RSSopy No. ^
INTELLIGENCE STUDY
THE SINO-VIETNAMESE EFFORT TO LIMIT AMERICAN ACTIONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR (POLO XX)
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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Thisorking papor of thoesearch Staff. It deals with one aspect of Peiping's relations with Hanoi in the context of the war in Vietnam andollow-up to an earlier Staff memorandumn differences between Chinese andviews on strategy for the prosecution of the war.
The writer this paper.has
found useful material in thenalys is
of the Foroign Broadcast Information Service. Theouldjelcomo comment addressed to the writer
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THE SING-VIETNAMESE EFFORT TC LIMIT AMERICAN ACTIONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR
Contents
To Deter the United States from Increasing Military
To Deter the United States from Air Strikes Against the
To Deter the United States from Air Strikes Against
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Summary
When the Viet Cong was re-activated, neither Peiping nor Hanoi seemed to estimate that the American commitment to Saigon would develop to the point at which territory in the North would be subjectedr strikes. In their discussion o2 the war, they emphasized that the American effort in the South waa "specialery limited character. As American military support of South Vietnam increased, the Chinese became increasingly concerned, and byheyino-Vietnamese communitynterest in trying to deter Washington from making air strikes against the North. However, they were at pains to ensure that Washington would not calculate that PLA forces were poised to enter Vietnam or Laos (and, therefore, would not feel impelled to strike by air at the China. air strikes on North Vietnam in4 almost certainly took the Chinese and Vietnamese leaders by Byheir failure to prevent strikes against tha North forced them to recognize that Mao was wrong in thinking that small wars could be fought with oily slight risks to the base areas and to the security of other bloc countries.
Once the concept of sanctuary for the North had been invalidated, the Chinese were apparently stimulated toew dimension to their encouragement of Hanoi. That is, in addition to encouraging the North Vietnamese to move the fighting in the South from primarily guerrilla warfare (with occasional big battles of annihilation) to primarily conventional warfare (with many big battles ofhe Chinese apparently began urging the North Vietnamese to infiltrate PAVK forces into the Southarger scale. Hanoi, evidently reluctant to comply to the extent advocated by Peiping inay now be somewhat more willing to do so, in the sense of being willing toew more PAVN units. However, the Chinese seem to bo sustaining thoir pressure for large-scale infiltration or even direct attacks across
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h parallel. The Chinese almost certainly would increase their pressure on Hanoi if American air strikes were to hit targets north ofh parallel and were to include more economic installations.
Considerably increased awareness of the threat to the China mainland apparently has impelled the Chinese leaders to stato publicly the conditions under which they would use the PLA to intervene. There seem to be two conditions Tor definite intervention. PLA ground forces will alitor the fighting if (a) the United states moves large forces of its own ground troops acrossh parallel and (b) the North Vietnamese prove unable to handle the matter and request Chinese assistance. Were the United States to strike by air at bases in China but not move its troops on the ground into the North, PLA ground forces might be committed tb Vietnam. This last part of the Chinese positionarge element of ambiguity, particularly on the mattor of what constitutes an American "attack" against the mainland. The Chinese have declared "If we are attacked, we will certainlyut they have been-equivocal on theof whether air strikes against the mainland would spur them to counterattack with the PLA on the ground, or whether air strikes against tho mainland would meet merelyounter air strike (or air defense action).
The Chinese certainly prefer to prevent suchair strikes against their bases. Their options, are limited because of their (Mao's) pugnacity and refusal to concede that the small war will not work in Vietnam. They aeem to believe that it will still work--that is, that,arger risk to tho Northbase area and to China than originally foreseen, Communist forces can still pursue the war effectively in South Vietnam, probably without provoking. into (a) moving its ground forces into North Vietnamarge scale, or (b) making air attacks on China. Therofore, the Chinese will not desist from encouraging Hanoi and the Viet Cong from continuing the war. They seem to be willing to risk, if necessary, even the destruction of their bases in South China to sustain the war.
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Introduction
Ah earlyt the time of the Taiwan Strait crisis, the Chinese leaders were apparently aware that the Soviet nuclear umbrella was credible only for the defense of the USSR, nothinese or North Vietnamese military effort. intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute made this awareness even clearer. the Chinese and North Vietnamese leadersviewed the removal of the Soviet nuclear umbrellaan earlierredible restraint on American military action in the Fara development which would not, and should not, prevent the guerrilla war ln the South from moving ahead. They seemed to agree that some other deterrent to American action against North Vietnam could be found, and their view centered on PAVN and PLA forces as constituting an adequate (or credible) deterrent.
Tho Chinese leaders have hinted at tho conditions in which they would feel impelled to commit PLA forces to fight in Vietnam. This paper examines the record of Chinese hints and direct statements on this matter ln the context of Pelping's and Hanoi's effort to deter the United States from (a) increasing advisory and material military aid to Saigon, (b) striking by air at the North, and (c) striking even at China.
Ambiguitytatement of deterrence sustains political maneuverability, but reduces credibility. eterrent statement can be both ambiguous and strong only when military dispositionseal threat. That ls, the degree of seriousness of the threat cannot be measured by the content of verbal warnings alone.
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Nevertheless, verbal warnings can provide indicators of intentions even without hard Information on military dispositions. In our view,eterrent statement acquire: strength from the degree of precision used Inountry to take direct military actions and (b) closing off avenues of retreat after the specific public commitment is made. Adjectives do noteterrent statement strong or weak, nor do analogies with earlier clashes.
Id the following analysis, all o- the underlining of words and passages has been supplied.
1. To Deter tho United States from Increasing Military
0he Chinese loaders avoided making any public statements indicating direct PLA support for the future defense of the North, but hinted, imprecisely, at Peiping's concern ln the matter. Typical of thethey used were those contained in Chou En-lal's remarks to thc North Vietnamese delegation in Peiping: the Chinese government and people "cannot be indifferent" to the grave situation created by American actions ln the South, and the Chinese and Vietnamese governments have always been "in close cooperation and supported eachn building socialism and opposing the United States (statemonts made on. Later, ln alluding publicly to American 'plans to send troops" to the South, Peiping did not go beyond committing "the heroic people of South Vietnam" to react to this new challengeof. Privately, the Chinese made threats which hinted at PLA action but were vague. They were reported to have told the Indian government1 that Peiping reserved the right to tako "direct action" at any time in the interest of its own security. At the same timehe Chinese press attache in Genevaestern Journalist that it would be errible thing" if American troops were sont to the South because it is much easier to commit troops inituation "than to withdraw them later."
