CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES, 1964-1970 (NIE 11-14-64)

Created: 12/10/1964

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM ELEASE IN FULL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose

IRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Conevmd in by th* UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

At indicated

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OCCBCT

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE

FOREWORD

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

OVIET POLICY WITH RESPECT TO CENERAL

Corissderations Affecting the PiomC Sice and Composition of General

Purpose

Khrushchev's Attitude Toward Ceneral Purpose Forctt

The Military Debate

Implications of the Fall of Khrushchev

II. PERSONNEL STRENCTHS

OVIET THEATER GROUND FORCES

Type* of Divisions22

Strrngthi of DivisionsU

Numbers of Divisions13

Ground Armies and Cen p.

Cround Force

Land16

Mobilization Potential17

IV. THEATER FORCES AIR AND MISSILE SUPPORT18

Tactical Aviation 18

Tactical Missile*19

Tactical Nuclear Weapons 20

Chemical and Biological Warfare 22

Theater Force Air Defense23

V. DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET THEATER FORCES

VI. STRENCTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF SOVIET

VII. NAVAL CENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Submarine Force) 26

Surface Forces 27

Naval Aviation 28

Strengths and 28

VIII. AIRLIFI' AND SEA IJ 31

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OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES

Warsaw Pact

Cround Forces

Air Force*

Missiles

Nuclear aod Chemical Weapons

Reliability

THEATER FORCE CAPABILITIES ACAINST WESTERN

EUROPE

Concepts ol"

Forces Immediately Available 35

Reinforcements 36

Capabilities lor Naval Operations Against NATO 37

Capabilities foe Theater OperaUons in Other Areas 38

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XI. TRENDS IN THE CENERAL PURPOSE FORCES8

Cround Forces

Tactical Aviation and Missiles

Tactical Nuclear Weapons ..

Naval Forces

Distant LimitedFoices

CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate lhc role and capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces over the next six years, especially against thc NATO area in Europe.

FOREWORD

As considered in this estimate, Soviet general purpose forces include: (a) theaterround combat ind tactical air forces plus their associated command, support, and service elements, up through the level of military districts and groups of forces; (b) navalaval forces subordinate to fleets and separate flotillas, including naval air forces, but excluding ballistic missile submarine forces; and (c) military airlift and scaiift elements. In addition, Soviet command and service elements providing general support to all components of the Soviet military establishment are considered where appropriate. Those Soviet forces which perform other military missions, namely strategic attack and strategic defense forces, are thc subject of other National Intelligence Estimates and are discussed herein only insofar as they might be used in support of theater operations.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Despite thc rapid and costly development of Soviet strategic attack and defense forces, the general purpose forces remain the largest and most expensive element of the Soviet military establishment. The present structure of tbe theater forces reflects operational concepts adopted some years ago, which envisaged large numbers of divisions advancing at high speed across NATO territory in the aftermathuclear exchange. The Soviets havearge number of line divisions, though their size has been reduced, ond have reconstituted

SCCRCf-

virlimlly all of (liem into heavily-armored tank and motorized rifleThey have sharply reduced conventional artillery firepower in favui of tactical missiles with nuclear and chemical warheads, and have emphasized speed and shock effect at the cx|)cnsive of staying power. The Soviets have made considerable progress tn modernizing tlieir forces, but the costs involved in keeping pace with their own technological advances and with developments in opposing forces have resulted in some equipment deficiencies.

uring the past year we have learned of importantnot reflected in previous estimates. The manpower in thegeneral purpose forces has evidently declined1 and we believe it is now considerably less than previously estimated.and demographic factors were contributory, but much of the pressure for manpower reductions came from Khrushchev. Some military men shared Khrushchev's strategic views and called into question thc traditional Soviet preoccupation with large-scale land campaigns in general war, but most of tlie marshals disagreed with him. Although there is evidence that Soviet military4 to debate basic strategic questions, including the role and utility of theater forces, the dismissal of Khrushchev has removed the leading advocate of reductions in general purpose forces.

C. Soviet general purpose ground forces nowinef which are combat-ready; the rest are at reduced or cadre strength. All Soviet divisions are small by Western standards, and combat and service support at all echelons ofery light. Soviet general purpose forces also includeacticalorpedo-attack and cruise missileajor surface ships, andaval jet medium bombers. Thc total personnel strength of these forces is estimated to be9 million men.'

liJIn-i:

'Th* total manpower in the Soviet mHIUry'esUbliihment i. estimated to be epjwrimsecl

Purpose

N*wfll

icAuacirwSSS

t-ommand and General Support

T0TAL0

the publication ofhc Soviets haveimprove the capabilities of their tactical aviation through theof newer models and by increasing capabilities for

nuclear delivery capabilities ol Soviet theaterto improve thiough the increased availability of missiles,and more suitable aircraft. Nuclear and toxic chemicalarc kept undet strict political control. Nucleai weaponshave been identified only within thc USSR, but we think theregood chance (hat tactical nuclear weapons are in Hast Cermany.

e have observed increased emphasis onof Soviet naval capabilities. The Soviel Navy has beenactive in tlic Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. Thelo strengthen their capabilities against carrier taskcruise missile submarines and ASM-carrying jel mediumof Long Range Aviation regularly support Soviet navalAlthough Soviet amphibious capabilities arc unimpressive,arc now underway to improve them. Soviel ASWtheir own coastal waters remain negligible.

believe that significant changes have also been occurringthe military forces of the East European countries during thcyears. East European capabiliUes to conduct militarywithout the large numbers of Soviet supporting unilsarc growing. These developments probably point to aawareness on lhe part of the Sovietsar wiih NATOto bc fought with the forces already in Eastern Europe.Soviets are evidently disposed to give East European forceswithin the Warsaw Pact structure, the growingof these countries probably tends to reduce the USSR'sin Its ability to marshal them for an offensive against NATO.

Soviets couldimited objective attackwith Warsaw Pact ground and air forces already inWc believe, however, (hat if they intended to launchagainst Western Europe, they would seek to assemble alarger force. Under non-combatorce could probably be assembled and organized forlhe Central Region of NATO within three or four weeks ofto do so. orce would contain about one mUlion men

-SCO: a

{up to one-third of them Satellite0actical missiles and rockets,oviet tactical aircraft. In addition, the Satellite air foices would be available for support,eater reserve of Soviet ami Satellite divisions would he assembled in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Thc Soviets would expect dieand assembly of forces on this scale to be quickly detected. Any attempt to reinforce secretly in Eastern Europe would bc much slower nnduch reduced scale.

I. In thche Soviets dismissed the possibility of limited wars between major powers, holding that limited non-nuclear wars would almost certainly escalate and limited nuclear wars certainly would.' oviet statements on this subject luiverowing acceptance of thc possibility of limited non-nuclear The latest of these, which may also have reflected concerns arising out of the Sino-Soviet dispute, stated that the USSR should be prepared for protracted non-nuclear war between major powers. Some characteristics of Soviet theater forces as now constituted could prove senous handicaps in non-nuclear operations, particularly if such operations were at all prolonged. Certain recent trends, including measures to improve tactical air capabilities, point to Soviet eflorts to improve the non-nuclear capabilities of their theater forces. Further, improvements in airlift and scali/t. the recent revival of Naval Infantry,reater emphasis on airborne operations may constitute initial steps to acquire better capabiliUes for distant limited military actions.

J. Considering that the new regime may be less disposed or less able to counter the views of the military leaders, we believe that there will probably not bc any substantial further reductions in general purpose forces in the near term. However, thc ecooomic and strategic situations which motivated Khrushchev have not changed, and there arc basic issues in the military debate which remain unresolved- The difficulties of implementing tbc concept of extensive inobihzation, large scale reinforcement,eneral onslaught to overrun Western Europe in thc aftermathuclear exchange have been dealt with extensively in Soviet military writings. If the Soviets should conclude that this concept is unrealistic and that thc East European armies could be given greater responsibilities, then tlie USSR might considereduction in its mobilization baseithdrawal of some So-

' tor the view of Uie Aultlar* Chid of Slat for IntrTlig'rtor. DcpoWat of thri- to pxigupJi ISI.

becbet-

viet divisions from Cermany. Similarly, if the Soviets now talcelhe need to prepare for non-nuclcai war. thc size and structure of theater forces will bc affected.

K. Wc believe that modernization of genera! purpose forces will continue and thatoderate reduction in the number ofwill have occurred. Dy that time there will probably have been some increase in thc proportion of combat and service supportThe rate of modernization of tactical aviation will probably increase, although tolal numbers of aircraft in the force will gradually decline. In any case, economic and doctrinal compromises. Sino-Soviet relations and developments in NATO, rather than any single clearly-defined strategic concept, will probably continue to govern the development of Soviet general purpose forces.

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DISCUSSION

OVIET POUCY WITH RESPECT TO GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Considerations Affecting ine Present Site and Composition of Genera! Purpose Forces

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espite elie rapid and costly development of Soviet strategic altack and alegic defense foices, the general puipoir forcei icnuin Ihe largest and man pensive element in Ihr Soviet military establishment Historical, geographical, id political factors have made large-scald land warfare on tlia Eurasianthe traditional preoccupation of .Soviet military thought. Thathas continued into live nudear age ll is reflected in the composition of the Soviet strategic attack forces as well as in the genera) purpose forces. Ai is usually the case in human experience, the present size and composition of general purpose forces does notingle clear and cottereot conception, but Is the net result of the impact of various factors, including the pressures for change generated by todinological developments and changing strategic circumstances, the limitations imposed by competing demands for funds and other resources, tho rationalizations advanced for thc protection of vested interests, and the inertia inherent in any large establishment

The present structure of tbe Soviet general purpose forces is based upon operational doctrines adopted some years ago whicheneral war Ixigiliningassive nuclear exchange. The Soviet ground forces, with air and missile support, are expected to advance rapidly, in the conditions created by tlie exchange, in order to destroy the surviving NATO forces and thus to dominate Western Europe. The naval general purpose forces are expected to defend against seaborne nuclear attack and then to interdict US support of NATO in Europe. At the time these doctrines were adopted the Sovietsthe possibilityocal non-nuclear war between nuclear powers, or of

a war in which only tactical nudear weapons would be used, holding that the Erst would almost certainly escalate into general nudear war and that tlie

second certainly would.

be Soviets haveostly effort fo modernize their genera] purpose forces and to equip them for the sod oi war envisaged io tbe foregoingdoctrines. During the past five years they have reduced the number and size of their line divisions, while enhancing Iheir firepower andabout half of them combat ready. Anticipating operationsuclearthey have sharply reduced conventional artillery in favor of tactical missiles and rockets wiih nuclear and chemical warheads. Expecting toa disorganized and demoralized enemy, they have emphasized speed and shock effect al the expense of staying power.

4esult of tbis effort, thc Soviet general purpose forces have been substantially modernized, but budgetary restraints have prevented the USSH

iGCUCT

IromIhem fully wiih theequipment it could develop and

Tfo* tlwns The Soviet* have found it difficult lo keep pace with rapid

levlmological advances and thc totisequcntly ispid otoolnccnce of relatively

new equipment. nnd with the developments in opposing forces.

Khrushchev's Allilode toward General Purpose Forces

iing thc part tevcial years Khrushchev frequently pressed distal is-faition with llie site und compoii'lon of the Soviet genernl purpose forces. Concerned with llw whole |Koblcm of the proper allocation of limited Soviet resources, a* the military were not. Khrushchev found it imperative to check tlie continuing increase incost of the Soviet military establishment as new strategic weapons sysiems were developed and deployed. According priority to the development of missile forces for both strategic attack and strategiclie could accomplish his purpose only by reducing the tire of the general purpose forces, or by retarding their modernization in order to spread the cost, or both. In stating his strategic views, lie contended that US and Soviel nuclear capabilities precluded either US or Soviet resort to generalnd that, ifar did nevertheless occur, large scale theater operations would be Inconceivable In the aftermathassive nuclear exchange. In theseKhrushchev poured scorn on the utility of general purpose forces in the modem world andrastic reduction In tlieir sixe.

The Miliiary Debate

hrushchev's views wesc- strongly opposed by thc military establishment in general. In order to reduce this opposition. Khrushchevebate among military authorities regarding basic military Issues, including thc utility and function of general purpose forces in modern circumstances. Variousof military opinion emerged in thc debate At oneere officers wlio sought vigorously to defend thc existing general purpose forceby contending that large scale and protracted land campaigns would be indispensable for victoryeneral nuclear war. despite llw devastatingof tbe nuclear exchange upon tin- enemy. At the other extreme* were officers who contendedcucul nuclear war would necessarily be of short duration and that the effect of tlie nuclear exchange would determine the outcome. This Utter contention could be used to support the maintenanceanding force which- would be smaller butigher state of combatIt put in question reliance upon extensive mobilization, as well as tlie concepttrategic requirement for multi-million man armies lo defeat NATO forces in Europe.

he doctrinal position adopted by most important Soviet military leaders (including Marsha) Malinoviky, the defense minister)ompromise. This compromise accepted the decisiveness of nuclear weapons and the probability

* TVs terrasad naodenafct" ara sometWm usedaint* of cosneasasoe

to relet lo tuilsiary spokesmen taking the most ertreme positiaea la.

eneral war would be short, but it also provided for llie possibility thatar would be protracted and held that the requirement for large theater forces continued into the nuclear era. Thu* these leadenilitary policy emphasizing strategic attack and defense capabilities, but they supported as well thc maintenance of large general purpose foices for use in all phaseseneral war. There is much evidence, however, tltat debate continued and that central tenets of doctrine remained at issue.

lie latest word in this debate, before the fall of Klirushdiev. wasby Marshal Sokolovsfciy in an article published inokolovskiy,hasiddle position in the debate, now declared it indisputableeneral nuclear war would be of short duration. He also indicated that it would not be necessary or even possible to occupy some enemy territory which had been subjected to massive nuclear attack At the same time, heew rationale for maintaining thc strength of theater forces. He added tho thought, new in public Soviet writings, that tlve USSR must prepare for the possibility of protracted non-nuclear war. Thb new consideration may have reflected notice of current US emphasis on "flexibleinstead of "massivet may also have reflected growingregarding the possibility of an armed conflict with Communist China.

The Soviet concentration on preparationeneral nuclear war hasthe capabilities of the general purpose forces for non-nuclear warfare, although their inherent capabuttics for such warfare remained'okolovsldy's statement is the latest and least equivocaleries of Sovietover the past few years suggesting growing acceptance of theof non-nuclear conflict between major powers. If now the Soviets take seriously thc possibilityrotracted non-nuclear conflict, some adjustments in thc composition of the general purpose forces on that account are LJcely to

Soviet general purpose force structure provides an inherent capability for limited nuclear warfare Although there was brief reference to the possibility of limited wars involving tactical nuclear weapons in the military presshe Soviets continue to insist that any use of tactical nuclear weapons wouldtrategic exchange. Limited nuclear warfare against NATO would pose acute problems to the Soviets in that their most significant nuclear delivery capability against European targets rests with MRBM/IRBM and medium bomber forces whose bases are inside tho USSR,*

Implications ol the Foil of Khrushchev

put new pressures on the size of Soviet general purposethe last year of his regime. Toward the ende put throughnew chemical industry program,mall reduction indefense budget, and launched new proposals for some further cut inmanpower. Given Khrushchev's strategic views and the known improve-

the views atAssistant Chief al Staff. Deps-taent of tl* Amy on tht. subject. *ee hii footitote to paragraph iSl.

mentt in strategic altack ami defense forces during tlic past year, wc think these initiatives must again have been at (he expense ol general purpose forces. Finally, ine gave notice of his position in the neat round of ixwmhik' planning liy forcefully stating that defenseat the propern view ol llie continuing raptinuon ofattack and defense forcei,fii' n: implied (hat lie intended to impose still furthereneral purpose force allocations.

Many factors contributed to Khrushchev's fall. We have, no reason to believe llmf it was initialed by military leaders, but we believe thai his slrategic concepts .ind his attitudes toward manpower and funding made his overthrow agireablc tn most of Ihe oiarslsah. We believe that his removal will not bring about any iharp changes in the allocation of resources to defense. Upward pressure would in fact be felt if the new regime were to hold general purpose forces at ptesent levels while continuing to build slrategic atlack and defense foices and to maintain recent growth rates of

AH things considered, we think that the size of the general purpose .forces will remain relatively unchanged in fhe near tcim. But over the years.successors will be subject to many of the same pressures which moved him. They will almost certainly not find the problems of an unfavorable strategic balancetrained economy any more tractable than be did,t likely that they will come toe,turn to the policy of restraining fhe growth of military spending. Before long they, in their turn, will probably be seeking ways to reduce the cost of the general purpose forces.

strategic debate has been muted for the past several months andremain soime, but we think it will continue becausehave not been resolved. Among these, of course, the role and utilitypurpose forces looms huge. Future Soviet policy towards thesetypes oi forces will continue to be shaped, not onlyariety ofhistorical, technical, economic, and political factors, but also byabout the relative Importance of these (actors and by shiftingtliese views. Among the key elements of uncertainty at this timepossible effectsrolonged struggle for power within the topleadership and the effects of the future course ofall these reasons, the sire and composition of Soviet general purposethe period of this estimate will probably not reflect any single,concept.

II. PERSONNEL STRENGTHS

ur estimates of total Soviet military manpower are based primarily on two types of analysis. The first uses demographic data Indicating the availability of Bt males for military service by year and information on the operation of the

' The lour penent reduction In tbrudget cannot tin taken to reflcot Uie trend In total defenseoniidersble part of which it Enanrod from other budget categories.

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conscriptlon system. Tlie second proceeds fiom order of battle and usesofud numbers of Soviet unil! mid their peacetime manning levels.

ate confident that the Soviet military establishment totaled aboutmen9 Hie securily (ofccs. which arc also manned throughare believed to have numbered anhousand men atIncluded in these forces wereillion conscripts, mostly fromdraft classes bornS3S,he subsequent draftof men born during Worldere much smaller, and ihcfaced wiih llie problem ol replacingillion men per yearclasses only maiginally able lo supply enough manpower

by both economic and strategic cons iderul0 announced his plan to reduce total military manpower tothe ende estimate tliat by1 Soviet military forcesreduced toillion men plus aboutthousandillion conscripts. At that time the reductsoni werepart because of the deepening Berlin crisis and the US military buildupSome reserves were called up and some conscripts weretlicir normal release dates, with the result that the total strength offorces increased. However, these temporary expedients did notbasic manpower problem.

IS. Demographic data for theuggestere was pressure to reduce military manpower levels and that the Soviels would have hadin maintaining then force level It was during this period uiat the effects of the low Soviet birth rate during World Warli were most keenly felt At the low point during this period, the numbnr of men becoming eligible for induction into thc armed foices fell to less than half of the number eligibleuch constraints would not necessarily haveeduction from1 levels of military manpower, provided that the Soviets were willing to draft an unusually high percentage of tliet this very time, however, the economy was faltering andreat need for manpower, particularly for the higher quality manpower which the armed forces were also absorbing In increas-ing numbers. Thus, the pressures exerted by the smaller size of draft classes were reinforced by pressures from the civilian economy.

2 tho Soviets departed from normal draft procedures and ordered twoo bo legutered for conscriptionhis measure probably reflected an intention at thc time to maintain the existing strength of the armed forces. In the fallowever, when these Iwo classes of conscripts could have been inducted, only one was called up. The one class inducted3 was squeezed hard, ie, lhe number of deferrals was reduced. It ii conceivable thai this and ihe other classes ineriod were squeezed hard enough to maintain military manpower at1 levelo believe it more likely that there hasoderate decline, on thc order ofmen.

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The order of baltle approach to an estimate of military manpowerremits which me generally contentith the demographic analysis. Current evidence indicates that tlie total number of giound force divisions wai reduced father sharply duringorce reductions, hut has remained generally stable sincehere are indications that both thcstrengths and the actual manning levels of Soviet ground force units have been deucascd. When new manning factors an- applied to current estimates of order of battle, thc resultalculaled range ofillion men in the Soviet armed forces, excludingoups. Tlie extremes of the calculated range an; the Sums of all highs and lows for all forte components. Neither extreme is likely to reflect thr actual Krt.il personnel strength, and thc methodology itself provides no basis for judging where within the range the actual total is likcly'to fall. However, the middle portion of this calculated rangerobable range much thc same as that derived from the demographic data. We therefore estimate that the current total strength of the Sovietillion men, excluding security troops.

Tire following table presents our estimate of the current dtstiibution of total Soviet military manpower:

EST1 MATED SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER

Strategic Attack Forces

' Stralegic Defease Forces

General Purpose Forces

Naval

Air

Command nod Ceneral Support

* This rangeonsiderable .lownward revision ofillion rangeillion in general purpose forces) presented In Itthe result of new evidence leading to new analysis. however, and

should not be taken to indicate lhal the SovieU have reduced their forces by thb

amount since thc publication of oui last estimate.

III. SOVIET THEATER GROUND FORCES

ground forces arc characterizedarge, number ofline divisions whicli. even at full strength, are substantially smallerdivisions. In general, thc smaller size of Soviet combat units innominally corresponding US unitsifferent concept of llieirAlthough Soviet divisions generally have less equipment thantheyigh proportion of tanks relative to manpower.have less organic combat and service support than US divisions,to the differences in overall size, and are backed up by lessand service support. This is due in part to the Soviet concept of thc role

"Tables of Organisation and Equipment.

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of ground forces in general nuclear war. emphasizing speed and shock effect al tlie cipcnsc of staying power. For reasons such as ihese, any description of Soviet giound units in terms of equivalents or percentage equivalent* of like-named US units can be of Utileortraying relative capabilities

Types of Divisions

Soviet motorired riBe and tank divisions are both armored-type divisions, having as theii main maneuver elements inotorlred rifle regiments and tank regiments. Thc motorized iifte division has three motorized rifle regiments and one tank lugiment, while thc tank division has thiee tank icgiments and one motorized rifle legimenl. These tank regiments are equipped with medium tanks, exceptew tank divisions have one heavy tank regiment. In both divisions tho motorized rifle rcgimenl has an organic tank Imitation and armored personnel carriers arc provided for the infantry elements. Soviet battalions are small; tlie motorized illle battalion contains feweren. and thc tank battalion fewer.

We have much less evidence on the organization and strength of the Soviet airborne divisions. They arc similar in structure to the motorized rifle division, but considerably smaller. They have no tank units and are lighter in artillery.

Srrengfhi ol Drvisioni

have fairly good evidence regarding tbe actual strength of theIn Cermany. but little evidence legarding the strength of tbethe USSIt. Soviet militaiy writings refer to divisions at three differentor near fullreducednd 'cadre."descriptions of the intended use of thc division! in these threededuce throe different peacetime manning levels, as follows:

1 {combat slrenglh) divisions arc intended to form the firstof Soviet ground forces in tlie initial operationsar. The SovietGermany. Poland, and Hungary are obviously Jn this category, as arein tho border areas of the USSR (see Tablee lutimatemotorized rifle divisions in Germany have an average strength of abouttank divisions, an average strength of. No Soviet divisionstoigher level of peacetime manning. Thc divisions In thisreceive some minor augmentation in anticipation of war. if thepermitted, but they are, by Soviet definition, ready for immediateto combat without augmentation.

II (reduced strength) divisions are intended for the earlyof theivisions. They are probably maintained atol the slrenglh olivisions, with some rubordinslccadre status. They could be fleshed out with reservists and made readyto the theater of operationseek or SO.

C- Category III (cadre strength) divmom aie intended loase for reserve training and rnolMlixalMn, Ther are probably maintained at aboutercent of the strength ofIivoion i. with most of their offcerbul few troops. All the divisions in thus category are believed to be moiomcd fine divisions They could lie fleshed out with reservistseek or so, but would not bc effective against powerful enemy forces until they hadonsiderable period ol Iraining. They could be used eatlier for mopping-up operations, Iine-of-coininumentions or internal security duties. Or reconstruction work.

Numbers of Divisions

We estimate Uiat thc total number of Soviet line divisions lies somewhere. Improved evidence and continuing analysis duiing the past year have provided the basis for narrowing our range of uncertamty. and Iiave changed the nature of the uncertainty.viouseflected, in large part, uncertainty as to the continued existence of entities which might be considered divisions. The actual existence of all the entities included In our current estimate, at least, is strongly supported in evidence; the spread of Bgures reflects uncertainty as to whether all of them are divisions.

We believe that tbc probable number ofivisions falls within the rangeategory III.he remainder are Category II. We make this estimate with more confidence than hitherto, on the basis ofinformation. It should be noted, however, tbat divisions can change from one category to another fairly readily without producing indications recognizable to US intelligence for some time In view of thc evident stability In total numbers ol divisions over the past several years, it is probable that any manpowerwere absorbed by shifting some divisions to lower categorlM and by paring down the already austere non-divisional combat and service support elements of the ground forces.

Order of battle methodology continues toolal number of drvi-sions near the high side of tbe estimated rangeroundivisions. We use the order of battle figureatter of convenience when discussing probable distribution of Soviet divisions by type and location inparagraphs and in our tables. However, this is not intended to suggest iliar this figure is any more probable than any other withinange.

Ground Armies ond Corps

oviel line divisions are incorporated into abouthe remaining divisions are not. These latter include the sevendivisions, which are centrally conttollcdirectorate in Moscow, and

"The Sovfct corps If net an MrrmcditM fcfceton between drnaon aad (nay, but ntfaer ii Innall army.

the six divisions subordinated to Die two gr on pi -of-forces headquarters in Poland and Hungary.

Soviet armies are of two types: combined arms armies and tank armies. The combined aims armies usually consist of two to four motorized rifle divisions and one tank division; the tank armies, of thiee or four tank divisions. There are indications that thc Sovicls now intend tootorized rifle division in their tank armies. This change would make such armies more effectiveefensive role or in non-nuclear warfare. At present, Soviet tank armies have no army artillerycud missile brigade.

Soviet armies and corps ate much smaller than those designations would suggest, not only because of thc relatively small size of their constituent divisions, but also because of the paucity of their non-divisional elements. For example, the strength of thc five armies in the Croup of Soviet Foices Germanyhich are deemed to be dose to combat strength, ranges00 man. In GSFG each of the combined arms armies hasen in non-divisional elements (headquarters and combat and service supportach tank army,en in such element*.

The Eve armies in CSFG are probably the only ones that are combat ready, with all their divisions innd with theirevel which would permit commitment to combat withoutWe believe that the armies and corps In tlie USSR have some divisions at reduced or cadre strength and generally lower levels of non-divisional support, averaging perhaps two-thirds of wartime strength in the latter respect However, three armies on thc western borders ol tlie USSR appear to have at least three of their divisions Innd arc therefore probablyigher level of combat readiness than the others.

n the event of war. most Soviet armies would be grouped into fronts. The Soviets wartime from is an echelon roughly correspendingestern army group, butactical air army. Tlie size and compositionront would vary with tlie conditionsiven theater of operations. The Croup of Soviet Forces Cermany (CSFC) can be considered theartime Soviet front currently operational. It contains five ground armies, and one tactical air army. Front-level units in CSFC include0 men in combat0 in headquarters and service support, and0 in miscellaneous housekeeping functions. CSFC is tailored to meel its particular mission in East Cermany; wartime fronts would vary in numbers of armies and divisions, as well as in numbers of combat and service support troops.

hc Soviets envisage general war campaigns broken down geographically into Theaters of Military Operationsefined as land and sea areas lyingingle operational-strategic axis. Evidence has revealed four of theseNorthewestern, including Scandinavia; the Western, mdudingEurope and Great Britain; the Southwestern, including the Balkans, Italy, and all the shores of the Mediterranean; and the Far Eastern, with areasThere are probably one or two more In Central Asia.

istorically, there has been no permanent echelon of commandfionl anti the Supreme High Command in Moscow, and wc have noSovietxuch intermediate headquarters. The complexityin (he emmnu mentions zone hi lhc rear ol Soviet fronts. Iwwcvercnuimuusly vincc Woild War II. Air defense, logistics support,control in the real ureas of widelyperations would bedifficult to coordinate directly from Moscow. To meet theseSoviet* may plan to |irovlde intermediate headquarters, particularly forwhich Ihey envisage more than one front or tlie use of non-Soviet units.such headquarters mighl control additional headquarters andwme units, such as railroad troops, scalift and airlift units, andsupporte believe that tbcilitary Districts Insidewould provide most of lhc headquarters and the supporting unitsand for any TVD headquarters which would be activated inTVDs include sea as well as land areas, any TVD organization wouldinclude some naval

Ground* Force Training

Soviet forces contain very few professional NCOs. but proportionally more junior officers on whom tlse responsibility for training largely devolves. There is about one-third turnover fn troop strength each year due to tlw Soviet three-year conscription policy. Tlie recruits are assigned directly to units and arc trained almost entirely within those units. While this systemeffective utilization of the pool of conscripts and eliminates the needarge separate training establishment, it alsorop In combat efficiency each winter as new recruits replace trained men. The increasing tcdinicalof Soviei theater forces has accentuated the problems associated with fhe annual turnover of large numbers of conscripts. There Is some evidence lhat the Soviets are now attempting to expand their corps of technically-trained enlisted men by offering additional inducements to re-enlist, although the harsh discipline in the Soviet Army tends to make such efforts iiwuecessful.

The Soviet ground forces conduct extensive individual and unit level iraining. There is no reason to doubt tlse professional competence of thc officer corps. Training of commanders and staffs at all echelons receives specialHowever, there arc some deficiencies in the nature of Soviet training, evidently occasioned in pariesire to conserve funds and to avoid wear-and-tear on the most up-to-date equipment, and alsoenchant for theoretical training methods. There Is good evidence that training ammunition for tanks and artillery is allocated sparingly and that most firing practice is conducted with sub-caliber weapons. Tank main armament firing is probably quite limited by Western standards. There are Indications tliat field training exercises with troops at levels above the regiment are relatively infrequent and that Intho larger unit commanders and staffs Iiave relatively little opportunity

secner

mmmamma

to practice llie solution of teal tactical and logistical problems which run be appreciated only when large forces arc active in tlie field.

land" Armomenls

n the two decades since World War II the Soviets have ronlmued the process ot reorganising ground force unks whileide >ange of new types of equipment, including misiile* and combat vehicles In somesuccessive generations of the same type of equipment have beenAt any given time during the period, however, thc distribution pattern of equipment has been uneven as tlie development and production of newer models overlook thc gradual tune of previous equipment. Ihui Soviel ground foices arc not fully equipped with the latest available material; many of thc older models remain in service.ivisions probably have first priority for the issue of new equipment.

We havehorough review of all evidence bearing on Soviet production and inventories of land armaments and conclude lhat Our evident*-does not pennit an estimate of total Soviet production and inventories of ground force equipment within useful ranges of confidence. There is little doubt that the Soviets have produced large quantiUcside selection of Kerns. As many asodels of land armament may have been produced since the end of World War II. and production in sizable quantities of at leastf these models is substantiated by firm evidence Soviet divisions appear to have all thorequired for adequate training or comitment in combat although older models remain In use in many units. There is evidence that even obsoletesuch as4 tank, is in many cases retained for routine training in order to extend life of newer equipment on hand.

The Soviets have exported leveial4 tanks, and we believe they have almost certainlyufficient quantity of various versions of this tank to satisfy tbc wartime requirements ol altnd II divisions. It is possible that enough are available fee Category III divisions as welt, but there is some evidence indicating4 tanks are substitute Items In such units. The latest medium tankIS mm smoothbore gun and lias beene believe that this model is not intendedeplacement for the main battle tank, and that It svill be assigned primarily an anti-lank ioie, perhaps replacing heavy tanks for thii pui|>ose.

In3 we estimated that therehortage of armoredcarrien (APCs) in So-net units. Evidence acquired during the past year indicates that thc motorized infantry elements requiring APCs are smaller than previously estimated, and that more men are carried per vehicle. Consequently, we now believe that Soviet divisions have APCs in sufficient numbers totheir motorized infantry. Tho bulk of the APCs in motorized rifle divisions arc tho first generation BTR-lSSt, which are not amphibious and lackmobility and arc thus not compatible with Soviet operational doctrine. Infantry elements of tank divisions have been largely rccqulpped with tlie

(rat-lux) amphibious carrier,. The later ami much improved amphibious UTH-GOp has appeared in very limitud numbers.

Soviet miliiary .spokesmen have discussed equipmentami obsolescence in the open press. Some of thc standardto be prevalent in Soviel divisions are: earlier4 mediumLiter models; early model APCs for BTR-SOpm rpcoillcss rifles and earlier anti-tank guns for anti-tankThese and other substitute* can be used tofunctions of later models, with the significant exception of thc oldersome categories of equipment, such as general purpose trucks and POLthere have been good indications of shortages. All thingsconclude lhat thc Soviets probably have enough land armaments inequip fullyivision force at wartime strength, but that few, Iflhe line divisions are likely to be completely equipped with latest model items.

Mobilization Potential

Thc Soviets have available large numbers of trained reservists who could be used for filling out existing understrength units or mobilizing new units. About one million of these reserves would probably be required to fill the current force to wartime strength; this would involve fleshing out existing units andarge number of additional combat and service support units for armies and fronts* Stocks of materiel on hand at or near existing units, supplcnwnted by engineer items and motor transport from civilian sources, would probably be sufficient forobilization.

The Soviets have planned to mobilize additional forces, if need be, by splitting the cadres of existing units to form new ones and by creating additional supporting units from civilian resources. This process would, of course, entail some loss of thc more immediate capabilities obtainable through filling out tlie existing divisions. We do not know how many additional divisions tho Soviets may have planned to form in this manner, or how many they could equip.ar emergency, thc availability of manpower would notimiting factor. There are enough reservists to man twice thc current number of ground force units, although this would require calling up men wlvose service experience was more tlian tliree years past. Thc Soviets could have retained considerable stocks of superseded military equipment, at some cost for maintenance and storage, but we have not been able to establish the existence of such stocks beyond thc requirements of theivision force. No matter what moblliza-tion plans the SovieU may have, considerations brought forward in the military debatend continuing budgetary stringencies may have prompted them to reconsider the utility of providing for the mobilization of any considerable number of line divisions additional to the number in the present force.

*eceive personnel would have' to- be mobilized as replacements ud toCommand and Ceoeral Support.

IV. THEATER FORCES AIR AND MtSSIlC SUPPORT

Tactical Avialion

liter minion ol .Soviet tariie.il an armies is to support (he frontt lo which assigned by gaining local aitand providing direct sapper! lo ground forcei Since the publication of NIEe have acquired evidence of increased concern liy Soviel military authorities to itrcngthen their tactical air capabilities. Tlicre has licen more emphasis on Iraining for reconnaissance, on bombing techniques, and on (he use ol unimproved airfields to increase flexibility and mobility. Soviet interceptor units inCermany. including thoie equipped witli all-weather interceptor v. are being crou-tramcd for ground attack rolev In addition tlic Soviets hr.vcwith at least one type of an aic-to-ah-miiiile usi-to-ground weapon.

Duringeduction in Soviet general purposes forces. Tactical Aviationomplete reorganization. Inactical Aviationtrength ofperational aiicraft; byt had been reduced toircraft. This sharp reduction probablyoviet intention to retire aircraft which they consideredarge part of the decrease involved the aging Beagle light bomber.0 Badger medium bombers which had liecn in Tactica) Aviation were reassigned toange Aviation during this same period. The reductions left Sovietia riot, with about half (lie number of aircraft previously assigned: of these almostercent were older models. The force had limited offensive support capabilities; all the fighters were basically interceptors and thus had limited range and load-carrying capabilities for ground attack missions.

Shortly after the reduction in tactical air strength, tlte miliiary leaders, apparently influenced by developments in NATO and the US announcementrle.iihle response* policy, began to consider (he possibility of non-nuclearThey were certainly well aware of the weaknesses of their tactical aviation for non-nuclear operations. They probably decided1 to arrest thc decline in numerical strength of Tactical Aviation by retaining older models in tlic force as long as possible, by accelerating thc introduction of newer models, and by increasing capabilities for ground attack through modification of current aircraft and crossof interceptor units.

A recent review of all evidence on this subject leads us to believe dial there have been no deliberate cuts in tactical air strength sincend wear-out of older models lias slightly exceeded the Input of newer models into units, but (he total number of airorafl has remained fairly steady. The proportion of older model aircraft has decreased, but Is still aboutercent.

Tlie total combat aircraft strength of Tactical Aviation was0 avhese aircraft arc assigned to regiments and separate squadrons in accordance with primary roles. There areighters, exclusive of (hose assigned to reconnaissance roles. In someegiments, of whichhird are primarily ground atlack and the remainder primarily

-sccucr

t^'T'.le-eouipped withr ,n'frlwFishbcd D. ver ICO new Brewers,igned to bomber

units.nal fighters and Beagle light bombers nrc innits. Soviet Tuclieal Aviationani/cd in tactical ai. armies for the support uf major ground commands, generally one TAA per front. Tluae

Mnin sire and composi-on. h TAAEast Cer.rn.iy hasombat aircraft, while iihi others are mudi smaller, ranging in strength from about.

Sovicl TAAs in Easternnd in the Soviet Far Easta (uglier proportion of currcnl model fighters than TAAs in tlich TAA in East Cermany has overercentigh proportion of all-weather interceptors. Over halftotal Soviet fighters in East Cermany are believed to be assignedthe mission of controlling the air over their own forces.

Tactical

theater forces have tactical missile and rocket systemsdrvisior, army and front level. We believe that these tactical systemsnudear. chemical, and high explosive (HE) warheads. Inbelieve that many of theedium and intermediate range missilehe Strategic Rocket Troops would be directed against target offront commanders, and that subsequent MRBM/IRBM strikes would besupport theater operations.

division-level system is (he Frog (free rocket over ground)up tom. We believe that all Sovietnd II divisionsairborne)rog battalion with at least two launchers, eachlight tank chassis. Such units may also bc available for Category IIIdivisions in CSFC probably now have three launchers rather thantheir Frog battalions. The Soviets have been dissatisfied with theof Frog launchers in the divisiom. because of thc difficulty infire suppoit for thc fast moving offensive operations prescribeddoctrine. There is some evidenceew truck-mounted Frog;of such weapons would help fo overcome this pioblcm.

f. ballisUc missile system with tbc launcher mountedeavy tank chassis. The Soviets have produced this missile in several successive versions, the latest being thc SS-lc. which fa probably now standard in Soviet groundJ-Uunchcr Scud brigade is probably assigned to combined arms and lank armies. There are tenuous indications that the Soviets areollow-on missile system with similar range diaracleristics.

Our evidence indicates rlut the Soviets at one time considered tbehcnd two types of cruise missiles as front level

systems. Wc believe that tin: Sibling, whichhort-range cruise missile system have been retired from service,ew Sibling units may still exist. Evidence indicates lhat lhc Soviets wore dissatisfied with the range character is lies of Scudronl system, but Scud brigade* are probably available for assignment to wartime fronts. Soviet classified documents indicate that one. possiblyauncher regiments of Shaddock. road-mobile cruise missile system, would be assigned to the front's tactical air army. Thc SovieU are probably. ballistic missile system which may be introducedront level system.

believe lhat each of tlve aniiics in CSFC has its Scud brigade.possible that an additional Scud brigadehaddock regimentpresent in East Cermany as CSFC level. Thus, there arc probablyandhaddock launclien in additionaunchers in CSFC. Thc level of missile support for most groundthe USSR is likely to be lower than that in CSFC.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The entire system of command and control of nuclear weapons appears well designed to reserve to the national leadership thc decision to initiate tlve use of nuclear weapons. Special units of KCB (Committee of State Security) troops have been created to niaintain custody of nuclear weapons, not only in storage, but also during delivery to units. It is probable tliat the KCB must receive instructions through its own channels before nuclear weapons can be released. These procedures give Moscow strict control over the numbers and yields of weapons employed in major theaters.

We have been able to Identify nuclear weapons storage sites only inside the USSR. If the Soviets do not abcady have nuclear weapons stored in Easternubstantial logistical effort would be required toeasonable quantity for the delivery systems currently in tbe area. Forarge number of sorties by transport aircraft would be required to move warheads and bombs forward from storage sites inside thc USSR. We estimate mat thc Soviets could launch nuclear-armed aircraft from East Cermany basesew hours after the transports had landed at the bases. In the case of Frogs and tactical missiles, we estimate that it would take longer to move thc warheads to the delivery units because reshipmenl by land transport or helicopter would be required. Movement of nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union by rail would, of course, take considerably longer than by air. In view of the above, we think that thereood chance that nuclear weapons arc stored in some GSFG depots, although we have no firm evidence.

Thc broad range of nuclear tests12 indicated an effort to Improve the nuclear capabilities of all arms of the Soviet military establish-

incut We believel lactical nudear weapon, ii now available to* delivery by tactual rocket v. mimics, and aucraft. virtually all ol them withlve Viloton range. Hie Soviets may have developed nudear rounds1 (oi ail tilery, ui even sub-kilolun weapons, but we liave no evidence that they have, developed specialized delivery systems lor sudi weapons. Several years ago they produced some prototype large nuclear camion, but they apparently did notdevdoprnent lui tha.

lie ntiinlicrs o( nuelcai weapons available to the Soviet (heater forces have piobably been limited by higher priorities afforded llw strategic attack (onus With the iMtsagc of lime, Iwwever. we believe that tlury liave by now hem able to provideonsiderable number of tactical nudear weapons for the .im' ul lhe fieldClassified documents indicate that Sovietew years ago were inosition to think in terms ol committing upew hundred nuclear weaponsront operation.

he Soviets consider mass initial nuclear strikes, including those delivered by strategic forces, to be of decisive importance to theater force opera Hons in general nuciear war. The theater forces will participate in these initial strikes to tlie extent that the availability of suitable targets and weapons allocationi permit. Thc primary targets In alt phases o( theater operations are enemy nuclear delivery systems. To the extent of weapons availability, nuclear strikes would abo be directed at command and control complexes, air defense facilities, logistical installations, and major troop formations. We believe, however, tint existing procedures, together with dchcicndca In logistic support, would hamper Soviet operational readiness and rapid response in their employment of tactical nuclear weapons. We have no doubt that the Soviets are working to overcome these deficiencies, although we have no evidence on their progress.

o

here is little new information on Soviet battlefield surveillance capa-bilities. Mot' Soviet aircraft designated for this mission are obsolete, although some current models have been introduced. The new light bomber. Brewer, as wdl as other tactical aircraft could be modified for use in reconnaissance roles. In thc theater ground forces there are apparently no longer any non-divisional arm cued reconnaissance units; divisions themselves are expected to perform requited ground reconnaissance missions, but their specializeddements are minimal The Soviets apparently rdy heavily onagents and infiltrated ground reconnaisance teams for target acquisition. Some Soviet authors have strongly criticized the system of battlefield surveillance available, at least ups incapable of fully meeting tlse reqiiirements of nuclear warfare. We believe lhat Soviet reconnaissance and batdefieldcapabilities have not improved significantly since that time, but there arc some indications o( devdopmental activity designed to correct deficiencies.

Chcmicai and Biological Warfare

Chemicaloviet tactical doctrine prescribes lhc use ofweapons in conjunction with nuclear weapons. We believe thai in Soviet thinking tbe same constraints which apply to the use of nuclear weapons apply also to toxic CW. and lhat the use of either wouldecision at the highest political level. The present Soviet emphasis on CW munitions for theater operations probably results In part from restricted availaliility of tactical nuclear weapons due to the longstanding nuclear priority assigned strategic forces. Considering thb and other factors, we believe that the Soviet leaders almost cei tainly would authorize the use of toxic chemical agents by Iheir theater forcesuclear war.on-nuclear war. the Soviets probably would not initiate thc use of toxic chemicals.

We possess good technical dala on Soviet toxic chemical warheadsfor use with cruise and ballistic missiles and Frogs. In addition, chemical bombs ami projectiles arc available for use with other delivery systems such as tactical aircraft, artillery, mortars, and multiple-launch rockets. Spray systems and land mines have abo beenhereas our evidence indicates that missile warheads are bulk-filled, probably with one of the extremely toxicgents, other munitions arc apparently filled with nerve agents including thctype (sarin or soman) or with agents of older types first used in World War 1.

Our evidence Indicates that Soviet organization, equipment, training, and research and developmenl can support substantial toxic chemical warfareCW munitions are probably immediately available to Soviet tactical units, but logistical problemsect the Soviets' ability to bring additional CW stocks into play against NATO forces in Europe. Most ol the probable toxic chemical storage depots we have identified are located east of tlie Volga. They are therefore not well sited for usear in the West which began with sboit warning time and Involved heavy Interdiction of transportation fadl'iies.

iologicaliitdligence derived from Soviel scientlfieIndicates continued interest and research In the field of biological warfare. We have no evidence of current Soviet military capabilities for application to theater operations, however, and we believe Soviet tactical use of BW to be highly unlikely.

hemical, Bieioejcal. and Radiotopcat Defense. Soviet militaryevidently assume that the West would use chemical and biological as well as nudear weapons In the event of general war. All elements of the Soviet forces stress training for chemical defense. This training, as well as most items of chemical defense equipment, is Intended also for defense against nudearand biological warfare agents. Manual and automatic radiation and chem-

a fuller discussion, seeSoviet GipablUues and Intention* with Honed io CticnilcalatedECRET.

uller diteussion seefil, "Soviet Capabilities ami (Mentions with Respect lo BiologicalatedECRET.

SIXBCT

detection device* ate available, but sensitivity of lhe latter to nerve agents it inadequate to guarantee human safety. An arrnotcd personnel carrrkcr has been modified lot mobile chemical and radiation reconnaissance, but we do not know the sensitivity of the deletion systems

Theater fence Ait Detente

oviet theater air defense at ill depends heavily on llie interceptors ofAviation. The defense capabilities of this force have been increasing steadily over Ihe past few year* It now consists ofighters. All of these have good intercept capabilities under clear air mass conditions Moref these aWcraft arc likely lo bc armed with air-to-air missiles, includingishbed D. an all-weather inteiceplor. An air defense control system with semi-automatic features is being deployed in East Cefinaiiy.

heGuideline) remains tlse only surface-to-air (SAM) system known to be deployed wiih Soviet theater forces. It is organised intoof Ihree or four firing battalionsupport battalion The filing battaUons differ fiom thenits of PVO (liomcland air defense) primarily in7 nun gun battery to provide local low-altilude defense. One of these regiments Is believed to be assigned to each army outside the USSB, and two such regiments may be made available for each wartimeheater force SAM units Inside tbe USSR ate almosi certainly under the operational control of PVO.

he Soviets haveew missile system, Ganef, which wetoheater lorce SAM. allhough it mayurfaee-to-surface cruise missile. Itual-launcher system mounted on an assault gun chassis. Its mobility would overcome one of tlic prime deficiencies of theield SAM system, Le. Us Inability to displace quickly enough to provide continuous defense for ground forces. However, the Ganef is probablyow-altitude system. Soviel tbeaier force SAM defenses will continue to bc deficient in this respect unless andobile low-allitude system is developed andInto units. The currently operationalystem has apparently not been deployed with theater forces.

The Sovetystem may be capable of destroyingan. or less) tactical missiles, but only under tbe most favorable circumstances. We believe that tlie SovieU do not consider it an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) defense system.

Despite increasing numbers of surface to au missiles, Soviet theater force ait defenses still rely primarily oo tactical aircraft and automatic anti-aircraftm andhe automatic anti-aircraft weapons currently constitute the only defeases mobile enough to provide continuous air defense for troops when fighter cover Ls not available, and lhe efiectrveness of these weapons against modem high performance aiicraft is minimal.

SCGHfcf

V. DIStRIBUTION OF SOVIET THfcATER FORCES"

he strongest segment of Soviet theater forces ii the Croup of Soviet Fotces, Cermsny8 this force hu consisted of AO combat strength (Category I) divisions. It has by far (hc strongest, most modern tactical mi support ol any major concentration o( Sovici theater foices. and probably the highest level of supporting elements. We believe that CSFC is generally as well equipped with new model land armaments as any Soviet ground foices. although it is possible that some of tbe groundhc western military districts in the USSR receive tbe blent model land armaments earlier.

ince4 llicrc have been indicationseorganization In CSFC. probably accompaniedmall force reduction The number of armyhas been reduced from six to five and many CSFC divisions have been resubordinated within the force. The number of troops withdrawn remains uncertain, although we believe that deactivation of the army headquarters plus thc known withdrawal of some CSFC admiiustrativc elements have reduced thc force by upen. There are some indication! that as many0 men were withdrawn from East Cermany this past summer. None of tlieivisions of CSFC has been withdrawn, however.

We are uncertain of the reasons for this reorganization of CSFC. but in effect it appears to improve command andspecially for defensive operationsuqwise attack. Two armies of five divisions each are now disposed In depth in the central part of thc Soviet Zone, well situated to resist penetrations or support defensive operations on any of the major avenues of approach This reorganization may be in responseoviet reappraisal of strategic requirements, with implications regarding the composition of Soviet armies elsewhere. On tlie other hand, we cannot exclude the possibility that it istemporary arrangement pending further adjustments or evenew divisions from East Cermany.

The Northern Croup of Forces in Poland and the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary have political valueoviet military presence in those countries; they also serverominent reminder of Soviet power lo ndghbor-ing neutral and Satellite countries. Moreover, tbey constitute nuclei forexpansion and employment against NATO. Both foices possess sizable tactical air elements, and what is known of their training indicates tbey are regular combal faces.

Soviet theater forces within the USSR are strongest in tlse western border areas, especially in the Baltic, Belorustian, and Carpathian mibtary districts. Those along the northwestern and southern borders aie characterizedreponderance of undcrirrcngth divisions. Soviet theater forces in the Far Eastelatively high proportion of combat strength divisions, and during the past year tbe tactical air army in thc Far East has apparently had priority

See aliondnner.

2 A

over otlic* forces inside Ilx- USSR for (he delivery of new radial aircraft. Tlicie liave been indications of Increasedoncern with thc combalof (heir forces on the borders of China, but no transfer* of divisions from llie western USSR to these areas appear IO have occurred as yet.

VI. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNISSES Or SOVIET THEATER FORCES

Thc Soviet Army, despite reductions in strength from previous manpower levels, remains the largest modem army in the world. Itery high proportion of its manpower in small, but heavily armored and mobile lineWhile only about hall of these divisions are at combat strength, the others can be filled up with reservistselatively short period of time.

Soviet operational concepts for the conduct of general nudear war demand dial theater forces be organized and equipped for high-speed armored operations by day and night. Delays at obstacles or pauses for resupply cannot be tolerated. Motorized rifle units are supposed to fight from their vehicles, never dismounting unless forced to do so; water obstacles are to be crossed la stride using snorkd devices for tanks, amphibian* for motorized infantry, andidging techniques.

While the theater forces have made considerable progress towardthc requirements dictated by Soviet doctrine, the eqidrancnt in tbe hands of troops is in some respects not well suited to the operations prescribed. Some items, such as amphibious armored personnel carriers with good crosscountry mobility, have been developed and produced, but have appeared io units in insufficient quantities; others, such is mobile SAM launchers and specialized reconnaissance moans, have failed to apjiear at all.

he execution of the Soviet operational concepts depends heavily on gaining tlve initiative immediately and never losing momentum. If the Soviet attack were halted or slowed, lucrative targets for enemy nudear strikes would soon form. Protracted battles would quickly exhaust the limited logistic support structure.

SL The Sennetsobile logistical support system which is designed to support their concept of tactical operations. They have eahibiled great concern over tbe problem of POL supply and have sought to solve the problem through the wide usage of diesel engines and auxiliary fud tanks, the introductionir>eline capability and POL transporters, and the prepoMbooing of largo-volume portable POL containers. Potential weaknesses are lack of experience in providing logistical support for their rood cruized forces during large-scale operationseneral shortage of service support units in the peacetime army.

umbers of combat units, tactical aircraft, armored firepower, and lough lighting men arc enough to give the Soviel theatercernidablo capabiUty for non-nudear operations. Nevertheless, tlie restructuring of Soviet theater forces for operations in general nuclear war lias resulted In force characteristics whidi could be serious handicaps in non-nuclear operations, particukuly if at

all prolonged. Tlie min bal and service support elements aie imuttcient for any large scale conventional operations

oviet Tactical Aviationrge inventory of operational combatbut ils strength is small in relation to llie sisc of (lie ground forces it is intended lo support. Furthermore, (he Soviets maintain no Tactical Aviation reserve units. The Sovicis apparently plan on using micsiles and rockets with nuclear anil chemical warlicads to accomplish most tactical bombardment missions Most of the aircraft assigned to Tactical Aviation were designed as interceptors and thear utility as fighter bombers for other than nucleai opera-lions would be limited by tlieu small payloadby tlieu relatively short range on low level missions, nnd by their lack ol an all-weather boinbaidinent capability. On thc other hand, the light wciglil and simplicity of Soviel tactical aircraft permits them to use lolntivcly undeveloped aufieldv and bases.

VII. NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

The capabilities of the Soviet Navy are not readily divided among slrategic attack, strategic defense, and general purpose missions. We believe, however, that the SovieU view their ballistic missile submarines as slrategic attack weapons. They piolwbly consider their coastal defense missiles and their untl-emrrier and ASW forces essentially as strategic defense forces. Cruise-missile submarines could bc used in either role. In (hb estimate, however, we include all naval forces except ballistic missile submarines in the category of general purpose forces.

Since the publication ofhere lias been an upturn in the attention given the Soviel Navy both in Ihe military press and in forceSoviet naval officers have long been the chief spokesmen for theof Soviel capabilities to conduct campaigns beyond the confines of the Eurasian land mass, and there has recentlylurry of naval articles in lhc open press attacking traditional emphasis on land warfare

c have observed increased Soviet emphasis onof their naval forces. New construction and modcritlxalion ofships anil submarinesew naval alr.tosurfacc missile maydevelopment for use on the medium lumber Blinder, which tsunits almost as fast as It Is entering Long llange Aviation (LFIA).medium bombers of LRA regularly support naval operations. Sovietand submarines have been markedly more active in realisticfn the Atlantic and (lie Mediterranean Sea. Soviet Navalforce almost cornplelely neglected for many years, has re-emerged aselite corns. Although as yet probably small In number, llSoviel attention to amphibious- warfare capabilities.

Submarine Forces

here arcm'U (excluding baBislic mimic submarines) in the Soviet general purpose submarine force,mall but growing number

of nuclear powered unlti. Submarines equipped with cruise missiles, capable ofiding both land targets and surface ships, continue to receive enaphaii* in tlte improvement of the Soviet lorce. There are eamentiy aboutnuclear-propelled unitviesel-propelled unils oflass operaUonal wiih umic of both these classes under construction. Tlic conversion ol thetasK diesel unils to carry cruise-misjilcs has probably ceased, withow operational Soviet csuise missile submarines have varying numbers of laundiers lor thcissile. Tlicissile system can be rued in either high or low altitude profiles andasimom rangen. depending on lite model of thii missile involved

alass toipedodttir propelled units areThc only diesel powered torpedo-attack submaiines withto operate off the continental US from their home bases are theZince the program started in the early I'/jOi thef tltcse submarines. The remainder ofnits, have considerably sltorter ranges. Olderare being phased out of thc operational inventory, although somebeing used for basic training,

Soviet nuclear submarines, built priorxperiencedtlie operation of .their engineering plants. The engineering plants ofbuilt1 are believed to have Incorporated significantwhich overcame many of the early problems. With existing huDcurrently operational engineering plants. Soviet nudear submarinesa maximum speed of aboutnots, with normal cruising speedsthe order ofonots. An assessment of available data Indicatesradiated noise levels of existing Soviet nudear submarines are at leastas those of early US nudear submarine. Nudear submirinej of thelasses are estimated toormal operating depth limitI mayapability as greateet.

Sw(oca Forces

oviet naval suiface forces, which are still heavily dependent upon land-based logistic and air support, appear suited primarily for defensive oparaltaat in waters adjacent to the USSR. Conventionally armed major surface units now compriseight cruisers,estroyers, andestroyer escorts. In recent years, tlie Soviet Navy lias considerably increased the firepower of Its surface forces by the addition of surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile armament, wluch lias extended lhe potential scope of effective operations.

he only known major surface combatant ships now being built tn tbe USSR are missile destroyer types. Tlie Soviets now havermed with mlsitlcs. The Kynda. Krupnyy, and Kildin dosses carry surface-to-surface cruise missiles for antiship use. The Kashln dass, one coverted Kotlin dass, and the Kynda class arc armed wiih surface-to-air missiles for use in air defense. In addition to their missile armament, these ships, like most of

thc conventionally aimed major surface units, also carry ASW weapons sysiems. All of these ships are probably intended primarily lot operations against both naval surface forces and submarines, either in defense of thc sea approaclies to (he USSR or in support of Soviel (heater field forces in coastal areas. In this bitter role, as well as for direct defense ul Soviet coastal areas against amphibious assault, lhe Soviet Navy alsoarge number of patrol beats armed with sliort-rangc cruise missiles, as well as slioic-baxcd coastal defense installations armed with short-range cruise missiles.

logistic suppori capabilities of the Soviet Navy, providedold auxiliary ships, arc being augmented by new tankers and supportSoviets arc improving afloat logistic support for submarines bymodern submarine tenders, rescue ships, repair ships, and specialships. The Soviet Navy utilizes the merchant marine Torsupport. In circumstances which permitted them to continue lolarge and widespread Soviet fishing fleets could provide limited supportThey also have considerable potential for mine warfare andcollection and transmission. The extensive research effortships of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and other institutionssupport to thc Soviet Navy.

Naval Avialion

Naval Aviation is composed largely of jet medium bombersadgers andl also includes jet light bombers, patrol aircraft, and helicopters, but no fighters. Its capabilities are focused primarily on reconnaissance and strike missions againsi maritime targets, and to some extent on antisubmarine warfare. If defensive air cover for naval operations sverc to be provided, it would have to come from fighter aircraft not subordinate to Naval Aviation.

aval Badgers are equipped to deliver antiship air-to-surfacc missiles. Of0 arc cadi equipped to carry two. subsonicissiles. This system is probably being phased out. The remainder are equipped to. supersonicissile. Both rnissilcs are estimated toEPeet against single, well-defined ship targets. Thes believed capable of employing either HE or nudear warheads.

Those naval Badgers which arc not equipped to cany missiles are assigned to reconnaissance, tanker, ASW, or olher support roles. The naval requirement for long-range aerial reconoBissBncc continues to grow and will probably be met by the continued use of Lang Range Aviation aircraft or by the provision of longer range aircraft for Naval Aviation.

Slicnglhs and Weaknesses

overall Soviet Navy strengths are the size and capabilities offorce, the growing firepower embodied in surface ship missileand thc large naval shipbuilding capacity. Conspicuous weaknesses arc

ck of slrategic mobility and capability for mutual rcinforocrncnl among! watch/ separated fleets, the lac* of adequate atr cover for suffice forces operating iVyond coastal waters, and Inadequacy ol alloaf logistic support which iici-cisilulcs heavy relianceelatively vulnerable shoie base complea. Thet weakness is (he Sovicl Navy's almost complete lack of capability to detect and destroy submarines in open ocean areas.

iinsttk forces. Soviet capabilities against carrier task forces haw been improved by coavianocd conversion of jet medium bombers to carry autivhip mivJlci. Iry lhe assignment of Blinders to Naval Aviation, and by the construction of additional submarines equipped with cruise-lype missiles. In the European area. Badgers wiih antiship missiles could operate against surface ships in Ibe northeastern Atlantic, the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and thc Mediterranean. In llie Pacific. Badger aircraft of Naval Aviation could range from the southern tip of Taiwan to lhe Aleutians. These capabilities are. of

course, subject to problems of target detection and identification. In the past year or so. leconnaissancc of open ocean areas by Lang Range and Naval Aviation

has Increased. Submarine operations against carrier task forces could eitcnd

to US coastal waters.

Against Sea Line* of Cemmvnieatiom. The threat of lhe Soviet submarine force to Free World sea communications is greatest In the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific Tlie capabilily of Soviet submarines to interdict these supply lines would dependumber of factors: endurance of the submarines, transit time to station, repair and overhaul requirements, logistic support, and the catcnt of opposition. Interdiction operations against North Atlantic supply lines would be conducted largely by submarines of the Northern Fleet We estimate that this force includesorpedo-attack submarines, of which SO would be limited by endurance lo operations in the Norwegian Sea and eastern Atlantic.

Not considering combat attrition, aboutorthern Fleet submarines could be maintained on station continuously in tlie eastern Atlantic approaches to the UK and Europe; this number might be augmented slightly by submarines deployed from (he Baltic prior lo hostilities. The Soviets could also maintain3 nuclear and diesd lorpedo-attack submarines on more distant stations for operations in the western Atlantic and in the approaches to the Mediterranean. If lhc Soviets were aWc lo provide logistic support during patrolsorward base such as Cuba, the number In lhe western Atlantic could be more than doubled- In addition, lhe number of Soviet submarines deployable throughout tlie Atlantic would be significantly increased if ihe Soviets were able to obtain unrestricted egress from lhe Baltic or advance bases on the Norwegian coast.

In thc Pacific, the Soviets are estimated to have about GO torpedo-attack submarines which could be used against sea lines of commurucations, as well as eight nudear and three diesd submarines armed with antiship cruise missiles. While only about one-third of this force has sufficient endurance to operate off the US west coast, the remainder can operale in those areas through which US

**CR&

r

shipping mini pass Io support Pacific island bases and Asian allies. Thcnudeai ieselabo toro til I hreal 10

n addition IO Iheii antiihippuig role. The Soviet! could probably maintain, hi (he ocean area bclween Hawaii and Japan. a> well at air-nil 6ve oil llie USoast.

Submarinesince thehe Sovietsa large number of ASW ships (mostly coastal types) and havefixed and rotary-wing aircraft An ASW role may have been assignedand there arc indications ofule for modified Cool aircrafl.role may also have been assigned to thcnd It-classwell as to tlielass, which appear to be the classesfor this purpose. Recent evidence of Soviet suhmarinn withinstallationsontinuing effort to improve subrnaiine

Since thes Soviet surface-ship ASW capabilities have been improved by the introduction of nesv ships with improvedthe MBU scries of ASW rocket launchers. These multiple-tube launchers can deliver antisubmarine rockets to probable maximum rangesards. MBUs appear on all new combatant surface units and have beenon some older

The only operational ASW torpedo now known to be available lo the Soviet fleet is the ET-fiOA passive accaistk-homing txapedo It can attack cavitating submarines to depthseet, but its capability would be limited againstinchtorpedo (Petya) soon may be operational with an HE warhead aboard some ASW surface ships and probably nil nuclear powered submarines. This weapon has essentially the same passive ncoustie>horrung characteristics as the ET-fiOA, but can atiack targets to depthseet. An au-dropped version ol this weapon may become available

Mines play an important role in Soviet ASW. The Sovietsoored, contact-filing mine, svith antennae. It can effectively mine from the surface downeet in waters as deepeet. Existing or new mfluence-Ering mines would be used in waters shallower than ISO feet

Soviet Naval Aviation using Hound helicopters and Madge seaplanes cm support coastal ASW operations against conventional submarines in good flying weather. Airborne ASW detection equipment consists of passive sonobuoysard rangeoisy target, and magnetic anomaly delec-tion (MAD) gearangeeet, the distance from the aircraft to the enemyonfirmed air-dropped ASW weapons now consist only of the conventions! HE depth, effective to depths ofeet. Nudear depth bombs, however, probably arc available now In limited numbers in all fleet air forces.

stcsr.r

oviet Navy ASW exercise* arc cipinding in scope, and training doctrine hasnorc sophisticated. Wc believe dial lite USSR now lias theto conduct fairly cflcctivc ASW upcratioov withinI milesajor Soviet naval baseonventional submarine operatedoderately well-traiucd crew.onvent mnal submarineighly trained crew lln> capabdily >vimld be materially degraded.uclear submarine, with its inherentoviet capabilities would bc poor. Soviet ASW capabilities diminish rapidly as the distance from their naval basesiles, and beyond lhat distance musl still be regarded at negligible.

dnubilitict. During live past year wc have acquiredof increased Soviet emphasis on improving Iheir limiled amphibiousTlic ie-csi'ablislunen( of Naval Infantry and sightings ofcrafl4 indicateecision lo improve amphibiousmade moreear ago. If this cjujihasis continues, we wouldSoviels to construct at least some new assault shipping.

Naval infantry strength is probably greatest in tlte Baltica brigade-size unit may exist There have been Indications of theof Naval Infantry units in lhe other fleet areas also. Overall, however,have few amphibious ships and craft, and these are usableshore-lo-shore operations over short distances. Only in thc Baltic arenumbers ol appropriately designed ships and craft to. liftin an amphibious assault. In thisaximum of two motorizedcould bc lifted. Tlte token numbers of amphibious ships andotlier fleet areas could be used for ship-to-shore logistic support or foroperations not requiring assault by balanced forces.

VIII. AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT

acquired during the past year indicates thai thc Sovietsvigorous efiorts to improve theit sea and airlift capabilities Parsdrop

and airlifted troop Iraining exercises have increased in scope and frequency. Improvement In amphibious capabilities has occurred In bolh Soviet and East

European forces.

Military Transport Aviation (VTA) now containsircraft, of whichightedium transports are assigned to Airborne Troops. The light transports, which ate older piston types, arc being phased out ofas they are replaced with medium turboprop (Cub) transports. The range of the current military transports limits paradtop operationsistance of. from bases, and airlanded operations to

Tbe Soviets are developing aircraft which will Increase lhe lift and range capabilities of Soviet Military Transport Avialion considerably in theew civil jet transport, tlieas been developed,iliiary version may be produced as well.4 the Soviets probablyrototype military heavy cargo transport II couldaximum payload

range of noa. This aircraft may have been designed to

correct the longstanding deficiency of Soviet airlift capability in terms of range and payload The current lilt capability of VTA could be substantially increased through the use of Aciollol (civil air fled) transports.

here are large numbers of helicopters in service, providing mobility for ground troops. Among themeavy helicopters capable of lifting payloads of almostons. These helicopters arc mgged and reliable and can Im: used for (he rapid operational redeployment of units or thc rapid delivery of critical supplies, such as nudear warheads.

oviet sealift capabilities continue to be improved, particularly through rhe construction of large-hatched ships such as those which ddlvered missiles to Cuba. These and other new Soviet merchant ships are characterized by fairly high sustained speeds, long endurance, and heavy lift boom capadty, all of which contribute to military sealift value.

hc following table presents theoretical Soviet sealift capabilities by area, assuming in one case tliat all Soviet rnerchant ships are available within thcir area of registry and in another thatxreent of the ships are available within their area of registry;

Sea Baltic Sea Black Sea Pacific

ift operation would require port or other extensive off-loading fedu'tics in the landing area.

lie recent trends in Soviet air and sealift point toward increasedfor distant limited military actions. However, the Soviets do not appear to be developing sea and air combat escort capabilities which would make possible long-range miliary sea and airlift against (he oppositionajor military power.

IX. CONTRIBUTION OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES Warsaw Pacf

rowing body of evidence indicates tliat dianges In Soviel military doctrine and force structure over the past three or four years haveevised policy toward East European forces. This evidence points to the provision of more modern equipmentortion of the Satelliteore responsible role for them within the Warsaw Pact, and increased Satellite control over their own forces.

:>2

SFtWH-

he typos andf equipment appearing in Satellite units from

aboumva.d* have included some of the best the Soviets have produced

Theuch equip-new appeared in Satellite units before Soviet units in

bast Germany had been fully rc-cquippedharp departure from ,he

l,cvproviding the Satellite forces svith hand-medosvns. Durinr

Ihe pas. two years, the Satellite forces have been receiving tactical missiles and

rockets, new model fighters, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and anti-tank missilet

lltL Over the last several years there have been increasing indications of nationalistic trends and growing capabilities for independent action-In East European fortes. Large Warsaw I'act military exercise* in which Soviet units have |iarticipatcd have been at least nominally under the command of East European officer* Within several of the Satellites, there has been in increased emphasis on training at field army rather than division level, suggesting that most of thc combat-ready East European divisions will be grouped iiito their own field armies, at least in wartime. Because, in Soviet organizationalthe field army is the lowest echelon with sufficient support to conduct independent operations, this development pointsessening requirement for support by Soviet unit*

Increasing capability for independent action of Satellite theaterthe Warsaw Pact structure probably reflect* an increasing awarenesspart of the Soviet military leadershipar with NATO mightbe fought with forces in place. The new trends probably also reflectin tlie military area to tbe increased political leverage nowthe East Europeans in their rebtionshipj with the USSR.

Ground1 forces

The toul personnel strength of thc East European ground forces btoexcluding Yugoslavia andf this total, more than half are in theatellite line divisions. There are wide variations in personnel strengths, equipment, and probable combal effectiveness of the hoc divisions. We believe thatatellite divisions could be committed to combat on short notice- They would probably be organized Into field armies of their own nationality and integrated into Soviet /ronrr. The other divisions would probably be used as theater reserves and for rear area security.

The East European countries have detailed mobilization plans and large numbers of trainede believe tliat, in the event of war. they would bring llieir existing units up to strength and form new combat and serviceunits. Enough trained reservists exist toonsiderable number of additional divisions, but we have no evidence of largo reserve stocks ofFor the most part mayar items of equipment for additional Satellitewould probably have to be provided by the Soviel Union.

iCCRCl

Air Forces

he Satellite air forces supplement both Soviet Tactical Avialion and PVO. There linvc been increasing indications of closer cooperation among the East European air forces. parliculain- an defense role. Their primary mission is air defense, hut some fighter units arc being trained and equipped to perform ground attack* missions as well. During (he past year, the capabilities of these forces tor giound support missions has increased. The Czechs and Poles have received some Titters, thc best fighter for ground attack now available in Soviet inventory. Abouteiecnl ofombat aircraft in Satellite air units are obsolescent or obsolete. However, new lighters such as Fitter and Fishbed. and the Mangrove reconnaissance aircraft continue to enter inventory.

Missilt*

presence of Frog and early model Scud launcliers In some ofcountries has been confirmed. We believe that the others willand that by the endrogs will be available to theground divisions on about the same scale as In Soviet forces. Wethat, within the next year or so, there will be one Scud brigadeeach wartime Satellite field army. There arc someitesEast European cities, but we have no evidence of any SAM units intheater forces.

Nucloar ond Chemical1 Weapons

European armies nowariety of tactical missiles andwhich are capable of carrying nuclear or chemical warheads andbelieve it highly unlikely that nuclear weapons would be turned overcontrol under any circumstances. In wartime some nuclearwould be made available to Satdlite forces, but only under strictAvailable evidenceonsiderable stress on the use ofweapons In Satdlite forces, and It is possible that chemical warheadsavailable for Satellite missiles and rockets.11

Reliability

reliability of Satellite forces in combat would depend primarilynature, causes, and locale of the conflict. We bdieve that Satdlitebe far more reliable if fighting in defense of their own territory thanof any Soviet offensive operation against NATO. The nationality offorces wouldritical factor in any case. Most Eastresist anything that they regarded as German aggression andong-standing antagonism toward Creeks and Turks, but itthat East Cerman troops would be reliable opposing West Germans.

"SeeSoviet Capabilities and. ttespeet to ChemicalatedECRET, for further details.

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X. SOVIET THEATER FORCE CAPABILITIES AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE

Concept of Operation*

he Soviet* have structured iheir theater lorcci againsi lhc contingency of general nuclear wai. Soviet military doctrine docs not address itself in any depth to the variety of circumstances in which general nuclear wat might begin. Although there is increasing attention given to general wat tesulling frommost Soviet military svrilings assume lhalar would bc initiated by Western strategic attacks against the Soviet Bloc. In thisrimary Soviet concern is to ensure thai the theater forces would bc able to survive the massive employment of nuclear weapons by lhe enemy and to fight effectively in conjunction with the USSR's own air and missile strikes.

Soviet theater forces would contribute to thc initial action by conducting nudear and chemical strikes with their own delivery means. As soon thereafter as possible, they would bc expected to attack the enemyroad front to seize and occupy strategically important territory. The prindpal area of such operations would bc thc Central Region of NATO, where Soviet concepts callapid and continuous advance (upm per day) to llie Channel coast by large ground forces.

Of the various TVDs (Theaters of Military Operations) which the Soviets visualize in their strategic concepts, the Western TVD. comprisingPoland. Cermany, France, Ihe Benelux Countries. Great Britain, and (less certainly) Denmark, has been given by far the most attention. Units located and probably earmarked for operations in this area are lhe most rwvcrful of the Soviet theater forces.

Forces Immediately Available

Warsaw Pact forces Immediately available in the Westernoviet and Satellite divisions at or near combat strength Thesewhich ate supposed to bc able to move on the same day dicy are

of Soviet Forces,divisions

Croup of Foices

olish,ast Cermandivisions.

Soviet tactical air strength In the area indudesombat aircraft fn two tactical air armies, of which aboutercent are current models andercent are older. There arc alsoast Cerman. Czech and Polish aircraft in the area, most of which aie older modeb.

prior buildup, the Soviets couldimited objectiveagainst Western Europe designed to maximize surprise. The Eastand Czech divisions listed above could bc employed to tho extentSoviets considered them reliable in tlte circumstances. Such an attack,would conflict with Soviet operational concepts,

itaintofconuwl

liould tho SovieU elect toround ollonslvo against NATO, tlieit operationalndicate tliat, if circumstances [minified, tliey would seek toonsiderably larger strikingreat many variable factors have bearing on the sire of tlte lorces which (he SovieU could and would employ in operations against NATO. Some of tlic most important of these are: (a) the manner in which the conflict arose,hether suddenly orb) the number of units which would be retainedobiliration and Iraining base; (c) tlte citent of employment and the combat effectiveness of Satellite divisionsi and (d) force icquuements in other areas. Considering Soviet concepts oflor combat and the geography of the area, we believe lhat the Soviets would seek totriking force of three ftonlt comprisingivisionsoviet tactical aircraftampaign against thcItegion of NATO. In addition ihey would seek toheater reserve.

lic Soviets could drawotal ofndategory II Soviet division* located withiniles of Berlin, andotal ofombat strength andeduced strength in East Cerman, Polish, and Czech divisions. In practice thc Soviels would probably draw their ground and air forces primarily from thc west cm botder militaryBelorussuui, and Carpathian. These military districts contain three tank armies and four combined armiesotal ofine divisions at various strength levels' In addition, there are seven motorized rifle divisions and two airborne divisions in the area apparently not subordinated lo armies. Wiih the possible esccpaon of one army Ln the Carpathian MD which might be used in lhc Southwestern TVD for reinforcing Soviet troops in Hungary, ihese ground forces would bc available for use against Western Europe. These areas also contain three small tactical air armiesotalircraft, includingf current models. Additional reinforcements could be drawn from tbe leningrad,and Kiev MDs and from the forces in Hungary If they were not required for other operations.

n reassessing our last year's estimate of Soviet capabilities to augment forcesampaign Into lhe Central Region of NATO, we have carriedetailed studyumber of factors, including the capacily of the Easi European rail and road networks, lhc lime required lo convert thc transpottallon systems to handle military movement, the reduced size of Soviet units, and improvements ia the transportation systems, especially highways. Considerable evidence has also accumulated that the Soviets plan toombined technique involving the Integrated use of road and rail to move iheir forces to Central Europe, and our reassessment has been particularly affected by the increased capabilityethod would provide Our reasessrncot indicates that the capacity of tlie East European rail and road transportation systems is theoretically luf&dent for tbe assembly of anivision Soviet and Satellite fotce Inays. Thus, assuming no enemy inleadiction, the capacity of transportation systems presents no practical Impediment to lhe speed of Soviet remforccmerrt In Eastern Europe.

1

oviet wpabilH.es for rapid reinforcement arc likely lo be governed more directly by factors less calculable than transportation system capacity. Forsve believe that. io. ihe mostoviet remforcement in Eastern Europe would involve the movemeni of forces by army raiher than by individual division regardless ol present subordination. The armies inside the USS It are not at combat strength, since llieir divisions arc not all innd army support .mils are also believed to be underslrenglh. Thus it appears lhat while some elements of these armies could moveeek or so might be required to bring other clcmenls up to strength and prepare them Fo. movement. In Soviel classified military writings, considerable attention has been given to this particular drawback to the rapid forward deployment of the border armies.

onsidering the confusion common to all large military movements and lhe problems of organizing divisions and supporting elements into effective armies and fronts, we estimate that under noncombat conditions the Soviets couldand organize in theivision striking force,heater reserve, within about three to four weeks of decision to do so. The striking force could consist of theoviet divisions normally sUtioned in East Cermany and Poland,ombat strength divisions from lhe western USSR, andoast European divisions. These divisions would be organizedoviet and Satellite armies comprising three /ronts. Each of these fronts wouldactical air army and there mightourth TAA to bolster air defenses En the communications zone of the TVD.

The striking force, when assembled, would number aboul one million men. of which up to onc-thlrd would be Satellite troops. It wouldnksactical missile and rocket launchers. It would be supportedoviel tactical aircraft, plusircraft of tlie East German, Polish, and Czech air forces. Inheater reserve of Polish, Czech, and Soviel divisions could be assembled In eastern Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The Soviets would expect movement oncale io be quicklyand would therefore have to consider lhe possibUily that such an effort would provoke an immediate Western .esponsc. Should thc Soviet, attcmpi to mainuin secrecy in their preparations and troop movements, reinforcement would be much slower and more limited.

Capabilities for Naval Operalions Against NATO

torpedo-attack and cruise missile submarines, bothdiesel-powered, could be deployed in thc North Atlantic forNATO naval forces, and this would probablyrimary Sovietin the initial periodeneral war. Aircraft of Long RangeNaval Aviation could operate against surface ships in theIhe Norwegian and Barents Seas, and tlie Mediterranean.cruise missile submarines could contribute, in the initial period,ampaign

37

occpxr

against Western Europe by attack* against important coastal latgcts. Attacks could also be directed against some inland taigcls, depending on tlieir locations in relation to sea approaches and on the depth and effectiveness of Western coastal ASW defenses. Following rhe initial phaseampaign, part of the Soviet submarine fleet could Im deployed for operations against sea lines olfrom North America.

Capabilities lor Theater Operations in Olher Areas

The Soviets maintain theater forces opposite Scandinavia, Southern Europe, and Turkey which could be used for campaigns into those NATO areas. Tliese forces, however, have'proportionately fewer combat strength units and very light tactical air support. The most likely of these areasampaign launched simultaneously with an offensive into Western Europe is Thrace and westernattack by Bulgarian and Soviet forces to seize thc Straits. Any other Soviet land offensive into Southern Europe would be complicated by the positions of Austria and Yugoslavia. Finland and Sweden would impose similar complicationsoviet campaign in Scandinavia. Al) such campaigns would involve difficult terrain and logistical restrictions on thc size of forces which could be supported.

Soviet forces in the Far East have been strengthened somewhat over the past few years, but these forces, have no significant capability for amphibious assault. They are probably adequate to cope with any incursion into Soviet territory shortull-scale Chinese invasion.

XI. TRENDS IN THE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES0

An attempt at this time to project future trends in (lie size andof the Soviet general purpose forces is fraught with more than usualAlthough Khrushchev was never able to implement his ideas fully, his attitude toward such forces was dear and consistent. It was possible to predict that, under his regime, there would be some continuing reduction in thc size of the general purpose forces, and perhapsrastic cut The attitude of Khrushchev's successors is less certain.ime at least, they will probably rely more heavily on professional military advice than Khrushchev did, and in any case, they will probably not be able to deal as firmly with military recommendations as wc think Khruslvchev often did. Among the militarythere remain unresolved issues regarding the role of the general purpose forces in present circumstances, but most of the marshals evidently disagreed with Khrushchev's efforts to reduce general purpose forces. For these reasons we foresee no substantial alteration in thc present size of thc general purpose forces for several years at least.

In the longer term, however, any Soviet political administration wiDfind it desirable, if not imperative, to check the steady growth in the cost of the militarymeans, fn practical effect, to reduce thc cost of the general purpose forces. Moreover, thc military debate will continue.

in private if noi in public, and ii likely to ptmluce some redefinition of the roles of thc general nuiposc forces. We thoieforehat0 there will Iiave been some (mllira redaction in the size of those forces anilon tideiablc restructuring of rhein to meet new and dillerent requirements.

Ground forces

ho present stiuclure of the Soviet ground forces contemplates extensive mobilization, large-scale reinforcement,eneral omlaught to overrunEurope in Ihe aftermathuclear exchange. The difficultiesoncept have been dealt with extensively in Soviet military writings. If the Soviets should conclude that this concept Is unrealistic, and lhat the East European armies, wllh some Soviet stiffening, can be given greater responsibility for thetr own national security, tlaen the USSR might considereduction in its mobilization baseithdrawal oi some combat ready divisions from Germany.

Similarly, if the Soviets should conclude tliat they must seriously prepare for the contingencyrotracted non-nuclear war. then they would have lo increase tlse proportion of motorized infantry, conventional artillery, tactical aircraft, and combat and service support troops in their theater forces.

The interaction of aU Ihc factors involved cannot be dearly foreseen. On balance, we believe (hat0 there will have been some reduction in the number of Soviet line divisions, butrastic one. On this basis, wc estimate that0 (he USSR will haveine divisions, perhapsfewer. As at present, some of these divisions would be at or near combat strength, some at reduced strength, and some al cadre strength. We believe that there will by then have been some increase in the proportion of nondlvisiona! combat and service support elements.

Modernization will continue to improve the quality of (he Soviet ground forces. The encot of improvement, however, will be closely related to trends in tola! size; thc larger (he forces which tlvc USSR dects to retain, the more it will have to contend wiih obsolescence and shortages

1 clerical Avialion and Missiles

believe that the Soviets will coniinue to modernize Tacticalils ground attack capabilities in particular. We expect the rateto Increase over lhe next few years, and we believe ths!with much improved range, armament, and payload characteristicsintroduced Weradual decline in total numbers of tacticaldue lo (he retirement of older aircraft exceeding (he Input of newernumber of free rocket launchers in divisions will probably Increase tofour per Frog battalion. The numbers of guided ballistic and cruiseSoviet theater forces may remain about constant or increase somewhat,new and improved systems becoming operational

field force air defense eapabililies will continue Io iinpiove over ihc

HjIlll'L Mil;

lew years through Ihc modernization of Tactical Avialion.esult of technical improvements in early warning, airborne, intercept, and CCI equipment, and Ihrough tlie introduction into ground formationsollow-on SAM system capable of giealcr mobility. Tlie new hack-mounted,ir missile <Cnnef) may appear in the Sovici ground forces in the near future. We have no evidenceow-altitude SAM for field forces, but wc beheve lhat thc Soviets mayystem to meet field force low-altitude defensebyS.

thc Soviets may bei.sportable ABMsystem, wc have no evidence indicatingield ABM will beground units during thc period of this estimate.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Shortages of nuclear weapons for support of theater forces will probably be alleviatedven if thc Soviets allocate priority to air and missile defense warheads. Soviet procedures for control and use of tactical weapons, including reconnaissance and target acquisition, are likely to improve significantly over the next year or so.

We believe that the Soviets will continue to regard tactical nudear weapons as for use In the contexteneral nuclear war and will develop their tactical missile and rocket forces accordingly. The Sovieis continue io maintain their longstanding view that limited nuclear war would Inevitably trigger general nudear war. If ihey were to prepare seriously for the contingency of limited nudear war. they would have to make in creased provision of more suitable delivery systems,onsequent further increase in theirfor tactical nudear warheads and bombs."

The Assistant Chief of Staff lo. Intelligence. Department of (be Am.y. believes that there is some evidence that the Soviets have considered ,he eonth.je-.eyimitedarfare sitoation,onsequently that their staientems on this subject, which for the most part have dismissed Hi* posribitHy oa the grounds oi inevitablecurely tledaratory response to statements of Western policy. The Soviet lesdership almost certainly is realistic enough to have recogni-ed (hit ,hrl: limited strategic eapsbltliie* cannothe virtual destruction of the Soviet Union, and fhst Uiey must be prepared to respond lo Western opi*nsower seals lo allow thcni aliemali.es to destruction. Despite the stand laken on thu sub|cct fn current writings, tl* SovieU have providedencrsj cwpose forcesonsiderableonduct limited nuclear warfare, aside fron MRBM/ IRBM fore*). To eompemate fo. their Infcrio. posiuor. with re^rd to numbers aad yield selectivity of tactical rmclea.oviets has* indicated ihat they would resort tol.ro. which they have consistently coupled with Uct/cal nuclear weapons both in writings sod in ew.obes. and in which theyonsiderable stipenorily over tbehe Assistant Chief of Stall for IntoDigenee, Department of the Arniy. estimate, thai Soviet capabilities to respond to westom options, psrticulidy those under the OS -fleaiMedoctrine, will increase during tbe period of the estimate, and could lead to an overt Soviel acceptance of limited nudear war concept).

Forest

e believe lhat lh* numerical strength ol Soviet surface naval force* will remain (airly liable ova the next five years Thc composition of ihii force, however, will change somewhat at the production of guided missileand of smaller specialized craft continues. Modernization of existing destroyers wdl also continue, and additional lurface ships may be retrofitted with missile armament. Naval medium bomber strength will probably increase moderately Over tlie next few years through the introduction ol increasingof the supersonic dash Winder medium bomber and possibly through the tiansfer of additional aircraft from Long Itarigeew antiship air-lo-surface missile system for the Blinder may become operationalnd missile-carrying Blinders will almost certainly appear in Naval Avialion units.

llifl

mproverncnt of both ASW detection equipment and weapons systems, chiding land based fiydroacouUic detection installations in some areas, will probably occur. The USSH will probably place increased emphasis on the use of submarines for open-ocean ASW. The effectiveness of surface units -vill probably be increased through such means at the addition of SAM armament, new sonar equipment, and better torpedoes Airborne ASW capabilities will lie improved by increasing numbers of more effective, turbine-powered aircraft with improved detection equipment and armaments. Despite thesehowever, we believo that llie capabilities of the Soviet Navyonduct ASW operations in open ocean areas will remain severely limited. Io particular, it probably svill haveimited capability to detect, id-ntify, localize, and maintain surveillance on submarines operating in open seas.

I The capabilities of Soviet submarines for all purposes will be increased during lhe period by the introduction of new classes and by improvements to currentew torpedo-attack diesel submarine with an improved hull design may be introduced within the next few years. Nuclear classes may attain speeds of more Ihannots. Utilizing present steels and technology. Soviel submarines becoming operational7 may achieve maximum operating depths ofleet.

ncremental improvements in tbe noise level of submarines could be made at any time, but an effective noise reduction program for existingwould probably require extensive redesign and rework or replacement of main propulsion and auxiliaryelatively quiet submarine would probably require Ihe developmenlompletely new class,ddition to internal machinery redesign, wouldew hull form and propellerWith sufficient priority and eHort, the Soviets couldelatively quiet new class of submarine, but tlie construction of significant numbers would require several additional years. We have no knowledge of lhe existence ofevelopment, but thc Soviets may have undertakenrogram.

e believe that tbe Soviets areystem lor thc ensergeocy mobile basing of surface ships and submarines in their coastal waters fcint.w-

net-

baUly would include .several small ship foe repair, refueling, and icpleiiidiineni of weapons and supplies. As the period advances, wcumber ul such nulls willdeployed in protected

coves and fiordsrovide wider dispersal and thus enhance Use survivability ol the Soviet support base (or naval opera lions. There is some evidence of improvement of the Soviel Navy's rudimentary capability lo replenish ships on ihc high seas.

oviet elforts to increase their amphibious capabilities are likelyire Soviets could provide appropriate assault and supportperhaps including Iu?Iicupter-carriers, for one division of Naval Infantry ir. each of the Fleet areas.

Distant limited Actions

ariety of developments in Soviet theater forces point to early efforts to increase Soviet capabilities to introduce military forces into areas distant from thc borders of the USSR. These developments include increased emphasis on specialized troops, such as paratroops and Naval Infantry, as well as development of better means of air and sealift. The numbers of merchant-type ships capable of supporting military sealift operations will continue to irtcreasc. and assault type transports may also be produced. If new heavy transport aircraft enter service, the Soviel capability to airlift troops to distant areas will increase sharply. However, none of these developments will permit long-rwgc lift operations against significant armed resistance.

Satellite forces

he military and strategic considerations mentioned earlier will obviously affect the course of Warsaw Pact development, as will political and economic trends in Eastern Europe. The individual states arc likely io insist on at least the outward trappings of aopposed to aforce. They will probably want better equipment at lower cost and some, for domestic economic reasons, may wish to cut back on military expenditures. Most will probably insistreater role for their own forces and personnel wifldn the Pact organization; under these circumstances, national rivalries among thc member states, as between Hungary and Rumania, would probably emerge within military councils. In short,wc have estimated elsewhere aspresent trends toward particularism in Eastern Europe continue to grow, tlse Warsaw Pact may in time come to resemble thc structure and assume the problems of more traditional forms of multilateral military alliances. Although some national components of the Pact might thus bc strengthened, thc coheslvcness of the alliance for concerted actionariety of contingencies would tend to diminish.

SCCRCT

Table i

KSTIWATKD NUMUIilUSiPLOYMKNT OFJVISIONS-

It BORN

I

1

forces almost certainly falls somewhere In the. The

KM

2|

bKSTof divans

tl* approach hM year. but the distribull

Table 2

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OP EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE GROUND FORCES

Germany

Poland

sech

Hungary

Rum

Toul,

MoTOIt-IIXII

n

0

0

10

0

Assault

43

STKBNOTI. OF EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS

BY TYPE ASCTOBER

disco

A. B, Farkeh KrrrEfi

oo

-

East to

10

35

Polish

40 "

Totals by

Probably slill in transitional training.

Includes aboutLASHoi linedin Ublc.

eye

0

O 40

FlBH-BID D

10

0

M

caovc

Dooie0

SO iu IB

145

sr

COONTRC fRoUHOEo)

Si

255

SECRET

TiW.1

ESTIMATED SOVIET NAVaL STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OCTOBER IBM TO MID-IHO

ru

Im or

FIRST USE SUBMARINES BiGMut MlMilr

0

N*w fl

SUB

BW

B-Onv .

SVB

TOTALM

MMk

o

MmI

t

i

SUB

rOPAL

Tor.*.

N. Improved md

Lon| Ranis M

F, ImprevtA

M

* BW foolnOMi w> UbU on*7.

OCTOBER IBM

roil Mia-

Tie

i

tn

Mil-

14

-'

KU-iM

Centinvid)

BY FLEETS,4

-

or Scie

cine

FIRST LINE SUBMARINES

UNS SUBMARINES-

typo*

'

SUBMARINES

LINE SURFACE SHIPS

Inn *

Eicoria

LINE SURFACE SHIPS

Although coi nan-ido be Included in the lerm "General Purpose Navelallistic mlatlle launching submarine* aia included in ihll table for convenience ol reference.

The lota! Soviet lotto ol nvetear-po-ered mb-etriacs prelected here haa bees derived by adding lo lb* csrrmt force an inert neat trWsai uhe* late aeeeunt production rates and the availability of coaitrucUon (selliUei. Within the total, two broad alternative mixes ol missile and torpedo oluses have been assumed, In order to show cumulative totalsatio rial nuclear submsrloes aod tots: annualhe larger numbers of nuclisr torpedo attack lubmarlee* ara shown (whore appropriate) oc the left and Die smaller numbers on ihc right.

Tba daUaeUeo between ftntt ted eeeood Ha* submarines Is aa arbitrary on* baaed on age. First line submarine! are those of medtfo mralm Hon; lhacategory Usls unitsears old. Some units carried as Brit Hoe may be removed from operational natus or Be icrapped tattler lhan oa an age bui* lo order to maintain personnel ttvela and th* adequacy of loglrtta support Submarinese accord line category may cocUou* la latalus and L*ar al tea represent mCllary capability.

' Tht total of cruisers Includes iwo Sverdlov Clan units fitted lornd D.

lurfaoo ihlps In this table are deslgnsted loeond lino when they becomeear* old. Theycarried In ihis ststu* until removed (rem lhc fieet or. la th* absene* of contrary evidence. until ihey areean old-

Tabic G

I. ESTIMATED NUMBERS OK SOVIET TACTICAL AlKCllAKT.TO

OCTOBBM

Soviet

Old

Current

Future Model

II.OF AIRCRAFT IN EAST EUROPEAN AIR FORCES'

SsteUitc

Old

Current Models

o0

FACOT, FRESCO. FARMER, FLASHLIGHT A. and BfiAGLE aircraft which phased out of production prior

Includes FISHBED, FITTER. BREWER, and MANGROVE.

An advanced design tactical fighter estimated to become operational as early as

Tlie primary mission of thc Satellite aircraft is air defense, but some also servo In lhc tactical suppori role.

Currently includes FISHBED and MANGROVE and FITTER; FISHPOT. BREWER,uture model may enter Inventory later in thc period.

The Assistant Chief of Stall, Intelligence, USAF believe* there may be three new tactical aircraft rather lhan only one as reflected in Iho table. Hohat thearge lonp-ranro inlcreeptor now entering IA PVO units, may also be assigned to Teelical Avialion during (hi* period. Thc FIDDLER, configuredactical rcconnsissenCC-slrike role, would Improve the range aud paylosd capabilities Of lhc current force, and its use would be io keeping will, the past Soviel practice of adapting Interceptor aircraft to tactical roles. Hc also believe* Uieactical fighter described In Footnoteto this table could enter lhc inventoryndactical STOL aircrafl may beas early

48

>

f rn t

I ll.l- .'

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OK SOVIKT NAVAL AVIATIONO0

UF.DWlt HUMKF.fUi

IlLINDEIt A

BLINDKlt with one

ToUl

UOHT BOMBERS

UKAGLB

PATROL AIRCRAFT

MADOB

MALLOW

MAIL a* Improved Lind-Baged ASW

HELICOPTERS

Mil

iCO-70

0

0

0

0

ISW

0

S-li

M

:io no

Kl i

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