railaspproved foi rolaaso through thoH PRCOTAM of tho Central Intelligence Agency.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Main Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE
PRINCIPAL I
I, THE BACKGROUND OF PRESENT SOVIET POLICY . etbacks to the Sovietpresent mood in Moscow-reasons for the Cuban missile venture
II. THE SITUATION IN THE
Characteristics of Khrushchev'sofonservative consensus
SOVIET VIEW OF PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES . 7
Limits of detenteol forwardto improve militaryofof another high-risk move
TACTICS IN THE NEAR
Negotiations on Berlin and disarmament-compromises withmilitary intentions into revolutions in newto limit Sino-Soviet dispute
V. THE LONGER
Influence of unforeseenol disaffection inside theeffects of Communistof foreign success or failure
VI. THE QUESTION OF
Importance of the individualof aof party, state, police, and military-probable policypolicy in the succession struggle'
mf
MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate main trends in Soviet foreign policy, withto the influence of political developments within the USSR and the world Communist movement.
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
forced withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cubawas the most dramaticeries of disappointmentswhich have been plaguing Soviet policy. It is truehave been offset somewhat by space successes, bythe development of missiles and nuclear weapons, andoothold in the Western Hemisphere.the fundamentally optimistic outlook of the Sovietoverlaid at presentober appreciation ofdangersealization that earlier expectations ofmust be stretched out into the future. Theof the Soviet leadership must also be adversely affectedcontinuing Chinese challenge to Soviet authority in thethe Communist movement. )
esult of these frustrations to Sovietleadership appears to have come into questionmonths. Although his colleagues probably have nothis downfall, they have apparently been trying to com-
etailed examination of Soviet military and economic policy appears In two recent. "Soviet MilitaryandaledOP SECRET,. "Soviet EconomicatedECRET.
pel him to take greater account of their collective opinions;has responded with policy revisions which seem to reflect their advice. While Khrushchev's freedom of action may thus be somewhat restricted at present, we believe that his essential authority remains intact.
the present phase, we think that the Soviets areto make serious attempts to resolve cold-warigorous new offensive againstInstead, they seem to see the present period ascan best be used to build up their strength and topositions in preparation for future opportunities.do not plan any early moves eithereightened crisis over Berlin. We believe thatto disarmament will be primarily agitational. Inprimary present aims are to induce the US to movefacto acceptance of Castro and to consolidate the Sovietfrom which they mean to pursue the longer termLatin America. )
do not mean to Imply, however, that Sovietin the present phase will be passive. The USSR willto search out vulnerabilities in the non-Communistit believes it can usefully exploit. It will alsoto make its influence felt throughout theFurthermore, while we think that the Soviets willsober view in the present period of the opportunities for athere is one important caveat to this judgment.identified the needajor triumph whicha trend of adversity as an important part of thefor deploying missiles to Cuba. This need stillwe cannot exclude the possibility of some newmove. )
key uncertainty surrounding future Soviet policythe problem of the succession to Khrushchev. Theafter his departure would probably_be_for moreelements to gain predominance, but the longer astruggle remains unresolved, the more tendencybeider range of alternative policies to beconsideration. )
F. We see some prospect that, over the long run, the element of ideological hostility in the Soviet outlook might gradually diminish. This depends upon many uncertain factors, however, and even if it should come about, the requirements of Soviet national security, prestige, and ambition would still bring the USSR into frequent collision with the interests of other states.)
DISCUSSION
I. THE BACKGROUND OF PRESENT SOVIET POLICY
The position in which the Soviet leaders find themselves3 Ls not the one which they anticipated five years ago. Soviet thinking8 was pervadedeneral optimism arisingumber of factors and calculations. Khrushchev, who had recentlyommanding position, apparently Judged that he had overcome both economic dislocations and the political turbulence unloosed by de-Stalin-ization and could look forward to steady and substantial internalHis view of relations among Communist States seems to have been that, freed of the burden of Stalinist excesses, Soviet policy could guide the Bloc more effectivelyooser hand while preserving the essentials of Moscow's leadership.
Looking out upon the non-Communist world, Khrushchev probably had considerable hopes that trends in the underdeveloped areas would continue to run ln his favor and that the USSR's earlier successes in the Middle East could be extended In that area and repeated in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Most important of all. the USSR's early sputnik and ICBM successes evidently persuaded him that the image andeven the substance of Soviet physical power would soon overbear that of the US and bring the West to the conference table ready for concessions to his demands. In short. Khrushchev8 saw the "world relation of forces" shifting rapidly in lavor of the USSR and believed that history, with vigorous assistance from Moscow, would in the coming period reward the Soviet cause with regular, tangible advances.