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Even when the Chinese Leaders implied the possible use of the PLAoint military effort with Hanoi, it was tooint action to defendko-tzu) countries. That is, it was vague on the matter of PLA use in Vietnam; the Chinese people and "theill make joint efforts with you to defend the security of our separate countries" (Marshal Lin Piao's message to Hanoi on. And when this unprecedented (and not repeated) statement of joint defense and other efforts proved to be Inadequate to prevent theof the American military command ln the South (in, the Chinese avoided references to any PLA involvement in defense of the North. They were not explicit on their course of action when they warned that the American military command posederious threat to the security of the DRV and China" and that Washington intended to move first against the North and "from there against China" (People's Oaily editorial ofebruary).*
2. To Deter the United States from Air Strikes Against the North"" "
Peiping and Hanoi probably estimated23 that the establishment of the American military command would not lead to American air attacks on the
this editorial, the Chinese repeated what they had said in their government statement ofebruary for the firstAmerican action in the South "seriously affects the security of China." The North Vietnamese had established the line earlier and for the first time in their government statement ofebruary that American action wasirect threat to the security of thehe Chinese government statement ducked the matter of PLA involvement andareful distinction between the "direct" threat to the DRV and the "indirect" threat to China.
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North.* They seemed to believe that the United States would restrict its military assistance to support belowh parallel and were probably confirmed in this view by Washington's references to the limited nature of its action and the need to fight guerrilla wars with (a) "special warfare" rather than with the more(b) "local" warfare or even (c) nuclear warfare.**
However, byhe Chinese and Northleaders displayed real concern about the prospects of American air strikes. In February, NCNA carriedpress references to discussions in Washington of air attacks which might be directed against the North, and Hanoi stepped up its deterrent statements. Defense Minister Giap called for the improvement of "combat cohesion of the armed forces of socialist countries" (Soviet Red Star article of, and the North Vietnamese army paper warned the United"is planning" to increase "provocations" against thethe
uggestion of Hanoi's thinking on this point was reportedecent defector from North Vietnam. Inhe Vietnamese Workers Party central committeeonfidential foreign policy directive which, among other things, stated that the United States was incapable of attacking the North;iscussion of the directive, cadres were told that the Americans were deterred by the strength of international Communist forces.
**These terms are not precise but seem consistently ln Chinese usage to indicate an ascending order. They refer, in order,mall operation like. effort in South Vietnam,arger one such as the Korean war, orld war. The Russiansomparable usage. The People's Daily editorial of2 mentioned all three types in connection with American strategic military thought and stressed Washington's use of (a) in Vietnam. Other Chinese and North Vietnamese articles discussed (a) as the prevailing type of American-supported warfare in the South. (Only on5hineseexplicitly that. was moving in the direction of the more extensive "local" war.)
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is stronger than ever and "together with the strength of the peoples and arned forces of the friendly countries in the socialistsupport usstrength is second to none" (Quan Pol Nhan Dan articlearch). arch article strongly suggested that only "friendly" China, rather than the USSR, was willing to support the DRV "closely.") Hanoi's concern was also reflected in private contacts; for the first time, diplomatic channels were used to warnorth Vietnamese official told
iahat ii the Dnitec were^ointroduce more forces and equipment into the South, the Communis side could easily match such increases. He went on to say that Hanoi was prepared to deal with the possibility that Washington might carry the war to the Northeforence to air strikes). Also in mid-February, the North Vietnamese increased military and civilian defense preparations against anticipated American air attacks.
At the same time, the Chinese were caroful to avoid identifying Peiping in any direct military sense with Hanoi's defense effort. For example, when Hanoiypothetical "invasion" of the North by American ground forces and then referred to thethat the United States 'would have to cope not only with North Vietnam, but also with China" (Hoc Tap article of JanuaryChinese omitted this "key passage in their Reflecting Chinese uncertainty of the extent of prospective American action, Pelping's statement ofln early March was so cautious as to be tantamountere repetition of Hanoi's mild warning that "any infringement on the DRV" would be the "responsibility" of the United States (People's Daily editorialarch) While the Chinese were short on specific commitments regarding PLA action, they were long onhinese "peace" statement of early March declared that "American clamors to extend the war to tho North can only frighten those who have lost theirheleaders.
Hanoi's concern about prospective American air strike; on the North continued through the spring On 9
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May, General Giap, ln an interview with the Communist newsman W. Burchett, the content of which was intended for Western leaders, reflected some anxiety on the part of the leadership when he warned that "any act ofagainst the DRV by the Unitedould be suicide." Under Chinese and North Vietnamese criticismress conference in Hanoi, Soviet Ambassador Tovmasyan revealed on IS May that: adre of the DRV's Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me that the Vietnamese people do not sco the dangerirect attack by the United States." (Tovmasyan's apparent point was that if the real North Vietnamese estimate minimized the prospect of an air strike, why should Vietnamese newsmen demand to know if there wouldtrong reaction on the part of the socialist camphe USSR) were the North to be attacked?) By mid-May, when the United States significantly increased its air-strike capability in the South, the North Vietnamese prepared to absorb bombing attacks. At the time, Hanoi's first major statement indicated awareness that "the Skyraiders introduced into the South are likely to be used in provocations against North Vietnam" and suggested the limited nature of the Communists' retaliatory capability by threatening the Americans only with the punishment "of history" (Nhanpan editorial ofay). Widespread construction of infantry-type defense ditches in the central part of Hanoi was notedisitor to tbe city in early May, suggesting that the Vietnamese were preparing to absorb air strikes evon against their capital. Hanoi's second majorat thc time (issued by the DRV Foreign Ministryune) indicated that countermoves would includetep-up of Viet Cong operations.
