bloc policy in Laos will almost certainly continue to reflect this overall Communist strategy, with Hanoi's choice of tactics dictated primarily by itsof local developments rather than by considerations of the Sino-Soviet dispute
Thc Soviets will probably continue lo compete with Peiping (or the allegiance ol North Vietnam, and they almost certainly would prefer not to give Hanoi andree hand to decide Communist policy in Laos However, the Soviet Union's interest in the Laos situation is peripheral in contrast lo Its deep Involvement in Cuba, Berlin, the dispute with Peiping, and several other immediate issues. The Soviets almost certainly prefer not to make much out of the Laos crisis and are unlikely to do so unless the situation threatens to flare up and bring lhe risk of an East-West confrontation there On the other hand. Communist China, bordering on Laos and loudly promoting the
of national liberation wars, is more directly Involved. In the coming months, as Moscow and Peiping approach another crisis in their relations, thc Chinese may try to make Laos an Issue In the Sino-Soviet dispute claiming that the Soviets are demonstrating an unwillingness to support wars of national liberation in underdeveloped areas But it seems unlikely that Peiping would risk significantly escalating the conflict In order to put the Soviets on the spot
any caic,long as Moscow and Peiping continue tothe allegiance of Communists everywhere, we believe lhatbe Inhibited in opposing Hanoi's and Peiping's desires in LaosVietnam, unless these seem to be endangering Moscow'srastic change of the situation In Laosof large-scale US Intervention) might exacerbateover policies to be pursued in southeuatrisis showdown with the US, we cannot assume thatfall to support Peiping and Hanoi.
fhe Situation in South Vietnam
policy and action in South Vietnam appears towholly dictated by Hanoi. As in Laos. Moscow andcertainlyoice in policy decisions Involving theirnational interests, but. in general, both appear content to"struggle" in the south as an irredentist issue and to permitVietnamese to pursue their subversive activityace andmanner which Hanoi deems appropriate Neither Moscow norknown to have any direct contact with either the Viet Cong ormechanism, the National Front for the Liberationlthough both, particularly Peiping. have madevisiting NKI.SV delegations.
7
ANNEX
SINO-SOVIET BLOC AID TO NORTH VIETNAM
North Vietnam has received extensive economic support from thc Sino-Soviet Bloc. Thc Initial phav ol tne Bloc aid program consisted largely of grants to support the North Vietnamese economy after the partitionoodstuffs and other consumer goods were dispatched underants as well as equipment and materials for economic reconstruction The reconstruction efTorl was mergedroader buildup of the economyhich required additional financial aid during thehird round ol financial assistance was extended to North Vietnamo support the economic development anticipated during the First Five-Year. The Sino-Soviet conflict probebly has had some adverse effect on Bloco( the foreign aid ptogram in North Vietnam, but Ils extent cannot be Judged.
Communist China has been thc largest contributor uf aid to the development program of North Vietnam. The Chinese assumed arole in the early rehabilitation of North Vietnam's transportation and communications facilities, as well as In the reconstruction andof Its Irrigation system In more recent years. China has undertaken the construction of several important light industrial projects. Inclulingice-husking plants, two sugarigaretteatchubber goodsojp factory,nitted goodshinese creditillion, extended ins being used to finance construction of several heavy industrial plants, including two power plants and an iron und steel plant. Inhina extended another credit, amounting7 million, to be used during theor theor expansion otndustrial and transport enterprises. This credit will provide for an expansion of the Chinese-sponsored iron and steel plant and for the construction of several smaller Iron and steel plants. Thc Iron and steel plant represents by far the largest foreign aid project In North Vietnam and will ubsorb the major share of Chinese aid to North Vietnam in thc first Five-Year Plan. Other assistance will be provided lo the chemical and cement industries and for railway and bridge Installations In the field of light industry, China will construct three mills for the manufacture of sugar, paper, and cotton yarn
The role of the USSR in North Vietnam's First Five-Year RH centers around8 million cicxiit extended in0 for economic and technical assistance in the construction ofndustrial projects. Sovicl aid will be used to expand the fuel und power in-
lay the foundationsodern machine-building industry, and strengthen thc scicntiflc research institutes in the country. This aid will include the construction of eight thermal and hydroelectric stationsotal capacityegawatts; thc expansion of the Hongay-Campha coal mines; the construction and equipping of three scientific and research training institutes; and the exploration of mineralIn addition, the USSR also extendedrant ofillion for medicine, insecticides, equipment, and specialists lor an antimalaria program.
4 Both the USSR and China provide agricultural assistance to North Vietnam. The Soviet programreditillion, extended inor the expansion of production and for the processing of tropical crops in North Vietnam. It envisages Soviet assistance in establishing stale farms with supporting workshops and the construction of factories for processing tea, coffee, and fruit. Chinese aid to North Vietnam's agricultural development began5 with work on the irrigation system and the dispatch of agricultural technicians. Inhina agreed to build eight rarmsiddletechnical school.
Chinese and Soviet assistance to North Vietnam includes specialists In many fields. The number of Soviet personnel working in North Vietnam probably isU. The number of Chinese personnel appears to be more numerous, perhaps amounting to. although some of lhe Chinese probably are laborers rather than specialists.
Nearly nil of the trade and aid moving to North Vietnam from the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries is transported by sea. Goodsby rail from the Soviet Bloc very likely make upmall percentage of the total volume of impoits arriving in North Vietnam by rail from China No information is available, however, indicating lhat armaments or munitions move to North Vietnam from the USSR by sea. and fragmentary data suggests that such materiel moves bythrough China.
The rail line Into North Vietnam from Communist China's Kwangsi Province, via P'ing-hsiang, is used for trade between North Vietnam and China. About two-thirds of the traffic passing through P'ing-hsiang, however, is CJiina-to-Chma traffic which transits North Vietnam inbetween Yunnan Province and the rest of China. About one-half Of the volume of nonmilitary imports by North Vietnam Irom China move by sea.
SE<*ET
TABLE
CREDITS AND GRANTS FROM THE USSR, THE EUROPEAN
SATELLITES, AND COMMUNIST CHINA (MILLIONS SUSi
ions
vm
1
56
Satellites
.1
China
42
hc USSR signed an agreement on further Sovietassistance to North Vietnam In the development ol agricultural resources. No details concerning the amount of Soviet assistance have been released.
11
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