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Copy No. VV
INTELLIGENCE .STUDY
L IT ART ^STfi
A COMPROMISE IN SOVIETEFERENCE -TITLE t CAESAR XXVI -
IBS
Kcsciirth. stair
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DIRECTORATE OP INTELLIGENCE -
WARSAW PACT MILITARYOMPROMISE IN SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING
This working paper of theesearch Staff explores the development of Warsaw Pact military strategy. The thesis of this study Is that the Internal Soviet debate on the naturear in Europe hasignificant effect on the development of the missions and force structure of the East European armies.
The author has benefited much from discussion of the thesis with colleagues in ORR and OCI. The author alone, however, is responsible for the paper'swhich are controversial.
WARSAW PACT MILITARYOMPROMISE IN SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING
SUMMARY AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PACT STRATEGY
I. The Defensive
II. The Offensive
1 Berlin Crisis
The Post-Cuba Crisis
Pact Policy Under The New Soviet
Summary and Conclusions
Ten yearsarsaw Pact doctrine was, in any meaningful military sense, nonexistent. Thefor warfare in the European theater and thinking on the conductar in Europe were at that time based essentially on Soviet resources. Today Warsaw Pact military doctrine callsighly integrated and coordinated series of Soviet-East European offensive and defensive operations. The offensive operationsell-defined combined arms mission on the part of the East Europeans, who act both as fillers for Soviet units and as national components assignedtasks under Soviet front command. The defensive operationsighly-integrated early warning and air defense networkell-coordinated logistic support system,
The development of Warsaw Pact policy has not paralleled the development of NATO missions and force structures. The initial and almostefensive mission to the non-Soviet pact forces remained the basis of pact policy for the first half of the alliance's history. Tho belated inclusion of substantial non-Soviet forces in Moscow's European invasion plans was somewhat coincident with certain Western military moves during1 Berlin crisis. However, there are signs that competing interests within tho Sovietthan tho Western "threat"responsible for the assignment of an offensive mission to the East European forces.
The competing interests were reflected in the debate within tbe Soviet Union over the role of land forcesuropean war. This debate has hadimplications for the missions and force structure of the East European armies. The modernist school of thought, advanced by Khrushchev after the ouster of Zhukovalled for the saturation of nuclear strikes on Western Europe and left little room for
of allied offensive forces under tight Soviet control. And infallhe first announced pact meeting exclusively devoted to military matters was held9 September Defense Ministers Meeting inho first joint pact exercises commenced (announced by Moscow onnd modern Soviet combined arms equipment sent to the East European armies increased in quantity and quality. To the extent that the mass armyraditionalist theme, overall control ovor the million-plus East European forces appears to have been one aspect of the Soviet military's part of the bargain in1 "compromise" toarger scale Sovietthan that which took place. Another aspect of the military's part of tbe deal was, of courso, theofviewand war in Europe would be fought under nuclear conditions. And in order to conduct the land operationuclear exchange--whichcould block the road and rail reinforcement effort from tho Sovietforces may have acquired an increased value to the marshals as plannedfor woakoned Soviet units. hird aspect; tho targeting of strengthened East European units against the West might draw some NATO firo away from Soviet units.
Novertholoss, tbe traditionalists were less than enthusiastic over the compromise, remained silent on the military reliability of the allied forces, and argued that the requirements for warfare should come essentially from Soviet resources. Khrushchev himself may have entertained doubt ovor the long-range political wisdom of equipping tbe allied forces with modern offensive weaponry and ovor the long-range effect1 panacea would have on his military views. In fact, Khrushchev's earlier school of thought was recmphasized ln Soviet media
Khrushchev's general strategic viewsecond setback following the failure of the Cubanventure. Tbo debate on the role of land forcos in Europe was renewed, but this time both schools of thought turned to1 compromise in support of various aspects of their arguments. The traditionalists pointed to tbe new offensive role of the non-Soviet forces ln support of their combined arms school of thought. The modernists appeared to suggest tbat Soviet forces could be cut due to the increased capabilities of the East
European forces. Thus inn
llied armed forces werefirst
tlmo directly brought into the context ofbudget cut formula by Khrushchev.
It appeared that the modernists were (temporarily at least) prepared to tolerate an inconsistent military strategy provided that substantial amounts of men and equipment could be derived from non-Soviet resources. However, one post-Cuba crisisvorsenlng of incidents along theto obscure somewhat the differences between the two schools of thought. The strengthening of tbe Soviet border wltb the CPR related to pact strategy in the sense that the improvement ln the East European national forces would provide the Soviets wltb the strategic flexibility to redeploy, if necessary, some of their forces stationed in East Europe to the Far East (toarge scale Chinese border incident) without jeopardizing Soviet security on their Western frontier.