The Chinese did not in any way associate themselves publicly with the defense of the North. They spoke only of f the PLA and tho PAVN and referred vaguely to PLA "support for the Vietnamese people's struggle for reunification" (Lt. General Liu Chih-chien in his speechune). They apparently were not clear about Washington's intentions. Air strikes in Laos (against Khang Khay) increased their anxiety, which waa partly reflected by Chou En-lal's reference to the "dangerous situation in Indochina" and his urgent appeal
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lor the "speedy calling"eneva conference on Laos (speech ofune). The meeting of American officials in Honolulu in June and the air strikes in Laos may well have led tbe Chinese leaders to conclude that Washington, by "enteringew phase of direct and open" support of anti-Communist forces ln Laos (People's Daily editorial ofas hinting at an intent"lon-fo strike next at North Vietnam if Pathet Lao and Viet Cong operations did not cease. They kept their deterrent statementsas they met in mid-Junework conference of the CCP Central Committee": if Washington wants its "own way, it will find itself woefully unwise in its choice" (Ta Rung Pao editorial ofune) and "we want to solemnly warn American imperialism to stop playing with fire at once or it will burn itself" (Ta Kung Pao editorial ofuno).
The Chinese leaders' effort to deter the United States at the time includedevision of Chou En-lai's appealonference, which was elaborated by Chen Tl toonference to seek "first ofettlement on Laos and (b) warnings that the appeal was notign of weakness" and that China "absolutely will not sit idly by" while the Geneva accords are torn up and "the flames of war are spread to its side" (speech ofune). Chen was careful to sustain Peiping's ambiguity on what it would do to protect North Vietnam from prospective air strikes and what it would do if American marines were sent to Laos. Privately, thewere bolder. By late June they seem to havethe Laotian ambassador in Peiping that they would act "as we had ln Korea" if the United States were toivision of marines into Laos. They also indicated to him that they preferred to "solve" the Laotian issue bynation Geneva-type conference, at which they would raise tho entire Indochina question.
Whilo attempting by this maneuver to impede further American commitments to Vientiane and Saigon, theyduring their "work conference" infurther encourage Hanoi and the Viet Cong. They declared that Peiping's support for the Communist effort ln Laos and Vietnam "will remain unshakable"
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(Kuang-mlng Daily article ofune). That they con-tinued to view any Soviet statement of deterrence as not essential (and, in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, as not desirable) was suggested by an article ln the Hong Kong Communist newspaper, Wen Wei Pao, onune. Referring to an article in Pravda onune, which had warned that tho USSR would noT necessarily support China in the event of an enlarged war, thedeclared that this warning would only stimulate the Chinese to support the struggle in Laos and Vietnam lnore resolute way." Khrushchev may have attempted, during the "work conference" discussions among the Chinese leaders, to deter Peiping from further encouraging Hanoi, implicitly warning the Chinese that they would have no Soviet military or political support in the event of any escalation of the war. Thisostly tactical blunder, as it provided the Chineseeans to "prove" to the North Vietnamese leaders that Khrushchevraitor on the matter of support for the revolutionary struggleraternal country.*
Regarding any expectation by Hanoi of support from Peiping io terms of commitment of PLA troops to tho North,ommitment was not anticipated and was notnecessary. North Vietnamese statements reflected this situation of non-commitment. For example, Hanoi's first major statement at the time of probable Peiping-Hanoi consultations in late June warned vaguely that if the Americans "directly encroach on the security of thehey willroperut it did not state who would administer the rebuff or how it would be carried out (DRV cote to the Geneva Co-chairmen ofune). The definitive North Vietnamese statement of
upport of Hanoi had made iteasy for the Chinese to disparage Moscow by stressing, for example, that Poiping always maintained that "it ls an unshirkable proletarian internationalist duty to safeguard the peace and security of the entire socialist camp, to protect all its members fromaggression." (People's Dally editorialuly)
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deterrence ln Juneharpworked out by the Chinese andwho would fight and who would merely support the fight:
they rashly venture to attack the North, they would certainlyhameful defeat. And this is because our whole people will resolutely fight back, because the socialist countries and progressive peoples the world over will unreservedly support us, because the American people and their allies too will oppose them (Pham Van Dong's Report to the DRV National Assembly ofune).
This distinction was made clearer in Nhan Dan on the sameune) that the premier gave his report. The party newspapertatement made months earlier by General Giap at the special political conference in Hanoi on "The PAVN and the people's armed forces stand ready to deal telling blows at the enemy if they recklessly encroach upon the territory, airspace, and territorial waters of the DRV." The newspaper went on to discuss the determination of the "Vietnamese" to hit back at American "encroachments" and did not refer to the Chinese. When the Chinese leaders made their deterrent statement, it was stronger than any Peiping bad made previously but was still ambiguous on the matter of PLA intervention:
China and the DRV are fratornal neighbors closely related like the lips and teeth. The Chinese people cannot be expected to look on with folded arms in the face of any aggression. of any degree or nature/ against the DRV. (Chen Yietteruly to the DRV Foreign Minister)
The Chinese later realized that they had gone too far even in this carefully composed government letter. Chen had usedtheat first probably considered suitable to their
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purposes. The word,as repeated when the People's Dally editorialuly reprinted Chen'sut later in July the Chinese leaders apparently perceived that the word was dangerously Inclusive, committing them to some form of action whether an American attack was launched on thc ground or In the air. Thus thoy dropped the word, y the end of July-
By late July, the Chinese were acting somewhat bolder than they had in earlyls, bolder than during the days Immediately following the Honolulu conference of American officials. For the first time, theyovernment statement which hinted at the use of the PLA:
Despite the fact that the United States has introduced tens of thousands of its military personnel into southern Vietnam and Laos, China has notingle soldier to Indochina. However, thereimit to everything. (Governmentofuly)**
*The editorialuly made the strongest statement of deterrence up to that timo: "Should Americanattack the DRV, therebyhreat to China's peace and security, the Chinese people naturally cannot be expected to look on with foldedevertheless, It did not say what the Chinese would do when theytheir arms.
