4
Copy No.f 60
A STUDY OF THE SOVIET GROUND FORCEf A SECOND REPORT
ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE ON LAND COMBAT EQUIPMENT
Handle Via Indicated Controls
CIA/DIA PANEL FOR A SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SOVIET GROUND FORCE FOR
SECRETARY McNAMARA
Assessment of the Evidence
Establishment of National Inventories .
Existence of Items and the Probability
of Quantity Product ion
The Existence of Items
The Probability of Quantity Production .
C. Assessment of Cumulative Production 1. Capabilities and Requirements
Organization and Facilities
Requirements for Production
of Equipment
2. Establishing Minimum Production
equipment in the Hands of Other Approaches
9
9 10
11
13
14
5 18
Findings
toP^ses/ret
secret [
!
A STUDY OF THE SOVIET GROUND ECOND REPORT
The Problem:
To reexamine the evidence and assess the level of confidence or range of uncertainty applying to the inventories and rates of production of land combat equipment and conventional ammunition of the Soviet ground force.
The Scope of This Report
On3 an interimreparedpecialanel, was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. 3 report was. in effect, the answer by tho CIA/DIA Panel to thequestions regarding the number of major line elements in the Soviet ground force and the gross capabilities and mobilization potential of the force in terms of available military manpower. The current report is concerned with the evidence on the inventory of Soviet land combatnd conventional ammunition currently available to the Soviet ground force and the conclusions that can be based on the available As was the case in the previous Panel report, the findingsin this report arc based on exhaustive research and analysis.
rne terms land combat equipment and land armaments include armored vehicles, artillery and mortars, rocket launchers, small arms and other infantry weapons, and special vehicles (such as amphibians, artillery prime movers, and tank-recovery vehicles). These terms do not include tactical missiles, army or tactical aviation, communications and other electrical or electronic gear not integral to land combator general-purpose vehicles and support equipment (such as trucks, graders, scrapers, dozers, cranes, and bridges).
TOP
Summary
The Panel has examined the evidencethe inven-
tory and rates of acquisition of land combat equipment and ammunition by the Soviet ground force. We find that the flow of information on thishas diminished greatly since the period immediately after World War It with very little information having become available in recent years. Current information is fragmentary and inconclusive.
The Panel concludes from its review that the evidence is adequate for understanding the general nature of the Soviet effort to develop, produce, and maintain various types and models of modern equipment. The Panel also concludes reluctantly that evidence is insufficient to determineof items in the existing inventory within useful confidence limits. The Panel further finds that evidence on rates of production is inadequate to determine withange of inventories from possibleproduction. The evidenceide selection of assumptions concerning production capacities, rates, and duration, exceptmall number of unrelated items. Various estimating procedures were examined, but none was found that would reduce the range of uncertainty to useful proportions.
L
The Panel has little doubt that the Soviets have produced andlarge quantitieside variety of items. As manyand combat equipment may have been produced in quantity sinceof World War II. There is firm evidence from
which indicates quantity production of aboutodels^ There also is reasonably good evidence to justify the belief that the extensive land armaments industry known to be in operation in early postwar years still exists and retains much of its output capacity. This capacity is almost certainly large enough to have produced in large quantities all
TOP SECRETJ
I
J
of theodels and types observed. In addition, the evidence has shown that the Soviets go to remarkable lengths to preserve the useful life of their inventory.
New equipment has been sent to field unitsradual, sometimes almost leisurely, rate. The Panel has not been able to determine the rates of production or distribution of equipment or the relationshipthem. It is possible that some new equipment is sent directly to storage as combat reserve, although reason would seem to rule The distribution pattern for new equipment has been uneven, and in some cases the development and production of new models overtook the gradual issue of previous models. Soviet military leaders have spoken of the heavy cost of furnishing modern equipment to the ground force and have said hat not all units would have the latest models.
Althoughrevealed stocks of weapons associated with
some of tne active un ti, it has not as yet revealed any large general storage areas for land armaments.
The Panel believes that the Soviets probably have enough landin inventory to provide all active units, regardless of theirlevels, with land combat equipment in quantities adequate for their training and commitment to combat, that few if any units are likely to be completely equipped with/the latest models, and that some are almost certainly equipped wholly with older models. The Soviets have planned to mobilize additional forces, if noed be, by detaching cadres from existing units to form new ones and to call reserve personnel into active service. It is uncertain how many additional divisions and supporting units could be equipped from existing stocks. Doctrinal and technical developments and continuing budgetary stringencies may haveeconsideration of mobilization plansesultant change in the requirements for stocks of equipment.
TOP SECRET
BLANK PAGE
I. Nature of the Evidence
The evidence available for the assessment of the levels of outputthe inventory of Soviet land armaments originates, with onethat have been discussed in the Panel's first
interim report
A.
The variety of materiel and the problems outlined above Onstorage, and deployment limit the scope of information Even accurate information which might be
VlABTiHva
Tor SECRMi
I. Assessment of the Evidence
After observing the" absence of evidence applicable to the direct determination of inventories, the Panel proceeded perforce along very basic lines in its assessment. It reviewed the evidence relating to the existence of items and the probability of quantity production and then examined evidence that might permit derivation of inventories through methods such as cumulating annual production or surveying thein the hands of troops.
A. Direct Establishment of National Inventories
o -
TOP SECRET
secret I
top secret
C. Assessment of Cumulative Production
Analyses of information on Soviet capabilities to produceand ammunition, past production patterns, distributionof the items produced, and length of production runs forpermit only an approximation of annual and cumulativequite broad limits of confidence, i1 1
1. Capabilities and Requirements
a. Production Organization and Facilities
Since the end of World War II the organizationsproduction of land combat equipment and ammunition have changed several times. At the end of World War II the Ministries ofnd Munitions were separate. 3 the Ministry of Armamentsombined with the Ministry of Aviation into the Ministry of Defense Industry. 4 the Ministry of the Aviation Industryeparate ministry once again. 7 the Ministry of Defense Industry waswith the Ministry of General Machine building into the Stateon Defense Technology, which organization continuedhe Ministry of Munitions was incorporated into the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building;2 into the Ministry of Machine Building; and4 into the Ministry of Automobile, Tractor, and Agricul tural Machine Building. Subordination after the general reorganizations7 is uncertain, but responsibility for ammunition probably was placed under the Slate Committee for Defense Technology along with responsibility for land armaments. In5 the state committees associated with defense production were reorganized into USSR minis-trios, one of which is the Ministry of Defense Industry. It is likely that this ministry has resumed control of those plants subordinate to theinistry of Defense Industry. inistry of General Machine Building also has been reconstituted, although its area of responsibility is uncertain. In none of the organisational patterns noted above have primary production facilities been known to have been directlyto the Ministry of Defense.
TOV SEVRte+f
Design and development of materiel may be handled either jointly or separately by the responsible military arms or services and by the design institutes and plant design bureaus. Designs areto plants for the production of prototypes with the developmental work and testing.of the prototypes under the supervision of military General direction and final decisions on all majorare given by the highest government officials.
This apparatus has available toarge, well-equipped industrial base for the production of conventionallants have been identified as producers of armoredoror small arms, andor ammunition.
It is believed that the plants producing armaments are
among the most efficient in Soviet industry, having first call on new
production equipment and skilled labor. S
Soviet designers have achieved an enviable record in develop
ment of simple, rugged land armaments that do the jobs for which they are designedinimum of weight and complex mechanisms. The record achieved by the Soviets in the design and production of landduring World War II borders on the incredible. This record should be taken into account in any assessment of Soviet capabilities. Sovietprobably still ha**fhe capability to increase its production of land combat equipment and ammunition very rapidly and to add significant quantities of these items to the existing inventoryeriod of months.
Information on production facilities and theirtheas received in large quantities
Nation on production
techniques, labor Force, types of armaments, and the destination of finished articles furnishes the base of our knowledge of the industry at the present time. Information received since thes has little more than confirmed the probability of continued production of some items and provided some small inalght imp th>resent activities.
Most of the plants which produce land armaments also produce civilian goods such as tractors, railway equipment and machinery, and heavy industrial machinery. Because much of the equipment used to
produce the civilian goods also is suitable for armaments, these offer the capability of rapid expansion of armaments production.
ihe production 01
Civilian goods by these plantsounter-indicaTion of armaments Not enough is known, however, about changes in production techniques, changes in plant capacities, or the range of articlesto provide moreeneral idea of the amount of plant capacity not devoted to civilian production and thus presumably available for armament production at any specific plant.
That evidence which is available on production policies indicates that the Soviets prefer rather long production runs at fairly constant levels. Analysts believeeriodoears usually is used to schedule the production cycleajor equipment model. The Soviets appear to prefer to make periodic major modifications on items in production rather than to redesign them completely.
Analysts believe that in most cases information isultimately to fix the date of initial quantity production toears of the actual date and to fix tho date of the end of production toears of actual termination. Some considerable time may elapse, however, before the evidence permits fixing limits with even the indicated precision. Often the cessation of productioniven item may be only inferred from the identification of an item which appears toeplacement.
b. Program Requirements for Production oi Equipment
Little is known about how the Soviets programof land armaments and ammunition. Available information has yielded no evidence as to the level of new equipment generally programed for the active field forces or reserves, the slse of the inventory required toiven quantity operational, or whether Bloc and non-Bloctrade requirements arc included. Response in the productionto changes in force levels, force composition, and tables ofof units is unknown.
not all would re-
ceive any given item of new equipment, but it is uncertain
[relates to the issuance of new equipment to the various military units. How the ground force fares in competition with other forces thai
-
CU El1
also may use the same model of equipment is not known. Air defense forces received some models of antiaircraft guns before the groundoth.Blo.c- and non-Bloc forces also have appeared to receive some Soviet equipment before the Soviet groups of forces were fully equipped with the same items. As first-line ground force units are re-equipped with new items, displaced items may be reconditioned for reissue or placement in reserve. If this is the typical practice, units to be mobilized probably would be equipped largely with obsolescent or obsolete items. It is also possible that some new material is placed in reserve to provide for replacement of early combat losses. As yet, however, there is no confirmation of long-term storage by the Soviets of new land combat equipment.
Establishing Minimum Production
b.
in the Hands of Troops
Panel has surveyed the possibility of identifying quantities of equipment in the hands of troops to gain some knowledge on minimum production and inventories of equipment. The information available on all troop areas was clearly inadequate for the purpose. Although the information on the GSFG greatly exceeds that from other areas, it was found to be severely restricted in scope and failed to prove generally rewarding for establishing minimum production.
On the basis of the information that is available, the troops of the GSFG seem to have no notable deficiencies in equipment. In. some instances, however, models which arc known to have been in production for years have nol completely replaced earlier models. The outstanding example is the medium tank. As shown in the table,24 tanks were estimated to be still in troop units, although production ceased in8b, was present in some units in East Germany. The
- IS -
Quantities of Selected Iters Estimated for Troop Units of the2
Required
by Estimated TOE's of Divisional
2
Quantity Estimated to Be in Hands of
Quantity Confirmed by Count of Imports
tankB
edium tanks
eavy tanks
{3,
3^0
h,2h0
T
Hoo
280
personnel carriers
0to-li2 BTH-^Op
OO
k)
290
on mortarnnro0
PAA
1:0
ire available I'or the years
Coverage over the period is variable tflth anpercent coverage for the0 andpercent for the- Some equipment that was imported may have bean subsequently returned to the USSR or turned ever to the East Oman army as well as being subject to normal attrition.
TOP SECRET
TOr
presence ofanks could be attributed to the GSFGlthough the requirements of the table of organization and equipment (TOE) were believed to be, and the tank had been in productionears. TR-SOp armored personnel carriers could bedespite the estimated TOE requirement of more thannd the fact that produclion started About half of Ihe expected number ofrmored personnel carriers was estimated to be in East Germany, although production started The validity of the figures shown in the table IB subject tttianges of error believed to' be as wide asoorcent, and no definite correlation between supply to the GSFG and production can be established.
Information
indicates thai now ground combat materiel is sent Id the GSFGsmall numbers and is used for demonstration, familiarization,training at headquarters of large units. Some field testingbe accomplished in the GSFG-* Subsequently, additionalused for reequipmentnit-by-unit basis within prioritiestypes of units and location. [atatcd that new equipment is
not issued to troops near the border. If the policy ware applied to all areas where Western observation isart of the GSFG could be rcequipped with an item not known by Western observers to exist.
Analysis of the information on imports of equipment into the GSFG during theeads to the conclusion that forreason, the supplying of new equipment isradual process regardless of when production started or the rates of production bplieved to obtain. Information on areas other than the GSFG is not adequate to confirm lhat thiseneral procedure. Another curious aspect of this situation is that some models of equipment have been exported in quantity to other countries, both Bloc and non-Rloc. before the GSFG was fully rcequipped. Thisuestion, which the Panel has not been able to resolve, of the relative priority of the GSFG for new equipment.
" It is possible thai some of the items firstthe
GSFG may be in this category. If so, the type of testing done isbeinal nature immediately before large-scale seriesthe evidence is too sparse to confirm |
small numbers of an itemuide to the initiation of series production.
-
"FOP SEGRET
The evidence from East Germany, supported alsofrom other areas, has shown that tho Soviets followthe use of equipment which are intended to maximize its combatof these practices are questionable by Western standards. place very limited annual norms on the use of most com>atparticularly vehicles. Training is accomplished through the usea small part of the regular inventory heldnit or withequipment retained solely for training. The remainder of theis kept in storage by the unit where the vehicles, althoughcombat loaded, are kept on blocks. The tanks in storageeparately secured area. Although it receivesfrom the crews that would operate it in combat, the equipmentis used only during large-scale unit exercises. In Westerndeterioration of equipment is notunction ofused or miles traveled. In addition, competencerew isto the use of and familiarity with the piece of equipment to whichis assigned. The Panel cannot judge the degree to which theovercome these negative aspects of the storage of equipment,Soviets do manage to keep the equipment in East Germany inwithout notably high rates of failure in road marches. equipment has been shipped to non-Bloc countries on verywithout unusual complaints about the state of maintenance
c. Other Approaches
In view of the inadequacy of direct evidence, ofof cumulative produclion, or of sightings of equipment on which to base estimates of inventories, the Panel sought other approaches that might yield estimatesreater degree of certainty. Among the approaches examinedeckoning of equipment levels fromindicated by the tables of organization and equipment and order of battle. It was discovered in this approach, as with all others tried, that the lack of evidence forced resortumber of assumptions such as those on production scheduling and replacement policy whichritical influonce on the inventories calculated. Changes in these basicpermissible within limits established by the evidence, could result in widely varying inventories. Thus no approach examined improved the situation so far as yielding inventories which could be claimed to be more solidly based on evidence. Inventories could be calculated that seemed to have improved internal consistency between types and models of equipment.
-
TOEr
The Panel cannot be sure, however, that the Soviets have followedof production and inventory that are both consistent and reasonable by Western standards.
ui, Findings
The Panel concludes from its review of the evidence on landand conventional ammunition that the evidenceeneral appreciation of the subject. In these terms,is useful for an understanding of the general dimensions ofeffort to develop and produce modern equipment for itsand the degrees of emphasis placed on various types and models Even in these respects, however, the situation regardingand currency of the information received is similar toof the Soviet ground forceur stale of knowledgethe current period and is restricted in scope, mud,
at any given time, Ihe Soviets couldurpriseiece of equipment as they did when first employing4 tank during World War II. Ordinarily, displayarade is the most likely means of first observation.
The evidence reviewed by the Panel has proved unsatisfactory for quantifying the production and inventory o( land combat equipment and ammunition within useful confidence limits. Crucial elements arefrom the available evidence, forcing the use of assumptions inprocedures. The reasonable variations in assumptions permitted by the evidence can cause large differences in the sizes of inventories calculated. The Panel examined various approaches to estimates but found none that would reduce the very wide ranges of uncertainly. Thus the Panel believes thai,with the exceptionew items, formulation of estimates of production, inventory, and related subjects such asat this time would be misleading and wouldisservicesuch estimates could not be justified by the evidence at hand.
The failure of the evidence to support useful quantitative estimates docs not mean, however, that the Soviets have neglected development and produclion of new land combat equipment and conventional The uncertainties are relative to the Soviel inventory objectives, rates of production and replacement, and disposition and extent of the inventory. In the opinion of the Panel there is no doubt that the Soviets
-
TOP
irCMTT
have had an extensive, continuing program for the design, development, and production of land combat equipment and ammunition since World War II. As many asodels may have been in production at some time or other during the, and there is firm evidence relating to aboutf these models of equipment,as follows:
of Models
Armoredor l6
Field
AA
Rocket
Missile launchers
Small arms and Infantryprime raovorn and amphibians
Of the above items, excluding small arms) probably enteredin the. resents in summary form the sources of information and the indicated dates of production fur each item. Fourteen types of ammunition have been identified by observation or from Soviet documentary sources. Most of the weapons shown inequired ammunitionew caliber oronfiguration different from lhat previously manufactured.
Although the materiel appears to reach the troopsradual flow and some troop elements may never have the latest models, no troop units on which there is direct information have been noted to havfdeficiencies of materiel when measured by the estimated TOE'S. The Panel believes it probablo that sufficient land combat equipment is in inventory lo outfit all active units, including cadre units, although it cannot judge the proportion of current models.
- ZD -
TOP SECRET
-top secret
BLANK PAGE
secret
or
SECRET
,
S
Sill i
i *
ini
TOP slcret
top secret I
i-
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: