COUP PLANS AND HESITATIONS OF GENERALS (DELETED)

Created: 9/7/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

tJELEGRAM

INFORMATION REPORTg"

TELEGRAM:

"ALMOST

TOO INTELLIGENT" THEY SEE THE DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS TOO CLEARLY

2. THE BASIC PROBLEM FOR THE GENERALS IS THAT THEY HAVE NO TROOPS. ONE WAYAIN THEM WHICH THE GENERALS ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING WOULD BE TO PERSUADE ONE REGIMENTAL OR DIVISION

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CONRD^IIAL

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ECURE TERRITORIAL BASE TO GO INTO1 TH MIS rCLLCWERS WOULD MOVE INTO THE REBELCALL UPON THE ARMY TO RALLY TO HIM AS CHIEFGAINST THE DIEMNT. W rH

GENERAL LE VAN TY NOW IN THE US AND PROBABLY DYING OF CANCER, GENERAL MiNH IS THE SENIOR GENERAL OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY.)j

THE AIR FORCE WOULD NOT BOMBREBEL ZONE, GENERALS CONSIDERED THIS PLAN

WORKABLE, AS BEING MORE SURE OF SUCCESSLAN TO SEIZE SAIGON

' fSBEf CHANCES OFLAN SUCCEEDING

WOULD,BBS bZ0ERCENT.) ITS PRINCIPAL DISADVANTAGE WAS THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE CONSIDERABLE 6LOOOSHED, AS IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ASSUMED THAT TROOPS LOYAL TO DIEM AND NHU WOULD DEFEND SAIGON.

ISCUSS ANY OTHER CFLANSOUP WHICH ARE UNDERERAT ION. INDICATE THAT WHILE IS THE PRINCIPAL DAI VIET CONTACT WITH THEjB-'AS THEIR MAIN CONTACT WITH FIELD GRADE OFFICERS. U. TRAN QUOC BUU, PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF

VIETNAMESE WORK:a

MOREEADER. HE WOULD ONLY ACT"AFTER GENERALS HADDIFFICULTY WAS THAT EVERYONE SEEMED TO WAITING FOR

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Original document.

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