Dnder the new Kremlin leadership, problemsby the compromise continue to be ln ovldence. On the one hand, the role of land forcesuclear warontroversial issue in the USSR, and thus places in doubt the long-range missions and force structure of the non-Soviet armies, and the Soviet forces stationed in East Europe as well. And on the other hand, certain Indications of an elevated status for the pact have emerged and the East European military modernization program has continued. In effect, the assignment of an offensive mission to the East European forces, which Initially seemed to bear the trappingsemporary panacea, has apparently given wayacteffortore permanent nature. Recently the modernization trend has been accompanied by signsrowing East European voice in pact pelan almost exclusive Soviet prerogative. Should the new Soviet leadership fail to bring forward amilitary policy, today's well-armed East European nations may well have the opportunity to shape pact strategy in thothus convert the pactonventional military alliance.
The growth oi two separate missions appears in the development of pact military policy. Tho earlier,aspects of current pact strategy appearirect outgrowth of tbe national interests of the individual Warsaw Pact nations. The latter, offensive aspects of current pact strategy, however, owe more to competing interests within the Soviot Union than to intra-pact developments. We first outline the development of the defensive mission.
X. The Defensive Mission
When establishedhe Warsaw Pact was little moreropaganda countermeasuro to the inclusion of West Germany ln the Western alliance. Soviet military thinking as reflected by available statements and forces-in-being gave little, if any, consideration to theutilization of Moscow's poorly-equipped allied forces in an Invasion of Western Europe. (While eachilitary training mission5 ledenior Soviet general, apparently little attention was given to coordinating Soviet-East European offensive An1 article
Military Thought Journal, which we uibcubh laier, luuiuated that virtually no efforts bad been given by Moscow to the utilization of Warsaw Pact allies in Joint offensive Tbe tactical command machinery of the pact was cumbersome, particularly in light of the demands of modern warfare, and betrayed the prevailing Soviet view that
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the allied forces vould have little military significanceis tho Wost.*
While the East European offensive role appears to have been Initially neglected, sightings in thes of vhat was then modern Soviet defensive equipment ln the allied forces (such as advanced radar and all-weatheruggest that Moscow hadeaningful military role for non-Soviet troops in the Warsaw alliance. Inoviet-East European early warning and air defense capability appears to have boon called for by Uoscow early in the pact's history (and ln certain countries, prior. The dual defensive missions were compatible with the national interests of tho East European nations (defense of their ownital to Soviet national interests (early warningomber attack from Western Europe andAfrica), and instrumental ineaningful vehicle to further tbe image of common goals in the newly founded alliance.
"pactT armed organization, tho Joint Command, as originally drafted in5 treaty consistedho hasoviet officer since the inception of the pact) aided by the defense ministers or other commanders of the individual member states who act as deputies. The "pact deputies" were to retain fullfor all the national troops that were assigned to the Joint Command. Sometime inrtreamlined "wartime" pact command organization appears to havo boon set up. More on this later.
**In the main, when air defensein the Soviet Union, satellitethe Soviet improvements in thewe point out later, this was not tbeoffensive weaponry.
Kfttrr-
The dual missions alsolearnot only under the views of the professional Soviot military but also undor Khrushchev's developing conceptsar in Europe. Khrushchev's strategic conceptsa European war (and thus tbe role of the pact) began to emerge in the months following his successful showdown with Marshal Zhukov in Elements ln Khrusbchev's imageuture war (which, as we discuss later, were more clearly generalized in his0 Supreme Soviet speech) were present in his8 speechoscow meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the pact, the first such meeting following Zhukov's ouster. In unusually graphic terms for the time, Khrushchev described the devastating consequences of the uso of nuclear weapons--not conventionala future war:
Wars between states have always brought grave disasters upon the peoples. uture war, If the aggressors succeed In unleashing lt, threatens to become the most devastating war in the history of mankind, because there is no guarantee that it will notuclear war with all its catastrophic consequences. Millions of people would perish, great cities and Industrial centers would be razed from the face of the earth, unique cultural relics created by mankind through tho ages would be irrevocably destroyed in the conflagration ofar and vast territories poisoned with radio-active fallout.
And tbat Khrushchev considered that nuclear weapons would be employed in the initial stages of the war was made implicit in his criticism of alleged Western policy. In scoring wbat he cited as official NATOcaseRussian aggression' the NATO armod forces were ready to use atomic weaponspublicly stated for the first time that NATO policy might oblige the Warsaw Pact members to consider the question of stationing rocket weapons in East Germany, Poland and
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Czechoslovakia. statement, but wi
Khrushchev hadimilar tmnnspecific countries, to
a few days after Zhukov's ouster.) The strategic implication of Khrushchev's reference to the need for counters*asures to "NATO policy" appears to have been that the Initial stageuture war would most likely involve the exchange of nuclear strikes. did not go on (as he dido state flatly that conventional forces under nuclear conditions had lost their former importance. But he did take the occasion at the8 meeting to reiterate the8 Soviet troop cut and redeployment announcements* and the other Warsaw Pact troop cuts as an example of the bloc's "peacefulot as an oxample ofmilitary realities, as he would spell out
The role that non-Soviet forces could play in tbe pact under the new Soviet imagoar ln Europe may have been suggested ln Khrushchev's sober reference to the capabilities of. strategic bomber force and the threat of. bases. In this contextin his8 speech boasted that "the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw treaty countries can have and do have everything necessary to keep themselves out of
*TASS announced in8 that the Soviet Army, Navy and Air Force would be cut0 men would be withdrawn from East Germany0 from Hungary. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania was announced at the meeting, and pact commander Konev announced the resolve of East European nations to reduce conventional forcesen. 0 Moscow reported that over one quarter million allied armed forces personnel cuts had been made) An5 TASS report of an interview with pact staff chief Batov claimed that the pact countries58 reduced unilaterally the numerical strength of their armed forcesfigure about six times greater than the one given by Moscow
a strategically disadvantageous positiou." The fact, that the pact was lnosition and that East European forces were oponly Included ln Soviet stratogic thinking on the Western bomber threat suggests that active allied participationore highly effective air defense system was regarded as an exigency under Khrushchev's viewar ln Europe.