Almost none of this has come to pass. In the relations ofpower, regarded by the Soviets as an indispensable element in their general calculation of forces. US military and intelligence programs have ledituation in which both sides; and indeed much of world opinion, understand that strategic advantage does not lie with the USSR. The Berlin ultimatum8 remains unfulfilled and. save for the constriction of East Germany's refugee flow, basic Soviet aims in the key area of Germany are no further advanced. Although the So-
SGfRET
viels may expect some benefits from present strains In NATO, over the last five years the strength ot the Westhole has almost certainlyore formidable aspect in their eyes. In the underdeveloped countries, postcolonial nationalism has in most areas openly diverged from the hoped-for association with Soviet policies, and the USSR has not succeeded in establishing patronage, much less control, over the new nations.
Over the same period, the USSR's relations with its major ally have fallen into acute disarray, and the Soviets must now defend themselves throughout the Communist movement toeadership which had not been effectively challenged for four decades. At home, economic progress has falteredariety ot reasons, of which the mostIs the impact of military and space spending At the same lime. Intellectual circles have used Khrushchev's attacks upon Stalin to raise painful questions which tend to challenge the authority of the party and its present leaders.
This Is by no means to say that the last five years have brought an uninterrupted series of defeats for Soviet policy. During this period, forrocession of space feats has regularly revitalized Soviet prestige and sustained the USSR's lead In this important field otBoth nuclear and missile development have recorded notable technical progress. The Berlin Wall has greatly eased the problems of the client state of East Germany. Cuba's accession to the Communist campajor gain despite the October backdown and theproblems and dangers encountered in dealing with Castro and the US Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership seems to recognize the last five yearseriod in which problems accumulated.
There is no sign that this trend has caused the Soviets to revise their fundamental assumptions or that they regard these setbacks as more than temporary. There are many signs, however,ecognition that earlier expectations were ovcioptimistic. Their unwillingness to turn over Berlin access to East Germany and their precipitateof strategic missiles from Cuba are the most striking Instances testifyingober appraisal of their opportunities under the present relation of forces between East andimilar concern can be observed in their treatment of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Importance of which they no longer attempt to deny, and of their military position, where assertions of absolute superiority have given way to claims of parity and expressions of anxiety about US intentions and the future relation ol military forces. Similaily. the indiscriminate optimism of Soviet pronouncements concerning new countries and independence movements Is now heavily tempered by criticism ol the bourgeois and anti-Communist tendencies of nationalist leaders. Domestically, thehaa had to issue warnings to consumers that defense priorities will
cut into the program to raise living standards, and Khrushchev does not seem confident that former rates of general economic growth can be quickly regained. In sum, the leadership appears to realize that the disappointments of recent years are not Isolated but in facteries of related setbacks sterriming in part from mistaken appraisals of the possibilities open to Soviet policy.
n our view, the attempt to deploy strategic missiles in Cuba was in considerable part due to Soviet recognition of this trend. We think that the Soviet leaders, as they pondered this venture, were highly conscious of the failing momentum of their offensive and thereforeery high premiumramatic triumph which they could turn to account in manyalter both the image and theot relative power, toruitful ground for Berlinto undermine US influence in Latin America, to disarm Chinese criticisms. They may have Judged the chances of failure as high but nevertheless felt it necessary toalculated risk, or the needictory may have led them to persuade themselves that the chances of failure were in fact low. Jn any case, we believe that thediscouragements of recent years contributedecision which did not reflect the caution usually characteristic of Soviet foreign policy moves.
II. IHE SITUATION IN THE LEADERSHIP
The failure of the Cuban missile venture has aggravated all the problems which the Soviets meant It to resolve. There are various signs that It has also affected Soviet top-level politics. Analysis of the workings of the Soviet leadership must always Involve considerable speculation, but our tentative conclusions suggest that, at the present time, Soviet foreign policy may be influenced in more than usual degree by internal disagreements.
Khrushchev occupies the central position in Soviet politics, and his personality and conceptionstrong stamp to both theand foreign policies of the USSR. He is capable of revising ideology to suit his purposes, but hereat deal more than merely pragmatic. Compared to his predecessor and apparently also to some of his present colleagues, he is an imaginative innovator in both doctrine and policy, prone to change course rapidly in his incessant search for results. Approaching each new tactic with his characteristic energy, he tends lo outdo others in boldness and often to assume considerable risk, trusting to his political skill, toituation somehow if difficulties ensue, even by reversing himself completely if necessary. The prime move or this type which can be directly associated with Khrushchev is the daring stroke of de-Slalinizailon, but the same traits can be observed in such disparate moves as the New Lands campaign, the Berlin challenge0 military reorganization plan, the
cultivationspirit of Campnd the two reconcilatlons with Tito. This pattern suggests lo us that Khrushchev either Initiated the Cuban missile venture himself or adopted lt early and supported it against any doubters.
