MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY RUSK, SECRETARY MCNAMARA, MR. BUNDY AND D

Created: 11/29/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

ha original program 4

l'Opened the moating by advising the Prsstdsnt that the OXCART program started as adevelopmentlaa recc plane which could fly any place In the world with aerial refu

n-u. rsconnaiajance pianaa, ail or which mmbow inone lost in a

In addition tha Air Force were procuring througheconnalaaanceong-range interceptors whichaterotal ofeconnalaaance bombers.

I atated two of tho Interceptors warshird would be operational shortly and three of the Mr Force reconnaissance planes would ba delivered shortly. Than there wouldiatus of ssvsral months because two Air Force reconnaissancesre modifiedpecial purpoaa (details not dlecuaeed) and thaeconnaissance bomber version. Involved substantial modification.

The development and the CIA and Air Tores reconnalaaancen number) would cost0 million, of which0 million have now been spentad been advised by Secretary McNamara that the entire program ofircraft would cost aboutillion.

I pointed out to thad ant. radar croea-aections featurea of the plane through which wa hoped to make thehvieible" to Soviet radar. This has been successful inasmuch as tha radar cross-section waa in the order0 of normal (auchut that we also knew of advances in the Soviet radar capability aad therefore felt that thla plane could probably be detected but we had not concluded as yet that the Soviet SAMS could actually intercept the plane.

NOTE:reUminary discussion prior to meeting with the President. McNamara stated that2 could be

y tha Cat Com SAM radars. uestioned whether thiatrue,ad been informed thai tba early warning, fan Song radar would have to make tba ialtlal detection and than alart th* SAM alta radar ao that thay could picktha plana aa Itould like to know what la correct la thia regard.

I than atatad that tha question of surfacing waa raleed for

three rniiom;

1. Crashlana might bring public notice.

1. Visibility of tha program aa flying Increased and tha military versions cams Into being.

oncern that technology developed would give Lockheed aad Pratt aadpecial position on the SST which would be unfair to other contractors.

I recommended that;

I. DoD aad CIA agra*tatement that would ba valid to eovari

b. r.ih

a exacativ* decision to aartace

That we not surface for tha foreseeable future as doing ao waa aot strictly necessary and would expose an Intelligence raeource aad had eome political Implications.

I arranged to brief select ad Individ oats of companies actually active in th* 3ST program so that thay will aot ba in

a diaadvantagaous position.

Tho President than requested Secretary >aak'a views, who responded that ther* waa ao foreign policy problem but that ha fait that if wa war* to surface, advance Informationaya should be given to certain foreign countries such as England. Germany, Franca, Japan, Australia, ate. In balance Rusk thought tt batter to mak* an advance ralaaaairect policy decision rather than ba forced to make anbee*oaarashaak.

1 (C>

President requested McNamara'sho strongly urged that we aurface In the Immediate future. Be stated he could not see how the reconnaissance capability of CIA would be impaired would maintain, our fleet of planea and our operations intact

i He noted that Increased Hying, more planea, panditu:

mguer mi oa says lid ttu re {and he repeated theillion figure of which0 million lall mads It virtually impossible to maintain tha aame secrecy in the future that we have maintained In tha past. Moreover, if be could preaent the bomber vera Ion to Cengrese, he couldreat deal of erltlclam, could cut out at leaei oneaving at least $T5 million, and the technology could be spread among tha hundreds of engineers and scientists Involved in the SST.

Theidem then decided and ordered that:

urfacing paper.

aa many planea produced and out at thaquickly aa poaalble.

e. Held up tbe aurfacing as long as poaalble, perhaps

into the Spring.

the aubject again at the end of Januaryearly February for further policy consideration, and

personally will dlacuaa with

All agreed with the decision* and Mr. Bundy undertook to reconcile the differing viewa between CZA and DoD on the aurfacing paper. hen gave Mr. Bundy coplea of our mark-up of tha DoD paper andopy of Dr. Wheelon's paper.

NOTEi Bundy haa arranged for Dr. Spurgeon Keeny to aerve with him on technical matteraart-time basla and It ia Keeny who Is working directly with Bundy on this paper

JAM/mfb

Original document.

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