deterrent aspect of the Chinese governmentofuly was suggested by the People's Dallyofh, which warned Washington to note the new threat and that "we mean what we say." They also pointed to the now threat as "showing that China has made up its mind, formulated its counter measures, as well as looked into every possible future development." (Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao commentator article ofuly) This reference to contingency planning probablj refers to the mid-June "work conference" of the Chinese leadership and further suggests that the decision to sustain and increase support of Hanoi and the Viet Gong was affirmed at the
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At the sane time, they took care to indicate tothat only an attack on North Vietnamround attack wasnot action in Southwould impel Peiping to commit the PLA in Vietnam:
We do not want toar in southeast Asia. This is absolutely clear to the State Department in Washington. Thisof ours is very accurately known in the State Department. Thoy know that wo do not want to wage war. We would feel threatened only if, perhaps, the United States would send their "special warfare" toward the North, if thoy attack North Vietnam. That is, if the other side were to attack. This would directly endanger the stability of our border and of the neighboring Chinese provinces. Inase, we would
Yet, being encircled by aggressive people on the other side, we have to maintain this army. It would lntorvene if the war in Indochina should be carried to thef theymall war,mall war lt will be. If theyig war, then it willig war. It all depends on the Americans. (Chen Ti interview ln late July with Austrian newsman)
This was the first timehinese leader bad publicly discussed the specific conditions which would Impel the PLA to "intervene." Peiping probably believed, at that time, that the United States would not strike at the North either on the ground or in the air. An indication ofelief, as of late July, appeared inolplng radio commentator onuly: be told listeners ln Japan that "Chinamerican threats to invade tho DRV as merely Intended to scare China, as the United States "would not be able" to invade. The Soviet leaders also may have believed in mid-July that American attacks on the North were Improbable; at the
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timo, Soviet officials reportedly downplayed the risks of escalation on the grounds that President Johnson would not let the fighting expandocal war.
When, ln early August, American planes hit North Vietnamese targets following the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, the Chinese seem to have been taken by hour delay, the Chinese Issued their government statement in which they threatened to help but avoided saying that tho PLA now had the right to Intervene. The statement fell back upon the distinction made by Premier Pham Van Dong onune:
In the surprise attack on thenited States Imperialism went over tbe 'brink of war' andthe first step in extending the war inince the United States has taken this action, the DRV bas gained the right of action to fight against aggression, and all the countries upholding the Geneva agreements have gained the right of action to assist the DRV ln its fight againsto socialist country can sit idly by withoutelping hand.
Aggression by the United States against the DRV means aggression against China. The Chinese people will absolutely not sit idly by withoutelping hand. The American government must stop immediately its armed provocations against the DRV and its armed encroachments on the latter's sacred territory, airspace, and territorial waters. (CPRugust)
Thus Pham Van Dong's distinction between those who would "fight" and those who would merely "assist" was clearly and deliberately stressed ln the statement and the Chinese made no threat to intervene, demanding only that the United States stop bombing (after, in fact, lt hadhey tried to conceal their decision not to retaliate by
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shifting this burden to others. For example, theythat "The question now is not one of the Dnited States bringingcomplaint' against the DRV, but one of the people throughout the world bringing the American imperialist pirates to trial" (People's Daily editorialnd asked eople's Daily editorialugust) "Will the people ox various countries look on with folded arms while Americanplays with fire? Absolutely not." In aonuguston-Communist Asiana Chinese Foreign Ministry official contrasted China's reaction with Moscow's as one of "totallyAmerican air strikes, but he did not say how Peiping intended to oppose the strikes, merely pointing-to the "strong opposition of all the peace-loving peoples of the world." At the same time that the Chinese warned, "Don't think that you can get away with your surprise attack on the DRV" (People's Daily editorialhey specified only that the Vietnamese would reply: "if the American aggressors dare to expand thehe Vietnamese people, who are noted for their glorious combat traditions, will most assuredly be able tothe United States bandits on their soil" (Liao Cheng-chihpeechugust).*
'Privately, the Chineso wore anxious to convoy to Washington an impression of restraint, almost certainly to deter the United States from Considering strikes against the mainland. Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien ln mid-Augustakistani official that Peipingto "recoup the losses by acting on the diplomatic front." Although warning that Chinese threats toshould be taken seriously in Washington, heChina's "patient and moderate" response tougust strikes. Publicly, Chen Yi later committed only the Vietnamese, not tho Chinese, toresolute rebuff" to the United States ln the event of moro air strikes (statementeptember).
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Following tho second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin oneptember, the Chinese againariety of statements which were intended as deterrents, but which avoided indicating any course of retaliatory, action in the event of sustained air strikes. Speaking in the language of an interested observer rather than an active participant, PLA Army Chief-of-Staff Lo Jui-ching, stated:
The Chinese people know how to deal with war maniacs. We are closely watching every action of American imperialism to see to what degree it intends to worsen the situation. (Speech ofeptember)
After the crisis of September subsided, the Chinesestatements remained vague, particularly on the matterew possible development which the Chinese seemed to see asgradual and phased escalation.
One should realize that if aggression is enlarged regardless under whatlimited or not verystill constitutes an act of warrazen attack on thell big aggressive wars ln the world were begunimitednce an aggressive neck has been stuckt must be chopped off. (People's Dally editorial ofovember)
This line was careful to sustain Peiping's ambiguity on whether the PAVN would be assisted by the PLA in actual combatthe event of any degree of escalation. This ambiguity was not really clarified in the unusualof Liu Ning-yi (speech at solidarity conference in Hanoi given onovember) that the Chinese people will always "fight" with the Vietnamese people. Thisdid not make clear whether "fight" was to mean Joint military operations (combat) or merely joint political struggle.
Hanoi was clearly aware of this carefully cultivated ambiguity in the Chinese position. Regarding Chinese
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behavior following the4 American airorth Vietnamese officialesterner in early November that "When the Americans attacked the DRV, the Soviets did nothing and the Chinese only talked."* ublished interview in December, Ho Chi Minh suggested that North Vietnam would have to fight alone in the event of escalation. He was careful to say that if the war were expanded to the North, "the CPR will support us and the socialist countries will support us" (reported by Vietnam News Agency onecember).At the same time, the Chinese continued to make their usualbetween supporting North Vietnam and fighting with it. Peiping declared that if South Korean troops were sent to South Vietnam, this would provide all Geneva accords countries the full right "to support" the South Vietnamese (People's Daily editorial of. Mao Tse-tung himself spoke even more cautiously of the conditions which would compel the Chinese to engage ln military operations in Vietnam. He told Edgar Snowanuary that "Only if the United States attacked China would the ChineseVietnamese can cope with their own situation."
