1- - YTJOOSLAVTA'S POLICIES TOWARD THE COMMTWffiT WORLD V
i;nj.eu'l,.'iVc it"*;
'ShLREr
5
OLICIES TOWARD THE COMMUNIST WORLD
President Tito of Yugoslavia vilL aoono* round of talks in various CommuBist capitalsPrague, Eastwill haveImplications tor his country's futurewith the Soviet Communist movement. Ills goal in bis meetings with tbe ne* Soviet Lesders and other Communist beads of state will be totho special association with the Soviet bloc tbat Yugoslavia gained under Khrushchev.
Sinceelations with the USSR and tbe East European countrlss have Improved drsmsti-cally in all areas, Including the Ideological,economic, and military. Tito has been particularly gratified that recent trends Id the Soviet bloc thinking generally coincide with his own concepts of diversity In the Communist camp,
ALthough Tito'a talks this sumaer probably mill contribute to these improving relations, they are oqually likely to remind him of Yugoslavia's vulnerability to the .Soviets' shifting tactics ln tbelr efforts to resolve tbe Sioo-Sovlet dispute, or to any new efforts by Moscow to reassert tighter control over the Communist camp. Already approhon-slve about none of Moscow's recent actions and com-sents, Tito mill take care to remain on the edge of tbe CommuDlst camp lest Moscowourse which appears inimical to Belgrade's Interest*.
in.^BB tjommunlst World
Without modifying Its ideo-Logy or weakening itswith tbe noaallgned states. Yugoslavia received theroglme's blessingommunist state, acquired aeconomic position, obtained access to Soviet military stores, and was consulted on somo Soviet foreign policy utters. In his first meeting with Khrushchev's successors nest month, Tito will |
bo exploring first of sLl to wtist extent their attitudes wlLL permit Yugoslavia tothis special relationship with the Communist movement. Be will slso seek to build close personal ties with them of the typo he enjoyed with Khrushchev.
Moscow bas sppsrently taken great pslns to sssure btm that Khrushchev's basic policies have not changed. Tito will stilt be approaching thewith certain qualms, however,
Page I SPECIAL REPORT ay 65
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE YUGOSLAV-SOVIET BLOC RAPPROCHEMENT
on
tmlmmmf
r mlaiita
*,
6m
mkai.
7 Jul
baain
w
um witn*
liHIi'll ill.
- .
|l.
nm.
. cm Mmi*. bmm
iwi
Mbm
rl*.II
ai
.
oM a. Ml*
taiM
. lab
o:m* .whim il-i-
af tm <ajtt*
i V'l Oa. ulalia-
lao* ta-II"
Jan Tinkrlla.
recalling that Brezhnev, during an official visit to Belgradeisplayed an arrogant and disparaging attitude anda number of pubLlcembarrassing to his hosts.
In his talks, Tito will voice approval ol trends toward diversity In the Cowaunlstand urge those policies which would ensure their As ho had successfully done with Khrushcbev, Tito will try to "sell" himselfink between Moscow and the nonallgned states, and as an example to the* that good relations with Moscow arc poa-slbLo without sacrifice of self-interest. Tito will also tirapha-size that good Soviet relations with Lolgrade are an Important
symbol to the entire world that Stalinism is dead.
Tito probably will come away reassurod that Uoscow's policies will not change In the foreseeable future and that his own position Is stillalthough probably less favored than It was under Moreover, be is not likely to develop the rapport with the new Leaders that he had with Khrushchev.
For the long ruD, however, Tito probably will become more convinced than ever that'a relations with Moscow depend principally on outsidecontinuation ofSoviet attitudes lao-3oviet dlsputo. Its pursuit or peaceful coexistence with the West, and its courtship of the nonallgned states. Tito
hagfo-ihclslln fane* ii-arid,otin -Mdi tho, o*
of Ifce canolrioni fiwn *ti!ch>iN*ne*tKa
o< oir one cantor of all otflsm and ollho emir*
octliril, e* the IMoroflonolnovtrrnnlodv(ton tmite IntarWJoftal -orion'
need. *kHot coxmI
Attar ell Mil vtlly if, th. .Mamotknel -ckW,o at UooUovIa'. elohlt* port, ra^w/
also recognizes that Moscow's current policies toward Belgrade can bo disadvantageous for the USSR. To the extent that Tito is reminded of those facta In Moscow, his sometimes Irrational apprehensions about theof good Soviet-Yugoslavwill bo fortified. esult, Belgrade willcontinue to exhibit Its discomfort whenever new Soviet tactics can be interpreted as signs tbat Moscow's basicmay bo changing.
In Eastern Europe, Tito wiLl continue toautious loosoning of Moscow's apron strings. Ho willYugoslavia's policies and experiences as worthy ofas these states modify their economic and political Institutions.
Belgrade-Moscow Relations
Since the currentbegan in earnestugoslavia's party and statewith Moscow have become Increasingly close. Before his ouster, Khrushchev had ac-copted Tito as a Legitimato socialist, and the Soviets had even come to tho view that internal poLiciOS bad some merit for other countries.
K1*
Page 3 SPECIAL REPORT lay 63
WhlLe In Yugoslaviaeturning2 visit toreferred favorably to Yugoslavia'scouncil system ofaanaeement.
Belgrade views as ansign Moscow's preliminary steps with profit Incentive in the production and distribution of some consumer goods, aYugoslavia bogan in the. Tito, moreover, has noted with some pleasure the turn to more permissivepolicies on party andrelations among Coiamu-nist regimes, and sees this as an endorsement of his own views. Khrushchev evenoint of keoplng Tito informed onpoLicies, and on occasion called upon him for support in squabbles within the Communist camp.
Vhen4 Soviet and Rumanian disagreements had reached the threshold of public polemics, for example,reportedly urged Tito to use his Influence withto cool tho accelerating conflict. Tito reportedly counseled both Khrushchev and Rumanian chief Gheorghlu-Dej tbat the differences wereand that precipitateby either side could cause
dlffanncn In utflMm tawortf lurflvlousl
cannot b* ngtudtdnrmtr of teelcHu davaJep
nor ton*ym wl Mi-iWrjinJ ,tn lhact ovr covnrry and pat, in tN> peal. Diffarawct olio cennor he tofvad byfptvibn.
fine* ufwiwKa fromolio ho icnflnrcd Ihet
saprortuimporor, rhino, Ihst itwy wilv**
onvoid problem andoe*Pen.
an open dispute and retaliation not ln the interest of either party.
In the struggle between the USSR and the Chinese, the Yugoslavs have clearly supported the Soviets, although all the while defending China's right to formulate its own views. This support reflects not only Yugoslavia's thoroughof China's dogmaticbut also the narrowing of ideological differencesBelgrade and Moscow. moreover, is convinced that Moscow's foreign poLiciesKhrushchev'sthe best bope forinternational tensions. This, ln turn, creates tbe best international atmosphere for Belgrade to pursuo its own approach to foreign and domestic affairs.
Tito and Khrushchev found mutual advantage in Tito's role in the internationalmovement, whichappealed to the Yugoslav President's sense of In return, Titolived up to histo avoid direct criticism of Soviet actions with which he disagreed, and he has been quick to voice Yugoslav support for soviet initiatives inaffairs.
Economic Relations
The improvement in 3ovlet-Yugoslav economic relations has been marked by frequentof delegations and signlngs of new agreements.5 trade agreement sets
secret
Page 4 SPECIAL REPORT ay 65
mlUion
2 totalpercent increase over4 goal. A
side agreement provided for Yugoslav constructionorth of ships for tbe
USSR
The Soviets also have agreed to provide on credit significant electric generating powerfor tho Yugoslav side of the Iron GatesJoint Yugoslav-Rumanian undertaking to construct power dams on the Danube. In this way Moscow probably hopes to ensureand in an Important segment of Yugoslavia'sdevelopment, as well as exclude the West from the The two count rlos also bave recently agreed to exchange electric power and to establish direct sir service between their capitals.
In addition, lo February tho bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)an agreement for limited Yugoslav participation which will facilitate negotiations and trade agreements In the.
Military Relations
Moscow has become tho sole supplier of modern military equipment to Yugoslavia, Since the beginninghas receivedet fighters, hardware for tbree surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites,4 tanks, and small quantities ofradar equipment, assault guns, antitank missiles, and antiaircraft guns. Reportsthat military purchases nay
amount to an additionalIGs, nine SAM sites, and ton tanks.
In addition, the military services of the two countries bave resumed some contactsong period of hostility. Tho Soviet fleetort call last June for the first time The defenseand high military officers bave exchanged visits onholidays. Yugoslavbave gone to the USSR for training on their newly acquired equipment, and there isoviet training mission in Yugoslavia.
Relations with Eastern Europe
With Soviet sponsorship, Yugoslavia has gained Influence
YUGOSLAVIA'S FOREIGN TRADE DISTRIBUTION
USSR
Other Coramunif Courttflei
Co-rmon
Mofkel
U$
Other free World
PERCENTAGES
Free Wot Id breakdown available
in Eastern Europe and rapidly Improved its relations with all the countries except Albania. Tito last year personallywith all tbe Eastbloc leaders exceptZhlvkov. In addition to tbe planned official visitB to Prague and East Germany this spring, he probably will see Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian leaders before the year is out. In the meantime, many Lower level delegations bave beenand biLateral agreements signed.
Belgrade probably hasclosost to Bucharest. the most critical phase of Ruaania's bid for economicfrom Moscow, party chief Dej consulted with Tito twice and allegedly requested his support. Economic relations also have gained impressively as tho two countries have moved through tbe planning stage and begun actual construction of the Iron Gates project.
Czechoslovakia, which has been attempting toay out Of its economic stagnation, tinseen interest ln Belgrade's internal economic programs. Prague apparentlyto experiment with Less central planningartially free-market economy using the profit motive to promote These are allwhich Yugoslavia pioneered some years ago.
Relations withrestricted in the past by its strong Stalinistbeen Improving since January, when Yugoslavia's then foreign
minister, Koca Popovlc, paid an official visit to that Sofia is apparentlywith more Liberaleconomic policies, and the attempted coup by anfaction Last monthstrong sentimentore Independent, Tito-Like policy.
Economic and statewith Hungary and Poland also bavo Improved rapidly, but in party affairs there is an apparent coolness between Tito and their Leaders. This maytbelr disapproval of many Yugoslav domestic policies and institutions which, when adopted by Hungary and Polandecame threats to their regimes.
Although Tito has been moro cautious ln warming up to the Ulbrlcht regime in Eastest be harm Belgrade'seconomic ties with Westplan to visit there ln June demonstrates histo achieve good relations with all the East European bloc. Moreover, East Germany is fastignificant trade partner.
Conversely, Belgrade's relations with Communist China's beaebbead in Europe, Albania, hsve if anything deteriorated from an already Low level. with Tirana's possibleon the Large Albanian minority in Yugoslavia has caused Belgrade to react strongly to continued propagandato this group from Belgrade aLso has twice ln the past year officially protested strong attacks on
Yugoslavia by Chinese Premier Chou Bn-Lal while he wasTirana.
Tito Remains an Outsider
Although Moscow andEurope baveong way toward Yugoslavia, andrelations areMoscow bas not asked for, and Tito bas not sought,commltmonts to Comnunist Eastern Europe.
YugosLsvis's limitedwitb CEMA, for example, was achieved only after many months of arduous negotiations and was obviously designed not to affect the predominantlyorientation of Yugoslavia's trade.
Belgrade has not associated itself with the Warsaw Pact and, moreover, has continued its explicit criticism of allalliances. Although the amount of equipment received from the Soviets is Impressive, delivery has been slow. Even after all the planned sbipmonts areafterare made for some unknownYugoslav military arsenal will remainWestern.
Yugoslavia apparently has not received tactical surface-to-surface roissiLes (Scuds or EROGs) aLthough the Soviets bave provided them to their Warsaw Pact allies, Including the less reliable ones such as Hungary.
The Jovicts reportedlyBelgrade credit terms for its military purchases as
early as last June, butapparently did not accept. In September, Defense Ministerexplaining the slow pace of modernization in thethat theestablishment, unlikeenterprises incould not make use of credits or loans. He noted that savings realized from reducing the size of the armed forces by one fourth and the term of military service froaoonths would go toward percent increase ln defense expenditures5 suggests tbat Belgrade Intends to pay casb for Soviet equipment.
There is no conclusivetbat Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have agreed to close collaboration and mutual assistance ln military affairs. Quite to tbe contrary, theArmy's last maneuvers were planned to counter an attack from tbe East. Belgrade'sdetermination to avoid entanglementlosewith the Soviet military, however, may be undermined If It fails to make satisfactory arrangements for spare parts and new equipment from the US.
