DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE tUowint.f'intelligence organUatibns"participated in the ation of this estimate: The Central intelligence Agency he intelligence oraanizations of the Departments of
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Concurred in by theSTATES INTELLIGENCE2 Junewent 'the Director of
Intelligence andjiesearch, Department of State; the Director, Defense Inlelligence Agency; and the Direcior of the National [Security Agency, fhe Atomic Energy Commissiono the VSIR and the Assistant to thel federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subjectutside of their jurisdiction.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SNIE PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US ACTIONS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the reactions of the USSR, Communist China, aod North Vietnam to US air strikes, including the use of heavy bombers, aimed at destroying fighter aod bomber aircraft and surface-to-air missiles in North Vietnam.
THE ESTIMATE
1. Present Ccmnunlst Reading of the Situation. In failing to make any meaningful response to thehe DRV has plainly Indicated that it is prepared to accept notontinuation of US air attacks on military aad transportation targets south ofh parallel, outonsiderable risk that the US will extend such attacks northward- The USSR, by supplying limited numbers of fighters, SAMs, and light bombers to the DRV, probably hopes to deter the US froa air attacks in tbe Hanoi-Haiphong
area. The Soviets vould not conaider the actual combat capabilities of these vcnpons to be the primary deterrent factor; the deterrent effect vould rest more in the recognition by the US that to attack this element of Soviet support for tbe DRV vould risk involving Moscow even more deeply. "In addition, the Communists may be testing US determination throughof offensive bombers into the Hanoi 'sanctuary', and, if this provokes no reaction, it may well be the Soviet/DRV intention to proceed withizable offensive air threat capable ofajor DBV thrust into South Vletaan and/or Laos." Peiping's apprehensions regarding an extension of US air attacks northward are evident In its propaganda, its civil defense measures, and Its public and private statements to outsiders, but it is evidently prepared to accept this risk.
Probable DRV Reactions
2. In light of these circumstances, attacks on North Vietnam's Jet-capable airfields and 8AM sites would be read by Hanoi to mean that military targets anywhere in the DRV were not safe from US attacks aod that the chances of future attacks oo urban centers and/or lodustriel targets were greatly increased. The DRV leaders would almost certaloly believe that the US was ready to apply substantially greater force if needed to attain its stated objective of stopping DRV intervention in South Vietnam. It vould also reinforce their concern that U8 objectives
2
Day not be as United in scope as the US has avowed. They recognize the vulnerability of their cities and industry to US or US-aided aerial bombardment and realize that tbelr laborious efforts at industrialization over the past decade could be wiped out in short order.
3- Hanoi's decisions, however, probably have been and will continue to be influenced by its estimate of the likely course of the war in the South bolstered by the memory of the Viet Minh victory over the French and by its doctrinal conviction that its determination torolonged and grinding struggle will prove stronger than that of the US. It probably thinks that, given present VC military strength and the political fragility of the Saigon regime. Communist forces in South Vietnam are moving toward victories which could crack their adversaries' will to continue the struggle. If so, Hanoi might feel tbat punishment from the air would be an acceptable price to pay for the achievement of its political objectives, and the vindication of its doctrinal belief in the inevitable successPeople's War."
a. The present Problem postulates specified vehicles of, and precisely specifiedhe Soviet-supplied SAMs and Jet fighter and light Jet bomber aircrafthe former located close in to Hanoi, the latter located in the northerly areas of Horth Vietnam, and asks our estimate of probable reactions under the
current political aod military conditions. Our present estimate is that the odds are against the postulated US attacks' leading the DRV to make conciliatory gestures toespite from the bombing; rather, ve believe that the DRV would persevere in supporting the insurgency In tbe South. *
* The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF disagrees with the judgment made In this paragraph. Be would substitute tho following for the last sentence:
"Our present estimate is tbat the odds on the DRV makinggestures toespite from further bombing will be markedly enhanced by successful accomplishment of tbe postulated US attacks, which by eliminating any concept of an area 'sanctuary' in Horth Vietnam will pose the added threat that urban/industrial targets might be neat. The selective and limited nature of US bombing target selections to date may well have led Hanoi seriously to underestimate the extent of US determination to exert the necessary power to force discontinuance of DRV support for the insurgency in the south. oscow/Hanoi agreement on the requirementespite could provide both countries an acceptable 'out' which they could Justify for 'tactical' purposes within the tenets of Communist doctrine."
Hanoi did persevere, it would be unlikely to revisestrategy or basic timetable in reiponse to the USfor psychological effect on both Communists andsts, Hanoi might order retaliatory Viet Cong raids,sneak attacks on major bases or installations In Southsimilar reasons, Hanoierhaps encouraged by Peipingalmost certainly re-examine the possibility of strikingUS carrier force in the Tonkin Oulf by sea or from the air
and vould certainly study tbe feasibility of aa air strike against US installations in South Vietnam. Though Hanoi vould probably estimate tbat the chances of seriously damaging US forces were not great, the effectuccessful attack vould by psychologically so advantageous that Hanoi might make the attempt if it had the capability.
the US strikes bad destroyed their air offensivethe North Vietnamese might consider aa overt InvasionVietnam. Because of the great risks of such an action,believe they vould not do so. Hanoi vould certainly continuethe extent possible, step up its support of ths Viet Cong andcertainly seek to Inject an increasing number of Northline units into Viet Cong forces with little or no effort The fears engendered by the US bombings woulddestroy Hanoi's determination or loosen its control of theit might have the opposite effect of rallying thethe regime.
Probable Chinese Communist Reactions. Although the Chinese Cotniunists have professed to believe all along that the US would expand its air strikes, the bombing of SAM sites and airfields north ofh parallel would still be regarded in Peipingajor and serious development. However, the Chinese leaders probably are more optimistic than Hanoi, and certainly more so than Moscow, that the US isumiliating defeat in tbe South, aod will urge Hanoi to stand firm whatever the cost. The use of SAC bombers would increase Peiping's concern that eventually these strategic forces might be used against targets in China, particularly in nuclear attacks against advanced weapons facilities. Nevertheless, the Chinese wouldtrong need to do something more to help the North Vietnamese, and to prevent Moscow from gaining more Influence in Hanoi and in the Vietnamese situation In general. They would also seek to exploit the situation to further weaken Moscow's influence in the international Communist movement and in theworld.
It is likely that Hanoi vould requestend that the Chinese vould provideadditionalroundand personnel for air defense purposes or engineering help for constructing and repairing airfields. Tbe Chinese probably would also supply fighter aircraft units on request, providing
they could he based iu North Vietnam. They would not wleh to use bases in China because of the risk of U8 retaliatory strikes against these bases.* The Chinese might offer to send ground combat troops to Berth Vietnam as an earnest of their commitment to defend their ally, but we do not believe bombing of airfields and SAM sites would bring Hanoi to tbe point of accepting such an offer by Peiping. Unless and until Peiping concluded that the existence of the Hanoi regime was in danger, it would probably not unilaterallyrescuento North Vietnam. Peiping might, however, make threatening troop movements and additional air deployments In South China witb the'objective of deterring the US from further bombings.
Probable Soviet Reactions
9. US bombings or airfields and SAK sites, especially by bombers
from the Strategic Air Command, wouldrisis for Soviet policy.
So far tho Soviets have been pursuing three somewhat inconsistent
objectiveso compete with Peiping for influence over the DRV, to
contribute to deterring US pressures against Hanoi, and at the some
* The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the assumed vigorous US air attacks on major DRVwould probably evoke the employment over North Viet nan of Chinese air defense from bases In China. Current deployment of Chineseto South China, the apparent completion of an airfield Just north of the DRV border, and explicit Chinese statementa alleging willingness to accept US bombing of China, suggest Chinese readiness to test US assertions that no sanctuary will necessarily exist should Peiping provide important support to Hanoi-
time to avoid becoming overly Involved in the present US-DRV. As noted in paragraphbe Soviets may also be testing US determination and be prepared, in the absenceS response, to further increase the DRV's offensive capability. They have apparently hoped that, in view of tbe situation in South Vietnam, the US vould sooner or later have to negotiate its vay out of the vex. TheUS actions vouldlov at such calculations aod vould probably convince tbe Soviets that the risks and costs of their involvement vould be greater than they had assumed. In particular, there vouldreater loss of prestige in ignoring any casualties among Soviet personnel than might have been the caseonth ago.
10. The Soviets vould almost certainly feel compelled to comply promptly vlth DRV requests to provide substitutes for those veapons systems destroyed by the US attack, though they might not again provide bomber aircraft. It is also probable that more Soviet personnel vould be supplied to man such equipment. Moscow might evenoviet presence in the hope of deterring tha US from further attacks, though this vouldurther loss of prestige if deterrence again failed.
The Soviets vould clearly recognize tbe danger of continued escalation, particularly since SAC had been employed. Hence, they vould probably urge Hanoi to open up political avenues for controlling the conflict and would put pressure on the US to atop bombing and to negotiate. Soviet pressures would he exertedariety of forums, hut the DRV's demonstrated unwillingneas to involve the UK in Vietnam makes It unlikely that that organ vouldajor political battle ground. US-Soviet relations vould further deteriorate. If tne crisis deepened and Hanoi chose to continue the struggle, tbe Soviets would -face thair most serious dilemma since the Cuban missile crisis.
If Hanoi stood adamant against negotiation. It is possible that the Soviets, recognizing the growing chances of being forced to confront the US in Indochina, would break with Peiping and Hanoi and back away from any deeper commitments. Moscow almost certainly realizes that the USocal military advantageis the USSR in the area. Nevertheless, we doubt that the Soviets would pay the political price of backing down and thereby handingajor political victory and weakening ita own prestige and influence throughout the world.*
*" See Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAP footnote to paragraph k, page k.
13. Thus in the aftermath of the TJS attacks, we think the Soviets would probably conclude that they had little choice but to increase aid to the BKV. If the war continued without the prospect of US-DRV negotiations, the Soviets would probably extend new commitments to Hanoi and level new pressures and threats against tbe OS. What precise moves Moscow would make in this direction vould depend greatly on Hanoi's demands, on the nature and degree of Chinese Involvement, and on how the Soviets interpreted US actions and estimated US Intentions.
Original document.
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