CW HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM ELEASE AS SANITIZED
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Soviet Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through
Svbm.hVd by lh. DIRECTOR OF CENTRA! INTELLIGENCE
n by Ihe UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD At Indicated oniUaf4
MATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Soviet Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ORGANIZATION OF AIR AND MISSILE 5
DEFENSE EARLY WARNING AND CROUND CON-
TROLLED INTERCEPT SYSTEMS 6
Cround Controlled 6
VI. AIR DEFENSE ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES
VII. SOVIET CONCEPTS AFFECTINC FUTURE
Long-Range SAM Systems
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Systems with Dual Roles
VIII, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSIVE
Surface-to-Air Missiles Antimissile
Radar Development and Deployment 13
IX. RECENT STRATECIC DEFENSEM
X HECENT DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENTIS
Tallin nnd 16
XL PKOSPF.CTS FOB SOVIET STIiATECIC DEFENSE . 17
Air Defense 17
XII. ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES 9
XIII CIVIL DEFENSE
Table I: Soviel Interceptor
Tableoviet Surfacc-lo-Air Missiles Systems (PVO
FigureAM Deployment in the East European Warsaw Pact
FigureAM Deployment In East Cermany Figurendeployment In lhe USSR
SOVIET AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH
To evaluate the capabilities of the Soviet air and missile defense forces, and to forecast probable trends in Soviet air and missile defense programs through
combination of area and point defenses provided bypresent force of interceptors and short-range(SAM) systemsood defense for major targetmedium and high altitude bomber attacks. However, thcsystem has limited low altitude capabilities, and specialare posed by supersonic aircraft and air-Co-surfaceWe believeajor Soviet efiort during thethis decade will be focused on meeting these particular55)
believe that improvements in thc Soviet air defensethc next few years will make progressively more difficultpenetration by manned bombers to major target areas.by manned bombers will require increasinglyof attack. Soviet air defense capabilities can be degradedincreasingly complex forms of attack which the West will beemploy, including air-launched missiles, penetration tactics,countcrnieasurcs, and low-altitude attack. Despite theseof their air defense system, the Soviets would expect tonumber of the attackers. We doubt, however, that they wouldthat they could reduce the weight of attackoinlresulting damage to the USSR would ho acceptable.
hcie are ciitical uncertainties in our knowledge of Sovietand deployment in tlic antiballistic missile (ABM) field. Prom (lie evidence now available, however, certain general conclusions can lie drawn: first, the Soviet HfitD effoit lias been extensive and of long duration, and lhc USSH several years ago probably solved tlie technical problem of intercepting ballistic targets at living singly or in small numbers; second, some initial ABM deployment activity was probably begun as long agout both the deploymenlrograms werenterrupted and modified; third, th?nd the probable early deployment activity pointtrong Soviet desire to obtain ABM defenses rapidly;ew antimissile missile (AMM) lias appeared, and some additionalactivity may now be underway, bul the USSR does not have any operational defenses against stralegic ballistic missiles today.
of our evidence indicates that the USSR has beenmethods of ABM defense which differ in importantthose now favored by the US. Low frequency radars mayimportant role in the Soviet program. An early Sovietissile designed to have dual capabilities againstand aerodynamic vehicles. The new AMM which wasby the Soviets is probably designed to conductintercepts at considerable ranges,arge nuclearlo achieve its kill. We believe, however, that the Sovielsnot conducted many AMM firings to exoatmosphericand that they have probably not attempted full systeminterceptions at these alUtudes.
Recent Defensive Deployments
Soviets began construction of three defensiveLeningrad. We believe that the Leningradoriginally designed toapability against ballisticperhaps against aerodynamic vehicles as well. However, wethat the initial design has been changed, We cannotnature of this change, or whether it was caused byealization that thc system was vulnerable toaids, or important new development in the state-of-theare similarities between new construction at one of thccomplexes and two recently discovered defensive complexes un-
construction in northwestern USSH. In tight of these similarities, at Icnsl these three complexes may now be intended for the deployment of lhe same defensive syslem. )
F. Wc are unable to associate thc new complexes with any systems equipment, and any explanation for lhc mission of these complexes and the modifictl Ixningrad complex is open to some doubt. There is some support for the belief that lhc complexes arcAM system to defend against aerodynamic vehicles. On the other hand, wc have auted intensive Soviet research on missile defenses for several years and indications that the USSR has been working toward new andABM capabilities. In light of this factor and otherwc ihink there are also persuasive reasons for believing that the new complexes are related to missile defense. However, any judgment at this time on their mission is in our view premature.
C. We have observed at Moscow three developments which may indicate ABM deploymentarge radar now undercould be the acquisition and early target tracking clement of an ABM system. Other.facilities also under construction could serve as thc final target tracking and missile guidance element.ites which are now being modified could be used as thc AMM launchfor the systems, However, tho activities wc have observed thus far may not be related, and some of them may represent improvements in Moscow's defense against aerodynamic vehicles orpace function. The missile to be employedajor unknown; thcdisplayed AMM could be used at Moscow to conductintercepts of ballistic missiles, perhaps at distances of several hundreds of miles from the city. In sum. we continue to beheve that the Soviets may be deploying ABM defenses at Moscow, but we do not yet understand how the installations we have observed would function as an ABM system. )
H. If ABM deployment activity is now underway at either Moscow or the other locations we have noted, the USSR Is likely to have some initial strategic ABM defenses operalional within the next two years or so. Limited deployment, especially al Moscow, couldpecial, highest-priority effort to defend the Soviet capital with an early and still unproved system. But widespread ABM deployment activity, whenever it occurred, would imply that the Soviets consider (heir ABM
systems good enough to justify extraordinarily largo new expenditures. It would indicate that the Soviets had achieved excellent RADand perhaps, that they had taken high-risk production anddecisions. We cannot exclude this possibility, but oursuggests that thc Soviets have been proceeding cautiously since they modified their program. )
I. In considering whether to provide ABM defenses for many of their urban-industrial centers and other targets, the Soviet leaders will have to weigh the great cost of such an cifort against the likelyof the ABM systems available. Area defenses might offer considerable savings over point defenses, but wc cannot be sure of this and in anyajor commitment of resources would beThc Soviets may defer widespread deployment pendingork on existing systems, or in thc hope of achieving belter systemsater date. They might even decide that thc cost of large-scale ABM deployment would not be coinmensurate widi the protection it could offer against anticipated Western strikeWc are certain dial the Soviets will push ahead withffort, but we cannot forecast whether or when they wil! achieve ABM systems with capabilities and costs justifying widespread deployment.
J. We believe that the Sovieis are noweries of large, new radars, most of which will probably be completede believe dial some or all of these radars will be linked togetherpace surveillance system.ystem will, we think,apability considerably in excess of that required merely to detect the passage of US space vehicles. In our view, the chances arc better than even that thc Soviets intend to provide themselves, not onlypacesystem, but with an antisatellite capability asf existing types of missiles were used in an antisatelliteuclear wax-head would probably be required,issile for non-nuclear kill could be developed in about two years after flight tests began.)
'Thr Director of IntellijjrnorResearch. tVpartment ol State, believes lhat on lhe biiiiisible evidence, lha iSrmitrvetule St Aon not cidude Ihe ant ia tell ftc functionouitidrty. present cvtdrec* does oo* persuade fibn
ih.it (he SovieU intend lo develop aod deploy within the neit iwo yeui snd at greet cost an eitremely compleaite system.
ince (lie aid of World War II. lliet if routed by large and powerful US strategic attack for to. have -Ltcadlly incicaicd and improved tlicir air defenses. They haveormidable capability against aircraft ntluinptliij* toedium and high altiludcsrincipal tnrgel areas. Unwinftjr US development of standnlf weapons and tow altitude penetralion ladies for aircraft Iiave furtlier ^implicated the Soviet air defense problem. Weherefore, tliat the Soviets will continue to spend large sums on air delensc despite the planned decrease In the size of the US strategic bomber force over the nest few years.
n addition, tho Soviets have been faced for some years with thc certain knowledge that as this decade advances, ballistic missiles, presenting wholly new defensive requirements, will comprise the main strategic threat to the USSR. Thc ballistic missile threat not only poses the question of how much additional effort to pour into improved defenses, but also raises tlic problem of whether,of resources committed, it It feasible for thc Soviets to crealc andofense of major targets against thc US strategic strike forces.
II. ORGANIZATION OF AIR AND MlSSItE DEFENSES
J Tlie Soviet air defense mission it the responsibility of the PVOnti-An Defense of thehoseeputy Minister of Defense, is ranked with the heads of the ground, naval, air and strategic missile forces. Tlie PVO is composed of lluee major elements, each of which performs one of the key functions of the air defense mission.arly wamuig and tontrol. interceptor, aivd surface-to-air missile (SAM) operations. In addition to forces directly assigned to thc PVO. other Soviet forces which can contribute lo the air defense mission are also operationally available to this command.
In addition to air defense, the commander of the PVO piobably is assigned the miislle defense mission. Thc Soviets have referred to the existence of PRO (Anti-Rocket Defense) units, and have usually indicated that these units are subordinate to. or at least integrated with, the PVO Striuiy. The Ministry of Defense Implements the civil defense program, but such operations are not subordinate to thc PVO.
Tlte air defense systnmi of thc several Warsaw Pact countries are separate national systems. Nevertheless, they are coordinated one with another, and for most practical purposes tliey constitute an extension of the Soviet systemhe Soviets undoubtedly will continue their policy of improving the air defense capabilities of these countries. Allliough thc Chinese Communist air defense
details of SAM deploymenl in lhe Waisaw Pact ttuitfrict, nc Annei B.nd 2.
Mill maintain* same contact with iliC PVO. coopeiation between Ihem has Inug been limited Io the exchange of KHitinc air information. In Our view, il is unlikely lhal cooperationhe PVO andChinese air defense system will be increased during the nexl several years.
III. AIR DEFENSE EARLY WARNING AND GROUND CONTROLLEDSYSTEMS
Sovicis have continued during the past two years to deploy(EW) and ground controlled Intercept (CCI) radars and lolarge number of radar sites. Wc estimate that there are now overdeployed atperational sites in lite USSR, litisoverlapping radar coverage of most of the nation; coverage iswest of the Urals and in peripheral areas. Almost all sites have atradars and many arc equipped with five to seven sets, most of whichin different frequency bands. Tin- resulting density of coverageprobability of detection, and the frequency diversification providesagainst electronic countermeasures.
altitude coverage of thr. Soviet EW system exceeds the combatany US aircraft now in service. Under optimum conditions, the Sovietcould detect and track aircraft Hying at medium or high. away from Soviet territory, and under normal conditionsand (racking of enemy aircraft flying ut such altitudes is. beyond the Soviet borders. Thc use of supersonic aircraftmissiles, because of their very high speeds, will reduce the warningby this system. The detection range of the EW system isagainsi aircraft penetrating at lower altitudes. Moreover, evenof low altitude penetratois occurs, the system is unlikely to beaccomplish continuous tracking of an intruding enemy aircrafteet.
s tlie Soviet EW system improves in quality, thc number of radar sites probably will bc gradually reduced. We estimate that0 the rangeof thc Soviet EW system will be limited only by the radar horizon line of sight. The Soviets will place increased emphasis on the problem of detecting and tracking low altitude targets. Radars better able to cope with such targets probably will bc deployed, particularly in border areas and along likelyroutes. Nevertheless, radar performance at low altitudes wiD remain limited.
Ground Controlled Intercept
bout one-third of the Soviet radar sites are capable of conducting CCI operations. Against targets flying at medium and high altitudes, we estimate
lhat CCI range capabilities vary dom about. ton. depend* ing on tlie radar employed al tlic site. Soviet CCI setsigh altitude coverage which exceeds thc combat ceilings of all US aircraft. We believe niovl CCI sites arc equipped with radars having moving target indicators or employing nntichitter techniques in order to improve low altitude coverage. Tlic Soviets piobably would have great difficulty in conducting effective CCI oper-itliiMK againsi enemy aircraft flyingeet. In addition, Soviet CCI capabilities against supersonic targets arc generally reduced.
he Soviets have liven improving tlicir air defense control capabilitiesnt yer.rs byatanius.on system in the western USSH andesser extent in other areas. This system is used for the rapid dissemination of tracking information from radar sites to air warning centers and probably to SAM units.ystem wouldajor inputround-to-air data link designed to vector interceptors. Wc believe that tho newer modd all-weather interceptors arc equippedata link system.
U. The Soviets will continue to develop their CCI capabilities during thc period of this estimate. An improved CCI radar probably will bc deployed during thc period of this estimate, possibly in combinationew EW set. The semiautomatic data system may be modified to increase traffic handling capabilities. 'All new model interceptors brought into service probably svill be equipped to operate with the data link.
IV. INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
(lie Soviet air defense system, interceptor aircraft constitute thcof active defense, performing both area and point defense roles. Wcduring the past two years, the Soviets have been placing greaterimproving thc mobility and coverage of their interceptor force,the use of forward deployment tactics. Air defense training hasincluded the dispersal and redeployment of PVO aircraft.
estimate that there now areVOoperational service. Only aboutercent of these are Mach 2slightly morehird of thc force is equipped for all-weatherIn addition to tlie PVO interceptor force, the fighters assigned toAviation units also can be used in thc air defense mission. Wethere arcightersn service with Tactical Aviation,of them deployed in western USSR and In tliose EuropeanSoviet forces arc stationed. Most of these fighters ore notall-weather operations, and slightly less than half of the forceircraft. Tlie fighters of Tactical Aviation, particularly themodels,ignificant potential to Soviet air defense capabilities.
H. The Sovieis now luivu in opernlion.il service some eight interceptor models, sonic of which have been deployed Inmany av five different variations."licsc aircralt canomhois attacking at medium or highhough moil of llw Soviet fighters and interceptors ;trc limited by (heir radar nnd armament to tail attack lacliis and arc not capable of till-wcatlicr operations.hird arc equipped with air-to-air missilesew all-weather models, sonic uf which now arc entering service, have improved AAMs and fire control systems.
introduction of newer model interceptors'cn relativelyreflecting Ihe gjcaterandof these weaponspossibly Soviet difficulty in perfecting them. The Soviets firstFirebar. Fiddler, and Flipper interceptorse believe thatthis year lo deploy the all-weather Firebar and possibly anotherinterciipior. llie Firebar is believed to be capable of performingas low ased. Tlse Fiddlerreater combatany operational Soviet interceptor and. with its improved fireit probably can attack airborne targets from any angle. Theis in the late stages of development; we have no firm evidencelias been operationally deployed.
Thc Soviets will continue to conduct research and development on manned interceptor aircraft. We believe that two or possibly three new interceptors arc currently underew all-weather interceptorpeed of aboutombat radius of. may be operational byhe SovieU may also be developing an advanced all-wcathcr interceptor with greater speed and combat radius, for deployment toward the cud of thc period of this estimate. In addition, new airborne intercept radarsow altitude capability may become available by thc end of thc decade.
Tlie introduction of newer aircraft will probably continue to be relatively slow.he PVO interceptor force will probably be reduced toircraft, more than Isvo-thirds of which will probably be Machll-weatheractical Aviation fighters will continue toignificant potential to Soviet air defense capabilities. The capabilities of both these forces will increase because oi the improved performance of the aircraft and thc wider use of AAMs and semiautomatic conlrol systems. Wc alsothat the Soviets svill arm some of their AAMs with nuclear warheads.
* For performance characteristics ol Sovici interceptor weapons systems, see Annea A. Table I.
1 The Assistant Chief of Staff, intelligence, USAF. considers Oat tlie estimatear* too-precipitous decline in IA PVO fighter strength, lie notes that the estimated cut back of betweenndercent from present strength levels during lhe neat five reamate of reduction ntoce than double what hat occurrede estimates that byhc IA PVO still will include morenlefceploi aircraft.
V. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS
ystem, which has been observed only at Moscow, isatitesouble ring around the city/ Installed inS. it was probably intendedefense against mass airthe changed nature of the threat and thc age of thc system, wc believeSoviets will phase out lhcetirement of thclmostbo compensated for by additional SAM deployment at Moscow.
great bulk of tbc Soviel SAM defenses consist ofites,deployed around most urban areas ofopulation and atof thc more important militaryhis system, whichoperational inas also been deployed in barrierIn some border areas. We believe there arc now morethe USSR, and that deployment of this system is continuing. Thepatterns lead us to estimate that the Soviet force goal is someand wc believe Uiat this total will bc deployed by thc ond
The Soviets arc likely to conUnue to rely on thes the principal SAM system for air defense during the period of this estimate- They have modified the system several times, arid tliey svill probably continue to do so. but they are not likely to replace it completelyollow-on system. The' most recent modifications, made during the past year, svere probably designed primarily to increase its range and improve its capabilities against supersonic targets. The Soviets almost certainly will provide some of theirites with nuclear weapons, and may have begun to do so.
Past evidence has shown that the low altitude capability of theystem has been limited toeet. Recent evidence indicates that there are modifications which can be made to reduce thc lower altitude Umita-tion toeet. Additional recent dala indicate that the Soviets are svilling to commit missiles against targets Hying considerablyeet. At these low altitudes, the effccUveness of the system may be degraded; the low altitude limitiven site would bc affected by local terrain and other factors.
the pait year, the Soviets have continued to deployelatively slow pace; sve believe onlyites have beensince the program begane estimate that this systemto cope with low-altiludeteet,have no evidence as to its actual minimum effective altitude. With few
For performance charactcrblkn of SAM tys terns, see Anoci A. Tableor details of SAMee Annei B, Msp X
c*ei-ptioiis.ites linvc been deployed in (lie border areas most vulnerable to low-altitude attack. Therogram thus far has been unusually small evenow-altitude supplement lo existing defenses. Considering the rate and pattern of deployment to dale, and if the program continues in this fashion, sve estimate thateployment will totalitesfi
slow and limited deployinciil of theay indicate thatare tint fully satisfied with ils capabilities. While wc have noa follow on low-altitude system, the Soviets may improve thernew system Inter in the period of this estimate. If they do so. wcthere wouldore extensive d'-'plcym^it ofcoviet attempt to defend all key targets fully against low-altitudeprobably precluded by thc cosl of tlse massive deployment which would
estimate that aboutites now are deployed In defensefield forces in Eastern Europe' Wc believe that these sites wouldto defend against the initial stagestrategic air attack. InSovieU may have begun in the past year or so toobile SAMground force units. This system may employ thc trackmountcd ramwhich has been displayed in Moscow. Wc have little evidence ofcharacteristics of this system, butield force SAM system it is
not likely to be fully integrated into the air defense battle plan of the PVO.
Similarly, svlicn in port the Soviet destroyers and destroyer escorts equipped
with SAMs probably would be employedupplement to port air defenses
in thc eventtrategic attack.
VI. AIR DEFENSE ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES
Soviels expect that their air defense system will have toelectronic countermeasureshc density of EW/CCI radarfrequency diversification at these sites, and the probable use ofand coaxial cables all reduce the vulnerability of tlie Soviet airto ECM. The Soviets may employ frequency diversification (ndata transmission systems. In addition, the Soviets havepower to overcome ECM and have been experimenting withTlic Soviets have placed great emphasis on training radaroperations hi the presence of ECM. Tlics designed to operate inenvironment. However, lhc Soviet air defense system still canombination of ECM and tactics.
lie Soviets nowood capability for jamming long-range radio communications and the navigational and bombing radars of Western aircraft
up0 mri-.li.ydta.ossibly in lhc higher frequencies. Weih.il Inward llit* vikI ol thu decade. Soviet equipment will be able to pro-ducv vigualsjamming any of llie fici plenties likelysed by theradar and navigational equipment of Western aircrafl. In addi-tiun. lhc Snvicls will piobably employ cleclfonie deception techniques, inch llie siiiiiiblion uf Western navigational aid*.
VII. SOVIET CONCEPTS AFFECTING FUTURE STRATEGIC DEFENSES
he massive deployment of air defenses over many years indicates the high priority that llie Soviets have assigned to the strategic defense mission. Thc general Soviet concept has been toefense in depth for their major centers- of population and national power. In addition, they haveendency to deploy defensive systems having some capabililyortion of lhe threat, rather than to wait until more effective defenses can be developed. Thc expenditure of resources on strategic defenses has been very large; in recent years it has amounted to about one-fifth of Ihe expenditures which we can attribute to the major military missions.
foregoing generalizations are well-supported by the varioussummarized in preceding sections of this paper. In addition towc believe that the Soviets have been working actively onsystems for .strategic defense. Thc present slate of our evidence andsuch that wc arc not able to eslimate with confidence the precise natureof this work. However, some perspective on Soviet thinkingfor new slrategic defense systems is available from classifiedliterature of recent years.
Long-Range SAM Sysiems
of the articles published in secret Soviet militaryealt with thc advantages ofong-rangeto defend against bombers and air-to-snrfacc missiles (ASMs).then commander-in-chief of thc PVO Sliany, was cited asthat long-range antiaircraft missiles he deployed in "zonal" defenseprotect the key industrial regions of the USSR. In commenting onrecommendation, the Soviet officer who cited him went on tothe SAM defenses of thc USSR should consist of "boundary groupings"missiles to screen the approaches to vital regions and "pointof short-range missiles to defend important targets In the interior.
Anli-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Sysiems
llie Soviets haverowing conecrn for thc threat posed by Western ballistic missiles, especially since the advent of the US ICBM and Polaris forces. Articles appearing in the classified Soviet military Utcraturo1 argued that an ABM system to defend against strategic missiles should be capable of performing intercepts at high altitudes and long ranges
llie target atcas. In thaw few articles discussing lwllijlic missile defense of wliipli wc nrc cognizant, llie most piaclical mclhod of destroying an incoming ballistic missile was said to bc cxnatmosphcricntercept prior to the wai head's entry into the dense layers ol Ihe atmosphere. One Soviet general asserted tliat minimum intercept altitudes against ICDMs and IRBMs should bc fromo. depending on the yield of thc enemy svarbead. Another Soviet general observed that it would he necessary to have antimissile missiles (AMMs) capable of ranges on thc order. and altitudes of not less.
Systems wiih Dual Roles
Soviets have also exprVssed'intcrcst in the possibility ofsystems which could be employed against both aerodynamicballistic missiles. Some officers, according to classified Sovietbelieved that theissile could bc modified for use againstmissiles. In addition, the Soviets have repeatedly referred to the(first displayedeapon capable of being employedmodern means of aenal and spacehich suggests that thisoriginally intended to serve asAM and an AMM.
VIII. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS
development of Soviet defensive weapon systems has beenal two test ranges, Kapustin Yar and Sary Shagan. Thc activitiessystems at Kapustin Yar began in the; to the best ofthese activities have been directed toward the developmentof SAM systems and for training. Sary Shagan has servedan ABM development center, although it has also supported otherspace programs and work on SAM systems has been conducted there,
have no specific evidence of any SAM system being, andowever, some new SAMshc Ganef tacticalappeared in Soviet parades, and they may already be in thc earlydeployment. Wc have therefore thoroughly examined our ability toidentify the development of SAM systems,ong-rangeand we Iiave concluded that such systems could have beentested without our knowledge.
Soviets are continuing with theirffort, begunyears ago. to develop defenses against ballistic missiles. In the pastthere has boon evidenceumber of changes in die Sovietprogram. These changes pointew phase or phases, the
of which wc- cannoi drlermine. Bui they suggest that thc Soviets wore testing new or modified system components, and lhat the new phase of tlie program was encountering some problems.
e believe it would be technically feasible for thc Sovicls to simulate an ICUM intercept al Saty Shagan. However, wu cannoi determine whclher they have made any attempt to create ICBM re-entry angles or velocities during any of the tests. Wo have no evidence that the Soviets have conducted tests involving thc use of decoys, multiple warfscads, or other penetration techniques nl Sary Shagan, and wc think it unlikely.
aken at face value, Ihc evidenceoncentration on thc problem of intercepting medium*range missiles. Tlie Soviets have not attemptedagainst ICBMs, but they have, of course, obtained considerable data on ICBM re-entry characteristics from tlieir many ICBM tests. We believe that the Soviets have concluded that the problem of intercepting ICBMs is not significantly different from that of intercepting medium-range missiles, except that greater radar ranges arc required for the acquisition and tracking of an ICBM.
Radar Development and Ocploymcnl
3V. An important part ofork at Sary Shagan has been theof large radars, the Hen Roost and Hen House, which wewere ready for initial testing In
J The Mneral
configuration of these
to Soviel development of radars which scan their beams electronically rather than by physical movement of the antenna. Large radars employing thisare particularly applicable to ballistic missile early warning, to long-range acquisition and early target tracking of ballistic missiles, and to detection and tracking of satellites. We believeumber of these large radars arc under conslruction in the USSR.
e believe Iwo Hen House-type radars arc now under construction on the Kola Peninsula. These radars probably svill serve as ballistic missile early warning radars, but they couldpace surveillance function as well. They could provide warning of US ICBMs directed toward westernfor example,inutes in thc case of Moscow. Additional radars in other locations would be required to provide similar warning of missile strikes against other target areas in llie USSR. We have no evidence of the oonsiruouon of radars suitably located for this purpose, but we estimate that the Sovietswill extend their ballistic missile early warning coverage. We believe that the SovieU require about two or three years to construct radars of this typo In thc field; the ones in the Kola Peninsula will probably be in operation
.TJ. Annthcr large radar (Dogow under construction near Moscow,ifferent in cnnfigmalinn from those discussed aliovc. It. too. will [xu.ial.ly employ the electronic scanning principle It may be part of an ARM vystem, but il ctn'ild wiveatellite tracking radar.
IX. RECENT STRATEGIC DEFENSE MISSILES
Ciifjim iiimrfc is described by tbe Sovicispilotlesscan be employed against "all modern meant of aerial and spacea capabilily against ballistic missiles. Several months ago. the Soviets
, TV film clip inissile ol Griffon's gcntwal appearance was pcHirnyed in an AMM role. We believe thc Griffon was designed in the, when the Soviets may have been seeking loeapon system which could be used against Iwlh aircraft and missiles. Our analysis indicates lhat CrilTonapability for intercepts at altitudes of up to about.ithin thc atmosphere) against an unsophisticated ballistic missile threat, and that it has long-range, high altitude capabilities in an antiaircraft role.licvc that the CrilTon missile was developed for use at Ihc large complexes which the Soviets have been constructing at Leningrad since the winter. (See later paragraphs.)
In4 parade in Moscow, lhe Soviets displayed what they described as an antimissile missile capable of destroying ballistic missiles "at great distances" from their targets. Preliminary analysis of paradeleads us to accept an AMM role for this missile. From its size and what can be seen of its booster engines, we think that it is likely toarge warhead and to be designed to perform exoatmospheric intercepts. Very preliminary calculations indicate tliat thc missilc-in-thc-canister may be able to accomplish intercepts at altitudesew hundred miles and at ranges of several hundred miles from its launch point,arhead in thc megaton range.issile could also be used in an antisatellite role,
Some new AMM may have been tested initially at Sary Shagan as early as the endhere is some chance lhal tlic Soviets could have conducted propulsion or component testing of an exoatmosphcric system,est program involving moreew AMM firings would probably have been detected. All things considered, we believe tliat the Soviets have probably not conducted many AMM firings to exoatmosphcric altitudes, and that they have probably not attempted full system tests involving Interceptions at these altitudes.
Our evidence shows that thc Soviets approach tlve lasting of missile systemstrong presumption that the tests will be successful and that the system will be deployed. In fact, we have observed initial operational deployment of certain missile systems at about the same time as test Brings began. However, thc Soviets have alsoroclivity for conducting full system tests prior to proceeding with wide-scale deploymentew system. Wc therefore
believe dial lhc Soviets arc likely lo tarry onf system tests before committint' ihemwlvw,arge-scale ABM deployment program.
e me unable lo drtt-rmjm- how lhcis lo bell could Ik- intended as ibe AMMystem lo be deployed in tlie vicinity of critical targets, such as Mnstw.ight be employederimeter nr arui defense system designed to protect large areas, such as (lie western uibiin-industrial region of the USSH.issile of this type could lie employed in lx.ll, Ihese ways. The kill niecluimsin could be designed to take advantage of the cxoal.nospheric effects of large-yield svarlieads to destroynusemncs. even (hough accompanied byhaff, dt-coys.n order fo reduce the prnhlcms of discriminallon.
imply that tin- USSH has developed an AMM designed toilTwiihay pulseudear burst.
lCm,hc"Wild differ in important respects from any US ABM system currently under development. Although it would have certain disadvantages, it might be attractive to thc Soviets, in part becausehl be more compatible with their technical capabilitiesystem depend-mg on highly sophisticated discrimination techniques.
X. RECENT DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES Leningrad
onstruction of three new defensive complexes was begun atthe winter. While our evidence has neve been adequatea firm judgment about the function of the Uningrad facilities, wefor the past several years that they probably comprised anwinch would be capable of engaging both IRBMs and ICBMs.wC estimated that the Leningrad system mightapabilitysmall number of re-entering objects arriving at about the same timemore than one missileissilemall number of decoys)it woidd probably have little capability against saturation attacks orpenetration
e believe that thc Len;,lgrad syi1em waseigncdapability against ballistic missiles, and perhaps against aerodynamic vehides as well, but that the mU,al design has been changed. We cannot determine Ihe nature of this change, nor can wc determine whether il was caused by -serious technical difficulties, the realization thai thc system was vulnerable to, pcnclrat.on aids, or important new developments in the state-of-the-art. There are similarities between new construction at one of thc Leningrad com-
to Holders of. -Soviet Bloc Air and MU-ileatedOP
and recently discovered defensive complexes under construction at Tallin and Cherepovets in northwestern USSR. (See latern light of these similarities, at Icasl these Ihree complexes may now he intended for thc di'ploymenl of the same delcnsive system. However, wo are unable lo associate the nesv complexes with any syslpim equipment, and anyfor the mission of these complexes and for the modificationsningrad Is open lo some doubt.
Tallin and Chcrcpovels
c know of no installations in the vicinity of Tallin and Cherepovets which would call for this selection as early sites for an ABM system or evenew SAM system. -In Order to function as part of an area ABM defense for Ihc western urban-industrial region, tbe complexes at Tallin and Cherepovets would need toissile with long-range, exoatmospheric capabilitiesompatible acquisition radar.ong-range AMM. complexes at these locations could defend against bath ICBMs and Polaris missiles ontowards Moscow or olher key targets in Ihe western region. To defend Moscow from these locations, intercepts would have to be performed at altitudes of.
These complexes, however, could be intended to serveAM role. If so, we believe tliey would beong-range system, and that they may be the startarrier torincipal route of US bombers toward the industrial centers of western USSH. Thc missile used byystem could be the Griffon or some other missile not yet identified. If used with appropriate guidance equipment, thc Criffon would probably be effective to ranges on the order. against aerodynamic vehicles at medium and high altitudes.
Thus, there is some support for the belief that die complexes areAM system to defend against aerodynamic vehicles. On the other hand, we have noted intensive Soviet research on missile defenses for several years and indications that the USSR lias been working toward new and different ABM eapabililies. In light of this factor and some of the foregoing considers.-lions, wc think there are also persuasive reasons for believing that thesearc related to missile defense. However, any judgment at this time on their mission is in our view premature.
have observed at Moscow three developments which maydeployment there. Southwest of the city, the Soviets arelarge radar (Dog House) having the shape of an inverted V. Theeet high andeet wide- instruction probablyearlye know of no prototype for this radar- itfrom developmental work at Sary Sh3gan and probably employsscanning principle. Because of its size, the apparent orientationface to scan the ICBM threat corridor, and its proximity to other construc-
(ion which may lie AIlMhink dial llie radar could servoaacquisition and early target tracking /acilily for an ADM system. Ittliat it vWll serveatellite tracking radar and bears
no relai In ABM defense.
uring the past yettr the Soviets have continued woik on probable dec-tumie* facilities located tit four of tlie outer ringites nt Moscow. Although wc believe that tlicsc fueililies arc intended to serve loinc- defensive function,uiiMit determine whether this fuiK-tion is connected with ballistic missile drfaMdefense -gainst aerodynamic vehiclcs.
iilitii.il. iliu Suvivis have begunodify many of theues during recent months. In'somc eases, large nesv revetments arconsistent pattern has not yet emerged, but some ol llie revetments arc big enough to accommodate very large missiles. This activity may indicate that thc Soviets intend to otiliie theites as launch positions for AMMs. How. ever, it also is possible lhat the activityodification of Moscow's SAM defenses.
we have observed under construction at Moscow what may beelements of an ABM system. The large radar could be theearly target tracking element, the facilities at lhe outer-ring SA-1serve as tlie final target tracking and missile guidance dement, andsites could be used as the AMM launch positions for tlie system.iho activities we have observed thus far may not bc related to eadisome of them may represent improvements in Moscow's defensevehicles orpace function. Also, the missile toaior unknown; the missllc-in-the-canister could be used atconduct no atmospheric intercepts of ballistic missiles, perhaps atseveral hundreds of miles from the city. In sum, we continue toIhe Soviets may now be deploying ABM defenses at Moscow, but wcyet understand how the installations wc have ob'-eived would functionABM system.
XI. PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE Air Defense
combination of area and point defenses provided by thoforce of interceptors and short-range SAM systemsoodfor major target areas against medium and high altitude bomberthe air defense system has limited low altitude capabilities, andarc posed by Western supersonic aircraft and ASMs. Woa major Soviet effort during (lie remainder of this decade will bemeeting these particular problems. Moreover, in light of theair threat and thc high priority the USSR assigns toariety of Soviet measures to reduce the changes thatvehicles of any type can pcnclrate lo key targets.
Over (lie next lew years,oviets will eifiMtd llseir networks of modern EW anal CCl radar* mid semiautomatic air defense conirol systems, and they will Introduce rnore advanced intoeptor weapon systems Theseill upgrade Soviet air tlelenui in general, and tome of lliem wilt be iqtplic.ihlc to tlic problem of lowaltiliidc defense, 'llie Soviets will aho seek to improve Iheir low-iiitiliidc enpabilitics piobably by modifying lhcir widely deployednd by cilcndiitg somewhat their present limited deployment of systems designedfor low-allitude defense. Finally, if lhc devrlc-pmcnls at Tallin. Cliciqiovcts. and Leningrad areewaiigi- SAM systemen lhc Soviets may Ivive begun to deployystemarriervc-nch route to thc urban-IndustrirJ region of western USSII. Tlie initial complexes forystem could be operational within the coining year.
lthough we arc uncertain aboutew SAM system is to become operational, wc believe lhat improvement* in the Soviet air defense system over the next few years will make progressively more difficult successful penetration by maimed bombers to major target areas. Successful penetration by manned bombers will require Increasingly sophisticated forms of attack. Soviet aircapabilities can bc degraded by the increasingly complex forms of attack which ihe West will bc able to employ. Including air-launched missiles,tactics, electronic coiinterrneasures, and low-altitude attack. Despite these limitations of their air defense system, the Soviets would expect toumber of the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attackoint where the resulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable
Bollislic Missile Dcfonio
here- are critical uncertainties in our knowledge of tlie present status ofnd deployment in (he ABM field. At this point In time, we can make no confident estimate about llie future prospects for Soviet defense against strategic ballistic missiles. From the evidence now available, however, certain general conclusions can be drawn:
thc Soviet RAD effort has been extensive and of long duration, nnd the USSR several years ago probably solved the technical problem ofballistic targets arriving singly or in small numbers;some initial ABM deployment activity was probably begun as long agout both tlie deploymentrograms wereInterrupted nnd modified;
thc magnitudend tlie probable early deployment activity pointtrong Soviet desire to obtain ABM defenses rapidly;
ew AMM lias appeared, and some additional deployment activity may now be underway, but the USSR does not have any operational defenses against strategic ballistic missiles today.
40P- ftrC-ftf T-
Much of Our evidence indicates lhal (lie USSIt Was been exploring mclliods of AHM defense svhich dilter iti impoitnnt respects fiom those now favored by tlii-iw frequency radars may play an impoitanl role in the Soviet pro-grant. An early Soviet eflurt may haveissile designed to have dual capabilities against bnllistie nnd aerodynamic vehicles. The missile mostdisplayed is probably designed lo conduct cxoatinotphcric intercepts at considerable ranges,arge nuclear warhead to achieve its kill.
CO. Wc cannot dclciiuiuc whether any uf the deployment we have noted sinceSM program was modified is in fact related lo ADM defenses. It could lie explained in tci ms of improved SAMullistie missile early svnrnihg system,pace surveillance system. Thus it is possible that thc Soviets have at least temporarily abandoned any ABM deployment cffoits. Al the other extreme, it is possible that thc recent activity includes two simultaneous ABM deployment programs:efense of Moscow, and thc other an area defense of the svestern urban-industrial region. If ABM deployment activity is now iindcrsvny at either Moscow or lhe olher locations we have noted, thc USSR is likely lo have some initial strategic ABM defenses operational within the next two years or so.
Limited deployment activity, especially at Moscow, couldpecial, highest-priority effort to defend the Soviet capital with an early and stillsystem. But widespread ABM deploymenl activity, whenever ftwould Imply thai the Soviels consider their ABM systems good enough to justify extraordinarily large new expenditures. It would indicate that thc Soviets had achieveduccesses and. perhaps, that they had taken high-risk production and deployment decisions. We cannot exclude thisbut our evidence suggests that the Soviels have been proceedingSince they modified their program-
In considering whetlser to provide ABM defenses for many of their urban-industrial centers and other targets, the Soviet leaders will have to weigh the great cost of such an effort against the likely effectiveness of the ABM systems available. Area defenses might offer considerable savings over point defenses, but wc cannot bc sure of this and in anyajor commitment ofwould be required. Tlie Soviets may defer widespread deployment pendingork on existing systems, or in thc hope of achieving better systemsater date. Tliey might even decide that the cost of large-scale ABM deployment would not be commensurate with the protection it could offer against anticipated Western strike capabilities. We arc certain that the Soviets will push ahead withffort, but wc cannot forecast whether or when they will achieve ABM systems with capabilities and costs justifying widespread deployment.
XII. ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES
evidence is insufficient for us to estimate with confidence whetherarc now developing weapon systems for defense against spacewe think that they almost certainly are investigating the feasibility of pro-
during audi systems. Tl* large radars, such at Hen House, whidi wc believe lo be now under construction in the USSH and ir* Dog House radar near Mokqw, arc candidates lor itsc in space surveiltiinc and Hacking. Tliis may not be the assigned or primary role lor somethesefew, (or example, will probablyallistic missile early warning (unction. However, sve believe llsat some oa all of thesewill he linked togetherpace surveillance system.ystem would enable tlse Sovieis to observe and track satellites nnd other orbiting objects during most of the passes over the USSH. lt would piobably also be capable of predicting the ad>ils and positions ol non-Sovjct sali'llites and space vehiclesu'gh degree erf accuracy after several cross-illgl Ul tlie USSR.
Most of the large radar* believed to be now under construction will pmb-ably become operationalll will probably be operationalc est im sie that, wlien completed, tlie system using these radars willapability considerably in excess of lhat required merely to detect the passage of US space vehicles. In addition, tlse USSR already has the capacity to track its own satellites, utilizing transmissions from them, with greater accuracy than would be provided by the new system.esc factors.think tlve chances are better than even that the Soviets intend to provide themselves, not onlypace surveillance system, but with an antisatellite capability as wcIL"
The kill mechanism which could lie employed by an antisatellite syslem depends on the capabilities of its tracking radars and the accuracy andof the interceptor missile it employs. If thc new radars are coupled with cxistbig types ol missiles fn an antisalellitc system, thc system would probably have touclear warhead toill. Non-nuclear kill of awouldissile which would combine an accurate guidance system with on exoatmospheric maneuver capability. We believe that the Soviets could developissile intwo years after tho initiation of flight tests. We have no evidence tliat the Soviets arc as yet conducting such tests.
The Soviets could probablyapability against satellites in near-earth orbits by modifying existing ballistic missiles and radars.apability could be acquiredew month*ecision to do so, but we have no
* Th* Director of InFctLgescc end Researrh.of Slate, bctirra Out ox Use bins of available evidence, diss affirm.liveremature. While he does notIheite functionossibility,idence doei not persuade him lint die SovieU Intend to develop and deploy within the nextri and at gieal east en eifremcly conplei antisatellite lysieen. The Soviets.oted to. could probablyimitedU capahflily byeitaOftg linilra and redanew month* after decidingo so.
The Director ol INR notes thai ijucc tmdhhg pioblemi In future years will be mad*nioie roanpltcaleil by an ever lucre* ling number ol spice experiments, uiing larger and morernponenti.will be carried oulrowing number of countries. The Soviets aree iatcetUrd iaaore toenrsticated apace mr.riU.icc capability to prepare for thrs eventuality.
cvalence lhat tliey have madeecision. Wc believe (bat. louccessful intercept by usingechnique, the Soviets would need touclear wat head.
XIII. CIVIL DEFENSE
he Soviets have long recognized the value of civil defenseeans of prewiring tlicir naiion to withstand and recoverull-scale strategic attack. Compulsory public training courses, initiatedrc beingWc believe, however, that thc Soviets have concluded it is infcasible to devise nnd implement shelter conslmction programs svhich would effectively protect the hulk of Ihe urban population in the eventarge-scale nuclear attack.oviet civil defense plans have emphasized tlic concept of urban evacuation. However, we estimate tliat two lo three days would beto conduct tlie evacualion of the population from thc major Soviel cities. Thus, mass evacuation is likely to be feasible onlyarge-scale nuclearwere preceded by an alert period. The Soviet civil defense system is now emphasizing mobility of operational unils for evacuation and mutual aid, and new units are being formed in the countryside to aid cities after attack.
6S. Although wc believe that thc Soviets have severely curtailed their urban shelter construction program, they probably have made provisions for including shelters in the schools, hospitals, and perhaps certain industrial facilities nosv being constructed. Wc calculate that there are someoillion shelter spaces available for the urban population, or roughly one space for every four city-dwellers. Tlie Soviets have, in addition, encouraged tlic rural population to prepare their own makeshift shelters, such as root cellars, for protection against fallout. Thc Soviet leadership probably docs not expect that tlie present civil defense program will provide adequate protection for moremall portion of thc population. We have no evidence to indicate that thc Soviets arcesumptionajor shelter construction program.
IE '555 '5cS3 '3S
I I -1
ESTIMATED CHAHACTBKIbTICa*PEItFOlt.MANCE OF SUUFACB-TO-AIllYSTEMS ASSIGN Kl> TO THE PVO STtlANY
Mnximum Operational IliiiiJO Altitude ' Effective Allilurk- nbout(CEP100
fence will varv will. ai*c, .Ititudc, weed, and approaching direction ot thewtewlc tarecli. Ibeere Mtarrett, rang**
Tlteystem* have some clfectfeeiicai nbove the shown nltilooe*.
Bueliflina eoiidiliwistareM speed* influenceitudc capabilities.
- Heeent evl.lcuec indicates thai theremodifications whichto leduw the lower altitude limitation of the .jWm toOO feet. data indicate MiniSoviets arc willing to commitflyr*
considerablyool. At there lo- altitudes, the cflceUvcMte of the system may be deereded; lhe low altitude limitite would be affected by local terrain.
. Wc have no evidence oa to the minimum effective nltitude capabilities of this eyiicm.
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