Because of these tendencies, any opposition to Khrushchev within the Soviet leadership has tended toonservative opposition, that is, one which both prefers greater caution in the appraisal of risks and shies away from novel departures in doctrine or policy. Khrushchev is accessible to the ideas of others, but It appears that most of hisoriginate either with himself, younger associates, orrather than with his colleagues In the top leadership. While he Is usually able to muster majorities for his proposals, some of them have at various times encountered opposition which has limited or even undone them. And when several of his programs encounter difficulties simultaneously, the restraints exerted by his colleagues accumulate. If the coalescence of opinion is strong. Khrushchev reacts by shifting ground to place himself at the head of the new and more conservative consensus which is forming. But he often returns to his originalwhen he deemsropitious moment has arrived.
The recent period appears to be one in which Khrushchev has been on the defensive and has had to move away from venturesome positions with which he had clearly identified himself in the past. In February, he all but abandoned his longstanding proposalsubstantial increase in allocations to agriculture and light industry: these had been continually opposed by the military and probably by some political leaders as well. In March, Khrushchev's chastisement of rebellious writers and artists abruptly checked the de-Stalinizallonwhich he had himself revived last fall. Khrushchev in the past has used dc-Stalinltationeans of direct attack upon political opponents, and It Is possible that this latest reversal represents adefense by his Intended targets.inimum, Khrushchev's judgment has probably been discredited by the strong antircglmewhich emerged when the intellectuals responded to his earlier encouragement to renewed attacks on Stalin.
These moves are logical responses to real problems, but they also comport better with the predilections of some of Khrushchev's colleagues than with his own earlier views and this, along with several ambiguous indications of current uncertainty in Moscow, suggests that his predominance has diminished somewhat. The difficulties with China, the frustrations over. Berlin, and the humiliation in Cuba have probably worked in the same direction. We think it unlikely lhat any faction is actively seeking Khrushchev's downfall. Instead, suchas Kozlov and Suslov have probably wished to bringreater practice of collectivity in Soviet policymaking and. by this route, to tighten central controls. Insist upon ideological conformity, and eschew
radical and risky departures In domestic and foreign affairs.temperament is not amenable to collectivity, however, and he is likely to respond to checks of this kind by moving to reassert hfs dominance. Kozlov's Illness Is in this respect convenient; whether real or political, it undermines his present strength and may lead lopersonnel shifts which Khrushchev could turn to his own
HI. THE SOVIET VIEW OF PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES
We believehase In regime politics of the sort described above has contributed to the relative immobility which seems tocurrent Soviet foreign policy. Even without this factor, however, there are important reasons for the Soviets to avoid major new moves. From the leadership's viewpoint, no major change in Soviet policy, sucherious attempt to reduce cold-war tensions drasticallyigorous new offensive against non-Communist positions, seems to offer much promise at present.
The Soviets would not expect that they could improve theirthrough negotiated agreementsime when they are relatively weak and their enemy feels relatively strong. In such periods, the task of Soviet diplomacy is primarily to pursue defensive tacticsore favorable correlation of forces can be brought about.post-October advocacy ot negotiation and compromise wasprimarily to buttress his version of the missile withdrawalictory for peace ratherefeat for the Soviet Union and to forestall possible US efforts to follow up with pressures on other Soviet positions. The Soviets did offer one concession which seemedprobably also to them, when Khrushchev accepted the principle of on-site inspectionest ban But the USSR soon indicated, by its conduct of the negotiations which followed and its refusal tobeyond three inspections, that it required greater counterconcessions than were forthcoming from the US before it would actuallyreaty. The requirement to sustain some commitment to Cuba in the face of continued US hostility lo Castrourther barrier against any genera! relaxation of tensions, as did the need for an external threat to Justify continuing deprivations al home.
In fact, while statements praising the method of mutualhave not dropped out ot Soviet propaganda altogether, they are now overshadowed by charges that the West remains hostile and has no genuine interest In reaching settlements. This does not mean, however, that aggressive Soviet actions are to follow. In the first place, the USSR recognizes that the world situation currently presents no opportunities lor major advances at tolerable levels of risk: Indeed,3 it has suffered distinct reverses in the Middle East and is having difficulty in holding its own in some areas of Africa. In the second
tW -
place, the Cuban episode has demonstrated to the Soviets that forward action is not without peril. Current Soviet pronouncementseen appreciation of US power, and the October crisis has almostpersuaded them that they had underrated US determination to use that power.
