SCCRLTE
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
5
Soviet Attitudes Toward the US
. i
SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US
THE PROBLEM
To assess current Soviet attitudes toward the US. particularly in the light of the Vietnam and Dominican Republic situations, and toprobable Soviet foreign policy in the next few months.'
CONCLUSIONS
successors, seeking new ways to cope withchallenge to Moscow's authority, have altered theSoviet foreign policy. They began lo do so very shortly afterpower and well before present US policies in Vietnam wentThe new leaders did not set out deliberately to reverseof East-West relations which lad developed after thecrisis. Rather, they gave first priority to efforts to repairposition in its own camp and in the underdevelopedacceptingeterioration ofthe US. )
revision of policy has led the Soviet leaders toVietnamese crisis and to assume increasing commitmentshas nowivotal issue in Soviet foreignnarrow limits on Moscow's freedom of maneuver in otherEast-West relations. )
Soviet conduct continues to reflect aavoid high risksesire to remain in contact withtime, experience may persuade the Soviet leaders thatChina on the latter's terms is unprofitable andard-line
qxcArd. Ihtt CHUM don no. roanfcr SWtrt tvxtxm to uy Ml"
H> US pofatfciAt DRV or.
foreign policy is iiiconsistent with efforts to promote domestic economic growth. During the next few months, however, we expect the USSR to give vigorous opposition to the USide range of issues. We believe that present conditions, particularly the situation in Vietnam, virtually preclude Soviet willingness to improve relations with the US.
- scene*
DISCUSSION
The Change in Soviet Policy
la (he seven montlt* following tlsc fall of Khrushchev, the USSR's attitude(he US ha* undergonechange. Shortly aftertool power, llie new leaden beganlay clown (he spirit of dclcntc. Although Moscow still made an effort Id fcetn open (he option of positive relationships withaidcr Ihic was manifest even before February, when the US responded to the Viet Cong alt.ick on Pltikn by bombing tin- DIIV during Kosygin's visitanoi. This puwl the itsiic acutely, and since that time Hwm hasumber at positions which have brough( i( into broader opposition to US pobcie*.
Some indicatorsiange in the Soviet line appeared immediately after the accession of (he new lenders in October.eek, hint* emerged tltat the showdown with China which Khrushclscv hud scheduled for December was to Ik- postponed, as in fact il subsequently was. Official statements began to lay greater stress on the (heme* of Communbt unltv and national liberation, while peaceful coexistciHv ntvived reduccl attention and the test luuwent almost unrncntioncd. In November, when the US and Belgium mounted tlsc Stanleyville rescue operation. Moscow went beyond propaganda attacks to Join the UAR and Algeria in military aid to (he Congolese rebels, taking no pains to maintain secrecy. Dining tltesc first inonflu. statements of Soviet leaders about East-West relations gradually altered, with optimism giving wayarker picture which presented the Wesl. and particularly the US.ore unfavorable h'ght-
1 One of the most urgent problems facing the new leaden was the needope with the pressures generated by Communist China. Pciping has long been seeking to establish that any accommodation at all with (he USetrayal of Communist principles and interests. Under this indictment. Ithole scries of Khrushchev'* post-Cuban moves on two major counts; thtil his policies directly harmed tho socialist countries ami that they deliveredcountries and national liberation movements into the hands of the imperialists. Khrushclvev responded with heated denials, continued to stress good relations with the US. and counterattackedampaign to isolate the Chinese and perhaps even cape) them from the Communist movement
ills way of conducting the Sino-Soviet dispute produced considerableinside the Communist camp but did not muster the strengthfor an all-out Soviet attack on China. Khrushchev nevertheless persisted; moreover, even tltough the test ban treaty was not followed up by otlieragreements, he continued to insist that the climate of detente created the most favorable circumstances for Communist advances, lbs successors evidently do not regard these at tbe correct tactics for the present phase. In their view. Khrushchev's detente policies were not leading to gains for the Soviets sufficient to counter those the Chinese were making. The new leaders
didut ileliberntery to reverse die course of East-West relations whidi had developed after (lie Cuban missile crisis. Rather, tliey gave first priority lo efforts to repair the USSR's position in its own camp and tlie underdeveloped world, consciously acceptingonsequence tlie deterioration of relations with the US.
In this conical, the most pressing question to Vietnam, an issue which not only combined the national interestsommunist stair and the fateliberation struggle' hut, even more, was closely bound up with the Sino-Sovict dispute. Khmahdtcv had virtually written olt Viet nam, consigning Hanoi to the Chinese camp. Sounding* during the vMiigh-ranking DRVto Moscow in November evidently encomagud hi* Kucccssors to change thii policy and to offer military and economic aid to North Vietnam. They may have thought merely to sliare in the credit for an impending Communist victory, and (hey proltably underestimated the risks of the new course, but in any case the upshot was to deepen their commitment to the DHV. Vietnam lias nowivotal issue in Soviet foreign policy, setting narrow limits on Moscow's freedom of maneuver in cither areas of East-West relations
It is likely that tlie very newness of tholeadership has .uiir-thiiiy In do with llic diange iii line. In an ciinrt to otahlu.li tli.ir authority, Khrushchev's successors liavc been under pressure to appear as unfailingof the causes of their allies and clients. Tills lias the effect of giving these allies and clients greater leverage over Soviet policy- North Vietnam is the obvious case, Imt this factor probably alsoart in tlie Soviet decision to give unusual hacking to East Germany in the Intense- harassment of last month's Bundestag meeting in West Berlin.