We do not know precisely when the decision was taken to equip the East European armies with more advanced air defense hardware such as surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and missile-equipped all-weather jet interceptorsut available evldonce points to the latter half8 or the first half
has reported that some time prior
to iybu tne
presidiurn of the Soviet Central Committee "in consultation with political leaders of the Warsaw Pact" decided to equip the East European forces with surface-to-air The last pact political consultative conference prior0 was the8 Moscow meeting, but the
stated tbat the pact's "political lead-
ers" participated in the decision during "unpublicized
visits to Moscow." has reported that East
European officers were brought to the USSR for ground to air missile training in and later in the year were sentwith SAMs,nd Soviet
reported that priorere insxTticted in tactical This clearly suggests that more than andefense role for the East Europeans was beingby Moscow. However, the first observationan "offensive" weapon actually in East Europeannot take place untilfterconcessions to his traditionalist mindedon thisInformed us
that Soviet Instruction cm gronna-iu-gruunu missiles9 was limltodursory introduction of general principles and only select Soviet officers were given instruction in firing such missiles.
train national forces. (The first SAM site manned by allied troops was observed in)
Byhrushchev had developed nis earner views on the nature and conductuture war in Europe, and he placed his particular image of the conflict before the Supreme Soviet on Re held that tbo characteruture war between the great powers would be rocket-nuclear, and that the decisive results would take place In the first minutes of the conflict. the offensive and defensive branches of the armed forces involvod in the Initial exchange were the critical forces, and that the surface navy, tbe tactical air force and the ground forces "had lost their previous importance' and could be cut by one-third. Khrushchev did not list enemy armed forcesarget ln the initial phase of the war; presumably he felt that such forces would bealong vith the rest of continental Europe. As for pact strategy, Khrushchev's considerations relatinguropean war virtually ruled out the participation of non-Soviet forces in any significant role but that of air defense.
The operational Implications of Khrushchev's strategic pronouncements were spelled out in the first issue of Military Thought
1 which appeared "InWarlyscenarioin theportrayed tho
virtual liquidation Of Europe inimited number of Soviet conventionalWarsaw Pact forces werecalled upon for secondary mop-up tasks. The saturation of nuclear strikes (as called for instrategy) left little roomonventional land battle in Europe, and thus no necessity to coordinate conventional offensive operations with Moscow's Eastallies.
the "traditionalists"
In public the professional military endorsed Khru-
shchev's strategic views.
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(Including general staff chief Sokolovsky and, probably, pact commander Konev, who were replacedigorously counterattacked the operational implications ofstrategy. The principal argument wasand battle would be fought ln Europe in which mass Soviet armies would be necessary. ew traditionalists argued that not only the non-strategic Soviet forces but the allied forces would be called upon. And in the Soviet debate, the utilization of pact allied forces
was Droacned in the first rebuttal of thear in Europe. General Kurochkin, in roundly criticizing the operational implications of the mpdern-ists' strategic views ofar, wrote
in tne determination of the degree of reaction it is necessary to consider tbat nuclear-missilo weapons must be usedecisive and purposeful way, but only within tho limits of The forsaking of thiscan leadituationar unleashed by aggressors will Involve such large human and material losses on both sides that themay be catastrophic for
In one case it may boconduct operations for theof the means ofindestroy theweapons bases. It is cleara strategic situation of thismay be possible tolaceutilization of the otherthe armed forces of the sovietof the forces of otherthe Socialist camp. (emphasis
Kurochkin did not explicitly state the "place" to be found or the "branch" to be employed by the allied forces. Ho
unLgsj
went on to argue that "in some cases and in somethe primary role will belong to the ground forces equipped with nuclear-missileat that time would have excluded non-Soviet ground forces, unless, such forces were to act as fillers for Soviet units
The traditionalists' near silence on the matter of using allied conventional forces seems to have been due to the fact that inase for tbe allies, the arguments for greater Soviet conventional forces might not bo correspondingly strengthened. In fact, when the modernistas it related to the European militaryfacedeversal hrushchev turned to the allied conventional forces in an effort to hold down the "metal eaters" in the Soviet high command.
