SUBJECT: Discussion with Rusk in his office Saturday,.
1. old Rusk of my increasing concern over the evidences of dynamic military effort on the part of the Soviets, the appearance of more tingle silos, the continuation of the testing of new and larger missiles, evidences that they are engaged in an extensive radar development which may mean ABM deployment or an anti-satellite efforte could not tell, continuing improvement of their nuclear submarine program, etc. aidas so concerned about all of thiselt Immediately upon the completion83 that the President, Rusk, McNamara, Bundyust sit down and review those estimates and concern ourselves with theaid that lt was apparent to me that the Soviets were saying one thing in Geneva and publicly and doing quite another thing privately, from the standpoint of the arms race. Rusk agreed and said the meeting was necessary. He hoped that the issue might not get into public print prior to the election.
2. Reviewed the reasons for
JRusk Is opposed to this and will oppose it with the President. His position is that the political consequences of the losslane outweigh the advantages of the intelligence gained. aid it was not possible for me to do anything but advance the arguments favorable to the flight from an intelligence point of view and let the President, after hearing me and receiving the advice of others, make tho policy judgment. Similar problem arises in connection with the
3. Rusk then raised the question of the total effort of collecting
intelligence and its relation to policy. |
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4- Rusk questioned me concerning the ChiCom nuclear
"lusk said that Dobrynin had told Thompson at
lunch that the ChiComs "would getest at anyhiseparture from Gromyko's position with Rusk and Khrushchev's position withew monthsear ago. J
usk felt the French should probably not risk the [blCIl dangers of getting caught. However, he could see the validity of the argument and did not dismiss the possibility. o not wishut this forward in any formal way, however, it is, in rayossibility worth noting.)
6. Rusk queried me concerning the reports from Saigon of military presence and military personnel wandering around in armored cars, jeeps, etc. At this point Bill Bundy came in. aid that we hadlood of coup rumors, that they came from factors that were
5. We then reviewed in considerable detail the proposed trip
isted the individualsntended to talk with
dissatified with Khanh's recenthat they were representative of the deepening schisms between factions in Vietnam,idn't think there was enough of an organization toormidable opposition to Khanh or get awayoup.
askedhought was going on in the He notod the growing indications of independence on thesatellite leaders, deepening rift betwoon Rubs'* andand he wondered just what Khrushchev had in mind in trying
to organise an international conference. aid that we too had obsorved the indicators. as particularly interested in Tito's trip to Hungaryidn't think Tito was trying to mend Khrushchev's fences, that on the contrary, he was trying to increase his own independentlso said that we agreed that tho Sino-Soviet rift was deepening, we had noted the deployment of the Soviet division to the Chinese border and also the differing positions of local Communist parties, such as North Korean castlgation of the Russians and their apparent cooperation with the Chi Corns.
Rusk questioned the publication of the TogUatti letter in Moscowould not explain. greed that our demonologists wouldresh look al the situation and report from time to time on our analysis as the situation evolved and unfolded.
Rusk asked if he should order Taylor to go immediately from Honolulu to Saigon, stating it would look bad if the American Ambassador was in Honoluluolitical disruption in Saigon. Both Bill Bundyelt that while the situation was unstable, there was no urgent reason for issuing such an order for Ambassador Taylor.
JAM{tape):mcm
Original document.
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