Hanoi put limits on its own reaction. The North Vietnamese reaction to the air strikesas marked by an apparent anxiety to dispel the notion in the North and elsewhere that Hanoi was obliged to hit back with the full force of the PAVN acrossh parallel. The DRV government statementebruary
ne fallhe North Vietnamese began to speak less optimisticallyictory ln the Southew years, and toonger period. In September,orth Vietnamese trade official told abusinessman that although it may takee are confident we'll win the war "so long as we have rice and salt." In mid-December, Ho personally told the Cambodian Foreign Ministeroears" would be required for the advent of Communist power in the South.
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declared that the enemy had been "appropriatelynd it made no mention of the need to retaliate in reprisal for damage inflicted by the strikes on the North. ebruary appeal of the Liberation Front presidium for forces in the South to "strike strongly, really strongly, and really lastingly, ln order to protect the North and to liberate the South" suggested that Hanoi's policy was to react by retaliatingarge scale with itsassets in the South rather than preparingajor PAVN offensive. Hanoi depicted the air strikes as part of an established pattern rather thanew By implication, therefore, no major newdirectly from the North was required. "Well-deserved" retaliation from the North took the form of bringing down American strike aircraft (Nhan Dan editorial ofebruary). Hanoi declared only thatouth Vietnamese people have the right to strike back." (PAVN regional military commander to NCNA onebruary)
Peiping, however, seems to have been anxious to go beyond the question of the right of the Viet Cong to that of the DHVto that of the use of the PAVN.
he DRV has secured the right to take the initiative in dealing counterblows to the South Vietnamese puppets. The United States government should be reminded that it is the United States which has invaded South Vietnam in violation of the Geneva agreements and which has now further taken the lead in breaking up the line ofbeouthern and northern Uo you seriously think that you alone are allowed to do so while others are not? (CPR government statement ofebruary)
This new language suggests that in5 the Chinese leaders were urging Hanoi to increase drastically the number of regular PAVN units in the South, apparentlyarge-scale attack acrossh parallel. Hanoi's propaganda media carried the text of this Chinesestatement, but the Vietnam News Agency summary omitted the theme of initiating counterblows, and the
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DRV government statoment ofebruary did not mention any DRV right to take such action. By contrast, the People's Dally and Ta Kung Pao editorials ofebruary repeated tbe theme, as did tbe People's Daily editorial published onh. The Chinese position'wasIntended also to keep the burden of retaliation on the Northls, on Hanoi's side of the Slno-Viotnamese border; at the same time, tho Chinese tried to avoid the appearance of an Inactive partner andthe United"We are waiting for you in battle array" (People's Dally editorialebruary). This statement did not quite focus on the situation at the time, as the United States wasNorth Vietnam, not China, and was doing so in the air, not on the ground.
Tho Chinese leaders tried to dispel the Impression in various countries that Peiping feared the consequencesirect military confrontation with United States forces. They and their followers tried to Justify their inability to deter air strikes against tho North and thoirto act militarily. One line taken was thatrefused to be lured into fighting isadvantage. An editorial in the Cambodian paper, La Depocheally which strongly supports Chineseeplyingebruary to "those who say that the Chinese arewith giving only verbalrgued that Peiping "must not commit ut must prepareonfrontation "under the best of all possible The Chinese leaders themselves revived the formulation4 tbat Geneva signatories had gained the right to "assist" the DRV and again resorted to meticulous ambiguity: "as to how this right will be exercised, it ls our own affair" (CPRebruary). They avoided the question of what the PLA would be ordered to do ln response to the early February strikos: "If American imperialism is bent on spreading the war flames and imposing war on us, then we shall have no alternative but to go along with it to the very end. In that event, the whole of southeast Asia, the whole of Asia, would be aflame with thefire in which you will be so burnt to death that not even your ashes would be traceable" (People's Daily editorial
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ofebruary). Thia statement was vague precisely at points where precision was easy to employ. That is, it referred to "imposing war on us" and then failed to make clear whether "us" referred to China only or to China and North Vietnam together. At thetime, it dodged the real issue: ommitment to act militarily to counter air strikes against the North- Further, to state that "an invasion of the DRV is an invasion of the CPR" and then to make the entire matter "If you insist on Imposing war on us, heavy rebuffs are in store for you ' (People's Daily editorialas to make no commitment to use the PLA In defense of the North against air strikes. Peiping seemed to be saying something else: that an American ground attack against the North, if large enough to threaten the PAVN with defeat (as the North Koreans had been threatened in, would lead the PLA to intervene. (It was not necessarily saying that the PLA would intervene in Vietnam ifere to make air strikes on. ground attack on the North waseal possibility; Itypothetical situation regarding which Chinese statements could be made to sound bold. "You will become utterly helpless when people roslsting aggression, Instead of being afraid of you, dare to fight, defy difficulties, and advance wave on wave. You have beenesson on this score in the Korean War. Do you want to have the lesson repeated inCPR government statement ofebruary)
In short, the Chinesehedged promise-was most nearly explicit on the development least likely tomajor American ground attack against the North (or China). Regarding the real military situation in February, the Chinese in effect conceded that tho air strike strategy against the North could not be baited by their prolonged verbal deterrent effort. They alsoconceded that the strikesignificant American initiative which deprived the North Vietnamese of sanctuary. onsiderable degree ofto their inability and unwillingness to try to stop the air strikes, the Chinese declared; "How far will you go? That's your own lookout. But you are grossly mistaken to think that the war can bo made to
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develop as you wish" (People's Daily editorial Explicitly disparaging American air strike capability based on carrier strength In the Gulf of Tonkin andunderscoring PAVN ground strength,*the Chinese pointed to the "airdromes on the sea" and asked "What can they do since the outcome of the war has to be decided on terra firma?" (People's Daily editorial That is, the* Chinese were compelled to fall back to the position that the PAVN would not permit theof the war to be defeat on the ground for Hanoi; but this did not alter the fact that the North was being subjected to bombing. Privately, the Chinese were bolder. Two statements made on ISin Paris and one ina behind-the-scenes threat fromthat China would "intervene" or send "volunteers" if tho bombings continued.