II. The Offensivo Mission
1 Berlin Crisis Compromise: When Khrushchev decided in0 or1 to try to Intimidate tbe West into making concessions on Berlin and Germany, he was soon facedoalition of his leading officers who countered that reliance on rocket-nuclear weapons alone would jeopardize soviet security. Tbe Soviet(and particularly Malinovsky andppealed,
criticism was made implicit in bisCongress speech in which he called forarmy while failing toUSSR military (Khrushchev had emphasized Sovietthroughout the year.)
1 Greenko was
aissaxisiacTloti Wlin KHrosncnev's Intention to reduce the size of the army, and he felt so strongly about this that he threatened to retire, whatever the consequonces,that lt was ridiculous to depend on nuclear-missile weapons alono.
arguing that the soviet conventional forces were not at an adequate level of combat preparednesshowdown over Berlin and that0 troop and budget proposal should be suspended. And ln1 the tradition-
open Soviet media.uul crisisas. vigorously reacted by sharply Increasing the military budget for strategic and conventional weaponry, extending tours of duty, increasing draft quotas andubstantial number ofSoviet marshals advanced their particular strategic views in calling for massive Soviet conventional forces toand war ln Europe. in short,0 strategic considerations were on tho brink of beingby the professional military.
Khrushchev at the same timo seems toethod to salvage the principalof his strategic considerations and thusefforts of his military professionals. Onepanacea was presentedajor General
-it Clear mat
there had oeen "little serious consideration given by the Soviet military to tho use of allied forces ln joint operations. Re wrote that "unfortunately" Soviot-East European military coordination "Is not shared evenimited number of generals and senior officers of the Soviet troops deployed in the border military districts who, in case of war, must personally direct combatof their troops In coordination with tho troops
on or from tho territory of the countries of the Socialist Camp."
Inroposal somewhat likeeems to underlie much of the decision to commence the
first joint military exercises in the fall* And the concept of joint training appears to haveKhrushchevemporary counterporposal in an effort to hold down the numerical strength of the Soviet conventional forces, or at least toarger Soviet mobilization on the scale envisaged by Malinovsky in his1 plea for "mass, multimlllion-strong armod forces" for the conductuture war. Increased reliance on non-Soviet forces would not only ease the
*tt is interesting to noteajor General A.
Klyukanov was identified1ember of the Third Shock Army, Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG)
area included in the first joint pact_exffrr1fiflg
carried out in the fall of that year. /
n
strains of suspending0 Soviet troop cut proposal, but vould also pass on to East European military budgets part of the cost of modern combined arms equipment.*
Tbat Khrushchev was less than enthusiastic about reversing his earlier troop and budget cut policies was made painfully evident ln1 speech tograduates in which he announced the suspension of the0 troop cut proposal and the increased appropriations for defense. He emphatically explained tbat the measures werohat they wereln nature, and tbat they would be promptly rescinded upon receipt of evidence that. was willing to relax tensions. In the same speech,also mentioned the allied contribution to the strength of tho pact: "It is admitted in tho West that the strength of the Soviet Union and tbe other socialist states is not inferior to the forces of tbe Vestern powers." While Khrushchev's brief reference falls short ofolicy of tapping allied resources to ease Soviot mobilization strains, lt does indicate that Khrushchev in1 regarded the military strength of "other socialist countries"eaningful factor in the East-West balance of forces. Less than four months earlier, thearch communique of the pact Political Consultative Committee (meeting ln Uoscow) stated that "the nations participating in the Warsaw Treaty, during the coursehorough exchange of opinion, coordinated measures which they consider necessary to implement in the interest of future strengthening their defensive capabilities." And less than four months after his Julyhrushchov in hisctober speech atd Party Congress claimed tbat "tho Soviet Union and
*'S6v'Tef comBlnod-arms equipment sent toincreased not only in quantity but alsoerlin crisis. ood discussthe modernization of tbe allied armies, see
the countries of the socialist camp are now even stronger compared to the imperialists."
In contrast, Malinovsky in hisctober speech at the congress made no claims to military superiority or even equality with the "imperialists." And even though Malinovsky noted that joint pact exercises had been heldo advanced no evaluation of the East European armies' new participation in the realm of offensiveoperations. This suggests that Malinovsky viewed the effectiveness of the East European armies in adifferent light than had Khrushchev, and that the requirements of warfare in Europe bad to be met from Soviet resources.
While Malinovsky may have been reflecting concern over the reliability of the East European armies,himself may have had second thoughts about the political wisdom of equipping the satellite forces with modern offensive weaponry. Khrushchev's subsequent return to his former strategic views suggests not only that1 gestures ln favor of Soviet conventional strategy wore tactical ones, but that his acceptance of an East European conventional reequlpment policy might have been less than enthusiastic. Andhort shrift was given to non-Soviet military contributions by Khrushchev, who was again engaged in another effort to intimidate. into concessionstime by Installing offensive missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev's initial concern (if in fact he had had any) over1 pact' modernization program may have stemmed not only from his strong strategic views but also from political considerations such as the possibility of further oxacorbating East European national sentiment by the creation of strong national offensive forces.
The remedy forolitical trend was, of course, tighter pact military integration and subordination to the Soviet defense ministry. And to the extent that "mass, multi-million man armies" was the theme of the it is possible that tighter control over theEast European forces may have been at least one aspect of the Soviet military's part of the bargain
stat-
in1 compromise. At any rate, 2 indications of greater Soviet control of allied offensive forces began to emerge. In contrast to General KlyukanoVs1 suggestionearlier) for greaterwith allied troops. ',
rrne soviet"author,dTonol v. ZSBSkov. stated tnat:
at the startar lt is necessary to eliminate dual control of allied armies (by the front commander and tho military leadership of the allied countries). The armies should receive combat tasks only from the front commander.
The "wartime" command of the pact forces as presented the Zemskov and Sokolovsky formula is, of course, in sharp contrast to the "peacetime" chain of command as officially proclaimed in5 Warsaw Treaty and i
subsequent official statements on pact organization. Tbe Soviet Supreme High Command would control not only the strategic direction of tbe war, but certain individual wartime combat operations (such as reassignment of tactical missions) and, presumably, the peacetime joint military exorcises.
Another aspect of the Soviet military's part of the bargain in1 compromise was, of course, tacit acceptance of the traditionalist view of tho need for mass armies in Europe under nuclear conditions. And the modernization of allied offensive forces relates to the traditionalist view in the sense that strengthened pact forces could be regarded by the Soviet marshals as vital to tho success of the Sovietif Western strikes blocked tho road and rail reinforcement effort from the Soviet Union. In short, satellite forces would be of greater value as planned replacements for weakenod Soviet units if the former were equipped with modern combined arms equipment. That the Soviets were concerned with the problom of isolation between the front
The question of East European military reliability has probably concerned the marshal (and the Kremlin loaders as well) from the time the decision was finally taken to target non-Soviet forces against NATO up to tho present time. The marshals, however, could have regarded the reliability issueomewhat different light owing to tho realities of nuclear war ln Europe. That is, the modernized pact forcestanding value to Moscow by the fact that non-Sovlot advancing forces could draw some NATO fire from advancing Soviet units. Tho direction of the advancing non-Soviet forces vas probably another consideration affecting Moscow's view of East European militarywould the Czech forces fight more vigorously their traditional onemy (Germans) than other enomy groupings? This rational* may, in part, underlie the Sokolovsky author's explanation that Soviet control of operations in the European theaters does not mean that all East European nationalact as "fillers" for Soviet units.
ln some military theaters, operational units of the allied countries will be under their own supreme high command. In such cases, these units can beaccording to Joint concepts and plans of operations, and by closo coordination of troop operations through representatives of those countries.
The "operational units of the alliednder their own supreme highthan the East European units specifically assigned to the Warsaw Pact Jointare assigned home defense and supply missions by the East European national defense ministries. Certain terrain considerations, however, may in some cases serve to obscure the differences betweon the two types of allied forces. Politicalmay alsoart in the allocation of semi-independent combat tasks. At any rate theof some independent missions to the allied commands seems to reflect the same rationale taken in tho earlier period of the pact for air defense responsibilities.
That is, Soviot planners appear to have capitalized on certain individual East European national interests (in addition to certain terrain considerations) to maximize their separate missions in the attack, while retaining the Soviet claim to over-all direction of the operation. Whileescription of "who will attackhis characteristic approach was obliquely referred toedelya article by Colonel General S. Shtemenko (issue six,fter aof "combat tasks":
It must be noted that Soviet military doctrine isruly international nature and is In keeping with the basic interests of all socialist countries including those united by the Warsaw Pact. It bears in mind the necessity to preserve in each socialist country the respective country's national peculiarities in militaryact which strengthens the military alliance of tho socialist states.
The Post-Cuba Crisis Debate: Khrushchev's military viewsecona" major setback following bisto rapidly redress the strategic equation bymedium-and-long-range missiles in Cuba. And, as in the days of1 Berlin crisis, tbe Soviet military reactiontrong bias in favor of conventional forces. But the distinguishing element in the renewed strategic debate was that now both schools of thought turnod to the "compromise" in direct support of various aspects of tbelr arguments.
For example, Khrushchov in his February election speech renewed his earlier line on Soviot and allied contributions to pact military superiority. At tho same time he lamented the burdensome cost of keeping Soviet military capabilities from falling behind those of tho West and reiterated his oarlier views on the nature of nuclear war. It appearod particularly curious that Khrushchev would refer to Soviet and allied military
superiority, then complain about the vast aaout ofallocated to the Soviet armed forces, and thon conclude with tbe Implicationuclear var would bo decisively settled before large armies could perform any significant mission. An explanation may be that at this time Khrushchev's attention was directedlocking the efforts of thoso who wero attempting to convert his1 concessions to conventional strategyull reversal,enewing0 effort to reduce tho numerical strength of the armed forces and cut tho military budget.
In early3 Khrushchev turned his emphasis on allied capabilities in another effort to headenewed campaign from tbe traditionalists ln the Soviet high command.* But this time his efforts were not carried outrisis atmosphere. Thus, while3 policy of detente with tho West (limited test ban treaty, ban on orbiting nuclear weapons,ast European military efforts were receiving emphasis in the Soviet propaganda media. The detcnto policyigh with the signing of tho limited test ban treaty ln August, and the campaign to direct attention to allied efforts hit an all-time high ln the unprecedented amount of bloc propaganda that was devotedoint pact'Operationn And finally in3 Khrushchev returned to his militaryand manpower reduction proposal, this time armed with improved East European forcos in one handetente policy in the other. In his3 approach, Khrushchev's
have found no explioit statement by Khrushchev or any other Soviet leader tbat Soviet forces could be cut duo to the increased capabilities of the East European forces. Such an assessment, while probably sound, would be far from prudent for Moscow's line to the Eastin the sense that such an open assortion couldhamper the military integration effort and contribute to the political and economic drift from Moscow.
view of the East-West balance of strength repeatedlyreferences to the contribution of the allied armies; in contrast, Warsaw Pact forces were not mentioned in0 troop and budget cut formula.
0 Khrushchev Supreme Soviet Speech.
The Council of llinistors puts before you forand confirmation tho proposal to reduce our armed forces byillion men. Ifroposal is accepted by the Supreme Soviet, our army and navy will haveen. Thus the complement of our armed forces will be below the level
proposed by the United States, Britain, and Franco during the discussion of theproblemhese proposals envisaged for the Soviet Union and the United States armed forcesevelillion men each.
We agreed to this proposal and have on our part advanced lt many times, proceeding, of course, from tbe premise that this would be only the first step ln the field of armed forces reduction. We mentioned these figures ln particular in tbe proposals of the Soviet Government to the General Assembly in tho autumn More than three years
3 Khrushchev CPSU Central Committee plenum speocb.
When the question was raised of roducing the number of armed forces and armaments of the Soviet Union and its allies of the Warsaw Pact on the one side and the number of the armed forces and armaments of the large Western states and their NATO allies on the other, it was invariably pointed out to us that the Western powers cannot agree to any essential roduction of thoir armed forces and armaments, primarily because the Soviet Union
and its alliesarge preponderance precisely ln the number of armed forces andarmaments.
At tbe same time, lt was stated that in view of this the Western states must presorvo and accumulate nuclear arms in order to balance the might of their armed forces with the might of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact This was said at
havo passed since then, but agreement has not yet been achieved on this. roposal is now being made to reduce tho armed forcesower level, and we are doing this ourselves, without delays, without an unnecessary waste of time and energy, without the nervous strain connected with endless arguments with our partners on the question of disarmament.
tho time when the Soviet Union waswe also propose thisto agree that tho strength of its armed forces be equal to the strength of the armed forces of the United States.
East European armed forces were again brought up byin the context of his4 CPSUCommittee plonum remarks about tho "measures we are taking to reduce defense expenditures" and the numerical strength of the Soviet forces:
I should like toew words about the measures we are taking to reduce defense expenditures, Tbe imperialist ideologistsot about the Soviet Union's being allegedly forced to reduce armaments and armed forces because of dilfficultles in economic development. Attempts are also being made toheory about the Soviet Union's being unable to develop its economy and strengthen its defense simultaneously, because it is unable to compete with capitalism successfully. All these are, naturally, fabrications. They show that the opponents of socialism are very worried by the tempestuousof the Soviet Union and the socialist countries and by the" fact tbat socialist countries have now created armed forceshas been admitted by the leaders of the imperialistthe forces of
the capitalist world. And we beliove that our armed forces are more (emphasis supplied)
One conspicuous contrast with0 effort followed ln the wake of his latest budgetary Whereas0 abundant propaganda support had been glvon to the manpower and budget cut proposal, Khrushchev's3 and4 proposals were given minimal attention in the Soviet media. (The leading Soviet marshals remained silent on the manpower reduction suggestion.) And open Soviet sources remained silent on the changes in and reported limited troopfrom the GSFG ln the summer
The traditionalists34 made it clear that they did not accept Khrusbchev's new rationale for the troop cut, and they argued with equal vigor that under the obtaining conditions "wild men" inascists and revanchists in the FRG, etc.), "the Soviet Union and the peoples of tbe commonwealth of socialist nations are compelled to strengthen in every way the defense potential of the socialist camp, and to see to it tbat thoir armed forces are always kept inreadiness capable of dealing retaliatory blows to any aggressor" (Marshal fiotmistrov,4 TASS interview on Armed Forces Day). Similarly, pact commander Grechko ln4 Kremlin speech argued that "it is necessary to strengthen even further the defensive power of the Soviet state and to see to it that, togethor with the armies of the other socialist countries, our armed forces are ready at any moment torushing repulse to the imperialist aggressors."
