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Mandatoryocument #.
NATIONAL INh^LUG
Political Prospects in Peru
SuWhtdIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurrad in by rha
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD At indicaiad3
' *and
V-oT-^n rWtnnrtmnrct* Army i
Concurring] Director
Director,mwnvanc*
AufalaM Chtof o( Staff (oraenia, Oapartmint o( tnVArmyAssiitoni Chief of Naval Operation*epartment of lha Navy Aswfant Chief ofirector for Intelligence, Joint"jsj?
of tho National Security Agency ;
Abstaining
Tho Atomic Energy Commmlonand the AwUtentFederal Bureau of lirvMHfja^^t^ being oufcude of" '
Thi. material contain*artonal.heJJnrtod State, wfmln the meaning af th.SC,. theor revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorizedron&rted.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Political Prospects in Peru
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE
I.
Election of
IL THE MILITARY
HI. COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE
IV. ELECTION
V. POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR
VI. THE ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE POLITICAL PROBLEM
APPENDIX A: POLITICAL PARTIES CONTESTING THE 3
APPENDIX B: EXTREMIST POLITICAL GROUPS IN PERU
POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN PERU
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the prospects for the establishment of an elected civil government and the basic problems which would confrontovernment.
CONCLUSIONS
present pollUcal difficulties are the result olpolitical and social change generatedong staticindustrialization and urbanization. Thesebeen building upesolution of thepolitical tensions is not likely to be accomplishedyears. )
present Military Junta seized power ino prevent direct or Indirect accession to power bythe result of2 presidential and congressionalhaa failed in its effort* toolitical coalitionensure the defeat of APRA in the new election which itto hold inn election with therunning could be as close and inconclusive as that)
as the military areosition to controlof the election, they will probably carry out theto hold it If, contrary to expectation, Hayaan undeniable victory, they could still intervene toinauguration and toilitary government which
'Atlanta Popular SecolucUmanaadical leftist butparty established inIn IU earlier daya APRA iu violentlyry and was repeatedly auppresscd by the conservative military. Howerer. In more recent times IU program has been considerably moderalod and it baa sought lo achieve power by pollUcal neUon.
would retain power for an unspecified period. There is no doubt that the military have this capability or that they would exercise it if convinced that it was necessary to do so in order to prevent APRA from coming to power. )
Peruvian Communist and pro-Castro groups haveof achieving power in the near future. Theforces and security services are capable of controllingactivities shortell-organized guerrillaa revolutionary uprisingational scale.)
the past, Peruvian Governments have beenmake the sacrifices or to risk the political liabilities ofaimed at bringing about fundamental social andNow, however, Peruituation in whichis becoming more and more dependent on thedisposition of governments to respond effectively tofor economic well-being and security. Thisa breakup of the existing structure of the Peruvianeconomy. Unless the forces of moderation are able toorderly change, radical leadership will probably getto try its methods.
DISCUSSION
I. BACKGROUND A. Basic Factors
Peru hasroadly based political system nor even effective national unity in the senseommon language and culture. The highland Indians, about half the population, still exist outside of the mainstream of national life and ln precarious circumstances. Political power is monopolizedmall oligarchy composed of agrarian,mining, and industrial Interests allied vith the military and' the church hierarchy. In the factional struggles for power within the oligarchy, the decisive factor has been the military, which Is still the ultimate arbiter in Peruvian politics.
The massive Andean mountains divide Peru into three distinctand make transportation and communications facilities difficult to construct and extremely costly to maintain. The modern sector of the economy Is largely confined lo the narrow coastal plain in which are concentrated aboutercent of the population and theagriculture, petroleum production, manufacturing, and trade that
together account for over half the country's gross national producthe Sierra (aboutercent of the total area andercent of the total population) supplies mineral and some agricultural products, but most of its more than five million Inhabitants live in primitiveoutside the money economy. The Selva, the vast, sparsely settled region east of the Andes, is still largely Isolated from the rest of Peru.
The Peruvian economy benefitsattern of exports which is more diversified than that ln most Latin American countries. Inyears decreased world market prices for zinc, lead, copper, and petroieum have been compensated for by increased revenues fromof silver, cotton, and sugar, and by development of other exports such as Iron ore andarticularly Important new product.esult GNP, which has grown an average of four to five percent annually over the past two decades. Is estimated to have Increasedercent
The bulk of the population, however, does not share in theprogress Indicated by these Increases in GNP. On the contrary, real income for many is probably declining. Per capita income in the Sierra Is about the same as that of stagnant Bolivia; that in the Selva Is about the same as that of poverty-stricken Haiti. Even in the coastal region, where per capita income Is about average for Latin America, there are great disparities of wealth and well-being. In Lima and other cities, conspicuous consumption exists In the presence of abject poverty.
olitical Background* *
The dominant Peruvian elite has been successful tn barring popular forces from exerting independent Influence in the national political system. However, pressure for pollUcal and social change, to make the government more responsive to the electorate and to ameliorate the condition of the masses, has been mounting with the growth of the urban middle class, the rising importance of organized labor, theparticipation of mestizos ln pollUcal activity, the migration of highland Indians to coastal areas, and the rapid Increase inwhich hasate of three percent per annum.
The established order In Peru was first challenged by the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americanaounded by Victor Haya de la Torreaya drew Inspiration from Marxist doctrine, but also from the Mexicanmovement was always explicitly naUve Americanatin American) and came to be vigorously anti-Communist. APRA gained considerable support in organized labor and ln Intellectual circles, and developed the only effective "precinct-level" political organization ln Peru. It was greatly feared by the oligarchy, who considered the Apristas more effective and therefore more danger-
For details regarding APRA and other political parties, see Appendix A.
ous than the Communists. APRA was repeatedly suppressed by the military, with consequent violence and bloodshed by both sides which still embitters Peruvian politics.
de la Torre was probably elected to the Presidencyut was counted out by the incumbent government.came to realize that it could gain political influencemaMng its voting strength available to ambitious oligarchs lnfor promised favors. On this basis it helped to elect Joseto the Presidency8 Bustamante's governmentby an anll-Aprista general, Manuel Odria, who ruled asfor two years and then arranged for his election assix more. Under Odria's rule Peru enjoyed relative prosperityprogress. This success led him to suppose that hiscould be electedair electiono hischagrin, his manoor third and Manuel Prado wasthe support of APRA. Prado's close competitor in the electionwas Fernandoemagogic member of the elitereform and drew to himself the support of some of theof APRA, including the Communists as well as middleand elements of the oligarchy.
C. The Election2
On the basis of its relations with President Prado, APRA believed that2 lt could at last elect Haya de la Torre to the Presidency of Peruree and fair election. Haya was opposed by both Belaunde and Odria. These three ranead heat. Because of the vote for minor candidates, none of them gained the one-third plurality required for directn APRA dominated coalition, however, gainedajority of the congressional seats, and consequently would have had the principal voice in the congressional selectionresident from among the three leading candidates, in accordance with the Constitution.
The leaders of the armed forces privately made it clear that they would never permit APRA to come to power, suggesting publicly that APRA could win the election only by the Prado administration'sof electoral fraud. After the election the military brought against APRA formal charges of "massive fraud" which were rejected by the National Election Board. Despite the now imminent threat of acoup, the civilian political leaders were unable toormula which would serve to preserve constitutional government,on account of the intransigence of Belaunde, who expected the military to install him In the Presidency. When Haya and Odria finally
'Hayand4 percent).
reached an agreement pursuant to which Congress would elect Odria (believed to be seriously ill) to the Presidency, with an Aprista as his Vice President and probable early successor, the military deposedPrado,ilitary junta, and annulled2 election.
military were moved by their ancient enmity towardby fear that APRA, in power, would try to deprive them olposition In public life and subordinate them to civilthis judgment they were probably correct. They acted with theor acquiescence of most political elements, which foresawstable civil government could be established on the basis of theelection results and were more concerned to have orderby an authoritative military regime than to maintainprocesses. Even the Aprista rank and file had no stomachthe militaryeneral strike called by the APRAthe collapse of the strike even APRA accepted the situation infor promises of no persecutionree election In
II. THE MILITARY REGIME
In2 the functions of the Peruvian Presidencyour-man Junta composed of General Ricardo Perez Godoy, President of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, and theofficers of the threeNicolas Lindley Lopezeneral Pedro Vargas Prada (Airnd Admiral Juan Torres Matoss primus inter pares, Perez Godoy occupied the Presidential palace and assumed the ceremonial functions of theThe other Junta members took charge of their respective service ministries. Other military officers were assigned to take charge of the other ministries.
In3 Perez Godoy was ousted by his colleagues in thehe charge that Perez Godoy tended to arrogate to himself too much of the prestige and powers of the Presidency covered aof his personal and policy conflicts with other members of the Junta and influential military leaders. It was clear, nevertheless, that Perez Godoy had in factan his colleagues could not trust By his acts and statements he had even aroused fears that he was coming to see himself as the leader of the country's popular forces. None of the remaining members of the Junta is devoted to theprocess, but in ousting Perez Godoy for personal presumption, they renewed their own commitment to hold elections in June.
"Tbe initiative came from Vargas Prada, who apparently took umbrage when Perez Qodoy refused to countenance the wholesale proscription ol APRA. The decisive factor was the delayed adherence of Lindlertrictly professional soldier who feels tbat the military should not be Involved In ordinary politics and consequently that the earliest feasible establishment of an acceptable civilIs desirable. The role of Torres Matos was passive
Despite Its authoritarian character, the Junta has permittedof speech and of the press, Including the right to criticize the Junta's decisions, and has been slow to take forceful measures to control popular unrest. It has tended to yield when specific measures have aroused strong opposition from powerful vested Interests.some of the measures which It has adopted presage fundamental changes in the traditional relation of the Peruvian Government to the economy and the society. It has established an elaborate system ofeconomic and social planning which could leadetterof resources, but which also has strong overtones of economic nationalism and statism. It has actually begun to distribute land to landless peasants, particularly in the La Convencion area. It has also begunomprehensive labor code.
Such measures are revolutionary ln their implications andwith the Junta's professed caretaker status. They partially reflect the activity and purposes of subordinate officials determined to transform Peru. This tendency derives important support fromof the Centre- de Altos Estudios MUitares (the Peruvian Warwhere authoritarian-minded but reformist professors (Including one known Communist) are highly Influential.
The Junta has had such an anti-APRA fixation that it was blind to the potentialities for Communist subversion. It welcomed andCommunist efforts to wrest the control of labor unions from APRA. Thereash of Communist-instigated labor violence and agrarian unrest which the Junta blamed on APRA, refusing to take effective action against the Communists. Finally the Communist-instigated destruction ofmillion worth of US mining property at La Oroya in2 brought the issue of Communist violenceead. Under the pressureidespread public reaction against its coddling of Communists, the Junta in January carriedoundup ofadical activists, mostly Communists. Since then labor violence and sabotage have subsided and most of those arrested have been quietly released.
III. COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES
Communist and pro-Castro movements have beena result of the personallstlc nature of their leadership andover tactics. The Peruvian Communist Partyembers, is the largest group. Itsmainly from among industrial workers, professional people,in the Llma-Callao area and the central andregions. The PCP has utilized various front activities tosympathizers, particularly In labor and student groups.and sympathizers now lead most of the important studentformerly dominated by Apristas.
The national leadership of the PCP has generally favoredwith the Incumbent ruling groups against APRA. Communists and Communist sympathizers were included in the lists of congressional candidates of all parties except APRA and the Christian Democrat Party (PDC)hey are campaigning for seats in3 elections on all major party lists, except APRA. and as Independents. Within the PCP,roup of younger members have cited the party'sas grounds for advocating more aggressive policies andTheir program, advocating violent revolution and closerwith the Castro and Chinese Communist positions, thus far has been rejected by the old-line PCP leadership. The PCP leadership in southern Peru, however,ore militant line and cooperates with dissident Communist elements.
Castroite, Trotskyite, and other dissident splinter groups advocate "activist" programs stressing Immediate revolution and guerrillaExcept during the2 period, however, when their operations had the forebearance if not the blessing of the Junta, they have not been effective.
In short, the Peruvian Communist and pro-Castro groups have little prospect of achieving power in the near future. The Peruvian armed forces and security services are capable of controlling subversive activities shortell-organized guerrilla movementevolutionary uprisingational scale. Over the short run, the Cc-inmt mists' best chances for Increasing their influence appear to lie in continuedwith and infiltration of an tl-APRA groups, particularly in the event of an open conflict between APRA and the military. Over the longer run the government's continued failure to meet substantially the Increasing aspirations of the mestizo and Indian masses couldthe extremists with an opportunity to foment widespread disorder andhance to attain power.
IV. ELECTION PROSPECTS
far the Junta has failed signally in its efforts to bringa combination of political forces as would ensure the defeatde la Torre in the presidential election now scheduled for 9The three major presidential candidates are the same as inof them has been willing to yield to any other orusionThe Junta was not even able to limit the number ofthree. In order to ensure that someone would receive therequired for election.3 election, if held, willa rerun of the abortive electionith little chance ofa clearly decisive result-'
' Beeor more Information on these groupe,
'Secor farther detail regarding tho parties particlpaUnB In3 election.
Meanwhile, however, there have been some shifts In the political lineup which could affect the result Some of these are favorable to Belaunde's prospects. He has secured the support of the Christianwhose candidate0 votese is also likely to get many of0 votes cast for minor leftwing partiesn the other hand, Belaunde has some new obstacles to overcome this year. To many people he is now the government candidate. Many of those who were with Belaunde2 remember his Irresponsible antics after the last election and will be reluctant to support him again. In addition, even within his own political organization there are people dissatisfied with his concessions to the PDC and with his Juggling of the party's congressional lists. The fourthhe newMario Samame Bogglo, is likely to draw more votes away from Belaunde than from anyone else.
Odria's prospects havehysical Injury curtailed his campaigne is now in apparent good health and isvigorously. The tensions and violence since2 elections win enhance his appealstrongman" who gave Peru order, progress, and. For these reasons most of the Pradtstas who supported Haya de la Torre2 are now supporting Odria. These gains, however, may be somewhat offset by the cavalier manner ln which Odria has treated aspirants for places on his congressional lists.
Haya de la Torre's electoral prospects have been reduced by the loss of Pradista support, including the financial support required to meet campaign expenses, and by the alienation of some Apristas, including Manuel Seoane, one of the party's most effective campaigners. Many voters may also have concluded that the military will never permit Haya to takea vote for himote thrown away.APRA still has the only effective precinct organization in Peru and has regained the advantage of running in opposition to the status quo. Haya has launched his campaign ahead of his rivals and has engendered enough early popular enthusiasm to alarm his military and political opponents.
The election, If held, Is likely to be close; the outcome cannot be predicted with confidence. For this reason, there are signs ofnervousness among the military and some elements of the oligarchy, which could leadove to preclude the possibility of an APRA victory by excluding APRA from participation ln the electionegal pretext or by cancelling the election. Since the present Junta could not take such action with good countenance, Its replacement would probably be required. The idea is under active consideration within the high command of the army and the air force.
Inasmuch as the military areosition to control the outcome of the election (unless the vote for Haya should be overwhelming, which ishey will probably carry out the Junta's commitment to
hold it Ii, contrary to expectation, Haya should win an undeniable victory, they could still intervene to prevent his inauguration.
V. POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENTS
If the election should be held and Belaunde should be elected, he would initially have the support of the military, of important elements of the oligarchy, of many middle class reformists, and also of theThe short-term prospects for political stability would begood, although some die-hard Apristas might cause someIn some respects, Belaunde's conduct in office would be likely to resemble that of President Goulart incrypto-Communists would be appointed to some offices. Communistand control of organized labor would be facilitated, and an ardent nationalism would generally characterize the attitude of the newRight as well as leftwlng supporters would urge the adoption of policies inimical to foreign investments in Peru,to the TJS ofl companies operating there. At the same time,extravagant designs for the development of the Peruvianwould require him to seek enormous amounts of foreign,US, financial and technical aid. These inconsistencies would be likely to produce confusion and strain in US relations with Peru. Over the longer term, the virtual impossibility of satisfying the conflicting interests of Belaunde's heterogeneous following and the probablehostility of the hard core of APRA would be likely to lead to considerable internal tension and political instability.
Odria, If elected, would almost certainlytronger and more realistic administration than Belaunde, but would tend to rely upon authoritarian controls. He would be keenly Interested In the further development of the existing Peruvian economy, but unlikely to expend significant resources on the less immediately profitableof the hinterland. He would pay Up service to social reform, but would probably not do much in that direction.
If, perchance, Haya de la Torre should win the election, thewould almost certainly intervene to prevent his inauguration. Even If he were allowed to take office, he would have to face not only constant political obstruction and agitation, but also the constant threatilitary coup. Haya Is committed to the reformist goals of the Alliance for Progress, but, in these circumstances, it is unlikely that he would be able to accomplish much In the way of effective reform.
If the armed forces should again intervene to prevent the election or the inauguration of Haya de la Torre, they would almost certainly do so under new leadership free of any commitment to hold earlyoup would have substantial civilian support, or at least
acquiescence, although it might encounter more resistance than was the casehere Is no doubt that the military have the power to impose their rule, should they decide to do so.
new military regime established in theseemporary caretaker government. It would have to faceurgent problems of economic development and socialit would have to seek toroad base of popularAlmost certainly there would be differences within thethe measures of reform and development to becircumstances, however, would tend to favor theeronlst-typeis, an authoritarianin origin but catering to the urban proletariatovernment would be highly nationalistic as wellreformist.
VI. THE ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE POLITICAL PROBLEM
Given reasonably stable political conditions, the Peruvian economy should continue to expand at about the present rate of growth, five percent of GNP per annum. This expansion, however, has been of little benefit to the Peruvian people.
A critical economic problem arises from the pressure of population on the land in the Sierra. Although the Inhabitants of the Sierra arcresent factor in Peruvian politics, their Increasing unrestatter of great potential politicalimpleof large landholdings cannot solve the problem, since the land presently under cultivation is not sufficient to provide adequate farms for all the landless peasants and subsistence farmers. Moreover, to break up the plantations which now produce major export crops, notably sugar and cotton, would reduce the foreign exchange earnings required for further economic development.
Satisfaction of the growing popular demandreater measure of economic security and well-being, upon which fundamental political stability depends, will require the extensive development of new areas of cultivation, principally through irrigation In the arid coastal area and through opening access to the trans-Andean region. It will also require the development ot employment opportunities, housing, and sanitation for rural migrants to the cities, and the general education and technical training needed to qualify them for urban employment. Such developments, particularly those related to irrigation and trans-Andean transportation, will be technically difficult and highlyThe accomplishment ofrogram would require not only an effective mobilization of Peruvian resources, but also large amounts of foreign (presumably US) financial and technical aidong period of time.
n the past. Peruvian governments have been unwilling to make the sacrifice* or to risk the political liabilities of programs aimed at bringing about fundamental social and ecoriomic change. Now,Peruituation in which political stability is becoming more and more dependent on the ability and disposition of governments to respond effectively to popular demands for economic well-being and security. This situationreakup of the existing structure of the Peruvian society and economy. Unless the forces of moderation are able to bring about orderly change, radical leadership will probably get the chance to try Its methods.
APPPENDIX A
POLITICAL PARTIES CONTESTING3 ELECTIONS
The AUama Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) was founded by Victor Raul Haya de la Torrehile In exile ln Mexico City. APRA was originally conceived as an international Latin American political movement, Under Marxist and Mexican influences, it advocated resistance to "Yankeehe political unity of Latin America, the integration of the Indian and Europeanlzed elements tn Latin American society, and the nationalization of land and industry. The movement took root only in Peru, where the Partido Aprista Peruano (still commonly called APRA) was establishedowever, the Peruvian party does have loose associations with other democratic-reformist parties such as Action Democratica in Venezuela. Because of lis historical origins, it is vulnerable to proscriptions againstpolitical parties designed to curb the Communists.
1 Haya de la Torre apparently won the Peruvian presidential election, but the Incumbent government manipulated the returns so as to deny him the victory. Since that time APRA has been forced tounderground, except during thend6 to the present. It was the decisive factor ln the election of Jose Busta-mante5 and Manuel Pradout foil Just short of electing Haya de la Torre
In the course ofears there hasotable evolution In APRA's political character. It responded with revolutionary violence to Its suppressionut6 had concluded that its goals could be achieved only by evolutionary political means. Its original anti-US attitude has beenis now In full accord with the Alliance for Progress, although it would probably still seek to assert some nationalistic and socialistic control over the operations of major US private corporations in Peru.5 APRA has been vigorously anti-Communist. Except when hindered by anti-APRA governments, it has proved itself to be the only effective competitor of the Communists for the leadership of Peruvian labor and student organizations,
The relatively moderate attitude of the aging APRA leadership, particularly the expedient decisions to collaborate with Prado6 and OdrJaas alienated some of the younger party militants. APRA Rebelde, composed of admirers of Fidel Castro, broke offontinued political frustration would be likely tourther erosion
of such elements, unless the party Itself should turn again from political to revolutionary action. In that case, it would probably lose Its more moderate elements.
The Popular Action movement (Accionwas formed6 to consolidate the various groups that had supported Fernando Belaunde Terry's strong bid for the Presidency as an Independent. Its diverse elements include members of the oligarchy. Intellectuals,Aprtttat, and extreme leftists. Including Communists,ehicle to defeat APRA and attain power for themselves. Its program is nationalistic and leftist, with something for every constituent group. In his attempt to capture APRA's mass support, Belaunde has appealed for agrarianationwide program of community action,ast program of rood building to open up the Selva and break down Peruvian regionalism. In his appeal for conservative political andbacking, Belaunde stresses the threat APRA poses for Peruvian society and advocates moderate economic policies. Belaunde professes friendship for the US, where he has traveled and studied, and seeks US financial and technical assistance. While Belaunde and the AP leadership have refused to make any statement that would alienate Communist support, their present electoral alliance with the small but strongly anti-Communist Christian Democrat Party has worked against Communist infiltration of the AP-PDC congressional lists.
The Christian Democrat Party (Parttdo DemocrataPDC) differs from the other contending parties ln not following the traditional Latin American pattern of personalized leadership. Itrogram based on the papal encyclicals. Since its founding in Are* quipahe PDC has gained little numerical strength outside that area. The party hastrong bias against US private investments in Peru and tends to condemn both the US and the USSR ln itson International affairs.
The National Odrllsta Union {Union Nationalof General Manuel Odriaurely personallsUc organization formed to support thend formern2 elections. It draws support from all sectors of Peruvianand depends heavily upon the relative prosperity and order achieved under Odrla's control lneriod. The lower classes, particularly In the urban areas, benefitted from the public works programs carried out by Odria and tbe upper classes have confidence in his ability to control the Communists and the trade unions. The UNO program advocates reforms similar. In the main, to those urged by APRA and the AP, with perhaps greater emphasis upon public works and industrialization. Odrla's appeal is typified by his campaign tactics of stressing "deeds, not words."
Tlie Union of the Peruvian People (Union delas founded in the latter part2roup of young leftist-
oriented professionals. The UPP's appeal is to groups dissatisfied with the candidates and programs of the other Peruvian parties, andto ex-Bclaundistas. It follows the AP's opportunistic line Inall things to all people. The UPP strategy appears to be based on the expectation that its presidential candidate, Mario Samame Bog-glo, Rector of the National Engineering University, will attract support as the only new candidate In the3 elections. APRA has tried to build up the UPP and Its candidate, in an obvious attempt to splitfollowing.
APPENDIX B
EXTREMIST POLITICAL GROUPS IN PERU
The Peruvian Communist Party (Partido ComunistaPCP) had its origins in the Peruvian Socialist Party (PSP) formed8roup of Marxist Intellectuals and labor leaders. Thespirit of the group, Jose Carlos Mariategui, one of Peru's most brilliant Intellectuals, died during the crisis within the PSPver affiliation with the Comintern. While most of the PSP members agreed to change the party's name (to PCP) and affiliate with the Communistinority group withdrew and established the present PSP. The PCP has survived subsequentand purges to its continued adherence to whatever linedictates. The PCP secured, first, official toleration for Its labor activities competing against, and then considerable freedom, though not legal status, Ineriod, in return for helping elect Manuel Prado to his first term in office. Whenever the PCP has not had official encouragement, as ineriods, it has lost ground to APRA In the labor movement. The PCP leadership, following the defection of Eudocio Ravinesas been plagued with personal Ism. The present principal PCP leaders are: Raul Acosta, the Secretary General; Jorge del Prado, Secretary for Press and Propaganda; Enrique Flores, Secretary for Finance; and Dr. Jorge Veldez, head of the party's Control Commission. Genero Carnero Checa, editor and author of numerous pro-Communist and anti-US publications, may have an even greater influence in the party than the nominal PCP leadership, despite his reported expulsion from the party in the.
The other extremist groups in Peru have considerably smaller memberships than the PCP. The Revolutionary Workers Party (POR) and the Revolutionary Workers Party (Trotskyite) (PORre both Trotskyite, have an estimated total membership of, and are strongest in southern Peru and In the Department of Lima.2 one of their members, the much publicized "guerrilla" leader Hugo Blanco, Incited rural unrest and encouraged peasant invasions of large estates in the La Convencion area of the Department of Cuzco. The Peruvian Leninist Partyn offshoot of the PCP, hasembers, mostly in the central region. The Peruvian Communal Movement (MCP) is an even smaller group primarily active among the Indians ln the central Andes. The Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR) is the former APRAadical offshoot of APRA. It has limited support in Trujillo, the traditional APRA stronghold in northern Peru, and some adherents In Cuzco. The National Liberation Frontstablished to unite these fragmented CommunUt elements In2 elections, polled only0 votes for its candidate, General Cesar Pando. The two Communist paramilitary fronts, the National Revolutionary Front (FKR) and the Trotskyite LeftistFrontormed in12 respectively, have not been notably successful In coordinating the subversive activities of these various groups.
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