'
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
NATIONAL INTELUGENCE ESTIMATE
Prospects for the International Communist Movement
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai Indicated overleaf4
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Jhe followingorganization! portiapattd in tht piupaialion ot fhilale:
Tin. Control IrtalfcgffK* Agency and thmaiviOliOA. of tho Dapartof Slate, Dwfenie, NSA, and M.
Concvrtingi
Director of htelltgtnos and Rataordi, DipaftnMl of Stole
Director, Defame Intelligence- Aat-ncy
Director of tho Notional Security Agency
The AiUfoM Director, Fedorol Bureou ot Investigation
Abstaining)
Iho Atomic Energy ConwrtaJon lopratonlotive lo lha USIt, ihe wh(oct being
ounida of hu
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XCM1
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Prospects for the International Communist Movement
-SfiCBcT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE . 1
1
I. B
II. THE COMMUNIST 5
The Sino-Soviet
The Other Communist Power*
The Sortet Camp
The Chinese
HI. TRENDS AMONG THE NONOOVERNING COMMUNIST
PARTIES 10
Western12
Sub-Sahaxan Africa 12
Latin America 18
Far1*
Front Organizations18
TV. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS 16
PROSPECTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COM-MUNIST MOVEMENT
THE PROBLEM
To examine the situation and probable developments in the world Communist movement.
CONCLUSIONS
international Communist movement is nowinto majority and minority factions orientedthe Russians and the Chinese. It is also disturbed(actors, such as the weakening of Soviet authority inthe example of Yugoslavia, and theumber of Communist parties, notably theof Italy.
Sino-Soviet dispute will probably continue to haveand downs, and in certain circumstances relationstwo states might improve considerably. However, theso deep and the national interest of each party so heavilythat there is now virtually no chance ofthe present leaders. The international movementbe on the eveormal split, but whether or not thistaken, the bitter struggle for control and influence overparties will continue. Further tension in slatebetween China and the USSR also seems likely,the common frontier. The demise of either or both ofleaders would offer some prospect of temporaryof the dispute, but we believe that the fundamentalbetween the two powers would remain )
international Communist movementholeto be characterized by increased dispersion of authority
i
and by more independent conduct by various parties. Although Soviet powerajor factor in Eastern Europe, further manifestations of autonomous and nationalist behavior willoccur. Among the parties out of power, werend towardin the Far East, but also perhaps in Western Europe and Latin America. The Sino-Sovietfor influence will in some cases lead to further splits within individual parties. At the same time, Moscow and Peiping will remain powerful sources of material support for their followers, and will retain considerable operational influenceilateral basis. )
the non-Communist world this situation offersadvantages and some dangers. The assertion ofnational interests by Communist powers offers anfor the West to deal profitably with some of themThe Sino-Soviet conflict is increasingly absorbingof the USSR and Communist China and divertingsharp contentions with the major Western powers.1nongoverningew have already sufferedesult of the conflict, On the other hand, someparties will become more effective and will gainof action and respectability because of their morestatus. While in some countries the parties willlose their rationale and elan, in others they willas more formidable revolutionary organizations,national than international in character. Regardlessquarrels. Communists will retain an underlyingthe West if only because their convictions are in soincompatible with traditional Western concepts ofand economic life. )
general, we foresee the emergenceariety ofand Communist parties, some chiefly influenced byor Peiping, some largely autonomous. In conductingwith Communist states and forming theirrevolutionary movements, the principalwill probably find it increasingly advantageous to judge
'Por discussion of thc impact of thc conflict on Soviet and Cninese foreign policy, seeSoviet Foreignated IDid, "Problems and Prospects ln Communist
2
each particular situation on its own merits, rather than on the assumptions which generally prevailed when Moscowdominated the international movement. This situation offers new opportunities and advantages to Western policy, but it presents new dangers and difficulties as well, )
cccatiT
Ihi
DISCUSSION
international Communist movement, once anorganization subservient to Stalin, has splitonflict between the two chief Communist powers.variations and Independent tendencies within the twoof Communist states; In the free world, many Communisttending to look more and more to their own local andIt is virtually out of the question that unity can beon the old terms, the main question now is whatgrowing diversification will take.
COMMUNISTSino-Soviet Dispute
The emergence into the open of the dispute between the USSR and Communist Chinaajor stage In the disruption of the unity of the international Communist movement. The present phase of this dispute dates buck at least toh Party Congress sndre interpretation of basic policies and doctrines. Even under Stalin serious diflerences had existed, but not9 did the latent antagonismsritical and open issue. We canide variety of factors, and no single cause is predominant. Longstanding conflicts of national Interest haveole, together with oldand racial antagonisms. More recently, the Chinese havethe Soviet claim to exercise controlling authority ln theCommunist movement. The quarrel was greatly stimulated by the refusal of thc USSR to provide China with the means touclear power, and Its failure aggressively to support Chinese national ambitions. There Isitter personal rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao. The dispute, therefore,ixture of Ideological, national, and personal conflicts, which explains its fundamental character.
Each year haseepening of the conflicturtherin party and state relations. Last year both sides discarded the device of indirect attack and made open denunciations Anal bilateral negotiations was doomed beforehand, and quickly broke down. Since then the Chinese have builtoluminous record of charges against thc Soviet patty, government, and KhrushchevThe Soviets have recently renewed their maneuvering toChina and possibly organize on international conference ofThe Chinese have openly recognized various dissenting Communist groups as legitimate parties, thereby laying tho ground-
work for iheir own International network of parties. Ine facto division has already occurred between the Chinese and Soviet parties, and between their respective allies.
It ls clear that thc Sino-Soviet split Is so deep and the naUonal interest of each party so heavily engaged that there Is now virtually no chance of reconciliation under the present leaders. The international movement may now be on the eveormal spilt, though the precise manner in which this might occur is stilln any case the bitter struggle will almost certainly continue, regardless of Itsform, with each side seizing opportunities to Impair the prestige and influence of the other. State relations must sufferesult, Political and economic relations arc already minimal. Militaryhave deteriorated to the point where the value of the alliance to either power Is questionable, though this is not to say that the Soviets would withhold support from the Chineseituation where they considered their own vital Interests to be endangered. Both powers are likely to become increasingly concerned about the security of their common frontier. Attempts at subversion among national minorities across this frontier have already occurred. We believe that neither side expects to undertake major military action against the other, but border clashes of significant proportions may take place. The Chinese are undoubtedly more concerned about Soviet military power than the Soviets are about Chinese, and we do not exclude thc possibility that the Soviets at some point may try to Intimidate the Chinese by military action on the border.
Despite the present intensity of tlie Sino-Soviet dispute, the quarrel will still probably have Its ups and downs, and ln certain circumstances relations might improve considerably. The demise of Mao Tse-tung would open the way for his successors to tone down the dispute, if they were so inclined, and the need for economic and military help might impel the successor regime to such action. Similarly. Khrushchev's successors mightodus vivendi with China so Uiey couldon other matters. However, we doubt that any of Uiesuccessors could view Uie basic issues much dlflerenUy than Uie presenteaningful compromise would involveepudiation of much Uiat has happened. Anyreached by new leaders, therefore, would beorking
the finalecomes more difficult as fewer and rewer steps remain to be taken. It now mayuestion of formal condemnation of thc Chineseajority of the partieseeting, excommunication of the Sovietsormal meeting of Uie Chinese and their supporters, or formal action by the Soviet or Chinese Central Committee severing party Ues.