While apparently rejecting Khrushchev'sof the allied contribution, certain leading marshals nevertheless regarded the strengthened allied armiesoint ln favor of the combined arms school of thought. Pact commander Grechko made it clear that future war plans for the European theater would be drafted with scenarios outlining nuclear and conventional pact operations:
The great importance of the jointlies also in that they have been conductive to the further growth ofmight of our Joint Armed Forces, higher standards of military training, better coordination of task forces and staffs, elaboration of common views on nuclear and conventional warfare methods. (Grechko Intervlevovosti Press Agency correspondent,4 Novosti Supplement)
Soviet thinking on the possibility of conventionalthe European theater had received surprisinglyindiscourse,
although at first glance Toil would seem to be afor the Soviet traditionalists todebate, the traditionalists
gavo no lnaicatioos that military operations in Europe could bo carried out by conventional forces alone. And Grechko's brief remark (above) regarding pact conventional exercises did not reflect the scenarios of virtually every pact theatertheater force maneuvers have been almost exclusively nuclear-oriented. The nuclear orientation of the exercises, however, has called for restrainedest European holocaust as called for in Khrushchev's school ofandorco structure of high speed, maneuverable combined arms equipment to seize important targets. In short, pact planning has been based on both nuclear and conventional operations, rather than on one or the other, and thus combined operations are given tho greatest at-tention.*
few Soviet military writers that have expressed preference for aton-nuclear Btageuropean war have stopped short of explicitly asserting thatar could remain non-nixlear.
One post-Cuba crisisworsening of incidents along the Sino-Soviet border, at least until the time of Khrushchev'sto obscure somewhat the differences between the two schools of thought. Since tbe Cuban missile crisis, Soviet military writers have given some attention to the question of conventional operations (most frequently in comment on Western non-nuclearut they have generally failed to relate the size of the Intended Sovietor, significantly, the particular theater of operations. And in addition to strengthening forcos in East Europe, Soviet defenses along the Sino-Soviet border have been strengthened (wltb conventional equipment) since the Caribbean crisis. This development relates to Warsaw Pact strategy ln the sense that the improvement in the East European national forces mayreater degree of Soviet flexibility, specifically relating toedeployment of some Soviet forces to the Far East (toarge scale Chinese border incident) without jeopardizing Soviet national interest on their Western frontier.* (Interestingly, though probably not directly related, increased Soviet attention on East European military capabilities roughly dates fromorsening ofmilitaryMoscow and Peiping).
Pact Policy Under the Now Soviet Leadership: The new Kremlin leadership,ware of the bitter debate over military strategy during the Khrushchev years, has cautiously steered awayomprehensive Soviet military doctrine andact military strategy. However, one factor in Soviet militaryresource allocationnot been completely avoided. Kosygin
the head of the Warsaw Pact was responsible lor strengthening defenses along the Sino-Soviet border. Evidence of Soviet military activity on the border with the CPR was, abundantut we have no other indications linking Grechko with Sino-Soviet border defenses.
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has identified himself5 military budget cutillionnd Brezhnev hasive-yearillion ruble agriculturalwhich might involve direct competition between tbe production of agricultural equipment (such as tractors) and conventional military weaponry (such as tanks). Brezhnev's speech did notord onhe manpower issue has been indirectly noted; the service term for lower echelon military personnel with higher education has boen sharply reduced, and decreased military manpower levels planned under Khrushchev have been claimed by one Soviet marshal.**
But with the exceptionew piece-meal moves into tho resource allocation issue, the now leadorship has not clearly addressed itself to questions of military strategy which directly relate to the European theater. Nevertheless, the nuclear crush versus the combined arms operation in Europe are still treatedontroversial issue by Soviet military spokesmen. While Khrushchev's views on the European nuclear war have not yet been championed by the new political leadership, theviews have been frequently restated by tbeleadership, who have generally substituted the theme of "mass, multi-million armies" with appeals for high speed, mancuverable combined arms equipment capable ofand war ln Europe under nuclear conditions. The mass armies theme has not been dropped, however, and at least one leading military spokesman has recently
Khrushchev's3 and4 manpower and budget cut formulas, Kosygin did not mention the East European forces in the context of his reduced defense expenditure proposalsnd4 at the Supreme Soviet.
Sokolovskyress conference on5illion as the numerical strongth of the Soviet Armed Forces. (TASS and Moscow radio,
r
asserted that superiority in manpoweronsideration for any kind of war. Malinovsky stated45 speechoscow meeting celebratinghof the pact that: "Irrespective of whether war is to be waged with the use of nuclear weapons or without them, we are convinced that tho superiority in manpower and material will be on our side."
Tho solution of the long-standing debateuture European war will have importantfor the future missions and force structureEast European armies, and the sovlct forcesEast Europe. If, for oxample, the SovietIts assessment of the reliability of theforces and/orhrushchevian view ofin Europe, ubstantial redeployment offrom East Europe
wouldogical militarymu
it may be significant that the newly appointed commander of the Soviet troops in East Germany, General Koshevoy, expressed certain Khrushchovlan viewsime when the
"mass armies" theme was most loudly proclaimed by the
Soviet high command. General Koshevoy wrote
Jays arter Khrushchev
nouncea, witn little enthusiasm, the suspension of0 troop and budget cut proposal) that "due to the high effectiveness of the nuclear-missileront can now fulfill its tasks ln an offensive operationreatly reduced number of forces and conventioanl firo means." reatly reduced number of Soviet forcos was
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announced by Marshal Sokolovskyew weeks of Koshevoy's GSFG appointment. And in hisebruary announcement,alter reiterating the standard Soviet throat of undisclosed countemeasures to possible NATO nuclear sharingthat "we shall gladly withdraw our troops from tho territory of Hungary, Poland, and the GDR if the Western powers announce their intention to follow our example."* Finally, it may be significant that the common Soviet formulation of countormeasures to NATO nuclear plans has, on at least one public occasion, not been couched in purposefully vague language. Pact commander Grechko4 May Kremlin reception this year made the unprecedented public mention of "the Jointorce of the Warsawhileorce (if lt actually exists) would most likely be tightly controlled by the Soviets, tbe fact that Joint nuclear efforts have beenomewhat more specific form, plus the fact that the5 pact meeting was allegedly called to discuss measures against the formationATO multilateral nuclear force, may suggest that an even greater Soviet nuclear commitment to defend East Europe represents an effort to lay the foundation (or in this case,trengthened "nuclearor future Soviet troop withdrawals. Or as
*ln hisune "rebuttal" of Sokolovsky'sebruary manpower figure, Botmistrov reportedly added that Europeostage to Soviet land forces and thus it vas foolish to think that the Soviet ground forces in Europe would be reduced. Botmistrov, ein somewhat similar to tbat of Malinovsky'say remark (citedommented that the Soviet Unionontinental power with the capability of taking Europeays, with or without nuclear weapons.
word "nuclear" appeared in both the TASS English and Russian accounts of Grechko's remarks; curiously, the Russian word forthanappearod in Red Star's version of Grechko's remark.
General Koshevoy reasonedhe Soviet rocket-nuclear effort will mitigate tho need for the large Soviet conventional force. At any rate, we have no concrete evidence of Soviet troop redeployment from East Europe since Khrushchev's ouster.
Meanwhile, the satellite modernization program has rapidly advanced. The earlier "temporary" aspect of the pact offensivo modernization effort has apparently given wayeequipment policy bearing the marksore nearly "permanent" nature. And generally unlike theolicy, now in most instances when modern Soviet tactical weaponry becomes available in tho Soviet Union, pact national forces receive the Sovietin the same time period. In addition to themodernization policy, certain indications of an elevated status for the pact have emerged. For example, Marshal Grechko at5 pact consultative meeting was identified byanuary) as the "Supremo Commander of the Joint Warsaw Pact Armedt the last pact consultative mootinge was identified only as "commander in chief." In addition to his Warsaw Pact job, Grechko has apparently boen givon command of tbe Soviet Ground Forces. The East European press since the coup has on occasion referred to the "Joint Supreme Command" of the pact; earlier references referred to the "Joint Command."
While general continuity in pact militaryhas been registered ln the post coup period, several signs of what mayrowing East European voice in pact policy-making have marked the affairs of the pact. Toew unprecedented developments, the January meeting was not used by Moscoworum for theof Soviet policy, it was not even called by Moscow (Kosygin openly stated that the meeting vas held at Ulbrlcht's insistence), and theanuary pactdid not list the delegations attending the(thus for the first time leaving open the question of who actually signed the document). And since tbe fall of Khrushchev signs of Rumania's apparentlyinterest ln pact membership have been aired vith some frequency.
With the possible exception of Rumania,ation left plainly outride the pact's "first strategic echelon"erra recently coined by Czech and GDR militarythat seems to follow3 "Quartet"he slackening of political ties within the pact in the past few years has had surprisingly little effect on policy relating to purely military affairs. And strategicon the European war, as we pointed out earlier, has remained an almost exclusive Soviet prerogativethe ten years of the pact's existence, even though the non-Soviet forces have grown from weak, poorly-equipped-and-organized home defense units to highly-trained,and streamlined military forces. Today, thisthe last policy domain to be dominated by the Soviets in Eastbe moving from the closed control of the Soviet planners to the more open tables of Warsaw Pact councils. In short, what may be Moscow's loosening grip in military planning mightomewhat belated reflection of Moscow's earlier diminution of political and economic dominance in East Europe. we cannot judge the extent of the rumblings of East European influence on pact military policy-making. It seems reasonable to assume that should the characteristic lack of direction from the new Kremlin leadership drag on, and particularly should the new leadership fail to bringomprehensive military strategy, the well-armed East European nations may well have an opportunity to shape pactthus to convert the pactonventional military alliance.
Original document.
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