SITUATION IN BOLIVIA

Created: 5/26/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligenceay5

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Situation in Bolivia

_ . ilitary government of General Rene Barrientos Ortuno la in serious danger ofa strong leader, very pro -

He Iti StVeSCommunist. An assessment of those forces attempting to oust him revealsuccessor government would probably permitand extreme leftists to consolidate and increase their power.

. 2- Shortly after the present military iunta

ower struggle was beginning betweens* Prominent members. Both junta president Slrti rlS^edommander GeneralOvando Candia are ambitious, and eacha significant power base. Working together

ootro1 Bolivia, using theorces to implement their authority. Opposing

C*nd thechoose sides between

3. Barrientos and Ovando are acutelv aware that

! torn byy *tol*ol

thTicooperate with each other. Up to this point, they have managed to resolve their dif-

!sity. Throughout tne past five months, Barrientos has known oflandestine contacts with two politicale extreme leftist and Communist-pene-llrl National Leftist Revolutionary Party, the

BPPPOWlOfOFRilLAS! J^JiV**lon" lia< Bo'^lanFalange, the FSB) unacceptable to himself

no FO^^CN^Tsej^i

allies. Ovando, In turn, has publicly endorsedcandidacy for election as constitutional Barrlentos, however, was not Ovando's private choice for president.

Barrlentos' support lines up as follows. Be has strong backing from the peasant groups, particularly in his native Cochabamoa area. These numberho are armed. They are fierce fighters and appear toersonal loyalty to him. Probably Barrlentos can count on at least so percent of the army to back him. Noncommissioned and junior officers are pro-Bsrrlentos. He has the solid backing of the air force. Of theparties, probably the only one to back himhowdown would be the sector of the NationalistMovement led by Hernan siles. General public opinion is pro-Barrlentos but would not count for much In an armed action.

Ovando is a former member of the BolivianFalangeightist and even reactionary party patterned after the Spanish Falange. Hisare still with the Falange and the party views him as Its major hope of coming to power. The FSB has allied Itself with the extreme left, including Juan Lechln's National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN) and the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB). The PRIN is heavLly infiltrated with Communists, for example Dr. Ramlro Vlllarroel Claure and Enrique Valverde. Both areParty members as well as members of prin and both visited Pelping in March The Communist Partyis led by Secretary General Mario Monje Molina and his deputy Jorge Kolle Cueto. This unholy alliance is not one of permanence but has been used by each group

in pursuance of particular ends. It was active andin precipitating the overthrow of former President Paz Estenssoro last November. Ovando has been meeting and plotting with representatives of the FSB and PRIN since last January. Together, the FSB, PRIN, and PCB can pull strong support from most labor groups and have the armed fighting militia of the FSB. Ovando can count on armed forces support also, about so percent also. He has the loyalty of many senior military officers who respect him profes-

ftPPHOWlDFOR*nd the FSB' MIL1

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no foreign dissem

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APPROVED FUR RELEASE DATLOCnOBI

Onay Ovando signed, on hla own cease-fire agreements with student and labor leaders representing the tin miners. This action has pushed him closer than at any other time to breaking with Barrlentos. Itirectof Junta policy and determination to follow through with military operations to gain control over the tin sines. An Immediate confrontationOvando and Barrlentos now depends upon the willingness of one or both men to repudiate the other. Ovando hasimid man who tended to withdrawifficult or dangerous situation. Barrlentos, on the other hand, lacks no courage but may hope to smooth over the crisis In order topilt In the armed forces and national chaos. This may be impossible if Ovando has now so committed himself to an FSB-PRIN coup that he cannot turn back.

Should Ovando and his supporters move soon against Barrlentos in La Paz. Barrlentos wouldhave little chance to survive. The civilian Line-up in the capital is clearly inavor. He

baa the backing of FSB and Communist-dominated students, FSB street gangs, the cooperation of the Ministry of Government, the National Guard and the Criminal Police, and most labor organisations. Barrlentos' only hope would be support from the military units in and near the city and air force men stationed at II Alto airport. The Waldo and Ingavlegiments in La Paz are thought to be pro-Barrientos. If Barrlentos should escape from the city, he would probably head for Cochabaaba andtand there with his peasant supporters and the Seventh Army

la any event, the overthrow or death of Barrlentos la likely to lead to chaos If not civil war. The peasants are violently opposed to the FSB, fearing that their hard-won land would be taken from them.

The FSB decidedeeting onay toolitical pact with the PRIN and Communists to overthrow Barrlentos. The PRIN has

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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fiFFPOKO FOP FEElEASE DATLOCU00I

a division of offices in any future government among the three groups. The FSB would get the presidency, vice presidency, alniatrles of finance aod government, and control of tha state mining corporation. The PB1N, PCB,and any cooperating MNR elements would divide up tbegovernment poaitiona, with ministry of labor and heads of all trade unions going to PRIN.

Original document.

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