In these circumstances, the Soviets seem to see the presentas one which can best be used to build up their strength and to fortify existing positions in preparation for future opportunities to make new advances. They seek in the first instance to strengthen their military power in hopes ofosition which repairs theirand lays greater inhibitions on Westernecent strong reaffirmations of military prioritiesetermination to proceed with existing programs and. beyondossible decision to Increase military spending above previously planned levels. These programs already include the introduction of protected strategic missile systems, the development of very-high-yield warheads,ajor antiballistic missile effort which has already led to the deploymentirstsystem at one location. The USSR is alsoigorous research and development effort aimed at technological advances which could radically enhance both the war-fighting capability and thevalue of its military establishment. As an Important aspect of these efforts, the Soviets arepace program aimed at prestigious accomplishments and are almost certainly investigating the feasibility of military space systems
We do not mean, however, that the Soviets consider that, unless they can achieve some sort of military advantage over the West, their political advances have reached final limits. Military power remains only one ingredient,ery important one, in the Soviet concept of the forces which determine their prospects. Still less do we believe that Soviet foreign policy in the present phase will be passive The USSR will be alert to search out vulnerabilities In the non-Communist world, to exploit the differences which have arisen in the NATOand to make its Influence felt throughout Asia. Latin America, and Africa. But the Soviet leaders' outlook is not one of highthat events can readily be made to move in their favor, and we think it likely that they willober view in the present period of the opportunities for major advance.
There is one important caveat to this judgment. We havethe needajor triumph which wouldrend of
he Assistanttart. Intelligence. US AT. ooes not consider the reasons lUtcd sufficiently describe Ihe basis foe Soviet military pehey decisions He would
insert the following sentence at thir point:
This would be in furtheranceasic Soviet military policy objective of
building by such means as become available toward achievementilitary
superiority over the West.
adversity as an important part of the Soviet motivation for deploying missiles to Cuba. This need still remains; In fact, lt has been magnified by the Cuban failure itself and by subsequent problems, such as the Communist setback In Iraq, the Western gain in India, and the renewed Chinese onslaught on Soviet leadership of the Communist movement. While we think it probable that the Cuban venture has strengthened the counsels of caution In Moscow, we cannot exclude the possibility of some new and audacious move. Such actions are essentiallyalthough we think they arc somewhat more likely whenascendancy is high than when collectivity, that is, his need to defer to the opinions of others, has been strengthened. Nor can we predict whereove might be launched. We note, however, that Berlin wouldieldar-reaching Soviet victory, although It Is obviously an extremely risky area in which toajor
t Is also conceivable that Khrushchev will react to presentin the opposite way. that is, by focusingajorwith the West, ratherajor encroachment against it. as the means of restoring movement to Soviet policy and scoring atriumph Given the present status of such issuesuclear test ban and Berlin, it Is difficult to see how he could expect to achieve an early settlement without making visible concessions or reductions in earlier Soviet demands. If he nevertheless chose to pursue this course, and to represent the results as important advances for the USSR, he would thereby setowerful momentum for general detente and bring new confusion into official Ideology. This in turn would intensify the strains in the international Communist movement and magnify present doubts within the Soviet Party about his leadership. For these reasons, and because of Khrushchev's own ambitions to achieve the kind of victories abroad which are clear defeats for the West, we think it very unlikely that he will proceed in this direction, although we cannot entirely exclude this possibility.
IV. SOVIET TACTICS IN THE NEAR TERM
erlin and Germany. We believe that the USSR does not intend In the near future toharp and direct challenge to the Western position in Berlin. Khrushchev's remarks in East Berlin last January seemed designed to put Ulbricht on notice that his regime, protected by the Wall, must now concentrateolicy of internal stabilization and growth and not expect early progress toward the objective of ejecting the Allies Similarly, the manner in which the USSR has resumed Berlin conversations with the US suggests that it does not intend an early showdown. We think It unlikely, however, that the Soviets expect these talks to lead to any early agreement on Berlin. Instead, we believe that their motives are, first, lo avoid the impression
ol weakness which would be conveyed by allowing the issue to die entirely and. second, to getosition to sow distrust and suspicion among the Allies and West Germany. In pursuing these ends, they are likely to resort to sporadic local harassments.
It is possible, however, that the Soviets will in fact seek some sort of mutually acceptable Berlin agreementay of discharging Khrushchev's longstanding commitment on this matter and collecting such concessions as can be extracted In return for an easing of pressures on the Allied position in the city. In such an effort, they wouldhave toontinued Allied presence in West Berlin and some form of guaranteed access. The USSR for its part would be primarily interested in extracting as much recognition as possible for the (SDK. perhaps by Involving lt In the administration of Allied ground and air accessay which did not entirely extinguish formal Soviet responsibility. Once such an agreement was achieved, the Soviets would probably feel free to fulfill their long-adjourned promise toeace treaty with the GDR. The USSR would of course wish toredetermined durationerlin agreement and, if this proved impossible, toormula sufficiently vague on this point to allow them to renew pressures at some future time.
Recent developments in the Western Alliance affecting theof nuclear weapons and the present check to the European unity movement seem to have focused Soviet attention once again on Europe. The prospects for changes of political leadership in West Germany and Britain probably reinforce this tendency. We do not foresee anySoviet initiative aimed at European problems, but the possibility of promoting disarray in the Western camp may be moreactor affecting Soviet policy than it has been for some time past. Both the Franco-German treaty and the plans to admit West Germanyarger role in NATO's nuclear policy have alreadya sharp verbal Soviet response. The vague threat to take counter-measures against West German participationultilateral force probably has no more substance than the long series of threats which have accompained the whole process of German rearmament. It Ishowever, that the Soviets will respond by increasing their efforts to extract from the West some formal recognition of the existence of two Oermanies, reasoning that this would offset, the dangersuclear-armed Federal Republic by making it more difficult for Bonn to mount heavy pressures against East Germany. There may alsoevival of Soviet interest in limited arms control measures affecting Germany.
The Soviets probably still sec certainthemselves in more general measures of arms control andThey would doubtless count it an advance, for example,eans of preventing the proliferation of nuclearreducing the chances of accidental war. The burden of modern arma-
merits on the Soviet economy Is an Increasingly important argument for the stabilization ot the arms race. On the other hand, the Soviets set great store by the political usefulness of great military power.they are aware that broad disarmament or arms control measures would have profoundcooperation with the enemy and recognitionigher sovereignty ln an Internationalcontrary to their assertions of Inevitable hostility between the two world camps.esult, they have regardedquestions primarily as an opportunity to capture peaceand to mobilize pressures against Western military measures-
Present Soviet behavior indicates that post-October reappraisals have not altered this approach, and that the USSR docs not regard the present periodavorable one for reaching arms control agreements which would advance Soviet interests.onclusion seems to be reflected in the announcement of economic policies which recommit the Soviets to an Intense military competition. Moreover. In the present context, it would be difficult to move on to further significant advances in the field of disarmament and arms control without firstest ban agreement. The Soviets have evidently decided that the gap between Soviet and US positions on this matter, while narrowed, is still too wide to be bridged. In this, we believe that they are influenced by the desire not to encourage hopesetente which would be generated inside the USSRajor East-West agreement During the present phase, therefore, we believe that the Soviets approach to disarmament will be primarily agitational and will focus on those measures which offer one-sided rather than mutual advantages.
he outlinesost-October Soviet policy toward Cuba have now emerged. The USSR's immediate objective Is to preserve the position it won. in the face of pressures from the US and problems in dealing with Castro. To this end it is continuing aflow of economic assistance which appears sufficient tothe Cuban economy at least at present levels. It regularlya commitment, albeit undefined, to the security of the regime. While the Soviets of course wouldisciplined puppet to take charge in Havana, they have accepted Castro, put up with his periodic public barbs at the USSR, and apparently agreed that the Moscow-oriented Communists should avoid conflict with him. Similarly, they are trying to reduce the chances of heightened L'S pressures by not firing upon overflights, by withdrawing some personnel, and probably also by urging Castro to soft-pedal the fomentation of aimed revolution in Latin America. One purpose of these actions is lo induce the US to move toward de facto acceptance of Castro.
uller discussion will De given In ihc forthcoming. "SituaUon andnECRET.
he pattern of Soviet policy toward Cuba described abovemeans that the primary Soviet aim at present is to consolidatein Cubaiew to using ltoothold from which to pursue the longer term struggle for Latin America which the Soviets foresee. If this Is so. It is unlikely that the Soviets would prejudice this aim by again attempting to use Cubatrategic base, thus courting violent US action against the Castro regime This is not to say lhat the Soviets will never again attempt the Introduction of some sort ofweapons system into Cuba. The time might come when they would again calculate that the net of advantages and risks would favor such an, attempt. For at least the near term, however, the Soviets almost certainly estimate that the risks of such an attempt would be excessive.
If trds is their present judgment, the Soviet must reconsider the usefulness to them of those forces which went to Cuba as part of the missile deployment. There are some signs that they intend to make gradual further withdrawals, but we wouldignificant number of Soviet military personnel to remain ln Cuba indefinitely, in training and advisory roles at least. We expect the Soviets to hand over to Castro their advanced weapons as the Cuban forces are trained to operate them, possibly including control over the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system We are unable toate by which Cubans would acquire complete control of the SAM system, but we do notthat this could occur as early as the lalter parthis would, in the Soviet view, involve some risk of Cuban attacks upon reconnaissance aircraft which could touchew major crisis, but they may regard this risk as preferable to the political cost of either withdrawing the system or trying to keep it Indefinitely under their own command
The Underdeveloped Areas* The USSR's understanding of the "national liberation" movement identifies the emergence of new.nations as an important gain for the Soviet world position. The Soviets go on. however, to argue the necessityecond stage, that ot "nationalhe hallmark of which is the participation of local Communistsoverning national front This in turn creates the prerequisites for "completing" the revolution, with or withoutby installing the Communist Party in power. Events of the last five years, however, have not followed this pattern. Cuba has reached approximately the predicted destination, but by an unpredicted route andanner which leaves the USSR with economic and military leverage but without full disciplinary control The IndonesianParty has successfully practiced the tactics of building political
FV,ie* Ih* recent
NIE. -The Sonfi Roto in the Arabpril IM1 SECRET The USSR* approach to Africa Is examined in. -Trends In Soviet Policy Toward Sub-SaharanECRET
weight and respectability and shows some promise of leading itsinto the phase of "nationalut the Cuban experience, and the Indonesian Party's behavior In the Sino-Sovlet dispute, cannot give the Soviets much assurance that the Indonesian Party in power would follow Soviet guidanceisciplined way either. Elsewhere, nationalist leaders have generally rebuffed or even repressed thein some cases, Soviet state relations with the new governments have not escaped damage
One of the features of the general line of policy described in this paper will probably be an increased emphasis, in areas where this Is feasible, on efforts to build subversive capabilities and tangible political assets within tho underdeveloped countries. The challenge of the Chinese Communists, and in Latin America tho competing appeal of Pidelismo. reinforce the reasonsreater Soviet effort in thisNevertheless, we do not expect any radical turn in Soviet policy stressing early Communist attempts to come to power. The Soviet leaders continue to give evidence that, in most cases, they regard auch attempts as premature, more likely to set back rather than advance the fortunes of the local parties, and prejudicial to other Soviet mtercsls. Meanwhile, they will continue to rely upon diplomacy and materialeven though stringencies In the domestic economy and their growing awareness of the limited political returns on aid programs may lead them to become more selective In assuming new economicthey do not wish to abandon this field to the West*
no At the present stage of the Sino-Sovletneither Moscow nor Peiping entertains much hope of pressuring or persuading the rival leadership to alter its stand. The stakes ln the conflict are therefore the allegiance of other Communist parties and radical movements In the non-Communist world. Because China has made gradual but regular gains in this competition over the last two years, particularly In Asia, the Soviet*trong interest in gaining some sort of respite, especiallyime when the accumulation ofelsewhere has lowered their prestige. The clearest example of this interaction occurred last October when the Soviets, foreseeingetreat tn the Cuban missile crisis,ain bid toChinese criticism by momentarily supporting Peiping in Its border dispute with India. The same tendency is evident in Khrushchev's callruce in polemical warfare and efforts to arrange bilateral talks.
while the Soviets can shelve an issue like Berlin simplyto agitate lt. they have no means of unilaterally shutting offdispute The Chinese show no disposition to stopcase, and Khrushchev is unwilling to make concessions important
'For an examination of Soviet aid to these countries, sec. "Bloc Economic and Military AssistanceatedECRET.
enough to allow tho two to compose their differencesime. The present attempts toeeting have been carried on in apublic correspondence filled with uncompromisingof position and veiled threats and insults. We think that aif It comes about, will at most resultuperficial compromise which would be highly vulnerable to the next turn of international events. Beyond these maneuvers, the general outlook is for aand widening estrangement between the two powers in which both Soviet and Chinese nationalism will become increasingly prominent.
n southeast Asia, differences with China, which includeover the tactics of "national liberation" struggle, have worked to complicate Soviet policy. Because of the important position of the North Vietnamese as the prime movers of Communist policy In both Laos and South Vietnam, the Soviets are probably Increasingly reluctant to oppose North Vietnamese interests. The Soviets probably do not want to dissipate what influence they have in Hanoi by constant intervention over secondary questions of local tactics, particularly if In doing so they appear to be giving way to Western pressures. On the other hand, the Soviets have broader Interests and problems which transcend thoseLaos. Hence they would be loath to give the North Vietnamese orree hand to decide Communist policy. On balance, even though the Soviets still probably prefer to malntaui the Genevawe think that they will be unable to respond to US and British efforts to stabilize the Laotian situation unless US pressures induce the local Communists to seek Soviet support.
V. THE IONGER RUN
It Is wholly uncertain how long Soviet policy will focus on the tasks of consolidation designed to prepareenewed offensive against the non-Communist world. This dependsumber of factors, such as the situation in the top leadership, the success of the USSR's efforts to improve its relative military position, and the opportunities foraction opened up by developments abroad An aggravation of divisions in Europe and between Europe and the US. for example, would encourage the Soviets to pursue more actively the exacerbation ofin the Western camp. General policy, moreover, might be heavily influenced by the need to respond to some unexpected turn of events, suchuccessful Communist revolution in Latin America, the flaring upew Cuban crisis, or an escalation of armed conflict in southeast Asia.
In our last estimate of the future course of Soviet foreigne examined the possibilityradual evolution in the Soviet world outlook which would diminish the importance of those conceptions of
Trends In Soviet Foreign
hostility derived from Communist ideology. At that time, we judged it possible that,uite unpredictable period of time, certain factors might force the Soviet leaders toore "normal" approach to world politics, one giving greater weight to national Interests andmodes of International behavior as these are understood In the West, and less to the effort to expand Indefinitely the area of Moscow's control. In this section, we reconsider the nature and influence of these factors: the course of developments inside the USSR, changing relations within the Bloc and the Communist movement, and the movement of events .in the East-West competition.
Internalear ago, we concluded that there was some prospect of an evolutionary trend Inside the USSR which, bypublic opinion toarger influence, would have someeffect on the Soviet world outlook. We have seen no significant movement over the last year, however, in the direction of involving wider circles of opinion, presumably closer to the aspirations of the general population, in Soviet policymaking. The regime has laid new economic burdens on the consumer and, in Cuba, carried the countryisky and remote adventure irrelevant to the concerns and desires of theThese actions have probably cost the regime some of the popular confidence and loyalty which tt seeks, and the relatively bleak outlook for the consumer3 raises the possibility that demonstrations of discontent may recur on the considerable scaleut thesedo not endanger the bases of regime control, and the recentof military priorities in the allocation of economic resources confirms that they remain only one factor, and evidentlyecisive one. in the leadership's choice of policies.
We attach considerable long-run importance, however, to the climate of opinion which, making use of the opportunities of de-Stalini-zation. has manifested itself among Soviet writers and artists. The recent works of the cultural intelligentsia, and their responses to critical attack, implicitly and sometimes even explicitly reject the legitimacy of party authority in the arts. More than this', in their strong affirmation of human values and their condemnation of the Stalinist past, they have formulated the hitherto unspoken question of the present leadership's responsibility for the crimes ofs and, consequently, its fitness to rule today. Implicit in their revolt Isepudiation of the way in which the party defines its historic mission and itsthat the Western world Is inevitably hostile to the USSR.
The regime haspecial sensitivity to the intellectuals' contention that the older generation does not deserve the respect of its sons. It senses in this notriticism of individuals, but aof the political achievements of the revolution to date. Current measures of repression reflect party fears that these attitudes areto other groups, and there are signs that some students and sclen-
Uflc-technlcal workers share the artists' outlook. In the lace of the present crackdown and demands for recantation, many of the rebellious artists may not be able to sustain the collective insubordination which their current silence represents. We believe, however, that theirfrom the party leadership as presently constituted is profound, and that it will continue to And expression so long as the regime remains unwilling, as it appears to be at present, to resort to repressions which truly terrorize.
Relations in the Communist World. In the past year, events have forced the Soviet leadership to move considerably further away from the traditional Communist view of Moscow as the undisputed center and order-giver for the entire world movement. Even as they look beyond Mao Tse-tung to his successors, they have little hope of being able to restore unity of action with Communist China or to be relieved of the necessity to combat its independent influence In parties and movements which earlier were exclusive Soviet preserves. By force of variousthey have had topecial status to Cuba in the socialist camp and to watch Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the parties in non-Communist Asia move varying distances out of their sphere of influence. Inapprochement with Tito, they have had to compromise their old demands of hegemony.
In all these ways the Soviets, respondingluralistic and contradictory world, areolitical give-and-take which has less and less relation to traditional techniques of Stalinist manipulation and to the blacks and whites of Stalinist thought. Wc believe that this process within the Communist movement has an eroding effect upon the basic Soviet view of world politics asipolar struggle of camp against camp. The private discourse of Soviet citizens and officials frequentlyecognition that, in some matters. Soviet interests parallel those of the West rather than those of Communist China. It would be wrong, we think, to interpret this trend as leading inommon Soviet-Western front against China. But it is not unreasonable to expect that the loosening of relationships inside the Communist world willignificant factor tending to diminish the ideological ingredient in the Soviet outlook upon the non-Communist world.
he Course of East-West Competition. In our last estimate, we singled out the success or failure which the USSR's foreign policyas perhaps the most significant factor aflecting the Soviet
outlook on the outside world. Since that time, the record contains
much more failure than success, but we do not perceive signs of any fundamental Soviet reappraisal of the validity of their key doctrines. Wc continue to believe, however, that the prolonged frustration of Soviet objectives, particularly the more ambitious aims having to do
orld-wide conflict of systems, holds some promise over the long run of bringing the USSR aroundiew which acceptsluralistic world. Conversely, it seems certain that successes In expanding Soviet influence, major weakenings In Western positions, and In particular any further advances of direct Communist rule will act to confirm the more far-reaching hopes and expectations of the Soviet leaders.
