Created: 9/13/1964

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Briefing of General Eisenhower in his office at

Gettysburg, Friday,.

1. ecalledad briefed Genera! Eisenhower on August 6th, immediately following the incidents of the Gulf of Tonkin.

2. eviowed the developments since early AugustVietnam, reporting to Eisenhower the actions takenfollowing thetate of

emergency and the decree reorganizing the government. This was followed by popular uprisings, the withdrawal of Khanh from the government, the conduct of government by Deputy Prime Minister Oanh, the return of Khanh, the reestablishmentovernmentriumvirate, lhe positioning of Big Minh as titular head of tho government and the restorationery fragile, but at the sameeaceful situation in Saigon.mphasized the fragility of the situation, my concern over the deepening schisms between Catholics and Buddhists, Dai Viets and other political entities, segments of the military and various political or religious sects. aid for this reason CIA estimated the future was very ominous and that we believed chances ofeliablein South Vietnam were less than even. lso commented on my concern about the deep down purposes of the Buddhists and its leader Tri Quang and also the antl-American sentiment which had been expressed though very minor might grow. eported that tho military situation was remaining "as Is" with no attempt by the VC to capitalize on the confused political situation, that the Vietnamese military commands were carrying on, that the Communists were attempting political infiltration as the best means of capitalizing on the situation.

felt the situation most critical, suggestions to offer.

had no


briefly the situation in Laos, thereach an understanding through negotiations in Paris, thede Gaulle had put his prestige on the line but that so farhad made no progress whatsoever.ommented onof assessing the Communist attitude following theepisode as evidenced by Peiping'8 accusation ofthe U. S. in Southeast Asia, the relativelyfrom Hanoi and Peiping, the willingness ofgo to Paris and the absence of dynamic military action onof the Pathet Lao. Eisenhower felt that these situationsto assess but they might be holding back for fear ofstrike by. forces.

4. eported that the Congo situation had improved in the lastays. Tshombe had come out better in the African conference than we had expected, that he had handled himself quite well, and while he had not received actual military assistance, ho had not lost tho gain because the conference had refused to hear or recognize the rebel government.

j. ieit [iieTeuuu oiuuivu mat Mings wouia woTK Out, although the rebelsubstantial section of the country in the east and in the north.

5. With respect to Malaysia-Indonesiaeviewed the issues, the passage of the British fleet unit through the Sunda Straits and the probability that the fleet would return in the next few days which mightonfrontation between Great Britain and Indonesia.xpressed the view that the British were going to back up the Malaysians and support them against any overt or excessive guerrilla operations by the Indonesians anderious situation might develop at any time.

t _.

summarized the situation in Cyprus and thehad been reached in the negotiations and the dangersthe Cyprus situation because of Makarios1 invitation for helpand Khrushchev. Eisenhower continues to feel that somepartition of Cyprus is the only solution to the problem. Thishas expressed to me on numerous occasions.


brought Eisenhower up to dato on Cuba and advisedwe expected that shortly after the election Castroeconnaissance over Cuba and very possiblylane. aid we were working towards havingready to Introduce if this situation developed, but not at allwe would do so.eported aU significant current intelligence

the most recent Soviet military developments

as covered by briefing memorandum and also the status of the estimate on ChiCom Advance Weapon Development, most particularly the test site at Lop Nor and the

Reviewed my proposed trip with Eisenhower. He expressed great interest in it and its purposes and specifically asked that his personal regards be extended to General de Gaulle.

J AM(em

Original document.

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