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national intelligence estimate
Political Problems and Prospects in
Communist China
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Political Problems and Prospects in Communist China
political problems and prospects in communist china
THE PROBLEM
To analyze Communist Chinas most significant political problems arid ro estimate its political character over the neat few yeans.
conclusions
dedicated, narrowly doctrinaire men who rale Chinagained the support of the Chinese people by swiftly unifyingIn chaos. But their adventurist "Great Leap Forward"failed disastrously, substantially reducing popular faith inand popular support of its programs. Despite theirthe dwindling group of elderly leaders remain determinedthrough poUdcal and social programs that will produce aChina,new Communist roan."
policy Is the workemarkably small and stablemen. Mao nnd his lieutenants have, over the past threemajor internal schisms and refused to achnit youngertheir ranks. In recent years the leadership has turneditself; it has virtually dispensed with foraial party meetingswhile cloaking its operationsver greater secrecy.
party can exact obedience and compliance, but, despitecampaigns, the people attempt to improve their nmteriaito avoid politics. These attitudes have widely infected theof the party apparatus as well The regime fa cturcntlymassive campaigns to "reform" or weed out errant partyto "educate" the people to accept tbe regime's coDeco'vist It has aimouiKcd that it will launch another production up-
ut thii is likely to differ significantly from the ill-hiied Great Leap Forward. Theor bxreesed tensions
nd most of his dozen or to closest lieutenantstheir AOs. Man's departure probably will not split thepolicy is likely to continue along preterit doctrinaire lines.will not have Mao's authority, however, and this may inthe door to the growth of iwrrionaltsm inside the party.
bewtenanti will be succeeded tn their turn by auf party veterans, now tn. Although these menevidenceroader, more moderate viewpoint, they willdealost of accumulated pressures and rosy perforceflexible and pragmatic. At least for the next several years,political and social problems within Chios are rmhkelv toand nnhotry development or tooftening ofpolicy.
DISCUSSION
L THE lEAKBSHtf
narrowing of the leadership base hat been ot patty affairs with greater secrecy Pot given to thoand staffing of thein the party apparatus underG
Tte-lung lias guided the fortunes of Chinese communism fora geoeratlon. During this hmc he has survived it lour twoand has purged or setumber of his lieutenants.the inner circle Orreaden has been tnh-ly stable. Thisnow, through age, neaiiag the end of the road. Mao Tse-tungs clearly declining In vigor and may be seriously ill; almost all tbeto have medtcul problems. If only those Incidental to advancingaverage age of the Polrtboro isnd that of the Central Committeehen changes Inmber Central CommHtee were butmembers have died. About one-third of the remainder seem to fee eitheror Inactive due to age or health. These losses have not been replaced.
nil publicity mal bureaus, The regime
narrowing of the leadership base has been accompaniedendency
to conduct party
hasajor
apparentlyrowing preference for ad hoc deliberations of the few top leader* rather lhan fonnsj meetings. Unlet tlw provision] of the partya party congress, which wouldew central committee, haa been overdueidening disparity between the formalities ofrganization and the realities of power has developed, while the role and indueoec of those directly in charge of the party apparatus have grown.
The exigencies of the Sino-Soviet dispute roobably explain tonse of this behavior.ikely that tome of those who are In disfavor opposed splitting with Moscow, while tha position ot* thoseard, unyielding line toward Moscow has rxrobabty been enhanced. By not formally dhHruszlrig and replacing the cbasenleis, Mao huonolUhic front and denied theolemical opening.
Mao Is fearful and smplctaui that future leaders, mWempcaed by war and revolutionary strife, will falter in the struggle. There are nidlcationi that ho ia Increasingly sensitive to criticism, and more and more concerned for personal loyalty to himself Even senior party leaders, wbo once spoke with some originality, are now Inclinedepeat chapter and verse from Mao's statements and the party line. The "cud of Mao" abo serves to sanctify him and hisin such fashion as to discourage future deviation from his policies.the c- ilt bas reached tuch levels ss to suggest thai Mao'a egotism is becoming as overweening aiis last years. At any rate. In Mso'? effort* to get the "revolution" ai lie envisions it bock on thee teems to be increasingly inflexible and arbitrary andesidency to look back upon his year*uerrilla leader for methods of coping with modern'day problems.
5 Sne* lhaem UMnr Peng Teh-boai md ha) tynvpaitWrsB. there has bra link direct evidence of caagTaarm fet the Inner circle, allhough there hive been some Mteicmsng "gin oi maneuvering for position. We ore still iianble lo idenUry with confidence any clique) or fathom within leadership ctrrJri. Yet comami the put hortory ol lhe party porsuade aa ihal persons! nntipatkiej and rlvalrlet esiit FrierxWIitpi and Bisotiittons based oa rcgjunal otgin. early party eipertmev, aad wartime service, at weal ai differences over poacv. aD tend Id dMoVjection olawo grouping*.
ince tha lataraWaaaw? of the Cftaawaraat regime. ssdMowal party kaden have tended to concentrate on one or lwo tmjot areas ofor central governmcni, or military again and may tend tn represent the syieosal interests of these areas. There havu been occasional reports of rivalry between
parti orgariiiailons and governmentin Peiping, wiih Shoo-chl
Mao's hen apparent, and Choa En-lai generally regarded as die leapncttve champions ol theae two groups Over the years. Lib. party lecrrury-catcral Teng Hnao-ping. and PcJirburo member rvng Cfcro kave boon advocatesflstant cfaeaiitic the and have vsgorcanly pushed tVapsng's qnarrel with Moacow, wstfle Chou and Foreign Mntster Chen Yl awi to be sosswwhat more faodevate and pragasalic
Mao Tsa-tong hai been prcpanng (at on orderly transfer of power to the present Chairman of theyear-old Hu Shao-chi, who seems to be at least al mil limit ly doctrinaire bi Mao. Although Liu ii capable andha beat the charisma and prestige of thelegendary Mao. If Uu docs not survive Mao, partygeneral Teng Hsiao ping and BsMiOen member Peng Chen, bothaasn (be strongest candidate* lor the top poaaion Frtralw Chouas tan scaioray. staiaro, and ucpatssly, but probably recognhai that ba ascks snfklent strength wrthsn the party organou-bon to tako ovtr. Theiter, trader. IJn Psao, Is sa (hroulc ill health and thus an unlikely candidate despite his relative
We cannot be certain thai with Ira. demise of Mao there will nottruggle for power arnong theut we see nothing hi suggest thai tha initial transition will at* ba icladvery smooth or that (hare will be lav mediate drastic changes ta poUcsn Nevutheleaa. the paaatng of such afgnrr a* Mao will inavstabl| have preeoaad eaaaaeaaaacas. His soc-oessor will beleader of much smaller stature and will probably have lo ermtend with greater (actional preasnrea. Al least until he has consolidated his postoon, the suooesaor Is likely to have more. diAeulsy in prcnadgaling and carrying out extremist prospains. He will he mom vulnerable than Mao to crlHctWn for any policyhe problem offorging new blood into Ihe aging hierarchy wfll probably devolve upon lhe succevaor.linost certain lo canse Increasing prnauaas troai below tat gi uatu reravsmoCition aud accommodation ol special Menati and views.
B. Then an enough partyhoaa be* go back to the Long Marcho permitcortouattoo of the "old guard' tradt-
don And policies (or some than lo tome. Over lhe neat few ytars, these men probably will umtm poaSUona of joSonit pmver to enure the" staxessJoo sywt any rtral cnunai From govvraraca* haJmlcasaabm merits or younger nlOiry tfttn. Thai hferun rnacrauOn of leaderi amy ba rma aaarc SwtSSt1 aire than rhe Incvmbmb and are Ificrly to be aarrowar In parapnurive; they wifl prohahh' xJ'i'c hardontinue Maoist poBtsrs.ihey wai have the abslrhes and staying power recesaary to persevere v.rogram *and
II. POLITICAL PROIlcMS
IO Up until IKW. die regime had tins enUmuaitie ntpport of Importantof thr population unci at bust tho genera] approval of tlw great majority of Cheese peopk- Mace rhe failure of the Croat Leap Forward8 and the ensuing economic ilnasU.it. there hasidening gap between the reveJn-uonary goals of lhe kadmhiprheeAunlK -cab of the people. The regime can LCtarnaad unapkaiice and cbrdtMicr.as been amble to arouse tha pormlanon from Irs dsssTtuaMnsnrnt and ns pohtical apathy-Altieugh Ihuc hw beenrecoveryeneral feeling that tha ccortoray ii again moving forward, the lormer rewlrtionary Am has not been
Chmu'i caicamotu economic problem* would severelyhase*-of any draeripUon. But the Communist regime, through Itscevea, has added grrilryhe problem. Faced with the rauroeet olaconomle collapse, the regime bad to hah its program of rapidon and was forced to retreat from Its aSSaccAecaViat propwnt and to shift to mora realist*afch vrcra adapted to China's limited reaources. Stetithaasnr.er capita baaat, food produetam Is sml far below pro-Leap) krvak Estapt for tha mftasry aad caw or two other favored mastrsrs, SwiuetTial enjinthi haa not raaamnd its carbrr growth rata. Keen now. tha regime can only hold outho pcopk the prcapad of austerity and painful social change over the coming decade. Moreover, to fosttfy the ono-tlrniod outhoray of the Party, the regime must raHooarlre and administer Hi new policies nlnng doctrinaire, md probably contradictory, lines
Much of the economic itnprneemmt ol thu last two or throe years In ruralue to oWentrahaarton Intocollective units and to production from private plots ami household bandhjufIi carried on by Indrvkhialt lor Iberr owaetpta the resalrJng production gaasa, lha Choi ana leadara arc dismayed by am resurgence of "sponUneons rapfrinrn" aad do not intend tod tha pattarn lor future tana pokey. Theae "rammshat" practices are, of course, aallhetical to the regime's doctrinal ermcepts. Thty also Interfere wsth Ihe process of srphoamg oaf raaoarces for slate investment, and Impair the reglme'i abthty to return to massive coQeettvlit peed action programs. Theii obviously anxious totlw commune admin Iu ration and restore lb control In the coonbyilde. but for fear of disrupting ravxluotion il has so far moved slowly and cauHouily.
Ii PoUowmg ill' drastic doeiirse in industrial activity beginning In IMO. several million erbnn weaken bn bom movi tank lo th* oDvartryiioV. Tho monk of lb* kadiaatriaJ verkert fartuioaU. enoagn to retain ibrattil! depressed, though uuooahtacny betterear or so age. Than anon th it worsenesponded poorly In variousecant nan. Vi.iirM to Communal China han been surprued by ihe ilow pace of vrork and thr seeming mdlBereoce of workers In the fed aria thr, hove mated,egree of dsajoesation froao the regime and Its goak
n* of FarBtngt ansa oohbeol probierM Metre, front tha) daatfrctkoo ofower-level patty cadres, especially in rural areas. Thas devoauproent .Imo Irom the onerous nnd contradictory demands jihred on them, the requirement
ororce unpopuiar pobeica, the demand to set an eiample of personal autfer-By, and the hazard of serving attor theeam of Ihe* unhappy ptghr. some cadres have been guilty of faaaactalMany han come to adeatify themaefvea with the people they an supposedontrol aad banendency to avoid reapoaiibddy by resorting to highly bureaucratic method*
is is owiunui iuii iuch >kwb
upper echelons of the part)'. Rather, what the regime apparently fears is these views will become tnincntkl after Mao and the old guard have left
IS. One of (he roost striking denlcpraeou of the pactotnmuaid Chin* hat been the bitter attack launched against China's intellectMao is reliably reported to barn said that "the irstetWuaat han never aligmdwithJudging from the regune's ptopaganda campaigns, ehose recai-cstrant mtellectuab would de-etrrphasile dots struggle and close party eotttroL They favor rnore moderate, practical programs oriented toward economic de-velopraent and Improved living staroardi. In foreign policy', they appear to favor KhruahoheVt concept of "peacefulould reconcile the differ eatoss la thaeWpote, and would reduce China'i support af rebel ban abroad. It ts cVxabehxl that these vtewi han any ttgrdaoant lupport
thehat the
he dMUusicrinenl ofrobably greater than that ol caber seg-
and
meets of the population. Once the exuberant and malousnewheir initial cancelation* were Ugh. Now, fir-ling their edaca-bettal aad enaptoymeot opportuttftta* severely cents sctcd. they aeean ta daspkry pragnvatle aad nca-revoajnoaaryall blown carapaign3 intendedramtful Chine's youthfciOouavy tpertt and toillingness, for(ailed. Rather thanttm> as the leadership caponed, young people ridiculed thil campaign andegree of cynicism that ikocked and dtomayed the regime
sstn haa been oo eastward evidence of major tension between the party aad tha atOKary saoct. when Defeat. ManMar Peng TeMtuai waa moved from ceac* because he opposed the Great Leap Forward and ccanmuoebjected to the interference of political ndcetrnsatlrn and noo-mdSaryoiaianaientt, and opposed the nalkjes which helped bring about lis* with-
drawtl of Soviet militarynimical juiitunce. Since then, five regime has
sistavsed campaign of political andnttrination combined withtightening of party central. FWlly. the high level ofla coiUbwy program ha* probablyong way towardhe drrnjpdr of the professionalrthrksa. the sadden abontion of miliary raaka ha5 "grs-sts that theot tuaV atttaVd wfih the "crvoaeionery purity" of the artned rrtrora and that it may fearreaearsyjvra of proirijeaialiiBi.
III. TKE KGWFS MfOORAMS
Ia Ihe fall1 (he rvgane decided to halt its retreat from the original colltEttvixt gotk of (he Creat Leap Forward and commune programs and to launch"jocielh* education" campaign Tha cumpalgu, with the objective, in the words of Mao, of "educating man anew and rt-orgajibins; oar revointionoryespucttly rectnrnlted (he poftaral disrepair of the regime and the party. Tho extent of the pcJUJcel locrmaCractaOri rexraarcdbdlcsUed by the Fortt rovitaged at kiting Ire to tocot It now ap raw eat that itM the regime decided ktt car rata both as Armatlc and oantSemet caaspaagntew patch of Msnatty that of 'sharp aavd rcaeoka eaosa Rruggk on the mtornariODal and aWeatKhe revival of the oka. Mruggk theme, though krgcty contn.rd.rapctoatn.roul for raevieaa faihncs,ilttani, itgkl ioO-msl political program, andreater contrail between the purity of Mao'i oaawMmtaan aad (he buck-slidingof (he Soviet Union
Although eti'ompiMiiiig al) classes and groups, (heampaign ItdUaHy haa been focused on rural areas, esocetally on the lower-level cadres. The regimeso sendroup of outsiders,ore of dasetpBrsrJ and herdeocd cadres, lo Investigate misdeeds and bring eirtng cadres before "struggle* ireetiagt where they awar confess their crimes "idrlf-crtiiiiseri For thoserr the (real ass pray; Want have contained miaow crime* and who wilkigry ro setts, the ptinfdsrneal usually consists merely of reateatag misappropriated fund* or payingi though it may abo include oaaraktal. For snore serious crimes or hlajre to conf'SS. the punishment is lo hackts ciiurny" and to be stntabor cainpin tho most etttetnti onset, tettWoced to death.ounting evidence that the campaign it Impairing, rather (km strengthening, the fervor of the cadrea Thenr authority, eefoctrvrsiess, and prestige have been eroded; many have stated that Ihey want to resign; and some have even cornmoted suicide. Since late spring, pressures oat the rural areas seem to have abated, this rosy be krgcty tn deference te prod action rrqoirrsoesrts. but story also ressect some rreospssbttn of these coaatw-feeoVebve aspects.
XL The regime hatlear that st nsearu to restore Da rural controls arid to get the revoktioo In tho coantryssde back oa tha track. INapavg has revived the peasant Btaotialkms wlucb were used during the land-rrform
ape-
y aadiflrini and rich rmnn fa In the [J* year. Poor lad Lnwtr Middlo PoawnO Aarormrlona and Cengriaaas haw been formed tocadrai and to keep in ova oa the sirmect rural daises, fncnidluK lhe more
mcrgrtie and productive "upper middle" pcaianu. may
ha used to peers for aa hMtrast tn the *ale ol grain to the itala and ht tho accumulation af invejtasont rands, ovcreomhig theof the better-off peasant, and those cadres who favorfat icimi
IL In another crganaattoaal measure tawsd at eatsajdasg party control, the regime Is nmbliding polilical offices, modrird on the pobneal rommhinr system of the Peoples Liberation Army, sn all industrial, Bnanrisl, bads, ami temmti-nimlioni organiialioat Peiping hai stated thai thai ineasure is designed tosaejpaawd labor "array* h> pr-yarationaw apsurge k> p. od octet).
St Tha regime', program. I* deal we* faibm -rh wwab aad BBteJ-heroah amrawsfre the concept af *remoldin| throughandmch of ihoosanda ofX04 alone) bar* beta sent to frantinr regno* and the toenoyssde for an Indefinite stay. Such measnras can be aaptaiiied at fan* hi pari on groundsearth of esnrsloyment ofjporteiaua*. The
reptnai pollli.nl motives,ian be seaarmlybw poMcy
rataenaptlag Use
tor periodi up to IS tauetba toha Vfaeaw education* aa Thii ts supposed to provide valuable rewajtkavary naming aad to naa stndent* from Iht corniptans; Ingoance of *boufjeoai Intellectuals and
In China's InttttoHom of higher learning. Theseho subjected to "ramcadinjT* through extended periodshe mauea. Thu
providhie the sound education essenliil toand al the urn time producing an aitdllgentjla that is receptive to simplistic
sadi
The regkne, though not seekingrovoke anaitU to db-traot people from ckmeillr problems, Ii using lha Vietnam war lo it' naOonaliMIcood eaampfe of thai It the current program to cm and ravkaUa* the ndktla 'lha regkne is screening nnbtia racrufa carefuDy aad si cwmfal to put pastoral sndoctrtanrjon ahead of ariatary inssnsag. While the snflfa* ha* fa mtStary purposes, one of ks mamo give the regime another devKc tor poiRkal ludcafi (nation and ceetroi rMptwg'a anti-Soviet campaign is aho befog put to dornuaHc uaa. Tha regime hai altadml to horn* grown "reviskaUst" tendencies the added atigma of idnailkuium with Ihe despised Soviet back-mden.
W TW nrgtme baa meadaw "produutloaad many current Chases* caoaraana suggest that Peapmg amy one* again cnapfoy the haaac nVortos of th* Leap Forward strategy: that tho baste wealth of China ii ta manpower, md that this manpower ia avaihthla lor roohilkauon and reaimrntation throughc.trination rather than materialt tha santo tamo, thoro tt ceauadeiabla evidence that lhe regime, rrmembormg well lite diaaster of the
Great Leap Forward.disposed towardiitlon andample, the rescttae haa emphasized quality nnd etnetciscy over rjuaofity in production poMctea and has given high priority to birth cootroJ andl wtitrtt ran cnuatrr lo htarsost-lxoaruat linati aad the underlying phsJosoeJiy of the Great Leap. If aod when tbo goofs lor the ceaaarg Third Five-Yearre revealed, we wille> bash lor (udg-fng tbe regimes itretc-gy If, al terms likely, the plan uaDiore intensive collective effort by tha workers and peasants, tha people's lestsonse wiH aha) grvelciirrr Idtot of the drgree of popular dbillaricntsiKTiL We judge lite situation to bo impropitious lor (he success ofontrolled Loop Forward in economic development.
IV. PSOSPECTS
IS. The docOinaSrt and etcYHy nam who rule dana are likely lo persist in, and probably rrstersify. their political progratttt timed otew breed of man that wea ta* tar was Id aa they do. We befiesrrogram is un-baeJy to restore; the former unity aad reveanoDonry ataa The reacfiuu to the Great Leap Forward data it at la still strong In all sectors of society. and there appeari toeneral, tirtcrprctjcd feehng that tht regimei premuet aril) not be carried to Wstclrmble levels and that ib more eafrrtnw demands can be evaded or withstood. However, if methods of tufsortation and persuasion fall, the regirrse will oJthtt hove to bach down from lb revolutionary goals or rely increasingly on ir**hodt of coercion and suppression We behave that the present lessdrrs, who teem to be IncreassDgly dogmatic- and mtVvJbte, wiH not give way. Than tbe outlook far the next several years is for economic and social programs losNrirg Itension.
2fi Akbovgh the regime has rrasharailed many of itst has been rensarkabfytsfonIng Its basic control over the cmsntsy. We see little chasten that thb control will ugnilkuntly weaken over the neat two or three years. Tbe Cliinrac people would almost certainly rally to the regimr and fight rn tbe event of war. Pripmg is srware of thb reatevotr of patriotism and It increasingly using the crisis In Vietnam to /unity Ib programs and the tightening of poitticnl and social controls.
eadership aa disposed to citrtmist enterprises at the Mao regime is lutcepObJe to factional rifts, and we do oof rule out the possibility of serious strhV within the "ppcrowever, we hava no good evidence of pchey dtSrreaoBS or personal rivalries suflscient to crack the dascipfane wider which the top lenders hava so bag ct^erated. Then wehat, even if Mao were to depart frorn the scene, the sooty of tlw top loaders wll rcruaka basically firm for the neat two or three years.here much chance lhal internal diffl-culbes will force PeSpavg to titer its aggressive and arrogant foreign policies. Rather, theor aa accumoUuon of dUScukhet anf pleasures thai wHI have to be occomrsodaled by some future leadership.eadership, oo present evidence, ii probably some years away.
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