The Chinese leaders' reaction to the air strikesarch seemod intended partly to encourage again the North Vietnamese to send more PAVN units to the South and partly to deter further attacks. Regarding encouragement of Hanoi, Peiping stressed explicitly the line that the United States had again "steppod over the boundary" ofh parallel and spoke of retaliation in termstrike back, apparently from tho North (People's Dally editorialarch). The NorthHowever, stressed the theme that the DRVartillery had given the Americans ananswer" and that the-Viet Cong, too, had "answered" and would answer them with more military victories ln the South (Whan Dan editorialarch). Althougharch- editorials mentioned "punishing" the Americans, they did not do so in the context of widening the conflict. Tet this is precisely the context in which the Chinese discussed striking back, downplaying Hanoi's theme of punishment by anti-aircraft artillery in the North:
Having flagrantly resorted to the war move of bombing the DRV again and again, the Johnson administration said in itsthat the United States 'wishes to avoid widening the conflict.' What does
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this mean? It means in fact thatStates ls free to bomb anywill while others should neverotherwise^ tliey would oeconflict.' What nonsense! logic! lsto give aftergoes. Since Americanforced the war upon others, itto escape the puriTsEment (People's Daily editorialMarch)
This line of argument, which gratuitously provided the North Vietnamese leadersasis for PAVNseemed to be intended to urge Hanoi to actarger scale as well as to accelerate the overall Viet Cong effort. That the Chinese wereourse of large-scale PAVN entry into the fighting was further suggested by the line of argument carried earliered Flag article dealing with the war in Vietnam:
The American Imperialists have extended the war to the DRV. Tho DRV, therefore, is fully allowed to use every possible means to deal telling blows to them and their lackeys. (Red Flagarticle ofebruary)
This article was not intended merely as justification of the war to neutral and other non-Communist leaders. It was broadcast in Vietnamese, and only in Vietnamese, to Vietnam six timesarch, Btrongly suggesting the Chinese leaders' intontlon to ImpelDRV isignificantly greater military commitment and to accelerate the effort in the South.
At the same time, the Chinese offered support for such an accelerated effort. Politburo member Peng Chen declared that the Chinese people "have made everyand resolutely support the Vietnamese people ln launching counterattacks for self-defense in various ways against the American aggressors" (speecharch).
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3. To Deter the United States from Air Strikes Against China
Following the early February air strikes, theleaders apparently became more awareeal danger of strikes against their own bases than they had been since Cutting directly across the bold talk of preparation to take "real action" was the not so bold move tore-emptive American air strike on bases in south China by privately indicating (to Washingtonhird party) that PLA ground forces were not massed on the southern border. following the air strikes1 February on the North, Pelping's Foreign Ministryisit to the Sino-Vietnamese border area by the China-basedof AFP; he was toldhinese official in Kunming that the visit was Intended to demonstrate that Peiping was not preparing for direct Intervention. as intended, the correspondent reported toofficials that he saw no military activity in the area. Although insisting publicly onarch that Americano sanctuary" and "hoto bomb China could not frighten Peiping, the Chinesein effect admitted their inability to prevent the bombings of North Vietnam from extending throughout the DRV and eventually to south China. They implicitlythat the United States had unlimited capability to bomb, but downplayed the military significance of bombing:
Anyhow, you have only so much armedyour disposal, and for all yourmeans you can resort to are /only?,
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Tha Chinese also insisted that the North Vietnamese should by no means maneuver for negotiationseans ofuspension of air attacks. Particularly in the wake of Kosygln's visit to Hanoi, the Chinesethe context of possible "peace"We shall never succumb to the American imperialists' blackmail. No socialist country should" (People's Dally editorialhat the United States is trying "to gain at the negotiating table what it is unable to gain on the battlefield" (Red Flag article ofebruary, broadcast in Vietnamese to Vietnamnd that "Vietnam will not agree, nor will all countries which truly uphold the Geneva agreements" (CPRarch). By contrast, Hanoi was more equivocal on the matter of negotiations in early March, did not directly attack the idea, and deleted the phrase,will notrom the Vietnam News Agency account of Peiping's statement.
Regarding Peiping's deterrent effort in early March, the boldest Chinese statements were made privately or quayi-prlvatoly. And even these statements contained elements of ambiguity. For oxample, an "important"officialapanese correspondent in Peipingarch that
I do not think the United States will be able to carry out bombingsarger scale, but if it shouldhance, China would strike the United States with real action. (Tokyo Nlhonarch)
Ambiguity was apparent when, after refusing to answer the correspondent's question, "By 'bombingsargero you mean the bombing ofhe Chinese official retreated into the following locutions: "Preparations are complete. Troops can be mobilized at anyhese locutions begged the question of when and under what conditions Peiping would use the PLA to assist North Vietnam.
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You may act ln your way and we will act ln our way. (CPR government statement ofarch)*
The Chinese leaders were also Impelled to downplay thesignificance of the landing of American marines at Da Nang. Dy arguing ln their statement ofarch that the marines' presence would "educate" the South Vietnamese by "negative example" and that "no village, town, forest or road in the whole of southern Vietnam ishe Chinese introduced another line offor limiting their response to support, falling short of use of the PLA in Vietnam. The apparent logic was: if American force-increases do not basically change Viot Cong capabilities and prospects, Chinese military Intervention is not required. "Howen save tho aggressors from defeat in war?" (CPR governmont statement ofarch) Tho argument was also intended, of course, to buoy up North Vietnamese and Viet Cong morale.
By warning, in the context of non-intervention, that the United States had "embarked on tbe pathorean-typo war" (CPR government statement ofhe Chinese further reduced the deterrent value of the Korean War analogy. And by using the analogy ln another in deploying South Korean troops to the United states "has gone farther down the path oforean-type war" (People's Dally articlehreatening no countermeasures.
ay, the Chinese explicitly contrastedair and naval power with Communist capability on the ground, declaring that "American naval and air superiority" is no match for "revolutionary war" on the ground and "That is why wo say, the enemy may fight in the way it choosos, but we fight in our way." (People'say This was an indirect admission that Hanoi and Peiping did not have the capability to prevent the air strikes.
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Peiping further weakened it.* Actually, Id tbe apparent Chinese view, the PLA would be used to act on the analogy only if American ground forces moved acrossh parallel, defeating PAVN units and continuing to advance northward. On this point, Edgar Snow in April reported the "thinking of the Chinese leaders" as follows: "Only after repeated warnings were Chinese volunteers sent into the Korean War. They did not intervene until theand communications networks across the Yalu River began to be bombed." Snow's distortion on tbe matter of bombed networks across the Yalu--if thecame from theweaken the analogy to the point of implying that China in this case would not intervene unless China Itself were attacked. While lt seems doubtful that the Chinese were trying tothis impression (as they wereifferent line in other Interviews in the samenow seemed to be saying, at tbe least, that Peiping would notair strikes against Northufficientfor PLA intervention. (His views were set forth in an article in the Tokyo Sekal,pril
Regarding the matter ofn the context of air attacks on the North, Chinese pledges to send them had political-psychologicalfor Chinese prestige, pressure on neutrals, and popular morale in thehad no military meaning. Although
weakening process had been accelerated by use of the analogy in Chinese statements published onebruaryarch following tho early February and early March air strikes on tho North.
sufficient reason for PLA intervention was asserted privately in the same month by Chou En-lai: an American ground force attack on the North (talks with Ne Win ln Rangoonpril). Chou also told Sihanouk in mid-April that Peiping would send no troops to North Vietnam as long as South Vietnamese or American troops did not invade aboveh parallel.
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the early and aid-March air strikes spurred Hanoi to publicize offers of the Russians, Chinese, Cubans, and others to send volunteers "to fight beside theircomrades" (Shan Dan editorial ofhe North Vietnameselmost certainly viewed these publicized offers as having no real deterrent value. In raid-March, Chou En-lai ln effect admitted this,out PLA intervention by alluding to DRV self-reliance. Replyingrench correspondent's question regarding air bombardment of the North Vietnamese, Chou said: "In the first place, they can defend themselves." Hanoideclared self-reliance the real Vietnamese Communist policy on military manpower, and voluntary enlistment of Vietnamese was depicted ln thendarch Nhan Dan editorials as providing the necessary fighting and reserve force for the PAVN. when, therefore, Hanoi's Council of Ministers' meetingpril stressed self-reliance In fighting, it was merely formalizing the fact that Vietnamese Communists were fighting and would fight alone in the war's then-current phase.
Regarding the matter of large-scale PAVN troop movements into the Southolicy Peiping apparentlytried to dispel the impression abroad that it would retaliate against tbe mid-March strikes by taking such, radical military action. The Northleaders probably believed at the time that athanmovement acrossh parallel would spur the United States into launching massive air strikes against all targets in the North. When Hanoi broadcast tbearch Liberation Front statement, which appealed for support from the North, it changed the key sentenceore restrained and contingent from "we will call" to "we will have to call in case of need" on thosesent North Similarly, when it hadew days earlier on PAVN forces to defend the country "in coordination wltb the liberation forces" in the South (Nhan Dan editorial ofarch), the context had suggosted
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that the PAVN would defend the North and thc Viet Cong would "defend" the South.* By stressing North-Southanoi ln these statements seemed to be sidestepping the majoris, whether toarge-scale retaliatory attackinstead that Viet Cong operations in the South (such aa the bombing of tho American embassy in Saigon)oordinated and appropriate response to air strike* against the North.
Pelping's prestige was damaged by the March air strikes. These strikes destroyed the conceptanctuary and forced them to recognize that Mao was wrong in thinking that small wars could be fought with only slight risks to the base areas and to the security of other bloc countries. The Chinese wero compelled to fall back on the argument that the United States would not win the final victory. They were also compelled to screen their military inactionloud of words, which Included the unprecedented pledge to send men to fight in the South. This pledge was made in response to tho Liberation Front'sarch appeal with an eye to (a) recouping setbacks ln Pelping's prestige, ith Moscow on the matter of willingness to send volunteers, and (c) preventing further increases
sentence made the North-South distinction in the following way: "Fighting In coordination with theforces and people in the South, let our armed forces and people in the North always stand ready, uphold tho spirit of daring to fight and to win, and deal thepirates still heavier blows to defend the life and property of our people and tho airspace, territorial waters, and territory of our country."
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of American (or anti-Communist) ground forces in tbe South.* However, the pledge was hedged. China is "ready to send our men, whenever the South Vietnamese people want them, to fight together with the Southpeople to annihilate the American aggressors" (People's Daily editorial ofarch). Chen Ti and Chou En-lai used the samewhoneveronndarch respectively. In thoarch edl-torial, Peiping was careful to distinguish between the fact that the Viet Cong had already called for 'aid, arms and all other war materials" (and were in fact receiving such aid) and the fact that they had not yet called for fighting men. That is, tbe Chinese in effect told Washington that their real position was not to commit PLA forces to fight in Vietnam at that
Theeaders hoped to deter the United States from striking by air at China by making it easy for
*"Sensitlvlty to Pelping's inaction and setbacks in prostige was also reflected lnro-Communistappeal to readersng Kong to send letters to the editor to refute local Chinese Nationalist claims that Chinese, not Americans, are the real "paper tigers" (Wen Wei Pao editorial ofpril) and (b) Peng Chen's useardChina is "willing to take emergency action" to force the Americans out of Vietnam (speech ofpril). But Peng was ambiguous on thenature of that "emergency action." His remark, madeime when tho delegation led by Le Duan was inwas primarily intended to regain some ground lost to Moscow as tho Soviet pressed their post-Khrushchev effort to Increase influence with the Nortb Vietnamese leaders.
the matter of negotiations, thearch editorial suggested that the Chinese also intended their position to serveeans of applying more pressure on Hanoi to adopt ain degree of harshness to that of the Front and Peiping.
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Washington to read the hedge in their position on the matter of sending volunteers. That they were anxious to make this clear to Washington is suggested by (a) Chen Yi'sestern diplomat inChina did not intend to intervenein Vietnam so long as Hanoi did not request China to do so and (b) the story givenapanese correspondent in Peipings, on the same day that Peiping published its bold-appearing but substantively-weak editorial on volunteers. The correspondent reported that "informed circles" (apparently several Chinese in Peiping believed the time not yet ripe forPLA forces to North Vietnam or to the South, that Viet Cong forces would first be strengthened by regrouped southerners, that after Hanoi and Haiphong had been bombed and the North had suffered considerable damage, PAVN forces might cross the demarcation line and strike at American bases in the South, and that only If, at some future time, there were fear that American ground forces would sweep the whole of Vietnam (including thehina would Intervene with PLA units. These signals to Washington from Peiping that the PLA would not be used in Vietnam exceptemote contingency were publishedime when the Chinese seemed intent primarily on deterring further American strikes against North Vietnam. They thus contradicted the ostensible intent. It is probable, therefore, that Peiping was more concerned at tbe time with deterring the United States from striking at bases in China--and was implicitly arguing to this end that since the PLA is not buildingre-emptive American air strike is unnecessary.
This increased concern about possible strikes against Chinese bases was expressed in various ways. Foreiping government statement ofarch declared that American threats to bomb China would not frighten Peiping; the Chinese ambassador in Paris onarch told an Asian diplomat that "some American leaders have even threatened to bomb China, we are quite prepared foreople's Daily editorial ofarch stated that after attacking SdufE and North Vietnam, Washington's "next step will be aggression againsthen Yi told Nepalese officials onarch that an attack on China might come at any time,
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and that China was preparing its defenses; and in late March, Chou En-lai reportedly told Ben Bella that "We are convinced that the united States will bomb China and we have already taken all measures to face this pril attack of Chinese Communist MIGon American Navy aircraft southwest of Hainanwas intendedarning to Washington and further reflected Peiping's real concern that the mainland, or at least Hainan, might be hit by American (or Chinese Nationalist) air and naval strikes.
The shift to increased concern occurred roughly at the time when, in March, the Chinese leaders were made clearly aware that their effort to deter strikes against the North had failed. They believed that these strikes would be sustained and even expanded. Central Committee member, Liao Cheng-chih, for example, was quoted on the air strikes by the Japanese correspondent in Peiping:
In order toevolution, they must bear even their own country's being ruined. (Tokyo Shimbun ofarch, basedelephone conversation between the paper's main office and its correspondent in Peiping onarch)
Onarch, the Chinese again hinted at their view that the deterrence effort had failed and they could notfurther American air attacks on the North. They declared that the Viet Cong would punish the United States "no matter how many bombs it may dump on North. Vietnam" (People's Dally "Commentator" article ofarch pub-lishod following the bombing: of the American embassy in Saigon). ime when North Vietnamese targets were subjected to air attacks and when the Chinese leaders ln effect were telling the North Vietnamese leaders that these strikes must be absorbed, the Chinese cast aboutlausible line to justify their encouragement of Hanoi to face even national destruction. Partly to justify the sacrifleal course they were urging upon the Vietnamese and partly in response to Secretaryay remark on the possibility of suspending bombing, the Chinese leaders discussed more openly than before the
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prospect of American strikes against the mainland. they pressed forward along the line that Peiping would support the war ln Vietnam even if China, too, were to be bombed. The Chinese in this way hoped to add weight to their argument that Hanoi should not accept negotiations in returnuspension of bombing.
Further, the Chinese leaders hoped to Indicate to Washington the futility of any future course whichvarious degrees of bombing the mainland of China. Marshal Ho Lung declared that Peiping would support the war in the South 'no matter how great the cost and sacrifice" (speechay at the East Germano Jui-ching wrote that Peiping would help the Vietnamese 'to the limit of our capabilities" even if the United States "enlarges the war" (Bed Flag article ofnd "Observer" wrote that support would continue "whether you bomb China ore have taken into full account every war venture you may possibly launch and made adequate preparations to meet it" aily article ofay). The latter statement about preparations strongly suggested air defense precautions.
As they prepared for the prospect of air strikes against the mainland (adopting the strategy of expecting the worsthey also indicated that they
*lo jui-ching wrote that "preparations must envisage the use by Imperialists of nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons" and went on to claim that the United States was converting the war intoocal war of the Korean type" (Hod Flag article ofay). The Poople'say also claimed that special war was being expanded into regional war. This emphasiswith the CCP doctrinal position that small wars can be confined and contrasts with that, when Chinese materials stressed the small-scale,nature of the fighting (see footnote onhe change ln Peiping's appraisal of the extent of the war reflects their awareness that not only North Vietnam, but also China has been denied the "right of indefinite sanctuary.
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preferred not toino-American clash. Lo Jui-ching laid it down that "Our principle is: We will not attack unless we are attacked. If we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack." (Bed Flag article ofay, in which Lo suggests that the Vietnamese can handle the fighting alone) Onhinese officialfor liaison with the Japanese trade office in Tokyoapanese businessman that "If the United States continues to move toward escalation of the war, China will not sit idly by. Even then, China's position would be to return the punch after being hit first."
Regarding the strategy of the war in the South, the Chinese apparently continued to press Hanoi to accelerate the introduction of regular PAVN units into the fighting. The Chinese seem to have responded to the air strikes of early February and March by encouraging Hanoi to move PAVN forcesarge-scale acrossh parallel. In early June, they again urged Hanoi:
All the Vietnamese people, including the people of Horth Vietnam, have acquired the right to exert their utmost to hith parallel provisional military demarcation line ceases to exist and the people in North Vietnam cease to be restricted in giving support to their fellow countrymen in the South. (People's Daily "Observer" articleune)
Unlike its February reaction, Hanoi did not delete this passage from the domestic broadcasts of the "Observer" article which were beamedune. This suggests that the North Vietnamese leaders may be willing toew more PAVN units to fight in the South. However, as for PLA action, "Observer" treated the matter with caution. he Chinese people have the right to do all in their power to aid the Vietnamese people in Further, onay, Chen Yl had been quoted in People's Daily asrench correspondent that the Vietnamese "are perfectly capable of driving the American aggressors out of their country by relying on their own forces." This is obviously the Chinesepreferred course in Vietnam.
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