Against this background of reappraisal and dunging priorities, various US actions have also affected Sovietumber of issues active in the first months after Khrushchevsemphasis on "building bridges' lo Eastern Europe, the UN payments crisis, iheadded to the new Soviet leaders' doubts about the wisdom of detente. Subsequently, the US military buildup in Vietnam, and particularlyombing of the DRV. served to demonstrate to them that the USSR could not hope to support Hanoi and still preserve an atmosphere of relaxed tensions in Soviet-US relations. These actions alsoS willingness to useespite restraints of world opinion, which probably dismayed the Soviets nnd indicated to them that US policy had taken an assertive turn. US intervention in the Dominican Republic, occurring well after the new Soviet line hud Item established, has merely reinforced the latter view.
Nevertheless, Soviet conduct continues tooncern to avoid high lisks and an awareness to the danger of challenging important US interests. In Vietnam itself. Moscow almost certainly is using its limited influence to urge caution upon Hanoi and lo keep alive die option of negotiations. Itsaid, while it nowariety of weapons, has arrived slowly and in small quantities. In its relations willi the US. Moscowesire at
DC I
least toinjiu in ixsntact with Washington and to preserve certain cooperative links created in recent years. These faeton indicate that present Soviet behavior contatm muchactical in nature.
The Outlook
some extent, (lie present Soviet line is probably the result ot* anaccumulation of curnmi Invents, in response to the factorswinch have earned the new leadersoint winch foreclosestlrno being tlsc option of detente tactics. We foresee no earlythis course. In particular, the increasing Soviet commitment to thepeed odes any substantial efforts to improve relations with theso long as bombing of the DRV miitmues. By the same token,are slim that tlsc USSR will make any positive response toefforts to improve relations. Ilie current Soviet line will also producereactions and tactics on many other international issues. These willon the US; it is ah-eadv evident that Moscow exempts Paris fromapproach, and it may attempt SirUtions with other US allies.
The further course of the Vietnamreat effect upon Soviet thinking and generalI. for example, the US substantially widened the scope of its attach on North Vietnam, tlie Soviets would fed compdlcd to harden lurthcr tlsrir general line. Apart from what they might do in Vietnam, they would probably tale some of the demonstrative steps from which they have thus far refrained, such as announcing an increase in military expenditures or severely harassing the US Embassy In Moscow. They might even go so far as to abrogate the test ban treaty. If, on the other hand, the Vietnam crisis somehow lost some of its intensity, this would give tint Soviets new flexibility. They would probably use tlx: opportunity to begin svorking backore balanced posture lim-cir tlie US which afforded wider optical for future maneuver.
omewliat broader perspective, time are factors at worl which contradict those elements now In tlie ascendancy in Soviet policy-making. If detente has its drawbacks for the USSR, so do increased tensions, and the gains of the latter are no more certain. One of the coraiderations behind Khrushchev's decision to relax tensions, for example, was the desire to refute the advocates of greater defense expenditures and devote more resources to improving living standards and Industrial nsodernization. His successors are likely to find themselves confronted with the same problem, for theyo committed to civilian programs scarcely compatible with major increases in defense spending.
With respect to China and (he US. Klirusliehcv's successors may End that they have fallen into an error opposite to his. They apparently judge that be had too heavily engaged Soviet policy in the effort at rapprochement between Moscow and Washington. In reaction to this, Isowever, tbey find themselves
scenes
embarkedind of "mo-tooism" which aeccpls Peipingi definitions of the terms of struggle within the Communist movement.
I" In our view, the Soviets will find little profit in competition with the Chinese on these terms. Any initial hopes that China could be induced to cease its attacks have certainly been destroyed by now.he USSR likely in this way lo arrest the general decline of its influence in otherparties and revolutionary movements Some Communists, particularly in Europe, are dissatisfied with tlie abandonment of detente; some militantsto the Chinese charge that detente has never really been abandoned; many are made uneasy by the new departure and the danger of larger war in Vietnam. Thus the time may come when the Soviet leaders judge thai their new tactics have greatly h'mited their freedom of action and laid litem open to greater risks, but have not shored up Soviet authority to any significant degrec.
he future course of Soviet foreign policy is also bound up with the future of tlie collective leadership. There has almost certainly been jockeying for position in the months since Khrushchev'she working out ofl rivalries, which is certain lo lie related to the formulation of newi in .in'! prcpantttons for (he approaching Party Congress; can hardly fail to involve foreign policy as well.
"This question will be cm mined in greater detail in, "Soviet Politics Afterdwduled for publication In June.
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