AiiROVED rOR RELEASE DATS:5
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
07ettivaves
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SPECIAL MET^ASDOM KO.5
SUBJECT; Soviet Tactics Concerning Vietnam
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Tbe new Soviet-DRV economic and military aid agreementtepupoviet arms shlpcents and vill have the effect of deepening the Soviet commitment in Vietnam. Partly in order to contain the risks cf this commitment, the USSR has of lateprivate approaches to the US, indicating continued interestegotiated settlement. At the same time. It has threatened in lov key to sake trouble In Berlin If the OB remains uriyleldlng In Vietnam. Ke believe that this combination of tactics la intended to deter further US escalation in Vietnam. It is also meant to prepare for the time vhen negotiations night become feasible and, the USSR canarger role In Vietnan.
USSR seens to have agreed to step up Its arcsto the DRV. Asunccd by Hanoi onewmilitary aid agreement vas recently signed In Moscow;thlngi, it cells for the "strengthening of the TSV'apotential" end specifies the additional aid to be provided.
signing of this agreementooth or nore
of public Soviet hints that something of this nature vas Icpendlng. Departing froo the usual formula on the subject, Prevda in eld-June, for example, declared that the USSR would give "the DRV government and the republic's armed forces all the assistance considered necessary by the DRV for the defense of the achievements of peoples rule and the repulse of aggression."
Chinese seem to have agreed to the transshipmentSoviet arms. The Soviet ambassador in Peiping,is reported to have told the Cambodian ambassadorhad recently given its agreement to let tbe USSRmaterial destined for Horth Vietnam across China. have been attributed to other Soviet sources. public emphasis on the failure of the Chinese toVietnamese policies with the Soviets suggests, however, that
a permanent solution to tbe trancshipiao-it problem has yet to be found.
Thooviet Aid
U. The extent of Soviet military aid program for the DRV is not, of course, spelled out in announcements of the new agreeoent, and it is not entirely clear to us what the Soviets have in mind. In general, however, ve think the Soviets are likely to provide weapons of en essentially defensive nature. Specifically, under the terms of the new agreement, we think further deliveries of Soviet air defense equipment are likely: SAKa, AAA, radar, and fighters. The SAM system will probably be extended to cover more then the Hanoi area.
The USSR apparently agreed last spring to strengthen the DHV'a coastal defenses; thus far, it does not seem to have done so. The nev agreement may spell out this commitment, and for example, provide for the strengthening of the MTB fleet and perhaps the delivery of Komar missile boats and coastal defense missiles.
It is possible that moreill be delivered. The lackpecific response to the delivery of eight of these aircraft in late Kay, together with the public airing of the issue in the US, nay have convinced the USSR and the ERV that more of these aircraft could be safely delivered.
Soviet Approaches to the US
7. Vbile Increasing their involvement in the Vietnamese crisis, the Soviets have madeoint to keep in touch with tho US. Gromyko told Ambassador Kohler in Moscow last month that it was "fundamental Soviet policy" to seek an improvementSoviet relations. He also seemed to say that further overtures to the DRV should be made. Kosygln, in rejecting the British Commonwealth mission, vaa careful not to rule out negotiating and ex relyany authorisation to negotiate for the DRV or Vietoviet official la Vienna, who expected that his remarks vould reach Washington, claincduly that Ms government fortssv an armisticeossible basis for Vietnam negotiations. Most recently, the Soviets have agreed to early resumption of disarmament tolks in Geneva, abandoning the line that Vietnam made such tolks useless. This could have symbolic import as the first positive Soviet move in East-Vest relations after raany months of deterioration.
6. In addition to these approaches. Ambassador Kohler has reported that onoviet official, privy to high level policy, told one of Kohler's diplcmatic colleagues that the U8 and USSR had the same strategic aim In Southeast Asiato prevent the area from falling under Chinese domination. He said the most
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feasible solution vould be an Independent, n< at rollietnam, guaranteed by tbe US and USSR as In Laos. Be added that negotiations were exceedingly difficult for the Soviets because they could not be kept secret and, If they become known, the Chinese would lambaste the Sovietsellout.
this sece Soviet official also stated that tbefor the USSR were becoming Increasingly painful; ifcontinues along present lines, he said, the Sovietsforced to "counterattack" in the area of the greatest USGerrmny. This pointedly declared warning is theits kind. Previous East Gemac coves affecting Westhave been portly intended to convey the same warning,officials on the scene disavowed any intention ofBerlin crisis.
continue to think that the Soviets wont tocrises on two fronts simultaneously. The new leadersthemselves willing, however, to put ecoe pressure onwhile the wax continues in Vietnam. We bslieve thatfurther develop the line that the US faces trouble in Berlin
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if It remain* unyielding in Vietnam, perhaps underscoring it from tine to time vith controlled hnrossmcnts falling shortajor challenge to the Allied position there.
these recent Soviet moves, in our view,are explained by the major dilemmas of Soviet policy. naturally desires the victory of cccmunlso in Vietnam, yet
it does not want to seeictory as vould magnify the prestige and pover of Communist China. At the same time, in theof the Slno-Sovlet controversy Moscow cannot afford to appear laggard In supporting the DRV and tbe Viet Ceng. Yet It is highly apprehensive of the consequences of expanded var in the Farajor military confrontation between the US and Communist China, and the extremely dangerous world crisis that vould result therefrom. Finally, the situation la one over which Moscow has little control; it cannot manage the DRV, or the Chinese Communists, or the US.
feasible options open to Moscow are thus limited It is giving more aid to Worth Vietnamspeaking, it cannot avoid giving such aid andwishes to atrengthen its presence and Influence in Hanoi.
It la putting some pressure on the US through low-keyed threatsBerlin. let It is also keeping open its lines of coeaunlcation vith the US, endeavoring somewhat to soften the crisis, to keep alive the possibilities of negotiation at soae future time, and to persuade the U3 not to carry military operationsegree of extreme severity. We continue to believe that the Sovietsegotiated settlement, becausecttleaent would bring least profit to the Chinese, vould dampen the danger* of extended war, and yet would not necessarily surrender Ccrounlst objectives lo Vietnam. At the moment there Is little the Soviets can do to bring about negotiation. They can only temporize, and lay what fouodatiors they may for the time when negotiations become feasible and they can hope to influence them.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
snrSMAN KBIT Chalmnn
Original document.
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