SECRETMtMMH
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBERSupersede*)
23
ain Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy
DIRECTOR Of CEN IDA'. INTEUIGENCE
UNITED STATES INTEUIGENCE BOARD Ai md-.of.tf owtao'3
mis docnann? baa bean approved for release through tha HISTORICAL IttVTBK PROGRAM Ot tho Central Intelligence Agency.
HHP
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
n Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE
PRINCIPAL
I. THE BACKGROUND OP PRESENT SOVIET POLICYlo the Sovietpresent mood inlor the Cuban missUe venture
II. THE SITUATION IN THE
Characteristics of Khrushchev'sofonservative consensus
SOVIET VIEW OK PRESENT. 7
Limits of detenteof forwardto improve military position-likelihood ofprobes--chances of another high-risk move
TACTICS IN THE NEAR
Negotiations on Berlin andwithIntentions into revolutions in newlo limit Sino-Soviet dispute
V. THE LONGER
Influence of unforeseenof disaffection inside thceffects of Communistof foreign success or failure
VI. THE QUESTION OF
Importance of the individualof aof party, slate, police, and military-probable policypolicy In the succession struggle
SEfrer
MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate main trends in Soviet foreign policy, withto the influence of political developments within thc USSR and the world Communist movement.
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
A. The forced withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba last fall was thc most dramaticeries of disappointments and setbacks which have been plaguing Soviet policy. It is true that these have been offset somewhat by space successes, by advances in the development of missiles and nuclear weapons, and by the retentionoothold in the Western Hemisphere.thc fundamentally optimistic outlook of the Soviet leaders seems overlaid at presentober appreciation of obstacles and dangersealization that earlier expectations of rapid advances must be stretched out into the future. The current mood of the Soviet leadership must also be adversely afTected by the continuing Chinese challenge to Soviet authority in the Bloc and the Communist movement. )
argelyesult of these frustrations to Soviet hopes, Khrushchev's leadership appears to have come into question in recent months. Although his colleagues probably have not been seeking his downfall, they have apparently been trying to com-
etailed examination of Soviet military and economic policy appears in two recent estimates.Soviet MilitaryandatedOP SECRET, and, "Soviet EconomicatedECRET.
SEfMET
pel him to take greater account of their collective opinions;has responded with policy revisions which seem to reflect their advice. While Khrushchev's freedom of action may thus be somewhat restricted at present, we believe that his essential authority remains intact.
the present phase, we think that the Soviets areto make serious attempts to resolve cold-warigorous new offensive againstInstead, they seem to see the present period ascan best be used to build up their strength and topositions in preparation for future opportunities.do not plan any early moves cithereightened crisis over Berlin. We believe thatto disarmament will be primarily agitational. Inprimary present aims are to induce the US to moveJacto acceptance of Castro and to consolidate the Sovielfrom which they mean to pursue the longer termLatin America. )
do not mean to imply, however, that SovietIn the present phase will be passive. The USSR willto search out vulnerabilities in the non-Communistit believes it can usefully exploit. It will alsoto make its influence felt throughout theFurthermore, while we think that the Soviets willsober view in the present period of the opportunities for athere is one important caveat to this judgment.identified the needajor triumph whicha trend of adversity as an Important part of thcfor deploying missiles lo Cuba This need stillwe cannot exclude the possibility of some newmove. )
key uncertainty surrounding future Soviet policythc problem of the succession to Khrushchev. Theafter his departure would probably be for moreelements to gain predominance, but the longer astruggle remains unresolved, thc more tendencybeider range of alternative policies to beconsideration. )
F. We see some prospect that, over the long run, the element of Ideological hostility in the Soviet outlook might gradually diminish. This depends upon many uncertain factors, however, and even if it should come about, the requirements of Soviet national security, prestige, and ambition would still bring the USSR into frequent collision with the interests of other states.)
DISCUSSION
I. THE BACKGROUND OF PRESENT SOVIET POLICY
The position in which the Soviet leaders find themselves3 Is not the one which they anticipated five years ago. Soviet thinking8 was pervadedeneral optimism arisingumber of factors and calculations. Khrushchev, who had recentlyommanding position, apparently judged that he had overcome both economic dislocations and the political turbulence unloosed by de-Stalin-Izatlon and could look forward to steady and substantial internalHis view of relations among Communist States seems to have been tliat. freed of the burden of Stalinist excesses, Soviet policy could guide the Bloc more effectivelyooser hand while preserving the essentials ol Moscow's leadership.
Looking out upon thc non-Communist world, Khrushchev probably had considerable hopes that trends in the underdeveloped areas would continue to run in his favor and that the USSR's earlier successes in the Middle East could be extended in that area and repeated in Asia. Africa, and Latin America. Most important of all, the USSR's early sputnik and ICBM successes evidently persuaded him that the image andeven thc substance of Soviet physical power would soon overbear that of the US and bring the West to the conference table ready for concessions to his demands. In short, Khrushchev8 saw the "world relation of forces" shifting rapidly in favor of the USSR and believed that history, with vigorous assistance from Moscow, would in the coming period reward thc Soviet cause with regular, tangible advances.
Almost none of this has vomc to pass. In the relations ofpower, regarded by the Soviets as an indispensable clement in their general calculation of forces. US military and intelligence programs have ledituation in which both sides, and indeed much of world opinion, understand that strategic advantage does not lie with the USSR. Thc Berlin ultimatum8 remains unfulfilled and, save lor the constriction of East Germany's refugee flow, basic Soviet aims In the key area of Germany are no further advanced. Although the So-
3
SEfRET
viets may expect some benefits from present strains In NATO, over the last five years thc strength of the Westhole has almost certainlyore formidable aspect In their eyes. In the underdeveloped countries, postcolonlal nationalism has in most areas openly diverged from the hoped-for association with Soviet policies, and thc USSR has not succeeded in establishing patronage, much less control, over the new nations.
Over the same period, the USSR's relations with Its major ally have fallen Into acute disarray, and the Soviets must now defend themselves throughout the Communist movement toeadership which had not been effectively challenged for four decades. At home, economic progress has falteredariety of reasons, of which thc mostLs the impact of military and space spending. At thc same time, Intellectual circles have used Khrushchev's atlacks upon Stalin to raise painful questions which tend to challenge the authority of the party and its present leaders.
This Is by no means to say that the last five years have brought an uninterrupted series of defeats for Soviet policy. During this period, forrocession of space feats has regularly revitalized Soviet prestige and sustained the USSR's lead in this important field ofBoth nuclear and missile development have recorded notable technical progress. The Berlin Wall has greatly eased the problems of thc client state ot Kast Germany. Cuba's accession to the Communist campajor gain despite the October backdown and theproblems and dangers encountered in dealing with Castro and the US. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership seems to recognize the last five yearseriod In which problems accumulated.
There is no sign that this trend has caused thc Soviets lo revise their fundamental assumptions or that they regard these setbacks as more than temporary There are many signs, however,ecognition that earlier expectations were overoptimlstic Their unwillingness to turn over Berlin access to East Oermany and their precipitateof strategic missiles from Cuba are the most striking instances testifyingober appraisal of their opportunities under thc present relation of forces between East andimilar concern can be observed in their treatment of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the importance of which they no longer attempt to deny, and of their military position, where assertions of absolute superiority have given way to claims of parity and expressions of anxiety about US Intentions and the future relation of military forces. Similarly, the indiscriminate optimism of Soviel pronouncements concerning new countries and independence movements is now heavily tempered by criticism o( thc bourgeois and anti-Communist tendencies of nationalist leaden. Domestically, thehas had to issue warnings to consumers that defense priorities will
cut into the program to raise living standards, and Khrushchev does not seem confident that former rates of general economic growth can be quickly regained. In sum. thc leadership appears to realize that the disappointments of recent years arc not isolated but in facteries of related setbacks stemming in part from mistaken appraisals of the possibilities open to Soviet policy.
n our view, the attempt to deploy strategic missiles In Cuba was in considerable part due to Soviet recognition of this trend. Wc think that the Soviet leaders, as they pondered this venture, were highly conscious of the failing momentum of their offensive and thereforeery liigh premiumramatic triumph which they could turn lo account in manyalter both the image and theof relative power, toruitful ground for Berlinto undermine US Influence in Latin America, to disarm Chinese criticisms. They may have judged the chances of failure as high but nevertheless felt it necessary toalculated risk, or thc needictory may have led them to persuade themselves lhat the chances of failure were In fact low. In any case, we believe that thediscouragements of recent years contributedecision which did not reflect the caution usually characteristic of Soviet lorclgn policy
II. THE SITUATION IN THE LEADERSHIP
The failure of the Cuban missile venture has aggravated all the problems which the Soviets meant it to resolve. There are various signs that It has also affected Soviet top-level politics. Analysis of the workings of the Soviet leadership must always involve considerable speculation, but our tentative conclusions suggest that, al the present time. Soviet foreign policy may be Influenced in more lhan usual degree by Internal disagreements.
Khrushchev occupies the central posilion in Soviet politics, and his personality and conceptionstrong stamp lo both theand foreign policies of the USSR. He is capable of revising ideology to suit his purposes, but hereat deal more than merely pragmatic. Compared lo his predecessor and apparently also to some of his present colleagues, he is an imaginative innovator In both doctrine and policy, prone to change course rapidly in his incessant search for results. Approaching each new tactic with his characteristic energy, he tends to outdo others in boldness and often to assume considerable risk, trusting to his political skill toituation somehow if difficulties ensue, even by reversing himself completely if necessary. The prime move of this type which can be directly associated with Khrushchev is the daring stroke ofa lion, but the same trails can be observed in such disparate moves as llie New Ijinds campaign, the Berlin challenge0 military reorganization plan, the
5 WET
cultivationspirit ol Campnd the two reconcilatlons with Tito This pattern suggests to us that Khrushchev either initiated thc Cuban missile venture himself or adopted it early and supported it against any doubters.
