DATE: 0
94
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Would the Loss of South Vietnam and Laos
Domino Effect" in the Far East?
"domino effect" appears to meanone nation falls to communism the impactas to weaken the resistance of otherfacilitate, if not cause, their fall to Most literally taken, it would implyand speedy collapse of neighboringow of dominoes falls when the firstpresume that this degree ofnot essential to the concept. Mostmeans that the loss of South Vietnam andload almost inevitably to theother states in the area, and perhaps beyond
the area.
do not beiieve lhat the loss ofand Laos would be followed by thecommunization of the other states of
the Far East. Insteadhock wave passing from one nation to the noxt, there would be adirect effect on all Far Eastern countries. With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to communismesult of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, aof the spread of communism in the area would not be inexorable, and any spread which did occur would take time--time in which the total situation
might change in anyumber of ways unfavorable to the Communist cause.
The loss of South Vietnam and Laos to the Communists* would be profoundly damaging to the US position in the Far East, most especially because the US has committed itself persistently,and publicly to preventing Communistof the two countries. Failure here would be damaging to US prestige, and would seriously debase the credibility of US will and capability tothe spread of communism elsewhere in the areas. Our enemies would be encouraged and there would be an increased tendency among other states to movereater degree of accommodation with the Communists. However, the extent to which individual countries would move away from the US towards the Communists would be significantly affected by the substance and manner of US policy in the period following the loss of Laos and South Vietnam.
Southeast Asia. In the remaining piece of Indochina, Sihanouk would probably accelerate his movement toward accommodation with tho in anticipationommunist victory ho considers inevitable. Thailand would almostshifteutralist position, hoping thus to forestall any vigorous Communist move against
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This memorandumlear-cut Communist victory in these countries,ithdrawal of US forces and virtual elimination of US presence in Indochina, either preceeded or soon followed by the establishment of Communist regimes in Laos and South Vietnam. The resultsuzzier, piecemealsuch as one stagedneutralist" phase, would probably bo similar, though somewhat less sharp and sevcro.
the regime for as long as possible. Cooperation with the US would be reduced. Already, Thai leaders have made clear their worries about the firmness of US commitments in the area and their doubts about the wisdom of ready responsiveness to Washington's immediate policy desires. Burma would be lesshaving already virtually severed its ties with the US. Ne Win would see the ouster of the US from Indochina as confirming the wisdom of the isolationist, somewhat pro-Peiping course he has already embarked upon.
Canberra, and Kuala Lumpurcounting ultimately upon US supportagainst Indonesian aggression. Theybadly disconcertedS failure inwould almost certainly seek some clear USto help them defend Malaysia. its part, would be emboldened in its efforts
to crush Malaysia.
Western Pacific Bases. USin the Far East is based on the chainfrom the Philippines to Japan, not onmainland. As long as tho US canfrom these bases, it will probably still bedeter Peiping and Hanoi from overt military Furthermore, the protection of these
island countries from Communist subversive effortsifferent problem from that of protecting countries on the mainland. In the Philippines, there would be some impetus to the tendency of ultra-nationalists, such as former Foreign Minister Lopez, to press for reduced cooperation with the USoftening of the Philippines* anti-Peiping stand. They would also seek restrictions on US bases
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similar to those presently enforced in Japan. We do not think this would affect Philippine government policy, at least as long as the presentis in power in Manila.
Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers
would be greately disheartened, but they would not be likely to seek an accommodation with the As in the case of the Philippines, the Nationalist Chinese leaders appreciate the efficacy of US sea and air power, and their nation has proved among the least, vulnerable in tho Far East toinfiltration and subversion.
Tn Japan, the loss of South Vietnam and Laos would almost certainly produce some increase of neutralist sentiment. There would be moreof the desirablity of remaining committed to the US side and continuing to berime Communist target by the presence of US bases. The mutual defense treaty and the US bases in Japan and Okinawa would come under even greater attack thai) at present. inimum, political pressures for further restrictions on theof these bases would be greatly intensified, and the government would probablyew concessions to these pressures. We do not believe that there would bo major changes in Japanese policy.
Communist Asia. Aside from the immediate joy in the DRV over achievement of its national goals, the chief effect would be upon Communist China, both is boosting its already remarkable self-confidonce and in raising its prestigeoader of World Communism. Peiping has already begun to advertise South Vietnam as proof of its thesis that the underdeveloped world is ripe for
revolution, that the USaper tiger, and that local insurgency can be carried through to victory without undue risk ofajorwar. The outcome in South Vietnam and Laos would conspicuously support the aggressive tactical contentions of Peiping as contrasted with tho more cautious position of the USSR. To some degree this will tend to encourage and strengthen tho more activist revolutionary movements in various parts of tho underdeveloped world.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN KENT Chairman
Original document.
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