DI ADVAHCB ArfD wasC JJ.aITSaSEODtV was CEATOEP,wis. RESPONSnrLIWLATiffflS WrK CCWCNISTWITH LKMEO rft-SttSIVESG 1EEMO^mS HAD GIVEN THEtOl. TiAV KBBWKHBV WASUT 7HS KEBTTKCULE EST)
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brezb31ev during kis reoeptO rome3 was 'vsewk0 WAS PUSUHiG the
USSR, SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SEE KHRUSHCHEV PERSONALLY. EELING TEAT HE MIGHT BE SHUNTED OFF AND CCWPDJED TO TALKS WITH LESSER SOVIETS WAS THE PRINCIPAL REASON WHY TOE PARTY DECIDED THAT TOGLIATTI SHOULD COMMIT HIS EDEAS TO PAPER, TO BE FORWARDED TO KHRUSHCHEV. THE TOGLIATTI MEMORANDUM WAS ACTUALLYALTA BUT THE DECISION THAT IT SHOULD BE WRITTEN WAS MADE IN ROME BEFORE TOGLIATTI LEFT FOR THE USSR.
3- THE THREE-MAN PCI DELEGATION THAT JUST RETURNED FROM MOSCOW HAS REPORTED THAT TBE PLOT AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV HAD BEEN MATURING OVER THE PREVIOUS SIX MONTHSEAR AND THAT THOSE INVOLVED HAD KEPT POQTPONINO IT BECAUSE OP KHRUSiKHSV'SNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE. THERE IS HO SUCH THINGIKHAIL SUSLOV REPORT; MINUTES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PRESIDIO MEETINGS WERE TAKEN BUT THERE is NO SUSLOV REPORT AS SUCH, IN THE REPORTED SENSEPEECH THAT TURNED THE SCALE AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV. IN FACT, SUSLOV'S ROLE OR THAT OF ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED. FTOLLECTIVE ACTION; LEADERS OF THEPARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (CPSU) ALL AGREED THAT KHRUSHCHEV WAS GETTING OUT OF HAND AND TEAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE.
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ACCORDING TO WHAT THE DFJJSGATION LEARNED, THE TIMING OF THE AFFAIR WAS THE RESULT OF TWO FACTORS: (l) WLADISLAV GOMULKA WAS PRESSING FOB AN END, ONCE AND FOR ALL, TO THE FLIRTATION WITH THE WEST GERMANS,SELING THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ELEHI3ATS KHRUSHCHEV BEFORE THE COSMONAUTS
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/ MINATION CONTROLS
DOWN. Jfl THE LATTER, 'l^ERE WAS RKOGNITIOKHRUSHCHEV'S
KKACK FOR SEIZING OPPOrfTUWITIES FOR KAKEJG DRAMATIC MOVES AED IT WAS FELT THAT HIHUSBCHEV MIGHT USE THE COSWWtlTESRETURN AS THE OCCASION3 SOME STARTLIKG, IRREVOCABLE STATEMENTERMAKY OR CHINA, FOR EXAMPLE, All ULTIMATUM TO CHIKA TO DESIST FROMSCMEITuXED ATOMIC TEST, ABOUT WHICH THE SOVIETS KNEW.
IHE PCI HAS BO BIFORKATIOS AiO-'iT WHAT ROLE, L? AMY, THE SOVIET ARMY OR THE SECRET POLICE (KGB) PLAYED IK TKS EVENT.
THE PCI DELEGATION WASHAT THE SOVIET POSTURE TOWARDS THE WEST WOULD HOT CHANGE. THIS ASSvRAKE WAS GIVEM HI ANSWER TO THE DELEGATION'S QUESTION OF HOW THE PCI SHOULD ADAPT I'.-'S TACT-CS TO ALLOW FOR SOVIET POLICY CHANGES. HOWEVER, THE DELEGATION WAS 'i'OLD TEAT THERE WOULD ES CHANGES IH IfiTERKAL POLICIES, ESPECIALLY AS REGARIfi AGRICULTURE. AS REGARDS CHINA, THE DELEGATION WAS TOLDWILL RELTHOUGH THE SOVIETS ADMITTED THAT THERE WEREORXOU5 PROBLEMS DIVED ISC THE TWO COUNTRIES.
THE DELEGATION WAS ALSO ASfli/KED THAT KOflJSECKEV WAS ALIVE AND WELL, THAT HB WASEMBER OF IHE CEREAL COMMITTEE, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE -NO FURTHER ATTEMPT TO BLACKEN HIS NAME.
THE PCI BELIEVES'lS'.WUEV AFFAIR HAS FAD BOTE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR THE PCI. GIB DISADVANTAGE IB THAT THE PARTY HAS HAD TO DEVOTE TIME TO EXPLAINERSJfAT IT SHOULD HAVE DEVOTED TO THE CURRENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN. IT FEEL" 'L^rVi' IT HAS NOW ACCOMPLISHED THIS
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SATISFACTORILY AMD IT INTEKDS SENEraSI TOLLO TOT CAMPAIGN. ANOTHER DISADVARTACE To TiAV taf STALINISTS IK THE PCI ARE AGAR) MAKING THEMSELVES FELT. BEFOPE, ki LEADStlT. COWLS MORE OP LESS IGKOSE THEM; fTCH THE LEADERS MJST LISTENATE WITS TUSM.
9- THE PRINCIPAL ADVANTAGE K>1 IS THAT IT HAS<EB PARTY AH OPPORTUKiri- AGAIN TO REASSERT vki timvmttxhcb. TEEEKT THAT ENRICO BERL1IIGUER, THE TCI DELEGATIOH HEAP, MATO AT TEE AIRPORT OTI HIS RETJRfl FROM MOSCCW, IN vmtCR HE EXPRESSEDISGATIGi "ACTICK vvb1 THE EXHAKATIOHS MADE BY THE SOVIETS, WAS NOTD WAi! DESIGNED FOB INTERNAL FOLTTICAL PURPOSES. HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOTE FACT THAT HIS STATEMENTS ACCURATELY REFLECTED PCI OPINION.
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Original document.
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