Because of these tendencies, any opposition to Khrushchev within the Soviet leadership has tended toonservative opposition, that is, one which both prefers greater caution in the appraisal ot risks and shies away from novel departures in doctrine or policy. Khrushchev is accessible to the ideas of others, but it appears that most of hisonglnate either with himself, younger associates, orrather than with his colleagues In the top leadership. While he ts usually able to muster majorities for his proposals, some of them have at various times encountered opposition which has limited or even undone them And when several of his programs encounter difficulties simultaneously, the restraints exerted by his colleagues accumulate. If the coalescence of opinion Is strong, Khrushchev reacts by shifting ground to place himself at the head of the new and more conservative consensus which ts forming. But he often returns to his originalwhen he deemsropitious moment has arrived.
The recent period appears to be one in which Khrushchev has been on the defensive and has had to move away from venturesome positions with which he had clearly identified himself in the past. In February, he all but abandoned his longstanding proposalsubstanUal increase in allocations lo agriculture and light industry; these had been continually opposed by the military and probably by some polilical leaders as well In March, Khrushchev's chastisement of rebellious writers and artists abruptly checked the de-Stalinizationwhich he had himself revived last fall. Khrushchev in the past has used de-Stalinlzationeans of direct attack upon political opponents, and it is possible that this latest reversal represents adefense by his intended targetsinimum, Khrushchev's judgment has probably been discredited by the strong antlregimewhich emerged when the intellectuals responded to his earlier encouragement to renewed attacks on Stalin.
hese moves are logical responses to real problems, but they also comport better with the predilections of some of Khrushchev's colleagues than with his own earlier views and this, along with several ambiguous indications of current uncertainty in Moscow, suggests that his predominance has diminished somewhat The difficulties with China, Lhc frustrations over Berlin, and the humiliation In Cuba have probably worked in the same direction. We think it unlikely that any taction Is actively seeking Khrushchev's downfiill. Instead, suchas Kozlov and Suslov have probably wished to bringreater practice ot collectivity In Soviet policymaking and, by this route, to tighten central controls, insist upon Ideological conformity, and eschew
radical and risky departures In domestic and foreign affairs.temperament is not amenable to collectivity, however, and he Is likely to respond to checks of this kind by moving to reassert his dominance. Kozlovs Illness is in this respect convenient; whether real or political, it undermines his present strength and may lead topersonnel shifts which Khrushchev could turn to his own
III. THE SOVIET VIEW OF PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES
We believehase ln regime politics of the sort described above has contributed to the relative immobility which seems locurrent Soviet foreign policy. Even without this factor, however, there are important reasons for Uie Sovieis to avoid major new moves. From the leadership's viewpoint, no major change In Soviet policy, sucherious attempt to reduce cold-war tensions drasticallyigorous new offensive against non-Communist positions, seems to offer much promise at present.
Thc Soviets would not expect that Ihey could improve theirthrough negotiated agreementsime when they arc relatively weak and their enemy feels relatively strong. In such periods, thc task of Soviet diplomacy is primarily to pursue defensive taclicsore favorable correlation of forces can be brought about.post-October advocacy of negotiation and compromise wasprimarily to buttress his version of thc missile withdrawalictory for peace ratherefeat for lhe Soviet Union and to forestall possible US efforts to follow up with pressures on other Sovlot positions. The Sovieis did offer one concession which seemedprobably also to them, when Khrushchev accepted the principle of on-site inspectionest ban. But the USSR soon indicated, by its conduct of the negotiations which followed and its refusal to go beyond three inspections, that it required greater counterconcessions than were forthcoming from the US before it would actuallyreaty. The requirement lo sustain some commitment to Cuba in the face of continued US hostility lo Castrourther barrier against any general relaxation of tensions, as did the need for an external thrent to justify continuing deprivations at home.
In fact, while statements praising the method of mutualhave not dropped out of Soviet propaganda altogether, they are now overshadowed by charges lhat the West remains hostile and has no genuine interest In reaching settlements. This does not mean, however, that aggressive Soviet actions are to follow ln lhe first place, the USSR recognizes that Lhc world situation currently presents no opportunities for major advances at tolerablr levels ol risk: Indeed,t has suffered distinct reverses in the Middle East and is having difficulty in holding its own in some areas of Africa, in thc second
lhc Cuban episode has demonstrated to the Soviets lhat forward action is not without peril. Current Soviet pronouncementseen appreciation of US power, and the October crisis has almostpersuaded them that they had underrated US determination to use that power.
In these circumstances, the Soviets seem to see the presentas one which can best be used to build up their strength and to fortify existing positions In preparation for fuiure opportunities to make new advances. They seek Ln the first instance to strengthen their military power In hopes ofosition which repairs theirand lays grcaier inhibitions on Westernecent strong reaffirmations of military prioritiesetermination to proceed with existing programs and, beyondossible decision to increase military spending above previously planned levels. These programs already include the introduction of protected slrategic missile systems, the development of very-high-yield warheads,ajor antiballistic missile effort which has already led to the deployment of asystem at one location. The USSR is alsoigorous research and development effort aimed at technological advances which could radically enhance both the war-fighting capability and thevalue of Its military establishment. As an Important aspect of these efforts, lhc Soviets arepace program aimed at prestigious accomplishments and arc almost certainly Investigating the feasibility of military space systems.
We do not mean, however, tbat the Soviets consider lhat. unless they can achieve some sort of military advantage over the Wesl. their political advances have reached final limits Military power remains only one ingredient,ery important one. In the Soviel concept of the forces which determine their prospects. Still less do we believe that Soviet foreign policy in the present phase will be passive. Thc USSR will be alert lo search out vulnerabilities In lhc non-Communist world, to exploit the differences which have arisen in the NATOand '" make lis Influence felt throughout Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Hut the Soviet leaders' outlook ls not one ol highlhal events can readily be made to move in their favor, and we think it liki-ly that they willober view in the present period of the opportunities for major advance.
There is one important caveat lo this judgment. We havethe needajor triumph which wouldrend of
"The Assistant Chief of Stan. IntelUgence. USAP. docs not considerreasons listed sufficiently describe the basis for Soviet military policy decisions He would Insert lhc following sentence at Ihis point:
This would be in furtheranceasic Soviet miliiary policy objective of building by such means as become available loward achievementilitary superiority over trie West.
8
adversity as an Important part of the Soviet motivation for deploying missiles to Cuba. This need still remains; in fact, it has been magnified by the Cuban failure Itself and by subsequent problems, such as the Communist setback in Iraq, the Western gain in India, and the renewed Chinese onslaught on Soviet leadership of the Communist movement. While we think It probable that the Cuban venture has strengthened the counsels of caution Ln Moscow, we cannot exclude the possibility of some new and audacious move. Such actions arc essentiallyalthough we think they are somewhat more likely whenascendancy ls high than when collectivity, that is, his need to defer to the opinions of others, has been strengthened. Nor can we predict whereove might be launched. We note, however, lhat Berlin wouldieldar-reaching Soviet victory, although it ls obviously an extremely risky area In which toajor
t is also conceivable that Khrushchev will react to presentIn the opposite way. lhat Is, by focusingajorwith the West, ratherajor encroachment against it, as the means of restoring movement to Soviet policy and scoring atriumph. Given the present status of such Issuesuclear test ban and Berlin, It Is difficuli lo see how he could expect to achieve an early settlement without making visible concessions or reductions in earlier Soviet demands. If he nevertheless chose to pursue this course, and lo represent the results as important advances for thc USSR, he would thereby setowerful momentum for general detente and bring new confusion mio official ideology. This in turn would intensify the strains In the International Communist movement and magnify present doubts within the Soviet Parly about his leadership. For these reasons, and because of Khrushchev's own ambitions to achieve the kind of victories abroad which are clear defeaLs for thc West, we think it very unlikely that he will proceed In this direction, although we cannot entirely exclude this possibility.
IV. SOVIET TACTICS IN THE NEAR TERM
erlin and Germany. We believe that the USSR does not intend in the near future loharp and direct challenge to thc Western position in Berlin. Khrushchev's remarks in East Berlin last January seerncd designed to put Ulbricht on notice lhat his regime, protected by the Wall, must now concentrateolicy of internal stabilization and growth and not expect early progress loward the objective of ejecting thc Allies. Similarly, the manner in which the USSR has resumed Berlin conversations with lhe US suggests that It does not intend an early showdown. We think It unlikely, however, that thc
Soviets expect these talks to lead lo any early agreement on Berlin.
Instead, wc believe that their motives are, first, to avoid thc impression
51
ol weakness which would be convoyed by allowing the Issue to die entirely and, second, to getosition to sow distrust and suspicion among the Allies and West Germany. In pursuing these ends, they are likely to resort to sporadic local harassmonla.
It is possible, however, that thc Soviets will in fact seek some sort of mutually acceptable Berlin agreementay of discharging Khrushchev's longstanding commitment on this matter and collecting such concessions as can be extracted ln return for an easing of pressures on thc Allied position in the city. In such an effort, they wouldhave toontinued Allied presence in West Berlin and some form of guaranteed access The USSR for its part would be primarily interested In extracting as much recognition as possible for the GDR, perhaps by Involving it In thc administration of Allied ground and air accessay which did not entirely extinguish formal Soviet responsibility. Once such an agreement was achieved, the Sovieis would probably feel free to fulfill their long-ad]ourned promise toeace treaty with the ODR. Thc USSR would of course wish toredetermined durationerlin agreement and. If this proved impossible, toormula nufflclently vague on this point to allow them to renew pressures at some future time.
Recent developments In thc Western Alliance affecting theof nuclear weapons and the present check to thc European unity movement seem to have focused Soviet attention once again on Europe. Tlie prospects for changes of political leadership in West Germany and Britain probably reinforce this tendency. We do not foresee anySoviet initiative aimed at European problems, but the possibility of promoting disarray in the Western camp may be moreactor affecting Soviet policy tlian lt has been for some time past. Both the Franco-German treaty and the plans to admit West Oermanyarger role In NATO's nuclear policy have alreadya sharp verbal Soviet response Thc vague threat to Lake counter-measures against West Oerman participationultilateral force probably has no more substance than the long series of threats which have accompanied the whole process of Oerman rearmament. It ishowever, that the Soviets will respond by increasing their efforts to extract from the West some formal recognition of the existence of two Germanics, reasoning that this would offset thc dangersuclear-armed Federal Republic by making lt more difficult for Bonn to mount heavy pressures against East Oermany. There may alsoevival of Soviet interest ln limited arms control measures affecting Germany.
Disarmament. The SovieU probably still see certain advantages to themselves in more general measures of arms control andThey would doubtless countn advance, for example, if they couldeans of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons or reducing the chances of accidental war. The burden of modern arma-
on the Soviet economy ts an Increasingly important argument for the stabilization ot the arms race. On the other hand, the Soviets set great store by the political usefulness of great military power.they are aware that broad disarmament or arms control measures would have profoundcooperation with the enemy and recognitionigher sovereignty In an Internationalcontrary to their assertions of inevitable hostility between the two world camps.esult, they have regardedquestions primarily as an opportunity to capture peaceand to mobilize pressures against Western military measures.
resent Soviet- behavior indicates that post-October reappraisals have not altered this approach, and that thc USSR does not regard the present periodavorable one for reaching arms control agreements which would advance Soviet interests.onclusion seems to be reflected in thc announcement of economic policies which recommit the Soviets to an Intense miliiary competition. Moreover, in the present context, it would be difficult to move on to further significant advances in the field of disarmament and arms control without firstest ban agreement. Thc Soviets have evidently decided that the gap between Soviet and US positions on this matter, while narrowed, is still too wide to be bridged. In tills, we believe lhat they arc influenced by the desire not lo encourage hopesetente which would be generated inside thc USSRajor East-West agreement. During thc present phase, therefore, we believe that the Soviets approach to disarmament will be primarily agitational and will focus on those measures which offer one-sided ralhcr than mutual advantages.
hc outlinesost-October Soviet policy toward Cuba have now emerged. The USSR's immediate objective la to preserve the position it won, in the face of pressures from the US and problems in dealing with Castro. To this end it is continuing aflow of economic assistance which appears sufficient tothe Cuban economy at least at present levels. It regularlya commitment, albeit undefined, to the security of the regime. While the Soviets of course wouldisciplined puppet to take charge In Havana, they have accepted Castro, put up with his periodic public barbs at the USSR, and apparently agreed that the Moscow-oriented Communists should avoid conflict with him. Similarly, they are trying to reduce the chances of heightened US pressures by not firing upon overflights, by withdrawing some personnel, and probably also by urging Castro to soft-pedal the fomentation of aimed revolution In Latin America. One purpose of these aclions is lo induce the US to move loward de facto acceptance of Castro.
'A fuller discussion win oetlie forthcoming NIESituation and Prospects in Cuba,"
11
SGtfRET
pattern of Soviet policy toward Cuba described abovemeans that the primary Soviet aim at present Is to consolidatein Cubaiew to using Itoothold from whichthe longer term struggle for Latin America which theIf this Is so, it Is unlikely that the Soviets would prejudiceby again attempting to use Cubatrategic base, thusUS action against the Castro regime. This is not to say thatwill never again attempt the introduction of some sort ofweapons system into Cuba. The time might come when theycalculate that the net of advantages and risks would favorattempt. For at least thc near term, however, thc Sovietsestimate that the risks ot such an attempt would be excessive.
this is their present judgment, the Soviet must reconsiderlo them of those forces which went to Cuba as part ofdeployment. There arc some signs that they intend tofurther withdrawals, but we wouldignificantSoviet military personnel to remain In Cuba indefinitely. Inadvisory roles at least. We expect the Soviels to hand overtheir advanced weapons as the Cuban forces are trainedthem, possibly tacludlng control over the surface-to-airsystem. We are unable toale by whichacquire complete control of the SAM system, but we do notthat this could occur as early as the latter partn the Soviet view, involve some risk of Cuban attacksaircraft which could touchew major crisis,may regard this risk as preferable to the polilical cost ofthe system or trying to keep it indefinitely under their
he Vnderdevetopedhe USSR's understanding of the "national liberation" movement identifies the emergence of new,nations as an Important gain for the Soviet world position. Thc Soviets go on, however, to argue the necessityecond stage, that of "nationalhe hallmark ol which is the participation of local Communistsoverning national front This in turn creates the prerequisites for "completing" thc revolution, with or withoutby installing the Communist Party in power. Events of the last five years, however, have not followed this pallern. Cuba has reached approximately lhe predicted destination, but by an unpredicted route andanner which leaves the USSR wiih economic and miliiary leverage but without full disciplinary control. The IndonesianParty has successfully practiced thc tar tics of building political
etailed discussion of Soviet policy in the Middle Kast. see thc recent. The Soviet Hole in the ArabatedECRKT. The USSR's approach to Africa Is examined in1 -Trend* tn Soviet Policy Toward Sub-Saharanecember isei
weigh! and respectability und shows some promise of leading lisinto the phase of "nationalut the Cuban experience, and the Indonesian Party's behavior in Uie Sino Soviet dispute, cannot give the Soviets much assurance Uiat the Indonesian Party In power would follow Soviet guidanceisciplined way either. Elsewhere, nationalist leaders have generally rebuffed or even repressed thein some cases, Soviel state relations with the new governments have not escaped damage.
One of the features of the general line of policy described in this paper will probably be an increased emphasis. In areas where this is feasible, on efforts to build subversive capabilities and tangible political assets within the underdeveloped countries. The challenge of the Chinese Communists, and In Latin America Lhe competing appeal of Fidellsmo, reinforce the reasonsrealer Soviet effort in thisNevertheless, wc do not expect any radical turn in Soviet policy stressing early Communist attempts to come to power. Thc Soviet leaders continue to give evidence that. In most cases, they regard such attempts as premature, more likely to set back rather than advance the fortunes of the local parlies, and prejudicial to other Soviet interests. Meanwhile, they will conUnue to rely upon diplomacy and materialeven though stringencies in Uie domestic economy and their growing awareness of the limited political returns on aid programs may lead them to become more selective In assuming new economicthey do not wish to abandon this field to the West.'
Communist China. At Ihe present stage of Uie Sino-Sovietneither Moscow' nor Peiping entertains much nope of pressuring or persuading thc rival leadership to alter Ils stand. The stokes ln lhe conflict are therefore the allegiance o( other Communist parties and radical movements in Iho non-Communbi world. Because China has made gradual but regular gains ln this competition over tho last two years, particularly ln Asia, thc Sovietstrong interest In gaining some sort ol respite, especiallyime when the accumuIaUon ofelsewhere has lowered their prestige Tho clearest example of this interaction occurred lasl October when the Soviets, foreseeing theof it retreat in the Cuban missile crisis,ain bid toChinese criticism by momentarily supjxirtlng Peiping in its border dispute with India. The same tendency is evident in Khrushchev's callruce In polemical warfare and efforts lo arrange bilateral talks.
But while the Sovieis can shelve an Issue like Berlin simply by ceasing to agitate it. Uiey have no means ol unilaterally shutting off Uie Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese show no disposition to stop pressing ihcir case, and Khrushchev Is unwilling lo make concessions important
an examlnauOn or Soviet aid lo these coimtrirs. secS3 "Bloc Economic and Military Assistanceutcd ios&HK
lo allow the two to compose their differencesime. The present attempts toeeting have been carried on in apublic correspondence filled with uncompromisingof position and veiled threats and insults. We think that aif It comes about, will at most resultuperficial compromise which would be highly vulnerable to the next turn of international events. Beyond these maneuvers, the general outlook Is for aand widening estrangement between the two powers In which both Soviet and Chinese nationalism will become increasingly prominent.
southeast Asia, diflerences with China, which Includeover the tactics of "national liberation" struggle, have workedSoviet policy. Because of the important position ofVietnamese as the prime movers of Communist policy inand South Vietnam, thc Soviets are probably increasinglyoppose North Vietnamese interests. The Soviets probably do notdissipate what influence they have in Hanoi by constantsecondary questions of local tactics, particularly if in doing solo be giving way to Western pressures. On the other hand,have broader interests and problems which transcend thoseLaos. Hence they would be loath lo give theree hand to decide Communist policy. On balance,the Soviets still probably prefer to maintain the Genevawe think that they will be unable to respond lo US andto stabilize the Laotian situation unless US pressures induceCommunists to seek Soviel support.
V. THE LONGER RUN
Il Is wholly uncertain how long Soviet policy will focus on the tasks of consolidation designed to prepareenewed offensive against thc non-Communist world. This dependsumber of factors, such as the situation in Lhe Lop leadership, the success of thc USSR's efforts lo improve its relative military position, and the opportunities foraction opened up by developments abroad. An aggravation of divisions in Europe and between Europe and the US, for example, would encourage thc Soviets to pursue more actively the exacerbation ofin the Western camp. General policy, moreover, might be heavily influenced by the need to respond lo some unexpected turn of events, suchuccessful Communist revolution In Latin America, the flaring upew Cuban crisis, or an escalation of armed conflict in southeast Asia.
In our last estimate of the future course of Soviet foreigne examined the possibilityradual evolution in the Soviet world oullook which would diminish the importance of those conceptions of
'. "Trends in Soviet Foreign
14
derived from Communist ideology. At that time, we judged ll possible that,uite unpredictable period of time, certain factors might force the Soviet leaders loore "normal" approach to world politics, one giving greater weight to national Interests andmodes of International behavior as these arc understood in the West, and less to the effort to expand Indefinitely the area of Moscow's control. In this section, we reconsider the nalure and influence of these factors: the course of developments inside the USSR, changing relations within the Bloc and the Communist movement, and the movement of events in the East-West competition.
Internalear ago, we concluded that there was some prospect of an evolutionary trend inside the USSR which, bypublic opinion toarger influence, would have someeffect on the Soviet world outlook. We have seen no significant movement over the last year, however, in the direction of Involving wider circles of opinion, presumably closer lo thc aspirations of the general population. In Soviet policymaking. Tlie regime has laid new economic burdens on the consumer and. In Cuba, earned the countryisky and remote adventure irrelevant to the concerns and desires of theThese actions have probably cost the regime somo of the popular confidence and loyalty which It seeks, and the relatively bleak outlook for the consumer3 raises the possibllily that demonstrations of discontent may recur on the considerable scaleut thesedo not endanger the bases of regime control, and the recentof military priorities in the allocation of economic resources confirms that they remain only one factor, and evidentlyecisive one, In the leadership's choice of policies
We attach considerable long-run importance, however, to the climate of opinion which, making use of Uie opportunities of de-Stallnl-zatlon. has manifested itself among Soviet writers and artists. Tlie recent works of tho cultural intelligentsia, and their responses to critical aitack, implicitly and sometimes even explicitly reject the legitimacy of party authority in Uie arts More than this. In their strong affirmation of human values and their condemnation of the Stalinist past, they have formulated Uie hitherto unspoken question of thc present leadership's responsibility for thc crimes ofss and, consequently, its fitness to rule today. Implicit in their revolt Isepudiation of the way in which the party defines its historic mission and ilsUiat Uie Western world is inevitably hosUle to the USSR.
Thc regime haspecial sensitivity lo the Intellectuals' contention that the older generation does not deserve the respect of lis sons It senses in this notriticism of mdividuaLi, but aof the political achievements of the revolution to date. Current measures of repression reflect party fears that these attitudes areto other groups, and there are signs lhal some students and scien-
workers share the artists' outlook. In the face of the present crackdown and demands for recantation, many of the rebellious artists may not be able to sustain the collective Insubordination which their current silence represents. Wc believe, however, that theirfrom the party leadership as presently constituted Is profound, and that it will continue to nnd expression so long as the regime remains unwilling, as It appears to be at present, to resort lo repressions which truly terrorize.
elations In the Communist World. In thc past year, events have forced thc Soviet leadership to move considerably further away from the traditional Communist view of Moscow as the undisputed center and order-giver for thc entire world movement. Even as they look beyond Mao Tse-tung to his successors, they have little hope of being able to restore unity ot action with Communist China or to be relieved of the necessity to combat its Independent influence in parties nnd movements which earlier were exclusive Soviet preserves. By force of variousthey have had topecial status to Cuba In thc socialist camp and to watch Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the parties in non-Communist Asia move varying distances out of their sphere of Influence Inapprochement with Tito, they have had to compromise their old demands of hegemony
n all these ways the Soviets, respondingluralistic and contradictory world, areolitical give-and-take which has less and Iris relation to traditional techniques of Stalinist manipulation and to the blacks and whites of Stalinist thought. We belitve that ihis process within the Communist movement has an eroding eflect upon the basic Soviet view of world politics asipolar struggle of camp against camp. Tlie private discourse of Soviet citizens and officials frequentlyecognition that, in some matters, Soviet interests parallel those ol the West rather than those of Communist China. It would be wrong, we think, to Interpret this trend as leading Inommon Soviet-Western front against China. Bul it Is not unreasonable to expect that the loosening of relationships inside the Communist world willignificant factor lending to dimmish the ideological Ingredient in the Soviet outlook upon the non-Communist world
he Course of East-West Competition In our last cslimate. we singled out the success or failure which the USSR's foreign policyas perhaps Uie most significant factor affecting the Soviet outlook on thc outside world. Since that time, the record contains much more failure than success, but we do not perceive signs of any fundamenlal Soviet reappraisal of thc validity ol their key doctrines. We continue to believe, however, that the prolonged frustration of Soviet objectives, particularly the more ambitious aims having to do
16
orld-wide conflict of systems, holds some promise over the long run of bringing tbe USSR aroundiew which acceptsluralistic world. Conversely, It seems certain that successes In expanding Soviet Influence, major weakenings In Western positions, and In particular any further advances of direct Communist rule will act to confirm the more far-reaching hopes and expectations of the Soviet leaders.
is possible, however, that the experience of prolongedadvance toward Communist objectives would bring to the foredogmatic elements in the Soviet outlook. But even Ifshould dimmish Ln the long run. this would not bring aninternational conflicts of Interest or necessarily reduce thegeneral war. On the contrary, even In these circumstances theof Soviet national security, prestige, and ambition, asthe Soviet leaders and people, would still bring thc USSR intocollision with lhe interests of other slates. Trie most thatexpected would be that some issues would become morenegotiable, particularly those not deeply rooted In thcof the Soviet state, and that the occasional recognition ofof common Interest with the West would not invariablyby Ideological hostility.
VI. THE QUESTION OF SUCCESSION
A key uncertainty surrounding future Soviet policy arises from the problem of lhc succession to Khrushchev. The style, skill, andof the top leader stillajor role In determining Soviet choices and in the effectiveness with which policies are prosecuted. We think, for example, that Khrushchev's personal views and attributes have been of major importance In shaping Soviet policies over the past decade, and that the USSRUTcrent leader might have posed significantly different problems to the US.
The Soviet Party appears to be no better equipped with anmechanism for the designationuccessor and his orderly assumption of power lhan itecade ago. The most likelyof events, in our view,epetition of the posl-Stalinin which the late leader's senior associatestruggle for supremacyacade of collectivity. Thc main arena of conflict will be thc leading party organs, butingle figure can gain control fairly soon, the contenders will probably try lo bolster their strength by appealing to important interest groups outside theparly apparatus. Of these groups, we believe that the economic administration, weakened by continuing reorganizations, will be an even less important political counter lhan when Malenkov tiled to use itnd the police would probablyignificant factor
SEwET
SEWcT
only In thc eventuccession struggle was prolonged and was accompanied by popular unrest which enlarged the role ot the security forces.
There is some reason to believe, however, that the militarywillubstantial factor in post-Khrushchev maneuvering for power. The special efforts to rehabilitate Stalin's military victims and military attempts to maximize their own credit for World War IIpointtrong sense of corporate Identity among thc senior officers, although we also have evidence of conflicts among the marshals. More Important, the military leadership in thc last two years hasasserted its own views, not always unanimous, on questions of miliiary doctrine and strategy; at times It has seemed even to be giving itsore general political import as well. We do not believe that the military aspires to an independent political role Inpolitics, but if, as we expect, the military and economic choices facing the USSR become more acute, the senior officers will probably find themselves more deeply involved in matters ot general policy. Indeed, there are some present indications of party alarm on this score, and it ls possible that, before the succession question arises, steps will be taken to restrict the political role of leading military personalities.
Wc know little about the Individual policy views of Khrushchev's colleagues. It is clear, however, that the leadership is frequentlyover policy Issues, and the record of the succession struggles after Lenin and Stalin indicates that divergent views on policy are heavily involved in inncrparty competition. So long as present trends continue in the economy, in the relationship o( East-West military power, in Bloc relations, and in Soviet fortunes abroad, Khrushchev's heirs willumber of acute issues and decisions. His departure would make it easier lo ditch some policies to which his personal prestige has been attached. But it would aggravate most problems by bringing about an inevitable temporary reduction of Sovietoss of authority in the Communist movement,eneral uncertainty in the country.
In such circumslances, it is normal for Soviel politicians lotheir own views to expediency and to espouse those policies which seem most likely lo serve Iheir personal ambitions. At the sameowerful weapon in this competitioneader can represent as promising solutionsroad range of problems confronting lhe regime; lo berogramrave weakness. Thus contenders for power are under pressure to formulate competing proposals, designed to appeal to politically important groups,umber of issues. Initially the tendency would probably be for more conservative elements to gain predominance, but theuccession struggle remains unresolved, the more tendency there would beider range of alternative policies to be given active
S6#RET
SEjKET
consideration. This tendency creates the likelihood that, if the struggle was protracted, the circle of political participation would also widen as rivals reached out beyond the party elite for support.
ecause of these factors, the period ushered in by Khrushchev's departure may present special opportunities and dangers to the TJS. Relations with the non-Communlst world, and particularly with the leading rival power, are likely to be among the prime issues In anycompetition, since these are Intimately related to militaryeconomic difficulties, and the key questions of China and Oermany. We think lt very unlikelywar party" will emerge In the Kremlin; there Is no evidence that othe'r leadersess sober view than Khrushchev of the consequences of nuclear war, and Indeed someIndicates that the military regard the USSR as inadequately prepared at present to engage In one.action may form which seeks lo meet the problems of Internal discontent and Chinese pressure by placing greater stress on factors of tension In East-West relations. It is also possibleuccession struggle would generate arguments for some accommodation with the Westeans of coping with these same problems. At any rate, the US will almost certainly be assailed with contrary indications, all of them difficult to interpret, and some of them suggesting that important changes are possible depending on the attitude adopted by thc West. If Khrushchev'soccursime when existing policies arc enjoying poorthc succession period may in fact offer unusual chances forIn Soviet policy.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
document wo*noted byor the informationl the recipient ond of porwm under hi
d to know bout Addmonol euentioloomortted by the foUo-*ngretpecfne oVportmenlv
o. Director ot Intell-genceBeteorch. for lhe Deportment of Stole
Defenie Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretory ot
Mm
Chief ol Slat! lor Intelligence. Deportmenl o' the Army, for
the Department ol tho Army
Chiefperation!or lhe Deportmenl of
lhe Novy
o. AuiUonl Chief of Stoff, Intelligence. USAf, for the Deportmenl of lhe Air force
for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for lhe Joint Stoff
ot Intelligence. AFC, for lhe Atomic Energy Commbiion
Director, FBI, lex the Federal Boreou ol Director of NSA, <o< lhe NationalAgency
i- AnbJonl Direclor 'or Centrol Reference. CIA for any other Deportment or Agency
Th* document may be retained, ot deefreyed by burning In accordance with applicable locurity ractUatiom. orhe Centrol lirMTgenee Agency by arrongemer*OAce of Central Reference. CIA
When tha document hemmeoe, the oermoi reopmrm moy retain iteriod not in eicet* of one yeor. At Wm end ol thb period, the document ihould either be destroyed, returned to Ihe forwarding agency, or per-motion ihould beed of the forword.ng ogency lon oeeocdonte wmS
Htle of mi* doci/ment when tned teporotely Irom lhe tertbe clot-
tiAed, mi fWfv6UJ im
DISTRIBUTION,
Whim Home Notional Secueity Council Deportmenl of Stale Deportrient o' Del erne Atomic Energy Commotion FeoVal Boreou of lnvevigot-or
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: