NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I SOVIET POLICY WITH RESPECT TO CENERAL PURPOSE
Consideration! Affecting Use Present Size and Composition o( Ceneral
Xhnisischev'i Attitude Toward Ceoeral Purpose Forces
The Military Debate
Implicafioni of the Fall of Khrushchev
II. PERSONNEL 9
Types of Divisions
Strengths of Divisions
Numbers of Divisions
Cround Armies and Corps
Cround Force Training
FORCES AIR AND MISSILE SUPPORT
Tactical Nuclear Weapons20
Chemical and Biological Warfare 22
Theater Force Air Defensetj
OF SOVIET THEATER FORCES14
VI. STRENCTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF SOVIET THEATER
VII. NAVAL CENERAL PURPOSE FORCES . 26
Strengths and Weaknesses
VIII. AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT
OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES
Nuclear and Chemical Weapons
THEATER FORCE CAPABILITIES AGAINST WESTERN
Concepts of Operations
Forces Immediately Available 35
Capabilities for Naval Operations Against NATO 37
Capabilities for Theater Operations in Other Arau 38
XI. TRENDS IN THE CENERAL PURPOSE FORCES8
Tactical Aviation and Missiles39
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Distant Limited Actions
CAPABILITJES OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE
To estimate the role and capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces over the next six years, especially against the NATO area in Europe.
As considered in this estimate. Soviet general purpose forces include: (a) theater forces,round combat and tactical air forces plus their associated command, support, and service elements, up through the level of military districts and groups of forces; (b) navalaval forces subordinate to fleets and separate flotillas, including naval air forces, but excluding ballistic missile submarine forces; and (cj military airlift and sealift elements. In addition, Soviet command and service elements providing genera! support to all components of the Soviet military establishment are considered where appropriate. Those Soviet forces which perform other military missions, namely strategic attack and strategic defense forces, are the subject of other National Intelligence Estimates and arc discussed herein only insofar as they might be used in support of theater operations.
SUMMARY AND -
A. Despite the rapid and costly development of Soviet strategic attack and defense forces, the general purpose forces remain the largest and most expensive element of the Soviet military esubluhment The present structure of the theater forces reflects operational concepts adopted some years ago, which envisaged large numbers of divisions advancing at high speed across NATO territory in the aftermathuclear exchange. The Soviets havearge number of line divisions, though their size has been reduced, and have reconstituted
virtually all of them into heavily-armored tank and motorized rifleThey have sharply reduced conventional artillery firepower in favor of tactical missiles with nuclear and chemical warheads, and have emphasized speed and shock effect at the expensive of staying power. The Soviets have made considerable progress in nwdernizing their forces, but the costs involved in keeping pace with their own technological advances and with developments in apposing forces have resulted in some equipment deficiencies.
B- During the past year we have learned of importantnot reflected in previous estimates. The manpower in thegeneral purpose forces has evidently declined1 and we believe it is now considerably less than previously estimated.and demographic factors were contributory. but much of the pressure for manpower reductions came from Khrushchev. Some military men shared Khrushchev's strategic views and called into question the traditional Soviet preoccupation with large-scale Land campaigns In general war. but most of the marshals disagreed with hJxn. Although there is evidence that Soviet military4 to debate basic strategic questions, inducting the role and utility of theater forces, the dismissal of Khrushchev has removed the leading advocate of reductions in general purpose forces.
C. Soviet general purpose ground forces nowinef which are combat-ready: the rest are at reduced or cadre strength. All Soviet divisions are small by Western standards, and combat and service support at alt echelons of command is very light. Soviet general purpose forces also includeacticalorpedo-attack and cruise missile submarines, ISO major surface ships, andaval jet medium bombers. The total personnel strength of these forces is estimated to beillion men.1
'The total manpower in the Sovietiie ipproitnulel, aa foBowii
Strategic Defense Forces
Command and Central Supnor
(he publication of NIEhe Soviets haveimprove tlie capabilities of their lactical aviation through theof newer models and by increasing capabilities for
nuclear delivery capabilities of Soviet theaterto improve through tlie increased availability of missiles,and more suitable aircraft. Nuclear and toxic chemicalare kept under strict political control. Nuclear weaponshave been identified only within the USSR, but wc think theregood chance that lactical nuclear weapons are in East Germany.
e have observed increased emphasis onof Soviet naval capabilities. The Soviet Navy has beenactive in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. Theto strengthen their capabilities against cairier taskcruise missile submarines and ASM-carrying jet mediumof Long Range Aviation regularly support Soviet navalAlthough Soviet amphibious capabilities are unimpressive,are now underway to improve them. Soviet ASWtheir own coastal waters remain negligible.
G. We believe that significant changes have abo beenn the military forces of the East European countries during the past several years. East European capabilities to conduct militarywithout the large numbers of Soviet supporting units previously required arc growing. These developments probably point to aawareness on the part of the Sovietsar with NATO might have to be fought with the forces already in Eastern Europe. While tlie Soviets are evidently disposed to give East European forces greater responsibilities within the Warsaw Pact structure, the growing political autonomy of these countries probably tends to reduce the USSR'sin its ability lo marshal them for an offensive against NATO.
H. The Soviets couldimited objective attack against NATO with Warsaw Pact ground and air forces already in Eastern Europe. Wc believe, however, that if they intended toampaign against Western Europe, they would seek to assemble alarger force. Under non-combativision striking force could probably be assembled and organized for combat against the Central Region of NATO within three or four weeksecision to do so. orce would contain about one million men
(up lo one-third of Ihem Satellite00 tactical missiles and rockets,oviet tactical aircraft. In addition, the Satellite air forces would be available for support,heater reserve of Soviet and Satellite divisions would be assembled in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Soviets would expect theand assembly of forces on this scale to be quickly detected. Any attempt to reinforce secretly in Eastern Europe would be much slower anduch reduced scale.
I. In thehe Soviets dismissed the possibility of limited wars between major powers, holding that limited non-nuclear wars would almost certainly escalate and limited nuclear wars certainlyoviet statements on this subject haverowing acceptance of the possibility of limited non-nuclearThe latest of these, which may alio have reflected concerns arising out of the Sino-Soviet dispute, stated that the USSR should be prepared for protracted non-nuclear war between major powers. Some characteristics of Soviet theater forces as now constituted could prove scrioos handicaps in non-nuclear operations, particularly if such operations were at all prolonged. Certain recent trends, including measures to improve tactical air capabilities, point to Soviet efforts lo improve the non-nuclear capabilities of their theater forces. Further, improvements in airlift and scalift, the recent revival of Naval Infantry,reater emphasis on airborne operations may constitute initial steps to acquire better capabilities for distant limited military actions.
J. Considering that the new regime may be less disposed or less able to counter the views of the military leaders, we believe that there will probably not be any substantial further reductions in general purpose forces in the near term. However, the eooaomic and strategic situations which motivated Khrushchev have not changed, and there are basic issues in the military debate which remain unresolved. The difficulties of implementing the concept of extensive mobilization, large scale reinforcement,eneral onslaught to overrun Western Europe in the aftermathuclear exchange have been dealt with extensively in Soviet military writings. If the Soviets should conclude lhat this concept is unreausiic and that the East European armies could be given greater responsibUities. then the USSR might considereduction in its mobilization baseithdrawal of some So-
1 For the view ol thel Stiff lot Intelligence. Department.V Army,ootnote lo.
viet divisions from Ccrmjiiiy. Similarly, if the Soviets now takethe need to prepare for non-nuclear war, the size and structure of theater forces will be affected
K. Wc believe that modeniization of general purpose forces will continue and thatoderate reduction in the number ofwill have occurred. By that time there will probably have been some increase in the proportion of combat and service supportThe rate of modernization of tactical aviation will probably increase, although total numbers of aircraft in the force will gradually decline. In any case, economic and doctrinal compromises, Sino-Soviet relations and developments in NATO, rather than any single clearly-defined strategic concept, will probably continue to govern the development of Soviet general purpose forces.
pcxicy with respectenerai purpose forces
Considerations Afrcci.ng /he Pre lent Sin ood' Composition or Generol Purpose forces
espite lira rapid and costly development of Soviet strategic attack and strategic defense forces, the general purpose forces remain the largest and most expensive element In the Soviet military establishment Ifiitoricaj. geographical, and political factave made large-scale land warfare on ihj Eurasianthe traditional peeoccu patron of Soviet military thought Thathas continued into dsc nuclear age- It is reflected in the corn position of the Soviet strategic attack forces as well as in the general purpose forces. As is usually the case in human experience, the present size and composition of general purpose forces does notingle clear and cohered conception, but is the net result of the impact of various factors, including the pressures for change generated by tccJMsological development, and changing strategic esreuarastauscea. Use limitations unnoted by competing demands for funds aod other resources, the rationalizations advanced for the protection of vested interests, and the inertia inherent in any large establishment.
present structure of tlte Soviet general purpose foroes is baseddoctrines adopted some yean ago whichassive nuclear exchange. The Soviet ground forces, withmissile support, are expected to advance rapidly, in the conditionsthe exchange, in order to destroy the surviving NATO forces aod thusWestern Europe. The naval general purpose forces are expectedagainst seaborne nuclear attack and then to interdict US supportin Europe At the time these doctrines were adopted the Sovietsthe possibilityocal non-nuclear war between nuclear powers, orwar in which only tactical nuclear weapons would be used, holding thatwould almost certainly escalate Into genera! nuclear war and thatcertainly would.
The Soviets haveostly effort to modernize their general purpose forces and to equip them for the sort of war envisaged in the foregoingdoctrines. During the past five years Usey have reduced the number and size of their line divisions, while eatharicing their firepower and nsainlain-ing about half of them combat ready. Aiitidparirtg operaQoiuuclearthey have sharplyonventional artillery in favor of tactical missiles and rockets with nuclear and chemical warhead* Eipecting toa disorganized and demoralized enemy, they have emphasized speed and shock effect at the expense of staying power.
esult of this effort, the Soviet general purpose forces have boon substantially modernized, but budgetary restraints have prevented the USSR
from equipping Il>cm (ulljr with ihe best equipment il could develop and pro-duccem. The Soviets have found il difficult Io beep pace with rapiddvance* and llic consequently rapid obsolescence of relatively new equipment, and with the development! in opposing forces.
Khrushchev's Altitude Xoword General Purpose forces
; the pact several yean Khnahcl>ev frequentlywiih the sire and composition of the Soviet general puqxsse forces. Concerned with the whole problem of the proper allocation of limited Sovietlie militaiy were not. Khrushchev found It imperative to check the continuing increase in the cost of the Soviet military establishment as new strategic weapons systems were developed and deployed. According priority to the development of missile forces for both strategic attack and strategiche could accomplish his purpose only by reducing- the sire of the general purpose forces, or by retarding their modernization in order to spread tlie cost, or both. In stating his strategic views, he contended lhat US and Soviet nuclear capabilities precluded either US or Soviet resort to generalnd that. Ifar did nevertheless occur, large scale theater operations would be inconceivable in the aftermathassive nod car exchange. In theseKhrushchev poured scons on the utility of general purpose forces in the modem world andrastic reduction in their size.
The Military Debate
hrushchev's views were strongly opposed by the military establishment in general. In order to reduce this opposition, Khrushchevebate among military authorities regarding basic military issues, including the utility and function of general purpose forces in modern circunutai>ces. Variousof military opinion emerged in tlw debate At oneere officers who sought vigorously to defend the existing general purpose forceby contending tliat large scale and protracted land campaigns would be Indispensable for victoryeneral nuclear war, despite die devastatingof the nuclear exchange upon tlie enemy. At the other extreme* were officersontendedeneral nuclear war would necessarily be of short duration and that the effect of ihe nuclear exchange would determine the outcome. This latter contention could be used to support the* maintenancetanding force which would be smaller butigher state of combatIt pul in question reliance upon extensive mobilization, as well as the concepttrategic requirement for mulri-mtflion man armies to defeat NATO forces in Europe.
he doctrinal position adopted by most important Soviet militaiy leaders (including Marshal Malinovsky, tlie defense minister)ompromise. This compromise accepted the decisiveness of nuclear weapons and the probability
tcimi "UadiUwuIist" and "modernist" iceused asnutter ol roovenirace
to refer lo nMlluiy spokesmen taking the mowitiuni Inebate.
enera! war would be short, butlio provided for (hey thatar would be protracted mid held lhat the requirement foi laige theater forces continued into the nuclear era. Thus these leadenilitary policy emphasising strategic attack and defense capabilities, but llicy supported as well the maintenance of laige general purpose forces for use in nil phaseseneral war. There Is much evidence, however, that debate continued and that central tenets of doctrine remained at issue.
lie latest word in this debate, before the fall of Khrushdiev. was pro-nounced by Marshal Sokolovskiy in an article published in AugustSokolovskiy. who hasiddlehe debate, now declared it indisputableeneral nudear war would be of short duration. He also indicated that it would not be necessary or even possible to occupy some enemy territory which had been subjected to massive nuclear attack. At the same time, heew rationale for maintaining the strength of theater forces. He added the thought, new in public Soviet writings, that the USSR must prepare for the possibility of protracted non-nuclear war. Tliii new consideration may have reflected notice of current US emphasis on "flexibleInstead of "massivet may also have reflected growingregarding the possibility of an armed conflict with Communist China.
he Soviet concentration oa preparationeneral nuclear war hasthe capabilities of the general purpose forces for nonnuclear warfare, although their inherent capabilities for such warfare remained formidabletatement is the latest and least equivocaleries of Sovietover the past few years suggesting growing acceptance of theof non-nuclear conflict between major powers. If now the Soviets take seriously the possibilityrotracted non-nuclear conflict, some adjustments in (lie composition of the general puipose forces on that account are likely to follow.
general purpose force structure provides an inherent capabilitynuclear warfare. Although there was brief reference to thelimited wars involving tactical nudear weapons in the military press inSoviets continue to insist that any use of tactical nudear weaponsa strategic exchange. Limited trudear warfare against NATOacute problems to the Soviets in that their most significant nudearagainst European targets rests with MRBM/IRBM andforces whose bases are inside the USSR.'
Implications ol Ihe Fall of Khrushchev
put new pressures on the sire of Soviet general purpose forcesthe last year of his regime. Toward the ende put throughnew dsemical industry program,mall reduction mdefense budget, and bunched new proposals for some further cut inmanpower. Civen Khrushchev's strategic views and the known Improve-
' Fee the view of th* Auottot Oud ot Stall. Department of the Army onebfacf, tee his footnote to.
menls in strategic attack and defense forces during (lie part year, we tbink these mtnatlvu mutt again have been at the expense of general purpose forces. Finally, in Sept cmave notice of his position in the neat round of economic planning by forcefully slating that defense *rs at the proper level" In view of the containing crpauuaon of strategic attack and defense forces, this statement implied lb.it be intended to impose still furthereneral purpose force allocations.
any factor* contributed lo Klu-uihcfscvs fall. We liavc no reason to believe that it was initiated by military leaders, but we believe that his strategic concepts and his attitudes loward manpower and funding made his overthrow agreeable to most of tho marshals. Wc believe thai his removal will not bring about any sharp changes in Ihe allocation of resources to defense. Upward pressure would in fact be felt if (he new regime were lo hold general purpose forces at present leveb while continuing to build strategic altack and defense forces and fo maintain recent growth rates of
things considered, we thinke size of the general purposeremain relatively unchanged in the near terra. But over the years,successors will be subject to many of use same pressures whichThey will almost certainty not find the rxnNerostrained economy any more tractable than he did, and it isthey will come toeturn to the polky of restrainina; Usemilitary spending. Before long they, in their turn, will probably beto reduce the cost of the general purpose forces.
strategic debate has been muled for the past several months andremain soime, but we think it will continue becausehave not been resolved. Among these, of course, the role and utilitypurpose forces looms large Future Soviet pob'cy towards thesetypes of forces will continue lo be shaped, not onlyariety ofhistorical. technical, economic, and political factors, but also byabout the relative importance of iltese factors and by shiftingthese views. Among ihe key elements of uncertainty at this timepossible effectsrolonged struggle for power within the topleadership and the effects of the future course of strro-Sovietall these reasons, the size and composition of Soviet general purposethe period of this estimate will probably sot reflect any single,concept.
II. PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
ur estimates of total Soviet military manpower are baaed primarily on two types of analysts. Tho Bnt uses demographic data indicating the availability of fit males for military service by year and information on the operation of the
'The four percent rrducUon la the5 <seTense budget cannot bo taken to reflect then mai defc-steoeuiaerable part of whichfinanced from other budget categories.
conscription system. The leeoiid proccedj dom order ol battle and uses esti-male* of types and numbers of Soviet units and thcii peacetime manning levels.
Wc are confident thai the Soviet military establishment totaledillion menlie securityhich are alio manned througharc believed lo have numbered aithousand men at that time. Included in these forces wereillron conscripts, mostly from the large draft classes bornS.he subsequent draft classes, composed of men born during World War II. were much smaller, and the Soviets were faced with the problem of replacingillion men per year from draft classes only marginally able to Supply enough manpower.
Motivated by both economic and strategic considerations. Khrushchev in0 announced his plan to reduce total military manpowerillion by the endc estimate that by1 Soviet military forces had been reduced toillion men plushousand security troops, includingillion conscripts. At that time the reductions were stopped, in part because of the deepening Berlin crisis and the US military buildup In Europe. Some reserves were called up and some conscripts were retained beyond their norma! release dates, with the result that the total strength of the armed forces increased. However, these temporary expedients did not solve the basic manpower problem.
emographic data for (heuggest that diere was pressure to reduce military manpower levels and that the Soviets would have hadin maintaining their force level. It was during this period that the effects of the low Soviet birth rale during World Warll were most keenly felt. At the low point during this period, the number of men becoming eligible for induction into the armed forces fed to less than half of the number eligible8 Such constraints would not necessarily haveeduction from1 levels of military manpower, provided that the Soviets were willing to draft an unusually high percentage of tliet this very time, however, the economy was Wtering andreat need for manpower, particularly for the higher quality manpower which the armed forces were abo absorbing innumbers. Thus, the pressures exerted by the smaller size of draft classes were reinforced by pressures from the civilian economy.
IB.2 the Soviets departed from normal draft procedures aad ordered twoo be registered for conscriptionhis measure probably reflected an intention at the time to maintain the existing strength of the armed forces. In tlie fallowever, when these two classes of conscripts could have been Inducted, only one was called up. The one class inducted3 was squeezed haid.he numher of deferrals was reduced. It Is conceivable lhat this and the other classes ineriod were squeezed hard enough to maintain military manpower at1 levele believe it more likely (hat there hasoderate decline, on the orderen.
in; order of battle approach to an estimate of military manpowerresults which arc generally consistent with the demographic analysis. Current evidence indicates that tlic total number of ground force divisions was reduced rather sharply duringI9G0 force reductions, but has remained generally stable since There arc indications lhal both the TOE* strengths and the actual manning levels of Soviet ground force units have been decreased. When new manning factors are applied to current estimates of order of battle, the resultalculated range ofillion men in tlsc Soviet armed forces, excluding security troops. The extremes of the calculated range arcsums of all highs and lows for all force component*. Neither extreme is likely to reflect the actual total personnel strength, and Ihe. itself provides no basis for judging where within the range the actual total is likely'to fall. However, the middle portion of this calculated rangerobable range much the same as that derived from the demographic data. Wc therefore estimate that the ctrrrent total strength of the Soviet military establish-mcntillion men. excluding security troops.
he following table presents our estimate of the current distribution of total Soviet military manpower:
ESTIMATED SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER
t Strategic Attack Farces
Strategic Defense Force*
General Purpose Forces
Command nod Ceneral
* This rangeonsiderable downward revision ofillion rangeUS million in general purpose forces) presented fat It rfie roult of new evidence leading to new analysis, however, and should not be taken Co indicate that the Soviets have reduced their forces by this amount since the publication of our last estimate.
III. SOVIET THEATER GROUND FORCES
oviet ground forces are characterizedarge, number of heavily armored line divisions which, even at full strength, are substantially smaller than US divisions. In general, the smaller size of Soviet combat units in comparison with nominally correspoading US unitsifferent concept of theirAlthough Soviet divisions generally have less equipment than US divisions, theyugh proportion of tanks relative to manpower. Soviet divisions have less organic combat and service support than US divisions, even relative to the differences in overall size, and are backed up by less nondivisional combat and service support This is due in part to the Soviet concept of the role
of Organization and Equipment.
of ground forces in general nuclear war, emphasizing speed and slice* effect at ihc expense of staying power. Foe reasons such as these, any description of Soviet ground units in terms of equivalents or percentage equivalent' of like-named US units can be of little value in portraying relative capabilities
Types of Drvrsioni
oviet motorized rifle and tank divisions are both aimored-type divisions, having as their main maneuver elements motorized rille regiments and tank regiments. The motorized rifle division has three motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment, while the tank division Iras three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment. These tank regiments are equipped with medium links, exceptew tank divisions have one heavy tank regiment In both divisions the motorized rifle regiment has an organic tank battalion and armored personnel carriers are provided for the infantry elements. Soviet battalions are small: the motorized rifle battalion contains feweren, and the tank battalion fewer.
have much less evidence on the organization and strength of thedivisions. They are similar in structure to the motorized rifleconsiderably smaller. They have no tank units and are lighter in artillery.
Strength, of OiVitront
have fairly good evidence regarding the actual strength ot thein Cermany, but little evidence regarding the strength of the(he USSR. Soviet military writings refer to divisions at three differentor near lullreducednd "cadre.*descriptions of the intended use of the divisions in these threededuce three different peacetime manning levels, as follows:
a.combat strength) divisions are intended to form the firstof Soviet ground forces in the initial operationsar. The Soviet divisions in Ccrrtiany, Poland, and Hungary are obviously in this category, as arc some others in the border areas of the USSR (see Tablec estimate that the motorized rifle divisions in Cermany have an average strength of. the tank divisions, an average strength of. No Soviet divisions an likely toigher level of peacetime manning. The divisions in this category might receive some minor augmentation in anticipation of war, if thepermitted, but they are, by Soviet definition, ready for immediateto combat without augmentation.
b- Category II (reduced strength) divisions are intended for the earlyof theivisions. They are probably maintained at about two-thirds of the strength ofivisions, with some Subordinate units In cadre status. They could be fleshed out with reservists and made ready to move to the theater of operationseek or so.
c Category iii (cadre strength) division! ate intended toase for reaeivc training and mobilization. They arc probably maintained al aboutercent of live strength ofivisions.mosl of their officerbut few troops. All the divisions in this category are believed to be motoriacd rifle divisions. They could be flcslted oil with reservistseek or SO. but would not be effective against powerful enemy forces until they hadonsiderable period of training. Tliey could be used earlier for mopping-up operations, line of-commutations or Internal security duties, or reconstruction work.
Numbers of Divisions
We estimate that the total number of Soviet line divisions lies somewhere. Improved evidence and continuing analysis during the past year have provided the basis for narrowing our range of uncertainty, and have changed the nature of the uncertainty. Our previousreflected, in large part, uncertainty as to the continued eaisteitce of entities which might be? considered divbions. The actual existence of all tho entities included in our current estimate, at least, is strongly supported in evidessoo; the spread of figures reflects uncertainty as to whether all of them are divisioos.
We believe that the probable number ofivision falls within the rangeategory III.he remainder arc Category II. We make this estimate with more confidence than ltitherto. on the basis ofmforirvation. It should be noted, however, that divisions can change from one category to another fairly readily without producing indications recognizable to USlbgence for some time. In view of the evident stability in total numbers of divisions over the past several years, it is probable that any manpowerwere absorbed by shifting some divisions to lower categories and by paring down the already austere non-divisional combat awl service support elements of the ground force*.
rder of battle methodology continues tootal number ofnear the high side of the estimated rangeround divisions.ivisions Wc use the order of battle figureatter of convenience when discussing probable distribution of Soviet divisions by type and location inparagraphs and in our tables. However, this is not intended to suggest that this figure is any more probable than any other withinange.
Ground Armies and Corps
omeoviet line divisions are incorporated Into aboutrmieshe remaining divisions are not These latter include the sevendivisions, which arc centrally controlledirectorate in Moscow, and
'Tha Soviet corps Is not an intennedute eeactoa between division and array, but rather is inmall aimy.
the il* divisions subordinated to the two groups-of-forces headquarters in Poland and Hungary.
armies aic of twoombined arms armies and tankcombined arms armies usually consist of two to four motorized rifleone tank division; tbe tank armies, of three or four tank divisionsindications that the Soviets now intend tonotorized rifletlieir tank armies. This change would make such armies more effective inroleonnuclear warfare. At present, Soviet tank armiesarmy artillerycud missile brigade.
armies and corps are much smaller than those designationsnot only because of the relatively small size of their constituentalso because of the paucity of their non-divisional elements. Forstrength of the five armies in die Croup ol Soviet Forces Cermanyare deemed to be close to combat strength, ranges0 toIn CSFC each of the combined arms armies hasenelements (headquarters and combat and service supporttank army,en in such elements.
The five armies in CSFC are probably the only ones that are combat ready, with all their divisions innd with their nonevel which would permit commitment to combat withoutWe believe that the armies and corps In the USSR have some divisions at reduced oc cadre strength and generally lower levels of non-divisional support, averaging perhaps two-thirds of wartime saeogth in the latter respect. However, three armies oo the western borders of the USSR appear to have at least three of their divisions innd are therefore probablyigher level of combat readiness than (he othert.
In the event of war. most Soviet armies would be grouped into fronts. The Soviets wartime from is an echelon roughly correspondingestern array group, butactical air army. The size and compositionront would vary with the conditionsiven theater of Operations. The Croup of Soviet Forces Cermany (CSFC) can be considered theartime Soviet front currently operational. It contains five ground armies, and one tactical air army. Front-level units in CSFC include0 men in combat0 in headquarters aad service support, and0 in miscellaneous housekeeping functions. CSFC is tailored to meet its particular mission In East Germany; wartime fronts would vary in numbers of armies and divisions, as well as in numbers of combat and service support troops.
Soviets envisage general war campaigns broken downTheaters of Military Operationsefined as land and sea areasa single operational-strategic axis. Evidence has revealed four ofNorf newest cm. including Scandinavia, the Western, includingEurope and Cecal Britain; the Southwestern, including the Balkans.all the shores of the Mediterranean; and the Far Eastern, with areasThere are probably one or two more in Central Asia.
istorically, there lias been no permanent echelon of commandfiont ai id the Supreme High Command in Moscow, and we have noSoviet puins lu organize inch intermediate headquarters. The complexityin tbe coiiiiiiniiicatioin wuc in tlic rear of Soviet fronts, howevercnunnoiisly viiice World War II. Air defense, logistics support,control in the rear areas of widely separated Operations would bedifficult to coordinate directly from Moscow. To meet theseSoviets may plan to provide intermediate headquarters, particularlywhich they envisage more than one front or the use of non-Soviet units.inich headquarter* might control additional headquarters ondlions zune units, xudi as railroad troops, scaliff and airlift units, andsupporte believe that the IS Military Districts insidewould provide most of the headquarters and the supporting unitsand for any TVD headquarters which would be activated inTVDs include sea as well as land areas, any TVD organization wouldinclude some naval
Ground Force Training
Soviet forces contain very few professional NCOs, but proportionally more junior officers on whom tlve responsibility for training largely devolves. There is about one-third turnover in troop strength each year due to the Soviet three-year conscription policy. The recruits are assigned directly to units and are trained almost entirely within those units. While this systemeffective utilization of the pool of conscripts and eliminates the needarge separate training establishment, it alsorop in combat efficiency each winter as new recruits replace trained men. The increasing technicalof Soviet theater forces has accentuated the problems associated with the annual turnover of large numbers of conscripts. There is some evidence that the Soviets are now attempting to expand their corps of technically-trained enlisted men by offering additional inducements to re-enlist although the harsh discipline in the Soviet Army tends to make such efforts unsuccessful.
The Soviet ground forces conduct extensive individual and unit level training. There is no reason to doubt the professional competence of the officer corps. Training of commanders and staffs at all echelons receives specialHowever, there are some deficiencies in the nature of Soviet training, evidently occasioned in partesire to conserve funds and to avoid wear-and-tear on the most up-to-date equipment, and alsoenchant for theoretical training methods. There is good evidence that training ammunition for tank* and artillery is allocated sparingly and that most Bring practice is conducted with sub-caliber weapons. Tank main armament firing is probably quite limited by Western standards. There are indications that field training exercises with troops at levels above tlte regiment are relatively infrequent and that inIhe larger unit commanders and staffs have relatively b'ttle opportunity
to practice tlic solution of teal tactical and logistical pioWcms which can be appreciated only when large forces are active in the field.
n the two decades since World War II (he Soviets have continued the process of reorganizing ground force units whileide range of new types of equipment, including missiles and combat vehicles In somesuccessive generations of the same type of equipment have been pro-duced. At any given time during the period, however, the distribution pattern of equipment has been uneven as Ihe development and production of newer models overtook the gradual issue of previous equipment Thus Soviet ground forces are not fully equipped with tbe blest available material; many of the older models remain in service.ivisions probably have first priority for the issue of new equipment.
e havehorough review of all evidence bearing on Soviet production and inventories of land armaments and conclude that our evidence does not permit an estimate of total Soviet production and inventories of ground force equipment within useful ranges of confidence. There is little doubt that the Soviets have produced large quantitieside selection of items. As many asodels of land armament may have been produced since tlse eitd of World War II. and production In sizable quantities of at least GO of these models is substantiated by firm evidence. Soviet divisions appear to have all therequired for adequate training or comiInvent in combat although older models remain in use in many units. There is evidence that even obsoletesuch as4 tank, is in many cases retained for routine training in order to citend life of newer equipment on hand.
The Soviets have exported several4 tanks, and we believe they have almost certainlyufficient quantity of various versions of litis tank to satisfy the wartime requirements of allnd II divisions. It is possible that enough are available fot Category III divisions as well, but there Is some evidence indicating4 tanks are substitute items In such units. The latest medium tankm smoothbore gun and has beene believe that this model is not intendedeplacement for the main battle tank, and that it will be assigned primarily an anti-tank role, perhaps replacing heavy tanks for this purpose.
In3 we estimated that therehortage of armoredcarriers (APCs) in Soviet units. Evidence acquired during the past year indicates tliat the motorized infantry elements requiring APCs are smaller than previously estimated, and that more men are carried per vehicle. Coruarquently. we now believe that Soviet divisions have APCs in sufficient numbers totheir motorized infantry. The bulk of the APCs in motorized rifle divisions are tho first generation. which are not amphibious and lackmobility and are thus not compatible with Soviet operational doctrine. Infatitiy elements of tank divisions have been largely reequipped with the
tracked amphibious comer, BTU-AOp The later and much improved amphibioiu BTH-GOp has appeared in very limited numbers.
uthoritative Soviet military ipukcarnen have discussed equipment- and tlie open prcM. Some of tbe standard substitutes
l-clicvcd to beoviet divisions are: earlier4 medium tanks for later modelsarlyCs for BTK-SOp and. and SS mm recoil lea* riles and earlier anti-tank guru for anti-tank nvissile-systcmshese and other substitutes can he used to perform the functions of later models, with the significant exception of tlie oldern some categories of equipment, toch as general purpose trucks and POLthere have been good indications of shortages. All things considered, wc conclude (list the Soviets probably have enough land armaments in inventory to equip fullyivision force at wartime strength, but that few, if any. of the line divisions aie likely to be completely equipped with latest model items.
Soviets have available large numbers of trained reservists who couldfor filling out existing undenOength units or mobilizing new units.million of these reserves would probably be required to fill the currentwartime strength; this would Involve fleshing out existing units andlarge number of additional combat and service support units for armiesStocks of materiel on hand at or near existing units, supplementeditems and motor transport from civilian sources, would probablyforobilization
Soviets have planned to mobilize additional forces, if need be.the cadres of existing units lo form new ones and by creatingunits from civilian resources This process would, of course,loss of the more immediate capabilities obtainable through filling outdivisions. We do not know how many additional divisions theliave planned to form in this manner, or how many they could equip.war emergency, the availability of manpower would notimitingare enough reservists to man twice the current number of groundalthough this would require calling up men whose service experiencethan three years past. Tho Soviets could have retained considerablesuperseded military equipment, at some cost for maintenance andwe have not been able to establish the existence of such stocks beyondof iheivision force. No matter whatplans the Soviets may have, considerations brought forward innd continuing budgetary stringencies may haveto reconsider the utility of providing for the mobilization of anyof line divisions additional to the number in the present force.
'Additional reserve personneltuva Saba nobtlUcd is rrpUcrwiiHi end to expand the Coowtud and General Sepport foroca.
IV. THEATER FORCES AIR AND MISSILE SUPPORT
he inisiion ol Soviet tactical airo support the fronts lo whichby gaining local air superiority and providing direct snpporl lo ground forces. Since theof3 wc have acquired evidence of met eared concern by Soviet military authorities to strengthen the. tactical air capabilities There has been more cmisliasix on training for leconna usance, on bombing techniques, and on the use of unimproved airfields lo increase flexibility and mobility. Soviet inlerccptor units in East Germany, including those equipped with all-weather interceptors, are being crcus-trained for ground attack roles. In addition the Soviets Ivtvc expcrirncnled with at least one type of an air-to-air missile as an air-to-ground weapon.
uringeduction in Soviet general purposes forces, Tactical Aviationomplete reorganisation. Inactical Aviationtrength ofperational aircraft; byt had been reduced to0 aircraft. This sharp reduction probablyoviet intention to retire air craft which they consideredarge part of the decs ease involved the aging Beagle light bomber.0 Badger medium bombers which had been in Tactical Aviation were reassigned to Long-Range Aviation during this same period. Tlie reductions left Soviet Tactical Aviation with about half the number of aircraft previously' assigned; of these almostercent were older models. The force had limited offensive support capabilities; all the fighters were basically LrMrmprors and thus had limited range and load-carrying capabilities tor ground attack missions.
Shortly after the reduction in tactical air strength, the military leaders, apparently influenced by developments in NATO and the US announcementflexible response" policy, began to consider the possibility of non-nuclearThey were certainly well aware of the weaknesses of their tactical aviation for non-nuclear operations. They probably decided1 to arrest the decline in numerical strength of Tactical Aviation by retaining older models in the force as long as possible, by accelerating the introduction of newer models, and by increasing capabilities for ground attack through modi6cation of current aircraft and cross-training of interceptor units.
A recent review of all evidence on this subject leads us to believe dial there have been no deliberate cuts in tactical air strength sincend wear-out of older models has slightly rjxxecdcd the input of newer models into units, but the total number of airoraft has remained fairly steady. The proportion of older model aircraft has decreased, but is stall aboutercent
The total combat aircraft strength of Tactical Aviation wasshese aircraft are assigned to regiments and separate squadrons in accordance with primary roles. There aregliiers. exclusive of those assigned to reconnaissance roles, th someegiments, of whichhird arc primarily ground attack and the reeraairsder primarily
interceptorlie ground attack units are being re-equipped with the Fitter, and Ihc interceptor units with the all-weather Fishbed D.ightncludingew Brewers, are assigned lo bomber units.dditional lighters and Beagle light bombers arcoviet lactical Aviation is Organized in tactical air armies for ihc support of major ground commands, generally one TAA per front. There ;irc currentlyactical air armies which vary considerably in sizeh TAA in East Cermany hasombat aircraft, while the others arc much smaller, ranging in strength from about.
Soviet TAAs in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Far Easta higher proportion of current model fighters than TAAs in tlieh TAA in East Cermany has overercentigh proportion of all-weather interceptors. Over halftotal Soviet fighters in East Cermany are believed to be assignedthe mission of controlling the air over their own forces.
Soviet theater forces have tactical missile and rocket systems available at division, army, and front leveL We believe that these tactical systems can deliver nudear. chemical, and high explosive (HE) warheads. In addition, we believe that many of the initi,al medium and intermediate range missile strikes of the Strategic Rocket Troops would be directed against targets of importance to front commanders, and that subsequent MRBM7IRBM strikes would be used to support theater operations.
The division-level system is the Fiog (free rocket over ground) with ranges up toan. We believe that all Sovietnd II divisionsairbome)rog battalion with at least two laundiers. each mounted on light tank chassis. Such units may also be available for Category III divisions. Some divisions in CSFC probably now have three launchers rather than two in their Froghe Soviets have been dissatisfied with the small number of Frog launchers in tlie divisions, because of the difficulty in providing continuous fire support for the fast moving offensive operations prescribed by Soviet doctrine. There is some evidenceew truck-mounted Frog; the addition of such weapons would help to overcome this problem.
The army-levd missile system is thetSO nm. ballistic missile system with the launcher mountedeavy tank chassis. The Soviets have produced this missile in several successive versions, the latest being the SS-lc, which is probably now standard in Soviet groundauncher Scud brigade is probably assigned to combined arms and tank armies. There are tenuous indications that the Soviets arcollow-on missile system with similar range characteristics.
Our evidence indicates tlvat the Soviets at one time considered thehend two types of cruise missiles as front level
systems, Wc believe that (lie Sibling, whichshort-range cruise missile system have been retired from service,ew Sibling units may still exist. Evidence indicates tha( (he Sovieu were diuatisncd with (he tange characteristics of Scudront system, barf Scud brigades are probably available for assignment to wartime fronU. Soviet classified documents indicate lhat one. possiblyauncher rcgUncnts of Shaddockoad-mobtV eniise missile system, would lie "iMjM.ri! to the /raft tactical air army. Tlsc Soviets are probably. ballistic missile system which may be introducedront level system.
believe lhat each of the armies in CSFC has its Scud brigade.possible that an additional Scud brigadehaddock regimentpresent in East Cermany as CSFC level. Thus, there are probablyandhaddock launchers in additionaunchers in CSFC The level of missile support for most ground(he USSR is likely to be lower than (hat in CSFC.
Tactical Nudear Weapons
entire system of command and control of nuclear weaponsdesigned to reserve to the national leadership (he decision to initiateof nuclear weapons. Special units of KCB (Committee of Statehave been created to maintain custody of nuclear weapons, notstorage. bu( also during deliverynits. It is probable dial the KCUinstructions through its own cliannels before nuclear weapons canThese procedures give Moscow strict control over the numbersof weapons employed in major theaters
have been able to identify nudear weapons storage sites onlyUSSR. If the Soviets do not already have nuclear weapons stored ina substantial logistical eflort would be required to supply afor the delivery systems currently in the area. For example, aof sorties by transport aircraft would be required to movebombs forward from storage sites Inside the USSR. We estimate thatcould launch nuclear-armed aircraft from East Cermany basesfew hours after the transports Itad landed at the bases. In the case oltactical missiles, we estimate that it would take longer to move thethe delivery units because reshipment by bind transport or helicopterrequired. Movement of nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union by railcourse, take considerably longer than by air. In view of the above, wethereood chance that Dudear weapons arc stored in some CSFCwe have no firm evidence.
he broad range of nudear tests12 indicated an effort to improve (he nuclear capabilities of all arms of the Soviet military establish-
merit. Wc believeariety of tactical nuclear weaponi is now available for delivery by tactical rockets, missiles, and aircraft, virtually all of them with yields in the kiloiou range. The Soviets may have developed nuclear rounds for artillery, or even sub-kilolon weapons, but we liavc no evidence ihat they have developed specialized delivery systems for such weapons. Several years ago they produced some prototype large nuclear cannon, but they apparently did not pursue this development further.
numbers of nuclear weapons available to the Soviet theaterprobably been limited by higher priorities afforded live strategicWith the passage of time, however, wc believe that ihey have byable toonsiderable number of tactical nudear weapons forof the field forces. Classified documents indicate (hat Soviet militarya few years ago wereosition to think in terms of committing up tohundred nuclear weaponsront operation.
Soviets consider mass initial nudear strikes, induding thosestrategic forces, to be of decisive importance to theater force operationsnuclear war. The theater forces will participate In these initialdie extent that the availability of suitable targets and weaponsThe primary targets in all phases of theater operations aredelivery systems. To the extent of weapons availability, nuclearalso be directed at command and control complexes, air defenseinstallations, and major troop formations. We believe, however,procedures, together with deficiencies in logistic support, wouldoperational readiness and rapid response in their employment ofweapons. We have no doubt that the Soviets arc working todeficiencies, although we have no evidence on their progress.
here Is little new information on Soviet battlefield surveillanceMost Soviet aircraft designated for this mission are obsolete, although some current models have been Introduced. The new light bomber. Brewer, as well as other tactical aircraft could be modified for use in reconnaissance roles. In the theater ground forces there are apparently no longer any non-divisional armored reconnaissance units; divisions themselves are expected to perform required ground reconnaissance missions, but their specializedelements are minimal. The Soviets apparently rely heavily on dan-destine agents and infiltrated ground reconnaisaoce teams for target acquisition. Some Soviet authors have strongly criticized the system of batdefidd surveillance available, at least ups Incapable of fully meeting the requirements of nudear warfare We believe that Soviet reconnaissance and battlefieldcapabilities have not improved significantly since that time, but there are some indications of devdopmental activity designed to correct defidencles.
Chemical and Biological Warfare
hemicaloviet lactical doctrine prescribes the use ofweapons in conjunction with nudear weapons. Wc bdieve thai in Soviet thinking the same constraints which apply to the use of nuclear weapons apply also to toxic CW, and that the use of either wouldecision at the highest political level. The present Soviet emphasis on CW munitions for theater operations probably results in part from restricted availability of Uetical nudear weapons due to the longstanding nudear priority assigned strategic forces. Considering this and other factors, we bdieve that the Soviet leaders almost certainly would authorize the use of toxic chemical agents by their theater forcesudear war.on-nudear war, the Soviets probably would not initiate the use of toxic chernieab.
possess good technical data on Soviet toxic chemical warheadsfor use with cruise and ballistic missiles arid Frogs. In addition,and projectiles are available for use with other delivery systems suchaircraft, artillery, mortars, and multiple-launch rockets. Sprayland mines have also beenhereas our evidence indicateswarheads are bulk-filled, probably with one of the extremely toxicother munitions arc apparently filled with nerve agents induding the(sarin or soman) or with agents of older types first used in World War I.
Our evidence indicates (hat Soviet organization, equipment, training, and research and development can support substantial toxic chemical warfareCW munitions are probably immediately available to Soviet tactical units, but logistical problems might aflect the Soviets' abilityring additional CW stocks into play against NATO forces in Europe. Most of the probable toxic chemical storage depots we have identified are located east of the Volga. They are therefore not well sited for usear in the West which began with short warning time and involved heavy interdiction of trarisportation facilities.
Biological Warfare,'* Intelligence derived from Soviet scientificindicates continued interest and research in the field of biological warfare. We have no evidence .of current Soviet military capabilities for appb'eation to theater operations, however, and we believe Soviet tactical use of BW to be highly unlikely.
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense. Soviet militaryevidently assume that the West would use diemical and biological as well as nudear weapons in the event of general war. All elements of the Soviet force* stress training for chemical defense. This training, as well asms of chemical defense equipment, is intended also for defense against nudearand biological warfare agents. Manual and automatic radiation and chenv
uller oWisuon. seeSoviet CSiuMiiiea and Intention, -id, RespecthemicalatedECflET.
uller ducvusion see NIESoviet Capabilities and Intention* with Respecc ro IJiologiciilucuri tflOa. SECRKT.
ical detection devices arc available, but sensitivity o( (lie latter lo nerve agents ii inadequateuarantee human safety. An armored personnel carrrier has been modified lor mobile chemical and radiation reconnaissance, but we do not know tlic sensilivity of the clctcetron systems.
Thcolet Forte Air Defense
Soviet theater nir defense still depends heavily on the interceptors ofAviation. The defense capabilities of this force have been increasing Steadily over the past few years. Il now consists ofighters. All of these have good intercept capabilities under clear air mass conditions. Moref these aircraft are likely to be armed with air-to-air missiles, includingishbed D, an all-weather interceptor. An air defense, control system with semi-automatic features is being deployed in East Cermany.
TheGuideline) remains tlie only surface-to-air (SAM) system known to be deployed with Soviet theater forces. It is organized into regiments of three or four firing battalionsupport battalion. The firing battalions differ from thenits of PVO (homeland air defense) primarily in7 mm gun battery to provide local low-altitude defense. One of these regiments Is believed to be assigned to each army outside the USSR, and two such regiments may be made available for each wartime front. Theater force SAM units Inside the USSR are almost certainly under the operational control of PVO.
The Soviets haveew missile system. Canef, which wetoheater force SAM. although it mayurface-to-surface cruise missile Itual-launcher system mounted on an assault gun chassis. Its mobility would overcome one of the prime deficiencies of theield SAM system, ie. its inability to displace quickly enough to provide continuous defense for ground forces. However, the Canef is probablyow-altitude system. Soviei theater force SAM defenses will continue lo be deficient in this respect unless andobile low-altitude system is developed andinto units. The currently operationalystem has apparently not been deployed with theater forces.
The Sovetystem may be capable of destroying short-range (SO run, or less) tactical missiles, but only under the mostcum stances. Wc believe that the Soviets do not consider it an anti-tactK.il ballistic missile (ATBM) defense system.
Despite in creasing numbers of surface-to-air missiles. Soviet theater force air defenses still rely primarily on tactical aircraft and automatic anti-aircraftm andhe automatic anti-aircraft weapons currently constitute the only defenses mobile enough to provide continuous air defense for troops when fighter cover is not available, and the effectiveness of these weapons against modern high performance aircraft is minimal.
DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET THEATER FORCES'
he strongest segment of Soviet theater forces is the Croup of Soviet Forces. Cermany8 this force has consoled ofombat strength (Category I) divisions. It has by far the strongest, most modern tactical air support of any mijor concentration of Soviet theater iorces, and probably the highest level ol supporting elements. We believe that CSFC is generally as well equipped with new model land armaments as any Soviet ground forces, although it is possible that some of the ground forces in the western military districts in the USSR receive the latest model land armaments earlier.
ince4 tliere have been indicationseorganization in CSFC. probably accompaniedmall force reduction. The number of armyhas beenfrom sia to five and many CSFC divisions have been resubordinated within the force. The number of troops withdrawn remains uncertain, although we believe that deactivation of the army headquarters plus the known withdrawal of some CSFC administrative dements have reduced the force by upen. There are some indications trial as many0 men were withdrawn from Eastthis past summer. None of theivisions of CSFC has been withdrawn, however.
e are uncertain of the reasons for this reorganization of CSFC. but in effect it appears to improve command andspecially for ddensive operationsurprise attack. Two armies of five divisions each are now disposed in depth in the central part of the Soviet Zone, well situated to resist penetrations or support defensive operations on any of the major avenues of approach. This reorganization may be in responseoviet reappraisal of strategic requirements, with implications regarding the competition of Soviet armies elsewhere. On the other hand, we cannot exclude ihe possibility that itemporary arrangement pending further adjustments or evenew divisions from East Cermany.
The Northern Croup of Forces in Poland and the Southern Croup ofn Hungary have political valueoviet military presence in those countries; they aUo serverominent reminder of Soviet power to ncighboi-ing neutral and Satellite countries. Moreover, they constitute nuclei forexpansion and employment against NATO. Both forces possess sizable tactical air elements, and what is known of their training indicates they arc regular combat forces.
Soviet theater forces within the USSR are strongest in the western border areas, especially in the Baltic. Ilclorussian. and Carpathian military districts. Tlioie along the northwestern and southern borders are characterizedreponderance of understrength divisions. Soviet theater forces in the Far Eastelatively high proportion of combat strength divisions, and during the past year the Uetical air army In the Far East has apparently had priority
' See alsondnnex.
over other forces inside the USSR for the delivery of new tactical aircraft. There have been indications of increased Soviet concern with the combatof their forces on the borders of China, but no transfers of divisions from the western USSR to these areas appear to have occurred as yet.
VI. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF SOVIET THEATER FORCES
Soviet Army, despite reductions in strength from previousremains the largest modern army in the world. Iteryof its manpower in small, but heavily armored and mobile line While only about half of these divisions arc at combat strength, the
' others can be filled up with reservistselatively short period of time.
operational concepts for the conduct of general nuclear wartheater forces be organized and equipped for high-speed armoredday and night. Delays at obstacles or pauses for resupply cannotMotorized rifle units are supposed to fight from their vehicles,unless forced to do so; water obstacles are to be crossedsnorkel devices for tanks, amphibians for motorized infantry, andtechniques.
While the theater forces have made considerable progress towardthe requirements dictated by Soviet doctrine, the equipment in tbe hands of troops is in some respects not welt suited to the operations prescribed. Some items, such as amphibious armored personnel carriers with good cross-country mobility, have been developed and produced, but have appeared fa units in insufficient quantities; others, such as mobile SAM launchers and specialized reconnaissance means, have failed to appear at alL
The execution of the Soviet operational concepts depends heavily oa gaining the initiative immediately and never losing momentum. If the Soviet attack were halted or slowed. lucrative targets for enemy nuclear strikes would soon form. Protracted battles would quickly exhaust the limited logistic support structure
The Sovietsobile logistical support system which is designed to support their concept of tactical operations. They have exhibited great concern over the problem of POL supply and have sought to solve tbe problem through the wide usage of diesel engines and auxiliary fuel tanks, tbe introductionipeline capability and POL transporters, and tbe prepositionihg of large-volume portable POL containers. Potential weaknesses are lack of experience in providing logistical support for their modernized forces during large-scale operationseneral shortage of service support units in tbe peacetime army.
Numbers of combat units, tactical aircraft, armored firepower, and tough fighting men are enough to give the Soviet theaterormidable capability for non-nuclear operations. Nevertheless, the restructuring of Soviet theater forces for operations in general nudear war has resulted in force characteristics which could be serious handicaps in non-nuclear operations, particularly if at
ttll prolonged. The combat and service support elements arc insufficient for any large-scale conventional operations.
oviet Tactical Aviationarge inventory of operational combatbut Its strength is small in relation to the Stic of the ground forces it is intended to support. Furthermore, the Soviets maintain no Tactical Aviation reserve units. The Soviets apparently plan on using missiles and rockets with nuclear and chemical waHicads lo accomplish most tactical bombardment missions. Most of the aircraft assigned to Tactical Aviation were designed ns interceptors and their utility as fighter bombers for oilier than nuclearwould be limited by their small payload capacity, by their relatively short range on low level missions, and by their lack of an all-weather bombardment capability, On tlie other hand, the light weight and simplicity of Soviet tactical aircraft permits them to use relatively undeveloped airfields and bases.
VII. NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
Tlie capabilities of the Soviet Navy are not readily divided among strategic attack, strategic defense, and general purpose missions. We believe, however, that the Soviets view their ballistic missile submarines as strategic attack weapons. They probably consider their coastal defense missiles and their anti-carrier and ASW forces essentially as strategic defense forces. Cruise-missile submarines could be used In either role. In this estimate, however, we include all naval forces except ballistic missile submarines in the category of general purpose forces.
Since the publication ofhere has been an upturn in the attention given the Soviet Navy both in the military press and in forceSoviet naval officers have long been the chief spokesmen for theof Soviet capabilities to conduct campaigns beyond the confines of the Eurasian land mass, and there has recentlylurry of naval articles in the open press attacking traditional emphasis on land warfare.
4 we have observed increased Soviet emphasis on qualitative improvement of their naval forces. New construction and modernization ofships and submarinesew naval air-to-surface missile may be under development for use on tbe medium bomber Blinder, which is entering Navy units almost as fast as it is entering Long Range Aviationeavy and medium bombers of LRA regularly support naval operations. Soviet surface warships and submarines have been markedly more active in realistic training exercises in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. Soviet Navalorce almost completely neglected for many years, lias re-emerged as an apparently elite corps. Although as yet probably small in number, it indicates new Soviet attention to amphibious warfare capabilities.
arenits (excluding ballistic missile submarines) ingeneral purpose submarine force,mall but growing number
o( nuclear powered .mid Submarines equipped with cruise missiles, capable of attacking both land targeti and surfaceontinue to receive empbasii in thef the Soviet force There are currently xboutass nuclcar-peopcllcd unit,iesel-propelled .mils oflass operational withf both these da.se* under construction. The conversion of theiesel units to carry cru lielias probably ceased, withow operational. Soviet crake missile submarines have varying numbers of launchers for theissile Theissile system can be used tn either high or low altitude profiles andaximum range. depending on the model of this missile involved.
bout i. dozen Nelass torpedo-attack nudear propelled units arc also operational. The only diesel powered torpedo-attack submarines with sufficient endurance lo operate off the continental US from their home bases arelasses: since the program started in thehe Soviets havef these submarines The remainder of the tcepedo-attack submarines,nits, have considerably shorter ranges. Olderaro being phased out of the operational inventory, although some arc probably being used for basic training.
arly Soviet nudear submarines, built priorxperienced difficulties in the operation their engmeering plants. The engineering plants ofbuilt1 are believed to have incorporated significantwhich overcame many of the early problems. With existing hull designs and currently operational engineering plants. Soviet nudear submarines canaximum speed of aboutnots, with normal cruising speeds probably on the order ofonots. An assessment of available data irsdicates that the radiated noise levels of existing Soviet nudear submarines are at leasth as those of early US nuclear submarines. Nudear submarines of the II, N.aises arc estimated toormal operating depth limiteet;I mayapability as greateet.
oviet naval surfacehich aro still heavily dependent upon land-based logistic and air support, appear suited primarily for defenrive ceieraHons in waters adjacent to the USSR. Conventionally armed major surface units now compriseight cruisers.estroyers, andestroyer escorts. In recent years. Use Soviet Navy has considerably increased the firepower of its surface forces by the addition of svrfaceMra-surface and surface-to-air missile armament, which has extended the potential scope of effective operations.
he only known major surface combatant ships now being built in the USSR are missile destroyer types. The Soviet, now havermed with missiles. The Kynda. Krupnyy. and Kitdin classes carry iuzface-fo-surl.ee cruise miss>Jes for antiship use. The Kashin dass, one coverted Kotlin dass. and the Kynda class are armed with surface-to-air missiles for use In air defense In addition to their missile armament, these ships, like most of
the conventionally aimed major surface units, also carry ASW weapons systems. All of these ships are probably intended primarily for operations against both naval surface forces and submarines, eitber in defente of the sea approaches to the USSR orsupport of Soviet llieater field forces in coastal areas. In this latter role, as well ai for direct defense of Soviet coastal areas against arnplBbious assault, the Soviet Navy alsoarge number of patrol boats armed with short-range cruise missiles, as well as shore based coastal defense installations armed with short-range cruise missiles.
float logistic support capabilities of the Soviet Navy, provided primarily by old auxiliary ships, are being augmented by new tankers and support ships. Tlie Soviets arc improving afloat logistic support for submarines by construction of modern submarine tenders, rescue ships, repair ships, and special missile support ships. The Soviet Navy utilizes the merchant marine for additional logistic support In circumstances which permitted them to continue to operate, the large and widespread Soviet fishing fleets could provide limited support to submarines. They abo have considerable potential for rnine warfare and for intelligence collection and tram mission. The extensive research effort conducted by ships of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and other institutions provides oceanographic support to the Soviet Navy.
Naval Aviation is composed largely of jet medium bombersadgers andt abo includes jet light bombers, patrol aircraft, and helicopters, but no fighters. Its capabilities arc focused prunarily on reconnaissance and strike missions against maritime targets, and to some extent on antisubmarine warfare. If defensive air cover for naval operations were to be provided, ft would have to come from tighter aircraft not subordinate to Naval Aviation.
aval Badgers are equipped to deliver an lis tup air-to-surface missiles. Of0 are each equipped to carry two. subsonicissiles. This system is probably being phased out. The remainder are equipped to. supersonicissile. Both rnissues are estimated toEPeet against single, well-defined ship targets. Thes believed capable of employing eidier HE or nuclear warheads.
Those naval Badgers which are not equipped to carry missiles are assigned to reconnaissance, tanker. ASW. or other support roles. The naval requirement foe long-range aerial reconnaissance continues to grow and will probably be met by (lie continued use of Lang Range Aviation aircraft or by the provision of longer range aircraft fox Naval Aviation.
Strengths and Weaknesses
overall Soviet Navy strengtlts are the size and capabilities offorce, the growing firepower embodied in surface ship missileand the large naval shipbuilding capacity. Conspicuous weaknesses are
Ihc lick of strategic mobility and capability for mutual temforcemenf among tlie four widely separatedhe lack of adequate air cover foi surface forces operating beyond coastal wafers, and Inadequacy ol afloat logistic support whichlicavy relianceelatively vulnerable sliorc base compter. The must important weakness is lite Soviet Navy's almost complete lack of capability to detect and destroy submarines in open ocean areas.
ffihal Cartict That Fotccr. Soviet capabilities against carrier task forces have lieeu improved by continued conversion of jet medium bombers to carry anltthipy llic assignment of Blinders to Naval Aviation, and by the construction of additional siibmarincs equipped with cruise-type missiles. In ihc European area. Badgers with antiship missilesperate against surface ships in the northeastern Atlantic, the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and the Mediterranean. In the Pacific. Badger aircraft of Naval Aviation could range horn the southern tip of Taiwan lo the Aleutians. These capabilities are. of course, subject to problems of target detection and identification. In thear or so. reconnaissance of open ocean areas by Lang Range and Naval Aviation litis increased Submarine operations against carrier task forces could extend to US coastal waters.
gainst See Lints c/ Communicolioni. The threat of the Soviet submarine force to Free World sea communications is greatest in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific Tlie capability of Soviet submarines to interdict these supply lines would dependumber of factors: endurance of the submarines, transit time to station, repair and overhaul requirements, logistic support, and the extent of opposition. Interdiction operations against North Atlantic supply lines would be conducted largely by submarines of the Northern Fleet. We. estimate that this force includesorjiedo-ottack submarines, of whichould be limited by endurance to operations in tlie Norwegian Sea and eastern Atlantic.
Not considering combat attrition, aboutorthern Fleet submarines could be maintained on stalion continuously in the eastern Atlantic approaches to the UK and Europe; this number might be augmented slightly by submarines deployed from the Baltic prior to hostilities. The Soviets could abo maintain3 nudear and diesd torpedo-attack submarines on more distant Stations for operations in the western Atlantic and In the approadies to the Mediterranean. If die Soviets were able lo provide logistic support during patroborward base such as Cuba, the number in the western Atlantic could be more than doubled. In addition, the number of Soviet submarines deployable throughout the Atlantic would be significantly increased if the Soviets were able to obtain unrestricted egress from the Baltic or advance bases on the Norwegian coast.
In the Pacific, the Soviets are estimated to have aboutorpedo-attack submarines which could be used against sea lines of com raun lea (ions, as wdl as eight nudear and three diesd submarines armed with antiship cruise missiles. While only about one-third of this force has suffidenf endurance to operate off the US west coast, the remainder can operate in those areas through which US
shipping must pas* lo support Pacific island bases and Asian allies. The II Soviet nuclear and diesel cruive-misiile submarines alsohreat to land targets, in addition to their antishipping role. The Soviets could probably maintainubmarines on station in the ocean area between Hawaii and Japan, as well as ali-mt five oil ilic US west toast.
gainst Submarinesince the, the Soviets havearge number of ASW thins (mostly coastal types) and have tested new fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. An ASW role may have been assigned to Kadgor and there arc indications ofote for modified Coot aircraft. An ASW role may also have been assigned to thend It-class submarines, as well as to thelnss, which appear to be the classes best suited for this purpose. Recent evidence of Soviet submarines with unusual sonar installationsontinuing effort lo improve submarine detection capabilities.
theoviet lurfacc-ship ASW capabilities haveby tlse introduction of new ships with improvedMBU series of ASW rocket launchers. These multiple-tube launchesantisubmarine rockets to probable maximum rangesoMRUs appear on all new combatant surface units and have beenon some older
only operational ASW totpedo now known to be available toBeet is theassive acourtic-homing torpedo. It cansubmarines to depthseet, but its capability would behigh-performance nuclear-poweredinchtorpedo (Petya) soon may be operational with an HE warheadASW surface ships and probably all nuclear powered submarines.has essentially the same passive acoustic-homing characteristics asbut can attack targets to depthseet Anof this weapon may become available
Mines play an important role in Soviet ASW. The Sovietsoored, (ontart-fuuig mine, with antennae It can effectively mine from the surface downeet in waters as deepeetr new influence-firing mines would be used in waters shallower than ISO feet.
Soviet Naval Aviation using Hound helicopters and Madge seaplanes can support coastal ASW operations against conventional submarines in good flying weather. Airborne ASW detection equipment consists of passive sonobuoysard rangeoisy target, and magnetic anomaly(MAD) gearangeeet. the distance from the air craft to the enemyonfirmed air-dropped ASW weapons now consist only of the conventional HE depth, effective to depths ofeet. Nuclear depth bombs, however, probably are available now in limited numbers in all fleet air forces.
oviet Navy ASW exercises arc expanding in scope, and training doctrine has become more sophisticated. We believe that the ussh now has theto conduct faitly effective ASW operations withinilesajor Soviet naval baseonventional lubaMrUinc operated bymoderately well-Iraincd crew.onvunliuual snbmarjncighly trained crew this capability would be materially degraded.uclear submarine, uith its inherent advantages, Soviet capacities would be poor. Soviet ASW eapabflitici diminish rapidly as tlsc dnlance from their naval basesilts, and beyond that distance must Mill be regarded as negligible.
rour CajKibililki. Duringpast year we have acquiredof increased Soviet emphasis on improving their limited amphibiousTlic re-establishment of Naval Infantry and sightings of improved landing craft4ecision to improve amphibious capabilities was made moreear ago. If tkal emphasis continues, we would eapect the Soviets to construct at least some new assault shipping.
Soviet Naval Infantry strength is probably greatest in the Baltic area,rigadc-sixe unit may caul. There have been indications of theof Naval Infantry units in the other fleet areas also. Overall, however, the Soviets have few amphibious ships and craft, and these are usable rxtmarfly for shore-to-shore operations over short dittanccs. Only in the Baltic are there sufficient numbers of appropriately designed ships and craft to.lift balanced forces in an amphibious assault- In thisaximum of two motorized rifle regiments could be lifted. The token numbers of amphibious ships and craft in other fleet areas could be used for ship-to-shore logistic support or for small landing operations not requiring assault by balanced forces.
VIII. AIRLIFT AND SEAUFT
Evidence acquired during the past year indicate! that the Soviets are making vigorous efforts to improve tlseir sea and airlift capabilities. Paradrop and airlifted licop training exercises have increased in scope and frequency. Improvement in amphibious capabilities has occurred in both Soviet and East European forces.
Military Transport Aviation (VTA) now containsircraft, of whichightedium transports are assigned to Airborne Troops. The light transports, which are older piston types, are being phased Out ofas they are replaced with medium turboprop (Cub) trans ports. The range of the current military transports limits paradrop operationsistance ofem. from bases, and arrlanccd operations to.
The Soviets arc developing aircraft which will increase the lift and range capabilities of Soviet Military Transport Aviation consideiably in theew civil jet transport, theas been developed,ilitary version may be produced as welL4 ihe Soviets probablyrototype military heavy cargo transport. It couldaximum payload
lbs.ange of Up. This aircraft may luve been designed io correct live longstanding deficiency of Soviet airlift capability in terms of range and payload. The current lift capability of VTa could be substantially increased throughe of Acroflot (civil air fleet) transport*.
There arc large Humbert of helicopters in net vice, providing mobility for ground troops. Among themicavy Micopters capable of lifting payioads of almoitons. These helicopters arc tugged and reliable and can Ire used for the rapid oiicralrc-ial redeployment of units or the rapid delivery of critical supplies, such as nuclear warheads.
Soviet sealift capabilities continue to be improved, particularly through the construction of large-hatched ships such as (hose which delivered missiles to Cuba. These and other new Soviet merchant ships are characterired by fairly high sustained speeds, long endurance, and heavy lift boom capacity, all of which contribute to military sealift value.
The following table presents theoretical Soviet scalilt capabilities by area, assuming in one case that all Soviet merchant ships are available within their area of registry and in another thatercent of the ships are available within their area of registry:
PjSm Dlv . .
a lift operation would require port or oilier extemive off-loading facilities in the landing area.
he recent trends in Soviet air and sealift point toward increasedfor distant limited military actions. However, the Soviets do not appear to be developing sea and air combat escort capabilities which would make possible long-range military sea and airlift against the oppositionajor military power.
IX. CONIRIflUTION OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES Warsaw Pact
rowing body ol evidence indicates that changes in Soviet military doctrine and force structure over tlie past three or four years haveevised policy toward East European forces. This evidence points to the provision of more modem equipmentortion of the Satelliteore responsible role for them within the Warsaw Pact, and increased Satellite control over their own foices.
he types and models of equipment appearing in Satellite units from1 onwards have induded some of the best the Soviets have produced. Tlie fact thatequipment appeared in Satellite units before Soviet units in East Cermany had been fully re-equippedharp departure from the previous pohey of providing the Satellite fotces with hand-medowns. During Ihe pact two years, the Satellite forces have been receiving tactical missiles and rockets, new model fighters, tanks, arrnorcd personnel earners, and anti-tank missiles.
Over the last several years there have been increasing indications of natronalulic trends and growing capabilities for independent action.in East European forces. Large Warsaw Pactxcises in which Soviet units have participated have been at least nominally under the command of East European officeri. Within several of thehere has been an increased emphasis on training at field army rather than division level, suggesting that most of the combat-ready East European divisions will be grouped it.no their own field armies, at least in wartime Because, in Soviet organizationalthe field army is the lowest echelon with sufficient support lo conduct independent operations, (hit ceveloprnent pointsessening requirement for support by Soviet units.
The increasing capability for independent action of Satellite theater forces within the Warsaw Pact structure probably reflects an increasing awareness on the part of the Soviet military leadershipax with NATO might have to be fought with forces in puree. The new trends probably also reflect Soviet concessioni in the military atea to the Increased political leverage now available to the Eait Europeans in their relationships with the USSR.
The total personnel strength of the East European ground forces istoexcluding yugoslavia andf this total, more than half are in theatellite line divisions. There are wide variations in personnel strengths, equipment, aod probable combat effectiveness of the line divisions. We believe thatatellite divisions could be committed to combat on short notice. They would probably be organized into field armies of their own nationality and integrated into Soviet fronts. The other divisions would probably be used as thealer reserves and for rear area security.
The Eait European countries have detailed mobilization plans and large numbers of trained reservist. We believe that, in the event of war. they would bring their existing units up to strength and form new combat and serviceunits. Enough trained icservists exist toonsiderable number of additional divisions, but wo liave no evidence of large reserve stocks ofFor the rnoat part major items of equipment for additional Satellitewould probably have to be provided by the Soviet Union.
lie Satellite air force* supplement boil: Soviet Tactical Aviation and PVO. There have been increasing indiaof closer cooperation aaaong tlie East European air forces, particularly in the arr defense role. Their primary mission is air defense. but some fighter units are being trained and eqiiipped to perform giound attack missions as well. During tlie past year, the capabihlics of these forces for ground support missions has increased. The Czechs and Poles have received some Fitters, the best fighter for ground attack now available in Soviet Inventory. Aboutercent ofombat aircraft in Satellite air units air obsolescent or obsolete. However, new fighters such as Fitter and Fishbed, and the Mangrove reconnaissance aircraft continue to enter inventory.
presence of Frog and early model Scud launchers in some ofcountries has been confirmed. We believe that the others willand that by the endrogs will be available to theground divisions on about the same scale as in Soviet forces. Wethat, within the neat year or so, there will be one Scud brigadeeach wartime Satellite field army. There are someitesFast European cities, but we have no evidence of any SAM units intheater forces.
Nuclear and Chemical Weapons
European armies nowariety of tactical missiles andwhich are capable of carrying nuclear or chemical warheads andbelieve it highly unlikely that nuclear weapons would be turned overcontrol under any circumstances. In wartime some nudearwould be made available to Satellite forces, but only under strictAvailable evidenceonsiderable stress on tlie use ofweapons In Satellite forces, and ft is possible that chemical warheadsavailable for Satellite missiles and rockets.'1
reliability of Satellite forces in combat would depend pcimarilynature, causes, and locale of the conflict. We believe that Satellitebe far more reliable if fighting In defense of their own territory thanof any Soviet offensive operation against NATO. The nationality offorces wouldritical factor in any case. Most Eastresist anything tliat they regarded as German aggression andong-standing antagonism toward Creeks and Turks, but itthat East Cerman troops would be reliable opposing West Cermans.
"SeeSoviet Capatxlitier and Intention* wiih Reeiwet to ChemicalatedECRET, tor further deUiu.
X. SOVIET THEATER FORCE CAPABILITIES AGAINST WESTFRN EUROPE
Concent ol Opcrc'l'j'ii
oviet* have structured their theater forces agamst the contingency Of general uiidear war. Soviet military doctrine does not addicts Itself in any depth to the variety of ciicuinstances in which general nuclear war might begin. Althoughncreasing allention given to general war resulting frommoil Soviet military writing! assume thaiar would bo initiated by Western strategic attacks against the Soviet Bloc. In thisrimary Soviet coiiccrn is to ensure that the theater forces would be able to survive the
massive employment of nuclear weapons by llie enemy and lo fight effectively
in conjunction with the USSR's own air and missile strikes.
Soviet liseater forces would contribute to the initial action by conducting nuclear and chemical strikei with their own delivery means. Asereafter as possible, tliey would be expected to attack the enemyroad front to scire and occupy strategically important territory. The rarincipal area of such operations would be the Central Region of NATO, where Soviet concepts callapid and continuous advance (upm per day) to the Channel coast by large ground forces.
Of the various TVDi (Theaters of Military Operations) which tbe Soviets visualize in their strategiche Western TVD, OTmprisingPoland, Cermany. France, the Benelux Countries. Creat Britain, and (less certainly) Denmark, has been given by far the most attention. Units located and probably earmarked for operations in this area are the most powerful of the Soviet theater forces.
Forces tmmedialely aroilobte
Warsaw Pact forces immediately available in the Westernoviet and Satellite divisions at or neat combat strength. Thesewhich are supposed to be able to move on the same day they arc
of Soviet Forces,
Croup o( Fracw (Poland)ivisions
Soviet tactical air strength in the area includesombat aircraft In two tactical air armies, of which aboutercent are current models andercent are older. There are alsoast Cerman. Czech and Polish aircraft in the area, most of which are older models.
prior buildup, the Soviets couldimited objectiveagainst Western Europe designed to maximize surprise. The Eastand Czech divisions listed aliove could be employed to the extentSoviets considered them reliable in the cueumslanccs. Such an attack,would conflict with Soviet operational concepts.
i Soviets elect toround offensive against NATO, their operational doctrines indicate that, if cucunuUnces permuted. Hey would seel toonsiderably larger sinkingical many variable factors have beaiuig on tlie aba of the forces which ihe Soviets could and would employ in operations agamvi NATO. Some of tlie most imporiani of these are; (a) the manner in which the conflicthether suddenly or gradually; (b) the number of units which would be retainedobilization and training base; (c) the extent of employment and the combat effectiveness of Satellite divisions; and (d) force requirements in other areas. Considering Soviet concepts offor combat and (he geography of the area, we believe that rise Soviets would seek tooiling force of three /rontr comprisingivisionsoviet tactical aircraftampaign against iheRegion of NATO. In addition they would seek toheatcr reserve.
he Soviets could drawotal ofndategory II Soviet divisions located withiniles of Berlin, andotal ofombat strength andeduced strength in East Cernian. Polish, and Czech divisions. In practice the Soviets would probably draw their ground aad air forces peiniarily from the western bender militaryBelorussian, and Carpathian. These military districts contain three tank armies and four combined armiesotal ofine divisions at various strengtho addition, there are seven motorized rifle divisions and two airborne divisions in tlie area apparently not subordinated to armies. Willi the possible exception of one army in the Carpathian MD which might be used in the Southwestern TVD for reinforcing Soviet troops in Hungary, these ground forces would be available for use against Western Europe. These areas also contain three small tswSical air armiesotalircraft, includingf current models. Additional reinforcements could be drawn from the Leningrad.and Kiev MDs and from the forces In Hungary if they were not required for other operations.
n reassessing our last year's estimate of Soviet capabilities to augment forcesampaign into the Central Region of NATO, we have carriedetailed studyumber of factors, including the capacity of the East European rail and road networks, the time required to convert the transportation systems to handle military movement, the reduced size of Soviet units, and improvements in the transportation systems, especially highways. Considerable evidence has abo accumulated thai the Soviets plan toombined ledinique involving the integrated use of road and rail to move their forces to Central Europe, and our reassessment has been particularly afiected by the increased capabilityethod would provide. Our reascssment indicates that the capacity of the East European rail and road transportation systems is OieneeticalJy sufficient for the assembly ofdivision Soviet and Satellite force Inays. Thus, assuming no enemy interdiction, the capacity of trartspoitalion systems presents no practical impediment to the speed of Soviet reinforcement In Eastern Europe.
oviet capabilities for rapid rdnforcement are likely to be governed more directly by factors lew calculable than transportation system capacity. Forwe believe that, for the mostoviet reinforcement in Eastern Europe would involve the movement of forces by army rather than by individual division regardless of present subordination. The armies inside the USSR are not at combat Strength, since their divisions are not all innd army support units are alio believed to bc understrength, Thus it appears that, while some elements of tliese armies could moveeek or so might be required to bring other elements up to strength and prepare them for movement. In Soviet classified military writings, considerable attention has been given lo this particular drawback to the rapid forward deployment of the border armies.
Considering the confusion common to all large military movements and the problems of organizing divisions and supporting dements into effective armies and fronts, wo estimate tliat under noncombat conditions tbe Soviets couldand organize in theivision striking force,heater reserve, within about three to four weeks of decision to do so. The striking force could consist of theoviet divisions nonnally stationed in East Cermany and Poland,ombat strength divisions from the western USSR, andoast European divisions. These divisions would be organizedoviet and Satellite armies comprising three fronts. Each of these fronts wouldactical air army and there mightourth TAA to bolster air defenses in the communications zone of the TVD.
The striking force, when assembled, would number about one million men. of which up to one-third would be Satellite troops. It wouldanksactical missile and rocket launchers. It would be supportedoviet tactical aircraft, plusircraft of the East Cerman. Polish, and Czech air forces. Inheater reserve of Polish. Czech, and Soviet divisions could be assembled in eastern Poland and Czechoslova kia.
The Soviets would expect movement oncale to be quicklyand would therefore have to consider the possibility that such an effort would provoke an immediate Western response Should the Soviets attempt to maintain secrecy in their preparations and troop movements, reinforcement would be much slower and more limited.
Capabilities for Naval Operations Against NATO
ong-range torpedo-attack and cruise missile submarines, both nudear and diescl-powercd. could be deployed in the North Atlantic for operations against NATO naval forces, and this would probablyrimary Sovietin the initial periodeneral war. Aircraft of Long Range Aviation and Naval Aviation could operate against surface ships In the northeastern Atlantic, the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and the Mediterranean. Ballistic and cruise missile submarines could contribute, in the initial period,ampaign
against Western Europe by attacks against important coastal targets. Attacks could also be directedome inland targets, depending onocations in relation to sea armroaches and on tbe depth and effectiveness of Western coastal ASW defenses Followinginitial rrfuu*ampa.pi. part Ot me Soviet submarine licet could in dqsloyed for onc.ni.ons .gainstes of com-munication from North America.
Capabilities lor Theater Operations in Other Areas
lie Soviets maintain theater forces opposite Scandinavia. Southern Europe, and Turkey winch could be used for campaigns into those NATO arw Tl>esc forces. However, have proportionately fewer combat strength unrts and very light tactical air support. The most likely of these areasampa.gn launched simultaneously with an offensive Into Western Europe ta.TWestern Anatolia-an attack by Bulgarian and Soviet forces to scste the Straits. Any other Soviet land offensive into Southern Europe would be complicated by the positions of Austria and Yugoslavia. Finland and Sweden would impose similar complicationsoviet campaign in Scandinavia. All such campaigns would involve difficuli terrain and togistical restrictions ont iorces which could be supported.
HO. Soviet forces in the Far East have been strengthened somewhat over the past few years, but these forces, have no significant capability for amphibious assault They are probably adequate to cope with any incursion into Sovet territory shortull scale Chinese invasion.
xi- TRENDS IN the general PURPOSE FORCES0
n attempt at this time to project future trends in tlie size andof the Soviet general purpose forces is fraught with more than usualAlthough Khrushchev was never able to Implement his Ideas fully, his attitude toward such forces was clear and consistent It was possible to predict that, under his regime, there would be some continuing reduct.cn in the size of Ihe general purpose forces, and perhapsiaatic cut. The attitude of Khrushchev's successors is less certain.unc at least they will probably rely more heavily on professional military advice than Khrushchev did and1 in any case, they will probably not be able to deal ash mibtary recommendations as we think Khrosrschev often did. Among the mibtarythere remain unresolved issues regarding the role of the ger.emlpurr.ose forces in present cu-^mstances, but most of the marshals evidently disagreed with Khrushchev's efforts to reduce general purpose forces. For these reasons we foresee no substantial alteration in the present size of the general purpose forces for several years at least.
n the longer term, however, any Soviet political administration willfind it desirable, if not imperative, to check the steady powth in the cost of the military establishment-which means, in practical effect, to reduce the cost of the general purpose forces. Moreover, tlie military debate will contmue.
in private if not in public, and it likely to produce some redefinition of tbe roles ol lite general pui|iose forces We therefore believe that0 there will luive been some fuithcr reduction in the size of those force* and perhaps arestructuring of them to meet new and dillcicnr requirements.
The present structure of tlie Soviet giound forces contemplates extensive mobilization, large-scale reinforcement,eneral onitaught tolie aftermathiKicar exchange. The difficultiesoncept liave been dealt withoviet military writings. If the Soviets should conclude that tha concept is unrealistic, and that the East European armies, with some Soviet stiffening, can be given greater responsibility for their own national security, then the USSR might considereduction in its mobilization baseithdrawal of some combat ready divisions from Cermany.
Similarly, if tlie Soviets should conclude that tliey must seriously prepare for tlie contingencyrotracted non-nuclear war, then they would have to increase the proportion of motorized infantry, conventional artilJery, tactical aircraft, and combat and service support troops in their theater forces.
The interaction of all the factors involved cannot be clearly foreseen On balance, we believe thai0 there will have been some reduction in the number of Soviet line divisions, butrastic one. On this basis, we estimate that0 the USSR will haveine divisions, perhapsfewer. As at present, some of these divisions would be at or near combat strength, some at reduced strength, and some at cadre strength. We believe lhat there will by then have been some increase in the proportion of nondivislonal combat and service support elements.
odernization will continue to improve the quality of the Soviet ground forces. The extent of improvement, however, will be closely related to trends in total size; the larger the forces which the USSR elects to retain, the more it will have to contend with obsolescence and shortages.
Tactical Aviation and Minilcs
e believe that the Soviets will continue to modernize Tactical Aviation, improving its ground attack capabilities in particular. We expect the rate of modernization to increase over the next few years, and we believe that tactical aircraft with much improved range, armament, and payload characteristics will be introduced Wcradual decline in total numbers of tacticaldue to the retirement of older aircraft exceeding the Input of newer models. The number of free rocket launchers in divisions will probably increase to three or four per Frog battalion. The numbers of guided ballistic and cruise missiles in Soviet theater forces may remain about constant or increase somewhat, but with new and improved systems becoming operational.
ield fence aif defense capabihlies will continue to imiirovc over tlicyears through the modcriiization of Tactical Aviation,esult ofin early warning, airborne, intercept, and CC1 equipment,the intioduction into ground formationsollow-on SAMof greater mobility. Tlic now track-mounlod, surface-to-airmay appear in the Soviet ground forces in tlic near future.no evidenceow-altitude SAM for Scldut we believe thatmayystem to meet field force low-altitude defenseby ,
lthough the Soviets may beield-transportable ABMsystem, we have no evidence indicatingield ADM will be introduced into ground units during tlic period of this estimate.
TacUcol Nuclear Weapons
ISO. Shortages of nuclear weapons for support of tlieater forces will probably be aJIeviatedven if the Soviets allocate priority to air and missile defense warheads. Soviet procedures for control and use of tactical weapons, induding reconnaissance and target acquisition, are likely to improve significantly over the neat year or so.
c believe that tlse Soviets will continue to regard tactical nuclear weapons as for use in the contexteneral nudear war and will develop their tactical missile and rocket forces accordingly. The Soviets continue to maintain their longstanding view that limited nuclear war would inevitably trigger general nuclear war. If they were to prepare seriously for the contingency of limited nudear war, they would have to make increased provision of more suitable delivery systems,onsequent further increase in theirfor tactical nudear warheads and bombs."
" The Aimtart Olid" of Stall forepartment of (he Army, bebeves that there
ii irtmp evidence Out tbe Soviets In considr'cd th* contingencyimited nuclear waifirc Situation, and corucqiiemly that their itateiiMnti on thh subject, which for tbe rami part hava dumissed the pusiibiltiy on the rroumli ol inevitable cacaEarion. may haveurely declaratory response to tUtementi ef Weatera policy. The Soviet ieaaermip abaca* certainly ii filmic enough to have reeorniaed thai their limited rtraiepc carabililks cannot prevent tlie virtual destruction of the Soviet Union, and (hat (hey aiust be prepared lo respondWe. tern optionsower icale to allow (hem alternatives tu destruction. I tho Hand taken on thii iub|cc( in currant writings, the Soviets haw provided thai, general pwpoa* feeoasoaalderabie captb-lnv to conduct tinned nvcataraiidc rroxa MRBM/ IRBM forces. To ceanperuate lor llxu inferior putition with regard to numbrn aad yield selectivity of lacttoal nudear wiileids. (he Soviets have Indicated that they would idort lo chemical warfare, which (hey have corubtendy coupled wtth tactical nudear weapona botli in wilting! and In eiercuea. and in which theyomidmble superloiity aver (he WnL The Anutani Chief of Staf feeaitraeM of the Array, eaurnates that Soviet capib.htict to respond lo areitren opbera. panieuUHy those under the USreaprmac-doelriivs. will mciuaic during ilia period of (ho animate, and could leadn overt Soviet acceptance of limited nucleicconcept!
c believe lliat the numerical strength nf Soviet surface naval forces will remain fairly liable over the neat five yean TKe composition of this force, however, will change somewhattlie production of guided missileand of smaller specialized craft continues. Modernization of existing destroyers will abo continue, and additional surface ships may be retioFiitod with missile armarnent. Naval medium bomber strength will probably increase moderately over live next few years through tlie introduction of increasingof tlie supersonic dash Blinder medium bomber and possibly tl-ough the transfer of additional aircraft from Long Rangeew antiship auMo surface missile system lor the Blinder may become operationalnd missile-carrying Blinders will almost certainly appear in Naval Aviation units.
mprovement of bodi ASW detection equipment and weapons systems, including land based hydroacoustic detection installations in some areas, will probably occur. The USSR will probably place increased emphasis on the use ol submarines for openocean ASW. The effectiveness of surface units will probably be Increased through such means as the addition of SAM armament, new sonar equipment, and better torpedoes. Airborne ASW capabiLtins will be improved by increasing numbers of more effective, turbtne-powexed aircraft with improved detection equipment and arrnamcnts. Despite thesehowever, we believe, that the capabilities of the Soviet Navyonduct ASW operations in open ocean areas will remain severely limited. In particular, it probably will haveimited capability to detect. Identify, localnc. and maintain survedlance on submarines operating in open seas.
capabilities of Soviet submarines for all purposes will bethe period by the introduction of new classes and byew trarpedo-attack diesel submarine with an unprovedmay be introduced within the next few yeais. Nuclear daises mayof more thannots. Utilizing present slccb and technology.becoming operational7 may achieveeet.
unptovements in tbe noise level of submarines couldat any lime, but an effective noise reduction program for existingwould probably require extensive redesign and rework or replacementpropulsion and auxiliaryelatively quiet submarinerequire the developmentompletely new class, which, ininternal machinery redesign, wouldew hull form and propel lorWith sufficient priority and effort, the Soviets could develop anew dan of submarine, but the construction of significant numbersseveral additional years. We have no knowledge of the existencea development, but tbe Soviets may have undertakenrogram.
e believe lhat tlie Soviets areystem for the emergency mobile bating of lurface ships and suboiarines in their coastal waters. Mobile
base laolU probably would include several small ships fgr repair, refueling,lcnrslimcnt of weapons and wpplrCS- As ihe pcrnsd advances, weumber of such "nils will be dqrtoycd in protected coves and fiords lo provide wider dispersal anil (bus enhance the survivability of Ihe Soviet support base for naval operations. There is some evidence ol improvement of the Soviet Navy's rudimeniaryy lo rqdemsh sliips o< lite liigh seas.
oviet efforts to increase their amphibious capabilities are likely-lse Soviets could provide appropriate assault and supportperhaps including IscIicoister-carriers, for one division of Naval Infantry ie eachleet areata. -
Dis'onl Limited Actions
ariety of developments in Soviet lliealer forces point to early efforts to increase Soviet capabilities to introduce military forces into areas distant from the borders of the USSR. These developments Include increased emphasis on specialized troops, such as paratroops and Naval Infantry, as well as development of better means of air and sealift The numbers of merchant-type ships capable of supporting military sealdt operations will continue to increase, and assault type transports may also be produced. If new heavy transport aircraft enter service, tho Soviet capability lo airlift troops to distant areas will increase sharply. However, none of these developments will permit long-nnge lift operations against significant armed resistance.
he military and strategic considerations mentioned earlier will obviously affect the course of Warsaw Pact development, as will political and economic trends in Eastern Europe. The individual states are likely to insist on at least tlic outward trappings of aopposed to aforce. They will probably want better equipment at lower cost and some, for domestic econcrnic reasons, may wish to cut back on military espersditures. Most will probably insistreater role for tlieir own forces and personnel within tlse Pact organization; under these circumstances, national rivalries among the member states, as between Hungary and Rumania, would probably emerge within military councils. In shod,we have estimated elsewhere aspresent trends toward particularism in Eastern Europe continue to grow, the Warsaw Pact may in time come to resemble the structure and assume the problems of more traditional forms of multilateral military alliances. Although some notional components of the Pact might thus be strengthened, the cohesiveness of the alliance for concerted actionariety of contingencies would tend to diminish.
UnMATHI LVUMBttK* AN I* WfPtOlTMKNT OFltfE DIVISIONS -
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE CROUND FORCES
ppoft uniu, bo<nc .ir ^wtod corned *nd
TIIENUTH OF EAST EUHOPKAN SATELLITE AlUCHAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS
BY TYPE AS4
alill In traiuiu'onal training.
Ineludea about ISot haled on inn table.
ESTIMATED SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT4 TO
Tth or Shi?
FIRST LINE SUBMARINES Ballistic>
N, Improved and tolVow-on
F, Improvarl P
TOTAL TORPEDOee fooinoiea io (able on
rt r- "1
o i O
o to "1
j> e< o
sir n .
I. ESTIMATED NUMBERS UK SOVIET TACTICAL AIllCHArT.TO
II. ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT IN EAST EUHOPEAN AIR FORCES
O0 . SCO
FACOT, FRESCO. FARMER, FLASHLIGHT A. and BEAGLE awerellhaaed out ol produciioo peiee0
lodudoi FISHBED. FITTER. BREWER, and MANGROVE.
advanced doeUtn tactical fighter estimated to becerne opcraUonat aa early aa-
aalon of the Satellite aircraft Ii air defense, but aomc alao aerve in the tactical aupporl roteincludea FISHBED and MANGROVE and FITTER; FISH POT. BREWER,uiunj model may
enter inventory later In (ho period.
Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence.otioves there may bc three net- tactical aircraft rather than only one as reflected In the Ublo. He considers that Ihearge long-range interceptor now entering IA PVO unit*,also be asnicnod lo Tactical Aviation during Uia period. Tlie FIDDLER, eenfiguredactical leeeonaiaunec-alrvke role, would Improve the range and payload capabilitiea of the currentnd IU use would be In Weeping with (he past Soviet practice of adapting Interceptor aircraft to tactical rotes. Ha abo balievea (bectieal Kgbter dcacribed in Footnoteto this table eeatld enter the inventory inandctieal STOL aircraft easy beas early
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIBT NAVAL AVIATIONO
BLINDER Willi one
MAILroproved Uad.ft.ird ASW (PawibJj
0 0Original document.