Despite agreement withviews on most foreign policy Issues, Belgrade has continued to act in concert with tbe non-aligned states rather than the Soviet camp. Yugoslavia was one of the principal organizers of Last October's nonallgnedconference Id Cairo, and chose toonference of nooaligned ambassadors ln Marchehicle for advancing
f it ?
till/a
olicy at ronoKanrBM il IWInfl loosy.Ivaicui BHloat Inih* pad, oil tottl al ptatiura andthii policy Koial-ayipcaparlnp Itwl'I loi nana toda ond for arrantthe IffamolrOrol lirmiion, bocouo Itli notapoilcvdoelilnot Kasnaaion or lirpmodjpaathon-hltc in tha UM)
its views on the Vietnam This Yugoslav approach reflects Belgrade's view that the world ls politically divided between states which pursue their Interests through peace and those that seek them lnIt ls not split betweenand capitalists,to Tito, for each can be found in both camps.
An Unstable Relationship
Yugoslavia's relationship with the Soviet camp basicallyy-product of the USSR's relationships with the West and the rest of tbe Communist world, and docs not depend primarily on matters of direct bilateral Interest. BeLgrade has the precedents of8 expulsion from the bloc and tho breakdown of theto remind it of this fact.
One vital factor In the situation is the Sino-Soviet dispute, and Belgrade lsalert to any tactical movos on Moscow's part wbicb suggest tbat Belgrade'swill be Jeopardized. BeLgrade ls overly suspicious, for example, that over tho Long term Moscow mightonditionoscow-Pel ping reconci Listunlikely that prospect appears to other Communist states.
Tito also realizes that Moscow's currently favorable poLicies toward Belgrade canhave an adverse effect on the USSR's relations with other East European states. Having defied Moscow and prospered, Yugoslavia may sorvoure for other Communists to seek more Independence than Moscow is Billing to give. Rumania's assertion of independence and tbe recent coup attempt lnare mute testimony of tbls reality.
Yugoslavia, moreover, bas over tbe past year openlyMoscow's tactics to unify the Communist movosent. Yugoslavia's ownfrom the bloc, Tito opposed4 caLlonference of Communist partieswas initially intended to srrsngo China's Isolation from tbe Communist movement. Although the consultativeconvened by Khrushchev's successors ln Marchburled any real likelihoodonference of any kind ln the foreseeableYugoslavia nevertheless was disquieted by its results. Tbe final communique* stillconferences as the best way to svttlc disputes--Belgrade docs notmade favorable
o.mlaV rfcar toaayard
mankind <an as Ukqci ba vlaaad onlyviw.il formarton* Cw-vtlK pvl*t'..ICY**offy) Illo prinUflaBioat CarmnlH and WarWn* partial oa aofapMewj fliul) lhaomldan that radaroihlarrwni a' tha unity ad lh*lOiiiani. tl il Nr mar* hrawora Ho- Il alll baatal abortion! il will Itoat and la anW way itfci isncliuioaa.'l**oiohim tordaraawitobat
SECRET
refereoce to7oth of which were highly critical of Yugoslavia's ideology and
Reflecting its acuteto possible changes in .Soviet attitude, Belgrade has also quivered over Sovietagainst revisionism and In praise of Stalin inwithay (Evenugoslav correspondent incomplained onpril that one hears with increasingIn the USSR thatis the main danger to the international Communist Tito, of course, hasbeen the chief revisionistStalin stands for the dogmatic, centralized control of the Communist movement soby the Yugoslavs, even
his partial rehabilitation ilitary leader would concern Belgrade.
Although these reactions mainly reflect Belgrade's over-sensitivity to the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Yugoslav disquiet may not be entirely unfounded.ebruary meeting with the Yugoslav ambassador InBrezhnev reportedlycertain features of tbe Yugoslav party congress last December, at which the Yugoslavsomprehensive view of their domestic and foreign policies. Moreover, there Is evidence the new leaders naybe looking beyond Tito, On several occasions in tbepast, Moscow's ambassador In Belgrade has purposefully consulted with Vice President RankovLc on problems which might better have been taken up with Tito. mawmmmmmmm
secret
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: