MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY RUSK, SECRETARY MCNAMARA, MR. BUNDY AND D

Created: 11/29/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

TOR THE RECORD

ECT: Meeting with tbe President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Bundy and DCI

the OXCART

I opened :ho meeting by advUing the President that the OXCART program startedevelop.-neDtlus reconnaissancej^anyplace In :heh jgrU* refuelir. jaaaVBJeeaV

-iglaaltorZ reconnaissance planes, all of whichnow inone lost in a

In additionorce were procuring througheconnaissancong-range interceptors whichodificationeaterotal ofeconnaissance bombers.

I stated two Of (ha interceptor* werehird would be operational shortly and three of the Air Force reconnaissance planes would be delivered shortly. Then there wouldiatus of several months because two Air Force reconnaissance planes were modifiedpecial purpose (details not discussed) and thaeconnaissance bomber versions involved substantial modification.

The development and the CIA and Air Force reconnaissancen number) would cost0 million, of which0 million have now been spentad been advised by Secretary McNamara that the entire program ofircraft would ec.it aboutillion.

I pointed out to theJ radar cross-aecclona featurea of the plane through which we hopedke the plane "invisible" to Soviet ladar. TM* has been successful inasmuch as the radar cross-section was in the order0 of normal {sach, but that we also know of advances in the Soviet radar capability and therefore felt that this plane could probably be detected but we had not concluded aa yet that the Soviet SAMS could actually intercept the plana.

NOTE: reliminary discuaaion prior to meeting with the President. McNamara stated chat2 could be

detected by tie ChiCom SAM radar.. uestioned whether this was true,ad been Informed tha: the early warning Fin Song radar would haveake the initial detection and then alert the SAM alte radar ao that they could pick op the pUne as it approached. ould liko to kaow what la correct in thla regard.

I then stated that the question of surfacing -as raised for three reasons:

lane might bring pubUc notice.

Visibility of the program as flying Increased and the military versions cam* into being.

Concern that technology developed would give Lockheed and Pratt andpecial position on the 5ST which would be unfair to other contractors/

I recommended that:

and CIA agreetatement that wouldto cover:

crash

c . An executive decision to surface

That we not surface for the foreseeable future as doing so was not etri-ctly necessary and would expose an intelligence resource and had soma political Implications.

1 arranged to brief selected indlvldeala of companies actually active in the SST program so that they .ill no: be in

a disadvantageous position.

The President then requested Secretary Ruak'sho responded that thereno foreign policy problem but that ha felt that Lf we wero to surface, advance Informationays should be given to certain foreign countries such as England. Germany. France. Japan. Au.tr ml la, et In balance- Rusk thought it better to make an advance releaseirect policy decision rather than be forced to make an announcement becauserashea'?:.

c.

Tho Presidentamara's views, who

urged that we suriace in the immediate future. He slated he could not see how the reconnaissance capability of CIA would be Impaired as we would maintain our fleet of planes and our operations intact fifflftfl&flidiiB&'gBBaBKfe' ted that increased flying, moreigher rate of expenditure (and he repeated theillion figure of which0 million lall made it virtually impossible to maintain the same secrecy In the future that we have maintained in the past. Moreover, if he could present the bomber version to Congress, he couldreat deal of criticism, could cut out at leas:aving atillion, and the technology could be spread among the hundreds of engineers and scientists involved in.

The President then decided and ordered

urfacing paper.

as many planesquickly as possible.

up tbe surfacing as long as passible,the Spring.

the subject again at the end of Januaryearly February for further policy consideration, and

personally will discuss with Halaby.

All agreed with the daclsioni and Mr. Bundy undertook to reconcile the differing views between CIA and DoD on tbe surfacing paper. hen gave Mr. Sundy copies of our mark-up of the DoD paper andopy of Dr. Wheelon'a paper.

NOTE: Bundy has arranged for Dr. Spurge on Keeoy to serve with him on technical mattersart-time basla and it is Keony who la working directly with Bundy on this paper

JAM/snfb

Original document.

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