^wttW?*r*
arrangement rather than any resolution of fundamental differences, which would almost certainly remain,*
The Olhor Communis! Powers
the Communist world the basic split is reflected Insideand Chinese camps, and each side can exert some influence insphere. The Soviets continue to hold sway over EastAlbania. The Communist Chinese are predominant infor Mongolia. Then there Is Yugoslavia,ause offormally nonaligned in the world, but accepted by thesphereegitimate Socialist state. And there is alsoloyal to the USSK butilitant policy morewith tbe views of the CPR
Tho Soviet Camp
Soviet ability to control even sympathetic Communisthas been declining. In discarding Stalin's methods, theled to emphasize the conceptloc held togethercooperation rather than by coercion. Khrushchev's ideaa vague commonwealth of Communist countries, autonomousmatters, but bound to the USSR by common ideologicalforeign policies. This commonwealth was to embraceboth right and left. Including Yugoslavia as well as ChinaAn inherent contradiction in thc concept betweenand subservience to Moscow has made practicaland this dilemma has been greatly accentuated by theChina. Nevertheless. Khrushchev is still advancing thc idea ofthough his acceptance of YugoslaviaemberChinese and Albanianut impossible.
8 As the Sino-Soviet conflict hasumber of Kastregimes have become uwarc that their bargaining power has grown with the need of the Soviets for support against China, and they have become more assertive. Surprisingly, the country which has exploited this situation most vigorously has been Rumania, previously considered one of the most submissive of Satellites. Rumania successfully defied Moscow last year, refusing to abandon its plan for broad industrial development or even to adjust it to the requirements of1 indicated that its support In the Soviet dispute with China was not to be taken for granted. Faced with such insubordination, the Soviets
"The Director of th- Federal Bureau of InvesUgaUon take* the poiltlon tint, baud on tht evidence now available. It Is premature lo conclude tbat any arrange reached by nowln the Soviet Union and Communis* China would beorking arrangement ratherenoluUon of fundamental
'Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.
iercer
gave way, postponing their plans for Integrating thc Bloc economies and lorentral planning authority for CEMA.
This concession only enhanced the nationalistic Inclinations of the Rumanian leaders. More and more, tbeir policies have shown anbent,anifested In an anti-Soviet manner. On the whole. Uiey have supported Soviet positions on foreign policy and ideological questions but not on the key one of disciplining the Peiping regime. They nave attempted to mediate tho Slno-Sovletattempt which has enhanced their independent status and causedembarrassment to the Soviets. Most recently, the party leaders have gone so far as publicly to condemn both China and the USSR for their actions in Uie dispute.
There are, of course, important constraints upon independent behavior by the Satelliles. Soviet military power remains dominant in tho area. The East European countries are bound to one another and to Uie USSR by mutual commitments under thc Warsuw Pact. The Satellite economies continue to be closely linked with that of the USSR; Indeed, economic cooperation and specialization is favored in one respect or another by all Uie Satellites, even though there arcover CEMA policies. They do not all necessarily wish to follow policies at odds with those of Moscow; generally they areto follow Moscow's lead on major issues of internationalfor example, on the Oerman qucsUon.
In spite of these considerations. Moscow's difficulUes Ina satisfactory degree of control over developments In Eastern Europe will almost certainly increase. Differences among the East European countries themselves arc becoming more apparent.and political ferment In Czechoslovakia has aroused alarm In the East Oerman regime, lest the disturbing tendencies spread to Uiat country. Recent moves by various Communist countries to Improve their relations with West Germany haveublic rebuke from leaders of the East German regime. The historic rivalries and national antagonisms of Eastern Europe will to an increasing degree tend to disturb Communist unity in Uiat area.1
Yugoslavia has been one of the strongest Soviet supporters in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Partlyonsequence of this, Yugoslavand economic ties with other East European regimes and with the USSR have been renewed and considerably strengthened in recent years. Tlie Soviets dropped their previous demand Uiat in returnloser relationship with thc Soviet Bloc countries. Yugoslavia should hew more closely to thc Soviet line. This new relationship isto Belgrade because It raises the presUge of Yugoslavia's in-
'For further discussion of developments in Itantc-rn Europe, see. "The Outlook In Easterncheduled for
8
dependent Communist road, especially in Eastern Europe. Anotherhas been that the Yugoslavs have shown themselves willing on occasion to use their Influence in underdeveloped areas, particularly ln Africa. In behalf of Soviet international positions. We believe that this arrangement suits both sides, and that the Soviets will not demand, nor will the Yugoslavs agree to relinquish, their Independence or freedom of maneuver.
Mongolia Is the only Asian Communist country whichln the Soviet camp. The Soviet advantage here is thatfear the Chinese more than they do the Soviets.appreciate tbc fact that the Soviets, under Khrushchev, haveto help Outer Mongolia develop. The USSR is likely toinfluence over developments in the MPR. but the Chineseto have some leverage because of the Mongolian desire tosubjection to Moscow.
The Chinese Bloc
As comparedhen China hadew hesitantthe Chinese now can be said toddly enough, their strongest and most unequivocal supporter Is in Eastern Europe. Albania's extremism and Its strong support for China has beeneflection of its fear that It will be left to thc mercies of Yugoslavia, whose large Albanian minorityotential rival ruling group as an alternative to the Hoxha regime. In China's more Immediate sphere of Influence, the Chinese position in North Korea and North Vietnam is not as strong as the long-established Soviet position inEurope. During the past year North Korea has subscribed almost completely to Chinese positions and its relations with China have grown closer. At the same lime, its relations with the Soviets have cooled, and there have been indications uf Soviet economic pressure and even of attempts to subvert the North Korean leadership. Nevertheless, the Soviets still retain an important military tie with the country, and they continue to supply it with certain Items of military aid. Chinese influence will probably continue to be paramount in North Korea, but the Koreans will not wish an irretrievable break with Moscow if they can avoid It.
From the beginning. North Vietnam has struggled to stay neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and has found It more and more difficult to do so. Proximity to China nnd the pressures of the war in Southimpel the North Vietnamese party toward China's side. It now espouses Chinese views on most doctrinal Issues In the dispute.Its stand Is somewhat less extreme than North Korea's, and it continues to trade with and to receive aid from the USSR and the East Eurojieun Satellites. Ho Chi Minh has tried loormal Sino-Sovlcl split, probably because he fears thatplit would result
rjr.cn CT
In his coming under Chinese control. We believe that North Vietnam will continue to side with the Chinese on most issues, but that Hanoi will seek to maintain its ties with Moscow and to avoid toohinese embrace.
Cuba
has publiclyumber of important Sovietalthough he is not fully committed to the Soviet side. Bothand the Chinese are acutely conscious of Cuba's importanceCommunist movement in Latin America, and each hasCuba's support; the Sovicis have used Cuban economic anddependence on the USSReans of persuasion. Despiteof this dependence, however, the Cubans continue torelations with the Chinese. The interest of the Castromilitant struggle in Latin America causes it frequently to takeconsonant with those of China. We believe that Castroitedoctrine will continue to conflict from time to time withof the USSR and its Communist supporters in Cuba and,in Latin America.
III. TRENDS AMONG THE NONGOVERNING COMMUNIST PARTIES
The image of Communist unity, together with the authority and universality of Communist dogma, have always been of great importance for the morale of Communists and for the appeal of their movement to potential supporters. This has been trueong history of factional discord. Accordingly, the existence of two distinct sources of doctrine with conflicting precepts has caused many Communist parties to be increasingly divided, confused, and disoriented. Manyleaders (like members of any political movement which Is openly split) are alarmed at the open rift, believing that it endangers their control over their parties and damages the prospect of victory for their cause.
Both the Soviets and the Chinese are actively engaged throughout the world in attempts to proselytize party members to their views. In this contest the SovieU still have the support of most party leaders and organizations. Among someommunist parties (Including those in power) onlyran now be counted as members of the Chinesend most of these are in Asia. But the Chinese haveamong the membership of almost all parties, and Chinese arguments raise doubts about the correctness of Soviet leadership. The very existenceival Chinese line tends to weaken established parties by providing an alternative to Soviet authority. Generally speaking, the Chinese position has more inherent appeal to militantlygroups than do the more cautious Soviet tactics.
EC IHT
In some of the nongoverning parties the Sino-Soviet dispute has simply accentuated longstanding factional divisions. In others it has led to the breaking away or expulsion of dissident. pro-Chinese elements. Until recently, such dissidents would normally have fallen into political oblivion. However, they are now able to turn to the Chinese forand can maintain their existence as separate political centers. Such pro-Chinese poUtical groups now existreat number of countries. Where these groups Include important party leaders, they are sometimes able lo form rival Communist parties. This occurred some time ago in Brazil, and more recently in Belgium, Australia,Ceylon, Switzerland, and Mexico.
The Chinese, however, are not the only contenders for influence; the Yugoslavs alsoertain role. Though they are no longer as active as was once the case, the Yugoslavs still exercise some influence on Communist parties and on the leftist non-Communist fringe because their country is an example of an independent Communist state which has developed its own unique "road" of Communist development. Castroism also has influence among thc parties; its appeal is mostamong restless Latin AmericanCommunist andIt also extends to militant groups in other areasanzibar) where violence is the approved method.
Finally there is an assortment of left-wing radicals andleaders who, in the early stages of their consolidation of local power, turn lo the USSR or perhaps to Communist China for economic and military support. Some work closely with the local Communists, but others avoid or suppress them. They usually proclaim themselves to be vaguelynd affirm their commitment toheir sympathy for the Soviet Union, and antipathy to WesternBen Bella, Lumumba, Nkrumah, Sukarno, and Qaslm arc examples of the type, which is to be observed mainly in Africa, Latin America, and some parts of Asia. Castro came to power aton-Communlst revolutionary, but ended by actually taking his country into the Communist camp.
Such leaders are by no means reliable instruments ofeven Castro has become that. Whatever the degree of their dependence on Communist support, they usually insistree hand fordomestically, and refuse to submit to control from the Soviet Union or from any other foreign country. Few of them have much understanding of Marxism, or much interest in finer points of doctrine, but they do spread the habit of associating movements of rebellion and protest with Marxist terminology.
Such leaders may elevate local, disciplined Communists toot influence, and may open the way to an eventual Communist takeover by infiltration. Even when the original leaders, or men like
sscner
them, remain in power, they mayendency to constitutehangers-on ot the Communist movement without being subject to its discipline, to accept its help without giving it obedience, and sometimes to add their own embellishments to the body oi Communist doctrine. This phenomenon presents Moscow with opportunities (or expansion of its influence and even (or infiltration, but it also carries certain dangers and the risk of sudden setbacks.
Western Europe
In Western Europe,esult of general prosperity, most of the Communist parties have to dealomparatively affluent and nonmilitant proletariat, and have to devise policies which will enable them to hold influence over the working class and to avoid becoming isolated from political developments within their own countries. The relaxation In East-West tensions has led West European Communist parties to place increasing emphasis on popular front tactics. This turn in events has favored the emergenceew leadership in the Swedish Communist Party that hopes to moveore respectablein Swedish politics. In France, the party is trying to broaden local electoral alliances with the Socialistsommon front against de Gaulle, In Italy, the partyong tradition of adapting its policies to local political necessity. However, its long political isolation is now deepened by the Center-Left coalition which may make it also difficult in the longer run for the party to claimenuine reform of Italian institutions is impossible without Communist participation.
The Communist parties of France and Italy, both by inclination and because of local circumstances, support Soviet views against those of China, especially on the subjects of war and peace and the transition to power. Most of the leaders of the smaller parties have tended to stifle discussion of the issues, lest the dispute stimulate dissidence among the rank-and-flle. Especially within the last year, however, pressure has increased greatly on these parties toosition in the dispute, with the result that dissension has occurred, and some parties have moved to expel leftist militant elements.
Sub-Soharon Africa
Republic of South Africaong-establishedwhich is now illegal and greatly harassed by the police.disadvantages arising from the fact that its leadershippredominantly white, it has Infiltrated various nonwhiteand itajor role among elements resistingpolicy of apartheid. Elsewhere south of the Saharaparties are few and weak; there is indeed nomovement at all. Nevertheless, thereairmall but gradually growing number of revolu-
12
tionaries who have undergone training in Communist countries. Inew pro-Communists gained ascendancy in the newgovernment, operating in the framework of the Afro-Shirazi Party, whose declared orientation Ls African nationalist rather than Communist
Most of thc new governments of Africa are one-party regimes, or are swiftly evolving in this direction, and it is in this context that the Communists must operate. In some ol thc French-speaking countries, for example, the generally conservative cast of the regime mayobscure the presence of fairly radical elements, includingsome genuine Communists, at various levels. That they are indeed present Is attested by the events following President Youlou's fall in Congo-Brazzaville. In more left-leaningasCommunists may operate with considerable freedom andood deal of Influence. The "liberation movements" of southern Africa presentifferent kind of situation. By their very nature these movements are revolutionary, and In varying degrees al) of them arc at least potentially susceptible to Communist penetration, if only because of their need for outside support.
Sino-Soviet competition has already been evident In Africa, for example in the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, and in rivalry for favor with Uie Angolan and Mozambique naUonaustChou-En-Lai's recent tour of the areatriking bid for Chinese Influence with some of the governments. The USSR'sgreater material resources giveonsiderable advantage, but the appeal of Chinese militancy may still be great, for example to the liberation movements of southern Africa and perhaps to the radical opposition in East Africa.
Latin America
strength and operaUonal conditions of the Latindiffer greaUy. In someChile andgradualist tactics as Uie most promising avenue toparty engages in violence againstin cooperation with pro-Castro elements. As In the rest ofUie Latin American parties are affected by theThc lop leadership of all Latin American parties Ispossibly ui Peru, and most parties have formally associatedwith Soviel positions. However, iactlonal quarrels havein Ecuador and Peru; In Brazil, Mexico, and Paraguayparties exist. In addition, the Latin American partiesto Uie influence ofhird element which Isnor Soviet. Castroism's primary appeal is to the youth andleft. Castroist organizations are action-oriented groupssome cases supplement, and In other cases compete with the Com-
13
munist parties. Unlike the Chinese, however, Castro does not seek to take the Communist parties themselves away from Sovietourth element Is composedumber of small Trotskyite groups which lean toward the Chinese
For Eoil
The Comunlst parties of the Far East have tended to come under the Influence of thc Chinese Party, mainly because of China's weight as the dominating power of thc area. Most of them operate In fairly backward countries and view China's revolutionary method asfor themselves Nevertheless, the great variation inand strengths of thc parties hasonsiderable range in the degree of their support for the Chinese position.
The Communist Party of Indonesia,embership of over two million, now supports China on all the major Issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Its feeling of affinity with China as anotherAsian country Is an important factor ln this alignment. Support of the Indonesian Government's policies remains thcof PKI strategy, and all major leaders of the party have stressed that while the possibility of violent revolution must not be overlooked, the PKI hopes to achieve power by other means. Impatience with this policy apparently exists among some party members,ilitant grouphange ln strategy has not yet gained supportignificant number of the party's members and ls not likely to do so in thc Immediate future.
The Japanese Party operatesighly industrializedmore akin to Western Europe than to Asia. The party is small and haa to competetrong Marxist socialist movement. Thc Japanese Party, though continuing to claim neutrality, now supports the Chinese on all major issues. However, pro-Soviet elements still exert some influence within the party, which still maintains ties with Moscow.
In Malaysia, andesser extent Thailand, the Chinese ethnic element in the parties Is strong, and the partiesested interest in violence; some of China's most loyal support comes from these very small underground partlca.Chincse influence is paramount In Burma, but the local movement Is rent by factional and personal rivalries. In the parties of Australia and New Zealand, the Chinese have had working in their favor the fact that the parties ore small, are sympathetic to Stalinism, and see little or no chance of achieving power except through violent upheaval. In spite of this, however, the Sovietslo swing the Australian Party to their side; pro-Chinese elements were expelled and have recentlyew party. The New Zealand
14
Party, on the other hand, has resisted Soviet pressure and has become one of thc strongest supporters of the Chinese.
Communist Party of India has had longstandingwhich have been greatly aggravated since policy towardof India hasajor issue in thc Sino-Sovlotwithin the CPI now is sharply polarized between left andthere are distinct subgroups within bothmallleftist extremists Identifies itself with China and agitates forsplit in the CPI. The bulk of leftist sentiment,to cooperation with the bourgeois government, Isthan pro-Chinese. Its leaders hope to dislodge theleadership of the CPI at thc Party Congress scheduledOctober. The right-wing leadership, with the support ofis attempting toasis of cooperation withkeep the party together.
Front Organizations
Thc Sino-Soviet dispute has been reflected ln Communistfront organizations for several years now, but in the past year the controversy has become more violent. Chinese obstructionist and undermining tactics so far have not threatened Soviet domination of the major front organizations (such as the WPC, WFTU, WFDY, and lUS'l However, they have destroyed any pretense of solidarity among Communists, and have increased doubts among non-Communists about thc purpose of the organizations. For the Soviets, theof most of these front organizations as Instruments of propaganda has been damaged. For example, in Japan, Chinese activity has strengthened the pro-Chinese position lnut has badly damaged the latter as an effective front organization. The Sino-Soviet rivalry ls also intense ln thc Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organizationhich is not strictly comparable to the other largefront organizations because of thc heavy representation it has of nationalist governing parties in Africa.
In addition to challenging the Soviets in open meetings, thc Chinese are also using the international fronts as forums In which to carry their ideas to African. Asian, and Latin American member groups and leaders. While, at the moment, the Chinese are mainly relying on bilateral contacts to achieve this end, they have also begun to experiment with establishing fronts on their own. such as the Afro-Asian Journalists Organization, with headquarters In Djakarta, in which the Soviets have been relegated to observer status. Peiping
'World Peace Council. World Federation of Trade Unions, World Federation of Democratic Youth, and trio International Union ofhe Japan Council Againsi Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.
OCCftST
hopes that, despite Soviet couniermoves. it will be able to use such organizations to compete with tlie Soviet-controlled international fronts in the particular areas where they believe their message Is mostand welcome. To thc extent that the Chinese are successful, these regional initiatives will put the major fronts on the defensive and seriously challenge their carefully nurtured influence in theareas.
IV. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS
During the last few years, both the USSR and Communist China have Increasingly devoted their attention and energies to combatting each other and competing for allies and adherents. This hassome adjustments in other aspects of their foreign policies. The Chinese challenge almost certainly Increases Moscow's current Interest in relaxing tensions with the Weslern powers, though at the same time the Soviets may sometimes feel impelledilitant policy in underdeveloped areas, lest they be justifiably charged by the Chinese with lack of revolutionary conviction. China, having suffered greatly from the economic sanctions imposed by the USSRas already been led to explore different approaches toward some major non-Communlst countries, though in this it has emphatically excepted the US. China cannot be sure of cither economic or strategic support from tho USSR, even should the defense treaty between the two powers remain Intact. In general, the aggressiveness of both China and the USSR toward the West, at least In their direct relationships with the major powers, seems bound to be limited in some degree by the new situation in the Communist world. It goes without saying that the activities of Soviet clandestine organizations against the West will not be significantly reducedonsequence of the rift.
The prospects for the Communist movementhole arc mixed. It hasreat setback already; the strength it derived from the claim toniversal mass movement, toodernIdeology, and to be moving toward Inevitable worldwide triumph, is seriously undermined. Some of the smaller Communist parties which were nourished largely by this mystique may fade Into politicalThose parties which commit their allegiance either to Moscow or to Peiping will be exposed to reprisals, intrigues, and disruptive action by the other side. The result will beumber of parties will be torn by internal struggle, and much energy will be devoted to attacking and destroying factional rivals.
On the other hand, some Communist parties will benefit from the breakupisciplined international movement. They willider range of choice in adopting the particular coloration they believe most politically effective in their own national environments. They will have the opportunity to disavow thc USSR or China on specific
occasions, and they mayew respectability In their own countries by erasing to be the mere mstrumentsoreign power. In someEurope formayendency for groups uf Communist parties to develop patterns of common policy and action, distinct from the Moscow or Peiping line, which may be more effective in the area of their primary concern.
n general, therefore, we foresee the emergenceonsiderable variety of Communists, some chiefly influenced by Moscow or Peiping. some largely autonomous. In some places. Communist parties will tend to lose their clan. In others, they may emerge as more formidable revolutionary organizations than before, though in such cases their aims will probably be more oriented toward their own nationalthan to the historic worldwide objectives of the International movement.
It ls Important to recognize, moreover, that communism involves other thingsorld organization and an Intricate doctrine. The techniques of revolution, of party organization, of propaganda, of public control, which the Communists invented or developed, will long be serviceable lo any who have the desire and the competence to use them, and Communists will be the most effective teachers of these techniques. Furthermore, communism, whatever its variety or Internationalwill continue to associate itself with some basic Impulses common to Urge sectors of mankind: the urge to rapid change, lhe demand for social justice, opposition to vested interests of all descriptions. And even though they may on occasion be as hostile to one another as the Chinese and the Soviets now are. Communists will long retain anenmity loward the West, if only because their convictions are in so many respects Incompatible with traditional Western concepts of political and economic life.
It cannot be convincingly argued, therefore, that lhe disruption of the unity of international communism Is wholly favorable lo lhe interests and security of the US. To be sure, thc view generally held through most of the postwar period, that for all practical purposes the world was divided into two camps, is no longer tenable. The unity of the Communist movement has been broken, largely because of the assertion uf various and divergent national interests among the new Communist states which came into existence after World War II. The peculiar dangers and difficultiesipolar world arc lending toIn conducting their relations with Communist states and forming their policies toward revolutionary movements, the principal non-Communist powers will probably find it increasingly advantageous to judge each particular situation on its own merits, rather than on the assumptions which generally prevailed when Moscow unquestionably dominated the International movement.
3MMT'
et confllcU of Interest between nations, whether Communist or non-Communist, will not cease, and may become more various andthan before. Revolution, violence, and upheaval will persist, and thc likelihood of war at some level may not be appreciably reduced. Communists will continue their advocacy of the class struggle and their support of "wars of nationalho ability of Communists, of one or another variety, to take advantage of revolutionary situations may not be significantly reduced; in some Instances it will probablyThe instability of the underdeveloped world may become greater as the alternative revolutionary affiliations open to governments and political groups in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere become more numerous. In short, the fragmentation of the world Communist movement is one of the principal developments contributing to thediversity and complexity of the current world situation. It offers new opportunities and advantages to Western policy, but itnew dangers and difficulties as well.
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nia and rha organUoMon of lha Joint Chiefs ofssistant Chief af Stoff for Intelligence. Deportment of the Array, for the Deportment of tha Army
Chief of Novol Operationsor tho DeportmentNary
Chief of Stoff,F, for the Deportment of the
of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Enetgy Commission
Director, FBI, lor tho Fadorol Bureau of Inrestigotion
of NSA, for lha National Security Agency
I. Assistant Director for Centrol Bale-ence, OA, for ony oihor Department or Agency
document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordancesecurity regulations, or relumed to the Centrol Intelligence Agencywith the Office of Control Reference. OA.
thbiss emir mad owsmi. tha overseeneriod not an eacesa of one year. At tha and ol this period, me
should either ba daii-oyad. returned to tha forwarding ogeney. or par-should be requested ei she forwarding agancy to tatoin it in <irrr*rlmra aM2
ho title of this document whan vtad saporo'ely Irons the teat should ba dos-
sffM
DISTRIBUTION,
White House Notionol Seenrily Council Department of Stole Deportment of Defense Atomic Energy Commission federal Bureau of Investigation
Original document.
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