Is possible, however, that the experience of prolongedadvance toward Communist objectives would bring to the foredogmatic elements in the Soviet outlook. But even Ifshould diminish in the long run. this would not bring anInternational conflicts of Interest or necessarily reduce thegeneral war. On the contrary, even in these circumstances theof Soviet national security, prestige, and ambition, asthe Soviet leaders and people, would still bring the USSR intocollision with the interests of other states. The most thatexpected would be that some Issues would become morenegotiable, particularly those not deeply rooted in theof the Soviet state, and that the occasional recognition ofof common Interest with the West would not invariablyby ideological hostility
VI. THE QUESTION OF SUCCESSION
A key uncertainty surrounding future Soviet policy arises from the problem of the succession to Khrushchev. The style, skill, andof the top leader stillajor role In determining Soviet choices and in the effectiveness with which policies are prosecuted. We think, for example, that Khrushchev's personal views and attributes have been of major importance in shaping Soviet policies over the past decade, and that the USSRifferent leader might have posed significantly different problems to the US.
The Soviet Party appears lo be no better equipped with anmechanism for the designationuccessor and his orderly assumption of power than itecade ago. The most likelyof events, in our view,epetition of the post-Stalinin which the late leader's senior associatestruggle for supremacyacade of collectivity. The main arena of conflict will be the leading party organs, butingle figure can gain control fairly soon, the contenders will probably try lo bolster their strength by appealing to important interest groups outside theparty apparatus. Of these groups, we believe that Ihe economic administration, weakened by continuing reorganizations, will be an even less important political counter than when Malcnkov tried to use itnd the police would probablyignificant factor
SEJFET
only in the eventuccession struggle was prolonged and was accompanied by popular unrest which enlarged the role of the security forces.
There is some reason to believe, however, that the militarywillubstantial factor in post-Khrushchev maneuvering for power. The special efforts to rehabilitate Stalin's military victims and military attempts to maximize their own credit for World War IIpointtrong sense of corporate identity among the senior officers, although we also have evidence of conflicts among the marshals. More important, the military leadership in the last two years hasasserted its own views, not always unanimous, on questions of military doctrine and strategy; at times lt has seemed even to be giving Itsore general political import as well. Wc do not believe that the military aspires to an Independent political role inpolitics, but if. as we expect, the military and economic choices lacing the USSR become more acute, the senior officers will probably find themselves more deeply involved in matters of general policy. Indeed, there are some present indications of party alarm on this score, and it is possible that, before the succession question arises, steps will be taken to restrict the political role of leading military personalities.
We know little about the individual policy views of Khrushchev's colleagues. It is clear, however, that the leadership is frequentlyover policy issues, and the record of the succession struggles after Lenin and Stalin indicates that divergent views on policy arc heavily involved in inncrparty competition. So long as present trends continue In the economy, in the relationship of East-West military power. In Bloc relations, and In Soviet fortunes abroad, Khrushchev's heirs willumber of acute issues and decisions. His departure would make it easier to ditch some policies to which his personal prestige has been attached. But it would aggravate most problems by bringing about an inevitable temporary reduction of Sovietoss of authority in the Communist movement,eneral uncertainty in the country.
In such circumstances, it is normal for Soviet politicians totheir own views to expediency and to espouse those policies which seem most likely to serve their personal ambitions. At the sameowerful weapon in this competitioneader can represent as promising solutionsroad range of problems confronting the regime; to berogramrave weakness. Thus contenders for power are under pressure to formulate competing proposals, designed to appeal to politically Important groups,umber of issues Initially the tendency would probably be for more conservative elements to gain predominance, but theuccession struggle remains unresolved, the more tendency there would beider range of alternative policies to be given active
consideration. This tendency creates the likelihood that. If the struggle was protracted, the circle of political participation would also widen as rivals reached out beyond the party elite for support.
ecause of these factors, the period ushered in by Khrushchev's departure may present special opportunities and dangers to the US. Relations with the non-Communist world, and particularly with the leading rival power, are likely to be among the prime Issues in anycompetition, since these are Intimately related to militaryeconomic difficulties, and the key questions of China and Germany. We think lt very unlikelywar party" will emerge In the Kremlin; there is no evidence that othe'r leadersess sober view than Khrushchev of the consequences of nuclear war. and indeed someindicates that the military regard the USSR as Inadequately prepared at present to engage In oneaction may form which seeks to meet the problems of Internal discontent and Chinese pressure by placing greater stress on factors of tension in East-West relations.lso possibleuccession struggle would generate arguments for some accommodation with the Westeans of coping with these same problems. At any rate, the US will almost certainly be assailed with contrary indications, all of them difficult to interpret, and some of them suggesting that Important changes are possible depending on the attitude adopted by the West. If Khrushchev'soccursime when existing policies are enjoying poorthe succession period may in fact ofTcr unusual chances forin Soviet policy.
Original document.
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