Created: 12/18/1964

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Dec caber 19

SC No.




office of current intelligence

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A long-rsnKo African nationalist offensivegainst Portuguese rule in Mozambique hiebegun. Since September. there baavrles of attacks on military patrols,centers, and communlcationa facilities ln northorn Mozambique and ln the area near tha southern tip of Malawi. These attacks have been conducted by Mozambique nationalists baaed in Tanzania, and probably ln Malawi. At preaont, tba nationalists are ill-equipped for any serious challenge to the Portuguese, who0 troops in the country and are determined tocontrol. The nationalists' long-rangela being enhanced, however, by greatlytraining, arita, and funds supplied byAfrican and Communist sources. The growing interest in Mozambique on the part of Africangenerally may In part reflect theirwitb the lagging nationalist movement ln Angola, and their anxiety to produce concreteln the effort to liberate white-dominated aouthern Africa.


The major Mozambiqueorganization ls the Front for the Liberation of Mozanblque (PRELIMO). Oased ln Tanzania and lad by EduardoS-educstod moderate from aouthern Mozambique, FI(ELIM0 ta recognized and supported by tha Organization of Africao Unity (OAU). Prior to September, FRE-LIKO had concentrated its efforts on infiltration, recruitment ef-forta, and propagandizing,among tbe Maconde tribe of northern Mozambique. Ithas tbe nucleus of an organization ln southernbut It remains limited and ultraclandestine because Of

public apathy and fear of the Portuguese police. An Informant of the US Consulate ln Louronco Marques hae characterized moat FRELIMO leaders as sen who are of necessity unobtrualvo, who blend well rowd, and whoift for organization.

Aa of last March FRELIMOrained tighter* to Tanzania, and thebas camcs at Bagaatoyo, at Kongwa, andew other areas along the Mozambique External support forhaa increaaed narkedlythe past year. Tanzaniatraining facilities and ozambique nationalIsta have



iron training insincend Egypt provides additional training. Algeria supplies arms, and none Chinese and Soviet weapons have probably reached the rebels via Tanzania. The OAU's AfricanCommitteeo FRELIMOut Hondlane stated In late November that he bad receivedroa the committee thisumber of students have been sent to the Soviet Union, presumably for academic training. RELIMO official recently claimed that further funds, training, and equipment had been proaised by Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Syria.

The Mozambique AfricanUnionmaller and probably more radicalheaded by Matthew Maole and Lawrence Malinga, split away from FRELIMOnd is probably competing with that group for members andsupport. Most of MANU'a support appears to come also from tbe Maconde tribe, but USbelieve that it bas few These may bave beenhowever, for limited torrorist activities inin August and September of this year. MANU claimed to havereedom fight-era Into the country at that time, but tbla figure la grossly Ita leaders havebeen in contact with Soviet and Chinese embassyln Dar ea Salaam.

A third group, theNational democratic Unioneaded by Paul Guaane, was until recently based In Cairo. It too waa in competition

with FRELIMO. It probably haa few members, but was supported by Egypt, and some of Itamay have received military training in Ghana. Inat the urging of tbe Egyptians, Gumano reportedly merged his group with FRELIMO, bringing withrom the Naslr regime, Gumano will probably pressoreeffort by FRELIMO, and Cairo may be ualng bim to extend Its Influence ln the nationalist movement. Both UDKNAH0 andmaintain offices in Lusaka, Zambia, but it ia not known whether these offices have merged.

Nationalist Incursions

Until last August,was largely free ofagitation, although there were sporadic Indicationsockworkera' strikend rioting in Mocimboa da Praia in During laio August and September however, there were several organized acts of sabotage in northern Mozambique, particularly in the Cabo Dclgado District. utch missionary was murdered, and thereew attacks on other civilians and Homo attacks on military patrols. Tho Portuguese credit MANU with these incidents,their origin is notclear.

In October, Hondlane stated thaiman bands offreedom fighters hadnorthern Mozambique from Tanzania during lateand October and had carried outaeries of attacks onpatrols, communications linos, administrative centera,


rs (SI

vehicles. He said that the attacks would continue at the rate of "at leastnd that he would increase the scope of the attacks and begin sabotage activities in larger cities if the Portuguese did not agree to negotiate. Most of the incidents took place in the northeastern corner of the country.

The Portuguese militaryor scattered at least five of the seven FRELIMO bands. and have been conducting mop-upsince. Although they publicly claim that the situation is quiet, Halted acts of ter-rorisa continue to occur in the area. ecision was aade by the Portuguese toordon sanitalre along the Tanzanian border, and severalvillages were burned. esult,led Into southernwhere they are living in refugee campa. Fearingreprisals for hissupport of thaTanzanian President Julius Kyororc sent troops to reinforce the poorly guarded border area.

