MEETING BETWEEN MR MC GEORGE BUNDY AND GENERAL CHIANG CHING-KUO 10 SEPTEMBER 19

Created: 9/10/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

subject meeting between mr. mc george bimdy and

general chiang chiag-kuo,3

oneneral chiang chlng-kuo met with mr. mc george bandy. alio present at the meeting were mr. ray cllno. mr. william nelson, mr. james shen, mr. cal mehlert, and mr. donald duffey. after an exchange of amenities, general chiang ching-kuo said that, although the government of the republic of china (grc) understood the reasone why the united states had signed the nuclear test ban treaty and tbe grc shared the u. s. desire to eaae world tension* and preserve world peace, the treaty alone would not solve all the problems. the grc is encouraged by president kennedy's public acknowledgement of the potential threat of continued chinese communist growth; but, chiang emphasized, the chinese communist regime at the preaent time la weaker than it has ever been since9 takeover of the china mainland. on the assumption that the u. s. and the u. s. s. r. will maintain the status quo in their mutual relations, the grc feela that now is the time for the u.nd the grc toormula aimed at solving the problem of the china mainland withoutajor war. the grc is prepared to assume full political responsibility for

such action with U. S. support. President Chiang Kai-shek is

positive that if the GRC acts now, the Soviet Union will not go to

the aid oi the Chinese Communists. Tims is the key element, however,

since new factors could change the situation in the future. According

to Chiang Ching-kuo, It le Important that the U. S. and the GRC take joint action Immediately to enhance the difficulties now facing the Chlneee Communlets and make it Impossible for them totheir position. Chiang Ching-kuo re-emphaslaed that the GRC recognizes the leading role of the United States and accepts the assumption that no action will be taken which would risk war. The GRC is willing to discuss ways and means to weaken the Chinese Communist regime and eventually overthrow It and feels that the solution to the problem must be more political than military. Chiang'a definition of political devices included political warfare, psychological warfare, diplomatic action and paramilitary operations such as maritime raids on the coast and airdrops of paramilitary tearaa. The GRC plana for the maritime raids and airdrops were to escalate from small and medium teams to large teams in three stages, six months apart. Chiang Ching-kuo claimed that the GRC haa located missile sites and atomic Installations on the China mainland and desires to work with the United Stater on ways and

me ana to remove these and restrain their expansion. Chiang promised to discuss details of the ways and meane to achieve this goal on other levels and reiterated that the GRC would assume full political responsibility for this action, expecting onlyand technical assistance from the United States. In conclusion, Chiang repeated tbe contention that the GRC is notarge scale attack on the China mainland and that the Chinese Communists must not be permitted to solve their present difficulties to become an even greater menace in the future.

In reply, Mr. Bundy told Chiang that the United Statesigh priority on measures to weaken the Chinese Communist regime, particularly its nuclear growth, and assured him that the U. S. Government would examine moat carefully any possibilities advanced. Mr. Bundy stressed the United States Government's aversion toajor conflict and expressed the view that tbe split between the Soviet Union and Communiat China would probably widen unless extreme forces of great magnitude drove them back together again. He said that one example oforce would be any major attack against the China mainland in which the United States wouldominant factor. Mr. Bundy empha-aized that the moment action against the mainland can be taken without Soviet intervention is not yet here and may never arrive.

In view of the lack of success of the small GRC operations of the past two and three years, Mr. Bundy felt thereuestion of whether larger operations would be productive and said the U. S. and the GRC must work together on the problem. In Mr. Bundy's opinion, any action against the China mainland should depend on three factors: ound Intelligence estimate of Chinesestrength andhe degree of political usefulness of such operations;he hazards and repercussions of failure to tho U. S. and GRC. In passing, Mr. Bundy mentioned the U. S. admiration of the GRC's accomplishments in its social and economic growth and assured Chiang that the success and effectiveness of such growth is of great Interest to the United States Government. (End of summary)

General Chiang Ching-kuo opened bis3 discussion with Mr. Mc George Bundy by saying that he had come to the United Statesost interesting moment in world politics, during the Sino-Soviet split and the nuclear teet ban treaty. Chiang said he was looking forward to discussing common problems at what his governmentarticularly important time. Mentioning that, in the past, the GRC and the United States had cooperated very smoothly, Chiang expressed the hope that this

President Chiang Kai-shek's views on matters of common interest which he hoped would stimulate Joint Sino-U. S. efforts. Tho GRC understands tho reasons why the United States had signed the nuclear teat ban treaty. The GRC feels, however, that the treaty

alone will not solve all the problems even though the GRC also

desiros to ease world tensiona and preserve world poaco.

Chiang Ching-kuo continued that the GRC had noted President Kennedy's remark that If the Chinese Communist regime continued to growteady pace,0 it will havereatind of Frankenstein. The GRC is encouraged by this statement since it moans that Washington recognises theof the problem. At tho same time, Chiang wanted to point out that the Chinese Communist regime is now the weakest it has been9 when the regime seised power en the China mainland. Proceeding from the major premise that the Soviet and the U. S. Governments would maintain the atatua quo in their mutualthe GRC feels that now ia the time for the U, S. and tho GRC to get together for tho purpose oformula aimed at solving the mainland problem withoutajor war. In this connection, Chiang aaid, the GRC ia prepared to

assume full political responsibility for its actions, with thethat it would receive United States support. Chiang Kai-shek is positive that if the GRC acts against the China mainland now, the Soviet Union will not go to the aid of the Chinese Communists. General Chiang Ching-kuo emphasized that time is the key element and it is uncertain how long the time will continue to be favorable. Many new factors may arise in the future and bring about changes and it is important that the GRC and the U. S. take timely action to make it impossible for the Chinese Communist regime toits position. We must act now, said the General, to enhance the difficulties the Chinese Communist regime now faces on the mainland. The philosophy that President Chiang Kai-shek desires to convey to the United States Government is that, in view of the close relations of the GRC and U. S. Governments, it is important that they coordinate their planning and their moves towardolution to the Chinese Communist problem.

Mr. Bundy replied by pointing out that the split doea change many aspects of tbe opportunities and dangers the GRC and. will face in the future but thought the two governments differed in their estimates of the effects of the split. This division has proceeded at an accelerated pace for seven years, since the

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Twentieth Congress, and unless extreme forces of great magnitude drive the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists together again, it is likely to widen in future years. For example, one of thethat would drive them back together again would be any major attack against the mainland in which the United States wouldominant factor. It is possible that the U. S. could be forced into conflict with them if they crossed the boundary lines now established. The moment that action against the China mainland could be taken wtthout^jjoviet intervention is not yet here and may never arrive. The United States Government does not desire to take any actios that wouldajor conflict.

In response. General Chiang said that the GRC has duly considered this question and anything that the GRC plans to propose doing will be governed by the premise that it must notajor conflict. The GRC recognizee that the United Statesorld leader and that its actions have world ramifications. Thus, the GRC recognises that it muBt not do anything that would lead to war. However, said Chiang, if no action is taken, the Chinese Communists may recover from their difficulties and in the futureroblem more difficult to handle. GRC plans do nota large frontal attack against the mainland but concern

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operations which will increase the Chinese Communist's difficulties on the mainland and decrease its strength.

Mr. Bundy expressed U. S. concern about tho type of operations that would be launched. He pointed outRC action mnet notajor conflict and must be measured according to the degree of involvement of tbe United States and the hazards to the strength of the GRCt Is debatable whether the operations will work. The U. S. has watched the email GRC operations of the last two and three years and has not yet found in them, at their level and form, any prospects of weakening the Chinese Communist regime. Thereuestion of whether somewhat larger operations will be productive and on this question the GRC and the U. S. must work together to see what can be done. Mr. Bundy thought any action would depend on three factors: ound intelligence estimate of Chinese Communist strength andhe degree of political usefulness of such operations,he hazards of failure to the United States and the GRC and the results of failure. Thio question should be carefully studied to determine our respective estimates of the degree of usefulness these type of operations would have.

At this point, Mr. Bundy observed that perhaps there were factors which be had not mentioned on which General CHIANG would like to comment.

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General Chiang thought It appropriate for him to mm up the

GRC position which fundamentally revolved around two points:

ow ia the time that. and the GRC should get together

to weaken the Chinese Communist regime on the China mainland and eventually seek itshe GRC Is mindful of the leading role of the United States and accepts the assumption that

no action will be taken which would risk war. The GRC is willing

to discuss ways and means to weaken and overthrow the Chinese Communist regime, and believes the solution to the problem must be more political than military. The GRC feels it should use more political devices than military means to obtain its objectives, such as political warfare, psychological warfare and diplomatic action plus paramilitary operations. The kind of paramilitary operations the GRC has in mind fall Into tworaids on the coast, and air drops of paramilitary teams. The GRC plans to startmall scale, then escalate to medium and then large teams. Tha GRC hopes to implement this plan in three stages of six months each, adding upearalf of action. Chiang Ching-kuo said that he would like to emphasise that the GRC is just as concerned as the United States over the growth of the Chinese Communist atomic capability. His government said Chiang, has located missile sites and atomic Installations

on the mainland and desires to work with the United States on ways and means to remove these, recognizing that if they are allowed to grow, they will be faceduch more difficult problem in the future. General Chiang did not wish to burden Mr. Bundy with the details of the ways and means he intended to propose but promised to discuss these at other levels. Chiang added that in this action the GRC will assume full political responsibility and that all it expects of the United States Is transportation and technical assistance.

Mr. Bundy saw no difficulties in cooperating ln political and psychological measures. He pointed out that thend the United States are not alone in the world and that other countries also have their own lntereata to consider. For example, many of theposaibilitiee such as economic pressures are conditioned by other countries. In distinction to political and psychological measures, there are obviously more risk* involved In military and paramilitary action and thereoat in failure. Mr. Bundy acknowledged the GRC's acceptance of political responsibility and emphasised that the precise size of the teams is less important than the prospects of success. In any action that we take, close study muat be given to specific ventures and in each case we must aak ourselves if thia operationatisfactory prospect of success.

Our experience in these kinds of problems is that they must not fail. The United States is very much interested in whether something could be planned which wouldelaying and preventive effect on the nnclcar growth of the Chinese Communist regime andost careful study in that field.

Touching briefly on another subject, Mr. Bundy said we have all watched with admiration the accomplishments of the GRC In its social and economic growth and that the success and effectiveness of such growth Is of great interest to the United States Government.

General Chiang said he would like to make two final points:

The GRC is notarge scale attack on the mainland!

The Chinese Communists must not be permitted to tide over their present difficulties because they would thenreater menace in the future.

Mr. Bundy assured Chiang that the United States priority on measures to weaken the Chinese Communist regime is high and said he understands General Chiang's concern, although he would not be so gloomy as to say "now or never." {General Chiang askedlarification of the term "now or never" and Mr. Bundy repeated,ould not say 'now or never'.")

General Chiang answered that he considered the important thing is tbat weommon mindommon problem.

Mr. Bundyhe agreed with General Chiang on this point and that our common mind should be aimed at action which we commonly accept as practical. Marginal variations were not so very important, but It was important that we look specifically at specific opportunities, consider our respective responsibilities and act accordingly. Mr. Bundy repeated his assurance to General Chiang that tbe United States share* his concern with the development of Chinese Communist nuclear capability.

In thanking Mr. Bundy for his frank exchange, Chiang said he wished to make It known that he was prepared to discuss with United States representatives ways and means of delaying the development of nuclear growth on the China mainland.

Mr. Bundy closed the meeting by again expressing his pleasure at having had the opportunity to meet with General Chiang and said he knew President Kennedy was looking forward to seeing him.

Original document.

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