Further acts of sabotage have been conducted ln the Zaa-bezia District ln centralprobablyafe haven in Malawi. These incidentslnnd may have been coordinated with the attacks in tbe Cabo Delgodo It was reported in4 that FRELIMO had established three branches in the Fortarea of Malawi, and had plans to increase its activities along the Mozambique border, but lt is not known if FRELIMO groups conducted the October raids. Prime Minister Kamuzu Danda of

Malawi, anxious to maintainwith thedisturbed by evidencercbols arotneir efforts to usea base of

Disappointment in Angola

Increased oxternal support for PRELIMO's efforts may ln part reflect discouragement among radical African leaders over the lack of success in otherAfrican liberation movements, particularly that ln Angola. Holden Roberto's Angolanin Exilein Congo (Leopoldvllle) has been increasingly hamstrung bysquabbling, lack ofand lack of nllitary success against determinedforces in northern Roberto has been subjected to growing criticism within bla own organization, largelyof his tendency toell authority in his own hands, his tribal outlook, and his inefflcioncy as an Morale among Roberto's military forces is very poor; they are poorly clothod. fed, and armed, and have been able only to serveinorto overwhelmingly superior Portuguese forces.

Moreover, competitionween the GRAE and one faction

of the Popular Movement foriberation of Angola (MPLA) ls extremely bitter. This MPLA group, based ln Congoand headed by Dr. Agos-tlnho .Veto apparently conducted recent Halted forays into the

Portuguese enclave of Cabinda. Roberto reportedly has stated tbat he ls determined to prevent the UPLA from grabbing theinitiative, even if lt means fighting tbe MPLA's troops.

meanwhile, another MPLA faction, headed by Viriato da Cruz and Matias Ulguels, has merged with GRAE, and ismaneuvering to wrestof tbe organization from Roberto.

The GRAE waa recognized by the OAU largely at the urging of the Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, after whichfrican states formally recognized Roberto's government. Roberto relied heavily onfrom the Leopoldvllleand thua itevere blow to his hopes whan Molae Tshonbo' became prime minister in July. pparently wiah-ing to maintain cordial relatlona with the Portugueae, bas been very cool toward the Angolanand has avoided any specific commitments to Roberto. Ho may even attompt to obstruct external support for GRAE.

In November, afterefforts to reconcile tbe competing Angolan refugee groups, tha UAU's Liberation Committee voted to extend aid to the Neto MPLA faction as woll as to GRAE. If Implemented, tbls decision obviously vould drasticallyRoberto's position aa sole recognized leader of the Angolan liberation movement. The decision probably reflects tha Liberation Committeo'ewith Roberto's progress, and may also Indicate

an unwillingness tootal commitmentroup whichon at least tha tacitof the hated Tahombw.

Prospects in Muzarr.biqmi

Eduardo Mom! lane had atated as recently aa July that he was unprepared to commit his FRELIMO foreaaopeless military struggle sgmlnat the Portuguese in Mozambique. The FRELIMO raids into northern Mozambique in tho months which followedtherefore that the radical African statea, ln addition to increasing their materialto the Mozambique nation-allate, may have pressured Mond-lano to step up his revolutionary

timetable. Hondlane has also been under pressure from MANU. UDENAUO, and members of his own organization toora

militant policy. Hondlane was touring Western and Eastern

Europe this fall seeking support, and lt ls conceivable that tho FRELIHO raids of late September and October were organized, and even initiated, without hla knowledge.

Although the natlonallala will be capable of continuing foraya into Mozambique, lt la unlikely that they will endanger the Portuguese poaltlon in the country ln tbe foreseeable Internally, tbellata appear poorly organized and divided. Hondlane may notadical or dynamic enough leader to control and channel the factions within hisand he suffers froma southernerroup composed largely of northern Mozaabicans. Although FRELIMO

apparently has largo quantities of arms, it lacks sufficient trained guerrilla fighters, and appears incapable of any sizable military confrontation of the Portuguese. Whether throughor fear of Portuguesemost Mozambicans appear disinterested in the nationalist struggle. Other problems includeimited communications between nationalists in Dar es Salaam and the field, the efficiency of he Portuguese police and their extensive informer network,ack of effective, educated leaders.

Despite their strongposition, the Portuguese face ariety of difficult problems. Their major concern appears to be the flagging morale of Portuguese settlers in the north. Continuing terrorism would worsen their situation. The Maconde tribe which inhabits the area is restive and difficult

to control, and the Portuguose have privately admitted that many of tbe regulos (government-appointed chiefs) on whom they had depended for support appear to sympathize witb the Portuguese morale may be further undermined by FBELIMO's threat to begin sabotage in the major southern cities if the Portuguese do not agree to It ls highly unlikely that the Portuguese will consent to any talks.

The nationalists' long-range potential ls Improved bytraining, arms, and funds being supplied by African and Communist countries. Their position would be still rurther enhanced should Prime Minister Banda be replacedeader more willing to assist thenationalist incursions from Malawi.


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