IBJ LIBRARY Mandatory ReviewNIT Document^ .
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Prospects for Argentina
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred In by me .'. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As Indicated5
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The Central Intelligence Agency and the fciidligwco^pr^aniiationi of the Dopon-.''.merits el State, Detente. and'N!
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',. Director, Defeme Intelligence Agency
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d the Assistonl to the
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ks Atomic Energy
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material contain! information within Ihe meaning of the esploj miuton or revelation of whkh
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Prospects for Argentina
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
i. INTRODUCTION
It THE PRESENT SITUATION
Political Forces
diniiustratkm
The Peronifti
Other Political Elements
of Ihe Military
C The Economy
LU. THE OUTLOOK
Political Outlook
lllla'i Political Prospects
Subversive Potentialities
Tlie Likelihoodilitary Coup
APPENDIX
PROSPECTS FOR ARGENTINA
THE PROBLEM
To assess the situation in Argentina, and to estimate the prospects for the Illia administiatJon through the congressional electionsfor the spring
CONCLUSIONS
its nearly two years in office, the Illia administrationfor Argentina the longest period of political stability inhistory, but has failed totrong base of popularsupport. During the same period the Argentinehasecovery, but only to the level ithe Illia administration has failed to cope effectivelypressures or to make headway with the measurespromote balanced economic growth.
5 congressional elections marked the returnPeronistsajor legitimate political force. The trendpolitical polarization around the Illia administration and thewill probably develop further in the congressionalelections
eronist landslide in7 elections,will have to act more vigorously to create an attractiveto Peronisrn. We believe it unlikely that he can dohe will have to devise some way to restrict Peronistin the election. This would, of course, frustrate theto reintegrate the Peronists into the normal politicalreaction of the die-hard Peronists would be violent, butcertainly be contained.
Argentine military remain the only element capablethe government The officers now in control ofestablishment would prefer to preserve theHowever, the military leadership in general has beenby tlie frustration of its desire for Argentina to play arole in tlie OAS peacekeeping force in the Dominicanofficers who have long regarded the Illia administration asineffectual are now less disposed than ever to make dueits political handicaps. Whether the Argentine military willthe Illia administration within the period of this estimatehighly uncertain, depending almost entirely on their ownof the developing situation in Argentina. )
the military should conclude that the Peronists underleadership were likely to prevail in7 elections,first urge upon the government the necessity ofparticipation in the elections. If not satisfied in thatwould almost certainly intervene to impose their will, or toor annul the elections.
Peronist leaders recognize that the movement is onin its resurgence into the national political arena. If,year or so, the Peronist leadership, or some elementseputation for reasonableness and moderation,the military might come to discriminate between "good""bad" Peronists and to tolerate the former. Thus avictory under moderate leadership might-precipitate aamong the military, with some calling for immediateothers seeking to preserve the constitutional regime at leastpresidential electionneriod ofcrises, like that which occurred,
Argentine Communist Party is the largest inut is not an influentialforce. The Communists and Castroists have no significantpotential in Argentina except insofar as they may be ablein conjunctionass reaction of frustrated and
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
L Argentina is well endowed with both human and material resources. It has an extensive and very fertile agriculturaleveloped industrial base, and adequate petroleum reserves and hydroelectric power potential. Itsnearlyillion, is homogeneous, being almost entirely of European stock: someercenl are literate. The moderate rate of populationxerts no serious pressure on available resources. Tlie Argentine people are foremost in Latin America In terms oi both technical skillsenerally bfgh level of living. Nevertheless, Argentina is plagued by deep-seatedsocial, and political maladjustments. These result from the inability of its political leadership to resolve strong social antagonisms and toasic political consensus.
Argentina was long ruledorrupt and complacent oligarchy which ignored the rising expectations and dissatisfactions of growing urban middle class and labor elements. This oligarchy was replaced by the quasi-fascistol Juanilitary leader who won strong popular support byto nationalistic and working class interests. PeronTt program of rapidand his provision of economic and social benefits for the working class were accomplished at the expense of agriculture, the principal interest of Ihe ousted oligarchy and the chief source of foreign exchange. Mountingand external debl, together with Ihe regime's waste and corruption, brought Peron to political bankruptcy.5 he was overthrown by the military.
5 successive Argentine governments have failed to solve two basic problems: (a) how to get the economy straightened out and growingthe per capita domestic product, high by Latin American standards, is probably no greater than it wasnd (b) how to permit the Peronists to participate in the political life of the country without opening the dooreturn of Peronlsm through democratic processes orilitary overthrow oi the constitutional system. Tlie measures required for the first purpose bear most heavily upon the working population, in contrast Io Ihe favor which they enjoyed under Peron, and this contrast tends to confirm them in their Peronhm and their alienation Irom the rest of ihe society.
Prior to3 elections the Argentine military were united in their de-termination to prevent any Peronist return to power, but were divided on how best to accomplish that purpose. Some, calledong period of authoritarian rule without elections, as necessaryhoroughol Ihe country. Odiers, callednsisted upon the restoration of constitutional civilappropriate safeguards. The military permitted the election and inauguration of President FrondiziS, but re-
garded with suspicion his relations with the Peronists, whom he was trying to integrate into Ins own political organization. They were also critical of bis administration of the government and his "softness" towards Cuba. When Peronists won important offices in the provincial electionshe military overthrew the Frondizi government. Then,harp struggle between the "Reds" andhe "Blues" prevailed and permitted (he election and inauguration of President Mia
Frondizi had been the leader of theranch of the middle class Radical Civic Union (UCR) which had dominated Argentine politics6The Argentine middle class, comprising aboutercent of theis one of the largest in Latinllia was the nominee of theombination of Radical factions formed7 to oppose Frondizi. There are many other parlies and factions involved in Argentineut the recent trend has beenolarization around lllia's UCRP and the Peronists.
Despite notable gainshe Argentine economy remains sluggish. Industrial production costs are unrealisucally high, inflation is chronic, real wages are probably no better than they were eight years ago. Foreign capital is needed to stimulate economic growth, but nationalistic predilections Itaveagainst obtaining it Operatingonstitutional system and froma minority political base, lllia's difficult task is to fashion congressional majorities In support of unpopular economic measures. Meanwhile, the militaty isthe situation carefully and is sensitive to signs of Ineffectuality in civilian leadership.
II. THE PRESENT SITUATION
A. Key Political Forces
The llfto Aotminisfrafion
* Sec the Appcndlsetailedof Argentinearties and movements.
he factions which coalesced7 to form tbe UCRP were united by little more than their common hostility to Piondlzi. lllia's selection to be the party's candidate in3 election resulted largely from bitter rivalries among the better-knevn party leaders and tbe general supposition that no UCruV candidate could win anyhow. Indeed, lllia's election was made possible only by the fragnxntation of other political parties and tbe exclusion oflurality with only someercent of the popular vote. His subsequent victory in the electoral college was accomplishederies of deah with other political leaden who were iineothusiastic about tlie man but eager to end active military direction of the day-to-day operations of the government- He entered the presidencyarrow UCRP majority in the Senate, bututeats) in the Chamber of Deputies. Since the UCRP came to powerationally prominentarefully developed economic and political program, or an effective majority in
congress, ils legislative successes have required skillful performances by the UCRP congressional leadership.
S. Most of the UCRP leaders maintain strongly statist and economicviews which hinder solution of the administrations fiscal problems. These attitudes and the party's internal differences have been key (actors in delaying issuance of the administration's economic plans.
contrast to his predecessors, particularly the charismatic Peron andFrondizi, President Illia has stressed compromise andguarded pronouncements and tendency to hope that time will atadministration problems have caused some Argentines to dub himfox" while others depict himortoise. Partly because Illia'soffice coincided with an economic upturn, his "quiet" style andwere particularly effective in keeping tie Peronist problem underobtaining for organized labor, the principal Peronist base, minimumprice control legislation, by using restraint in measures lo preventfrom occupying industrial plants, and by refusing to panic atlo secure tlie return of Peron from exile, Illia has helped Argentina tointerval oi political stability during the last decade Alsohas been the influence of Lieutenant General Juan Carlosof the Army, who hasood workingwith President Illia and has insisted that the Armed Forces refrainin day-to-day politics despite military distrust of some
1 The development under these contract! enabled Argentina toirtually sdf-suHk-ienl in petroleum production, by tbe time they were cancelled, hut rising demand hu again rait-stripprd production. Since the contracts were not submitted to the Argentine Congress for ils approval, tlvey have been attacked in Argentina a* unconstitutional, tainted with corruption, end on invasion of the prerogatives of tlte state petroleum inonoplysensitive point with the Argentine public.
In its foreign relations the illia administration has followed traditional lines in emphasizing its support for nonintervention, self-determination, trade with all nations, and the peaceful settlement of International disputes. It lias stressed the need for Latin American unity, especially to solve development problems. Despite the internal political importance of maintaining anforeign policy, the Argentine Government lias generally supported tlie US position On critical issues between the US and Communist powers. Except for occasional minor incidents, Argentina continues to maintain friendlywith all Otlter Latin American countries except Cuba. It has agreed toongstanding border dispute widi Chile to arbitration.
The principal irritant in US-Argentine relationsispute betweenUS petroleum companies and the Argentine Government Upon taking office the Illia administration, in accordance with its campaign promises, promptly cancelled certain petroleum development contracts made with foreign companies during the Frondizieltlemenl with Iheschas been delayed by basic disagreements within the administration, by involvement of die dispute in Argentine domestic politics, and because the
lems involved are so varied that each case requires an Individual settlement. This delay haslowdown in the US economic aid program.
uring his firstonths in office lllia did succeed in reducing some of the sharpest political tensions. In maintaining good relations with the military leadership, in keeping civilian government functioning, and in moving Argentina through an initial stage toward restoration of constitutionalism. But during this period the lllia administration was not strong enough to come to grips with some of its most difficult economic and political problems. The results ofelections in3 have probably reduced its chances fora. consensus on key policy decisions. The UCRP increased its popular vote, but lost two seats in the Chamber. At the same time the Peronist bloc gainedeats, Ihe only net gain made by any political group. Itseputies now constitute the second largest group in the Chamber. The UCRP,till remains the largest party there, but, whereas UCRP legislative leaders could formerly operate among many fragmentary political elements to constructfor specific legislative proposals, their ability to do so is now reduced by the emergenceajor opposition bloc. In some cases, the residual minor parties are disposed to oppose the UCRP and to court the Peronists. Moreover, relatively few Peronist seats will be at stake in7 election, which will probablyurther polarization of political support around tbe UCBP administration and the Peronist opposition.'
'Seehich follow*ecapitulation of the5 election resultsummation of the seats which are to be contested in die elections scheduled for
Figure 1
COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
ontosT(tou
in thein
Paptt 7
People's Radical Civic Union
Popular Union
Neo-Pctonlit
Movement for Integration and Development
(MID)
Federation of Center Parties
Intransigent Radical Civic Union (UCRI)
Progressive Democrats (POP)
Uiuon of Argentine People
Argentine Socialist Party (PSA)
Christian Democrats (PDC)
Democratic Socialist* (PSD)
Others"
Includes various pasties organized primarilyrovincial basis.
lus whatever vacancies occur prior to the eleitiun. Elections for Uw governorships of the province* and tlte provincial legislature* will also bo held
The Peronists
Argentina's primary political problem continues to be the integration of tlie Peronists into the political processes on the same footing as other parties withouterious military reaction. The Peronist movement retains Its mass support because labor groups are convinced that it Is the only effective vehicle for satisfying their needs and aspirations. They still recall the social, economic, and political gains organized labor made during thend resent the less favored treatment which they have received from subsequent governments. Consequently, Peronist politics] movements retain the allegiance of more than one-third of the eleclonite and Peronist leadership controls about two-thirds of the Argentine labor movement Among thethere are many political and tactical differences and (hereontinuing struggle for leadership as the chances for the return of the) former dictator diminish.
The bulk of tbe rank-and-Ble remember Peron as the dynamic, all-powerful leader olears ago. Some Peronist leaders publicly profess theirto secure Peron's return and make periodic trips to Spain to maintainwith him. Even avowed ncc-Peronistshose provincial leaders who contested3 congressional elections despite Pcrdn's order to abstain and who haw effective control in their local areas) seek to avoid an open break with Peron and his lieutenants. Some of the nco-Peronists did cooperate with the Illia administration prior to the5 elections and mayoderating influence on tbe newly-elected Peronists who. for the most part, have trade union backgrounds.
When in power die Peronistseterogeneous lot held together by Peron's dominant personality. They had no rational program for resolving Argentina's economic problems then, nor do they have one now. Peronlsmass protest movement antagonistic to other social groups and contemptuous of democratic processes of government. Its social and economic program, Justiclalismo, isotpourri of high-sounding phrases drawn from welfare and corporate sialism and papal encyclicals. The present leadership of the Peronist bloc includes representatives of four distinct Peronist factions and its declared intent to behaveresponsible opposition" lias yet to be tested.
Although Perdu and most of his lieutenants profess friendship for the US, Pcronisms main stress is on anoreign policy in line with the opportunistic "Third Position" emphasized by Peron Ineriod. Thus far neither tire Caslroiles nor the Communists (despite supporting Peronist candidates in25 elections) have had much success in their efforts toPopular Front" with Ihe Peronists, However, there are small extremist Peronist factions, including the pro-Castro group led by John Williamormer Peronist congressman, that arc willing to cooperate with the extreme left
Other Political Elements *
The recent polarization around lllia's UCRP and the Peronists has seriously weakened other parties. In the March election the Movement of Integration and Developmentvehicle of former Presidenta poor third withercent of the popular vote. Other Ieft-of-center par-tics got even less support. On Ihe conservative side, although there were some gains in individual provinces, most of the conservative political groupings have become so badly fragmented that they are important nationally only when therelose, important vote in Congress.
The Argentine Cornmunist Party, withembers, is (lie largest in the Western Hemisphere, but is not an Influential force on thepoliticalhe party leadership has continued to prefer legalist political tactics to the risks of violent action. From time to time, it has made overtures to certain Peronist leaders in Ihe hope of enlarging its own influence through joint political efforts. There arc two small Communist splinter groups in Argentina, the Movement of Revolutionary Action and tbe Revolutionary Vanguard, both of which adhere to the Communist Chinese line on the need for direct action. Older and more firmly established is the Argentine Trotskyite movement, which in its various organizationsembership of
B. Role of tho Military
Early in the nation's history the Argentine milltaiy pre-empted the position of final arbiter in Argentine politics. Generally, it has exercised that prerogative only during periods of crisis and only after the nations civilian leadership had proved inadequate.0 the military have intervened in the political system on several occasions, most recently. Each time, however, those military leaders advocating withdrawal of the Armed Forces fromdirect participation in day-to-day politics have prevailed. Nonetheless, the idea that an extended period of military rule may become necessary toIhe way for "responsible civilian government" still has some support among active as well as retired officers.
Although attitudes toward national politics differ and there are inter-service and personal rivalries, the Armed Forces are united in their determination that Pcron and traditional Peronism shall not return to power in Argentina. Genera! Ongania, however, accepted President lllia's decision to permit Peronist participation in the March congressional elections. Ongania has had somein encouraging tlie military to focus attention on professional military
iscussion of these other political patties and movements, see Appendix.
'esult of the lllia administration's repeal of certain restrictive decrees and legislation, the Argentine Communist Party Is no longer outlawed. However, through his use of the electoral courts. lllia lias fcept the party from presentinghe national elections. Id the only provincial election the party didfoiled to elect any of iU candidates to the provincial legislature and polled onlyf moreotes.
matters, and in particularrogram for streamlining and nwdemrzing the Argentine militaryut the overriding problem ol tlie military-Peronist relationship has by no means been resolved. The conduct of thein months to come willactor influencing the Armed Forces position on the question of Peronist participation in the7 congressional and gubernatorial elections.
C. The Economy
'Inrgentinailitary assistance agreement with tbe US wlucbthe Armed Force* with moreillion in grant assistancendnd the right to purchase additional equipment on credit.
* This brought tbe level of reserves to on estimated2 million, us compared to the post-Peron peak3 million02 million at the end
The Argentine economy shows mixed tendencies. The basic resources of the country are certainly adequateigh rate of development. The condition of much of tho industrial plant and equipment Is good.arge part of the cultivated land is so fertile, even with little use of fertilizer or expenditure on other improvements, that Argentina's agricultural sectorenough for tbe population and usually for very substantial export.
In view of these assets, Argentine economic performance has0 the economy hasoom-and-bust pattern, with the depression phases of the cycle wiping out most of the gains of the prosperous times; the average annual rate of economic growth has been onlyercent, and the per capita growth rate less than one percent Most Argentine industries continue to be high cost producers, heavily dependent on official protection from outside competition. The railroad, highway, and port facilities remain in sore need of reliabilitation and modernization.methods remain technologically backward in many respects; there ishortage of such simple facilities as roofed storage places for wheal.
4 the economyubstantial recovery, but (he growth of some eight percent merely brought it back to tbe level reachedoreover, much of this improvement was the fortuitous result of good crops and good export prices. There was no appreciable progress in the government's handling of financial and budgetary affairs; indeed the budget deficit which had risen to0 millionncreased4illion. Inflation has now become chronic, and has.runear for the past three years.
Tlie public external debt inherited by the Illia government still amounted to4 billion after the payments made to the foreign holdersPrivate debt not guaranteed by the government comes lo0n meeting4 payments, the government had to draw downt is presently seeking debt renegotiation, which would stretchillion) of the large payments on the public debt now
scheduled lo come duenearlyut it has shied away from an accord with the International Monetary Fund, whose financialwould be contingentore rigorous domestic stabilization policy.
capital inflows have slowedartly owing toeconomic uncertainties and partly because of the lllia administration'scancelling the petroleum contracts with US firms and its delay inwith them. At the same time, the inability of the Argentinemonopoly to meet growing domestic demand has forced thepetroleum in growinga cost ofillion
III. THE OUTLOOK
A, Economic Prospects
the past six months or so. the IUia administration has shownawareness of tlie serious economic situation it faces. It liassteps to bring revenues and expenditures into closer alignment bygovernment enterprises to cut waste, by revising the tax structure andof tax collections, and by increasing the prices charged forgoods andhrough such measures it has hoped tobudget deficit5 to aboutercent4 levels and tohalf the amount of the deficit financed through Inflationary bankof such factors as wage raises and currency devaluation, however,that the government wiU find it difficult to achieve these goals.
A five-year National Developmentas been prepared under administration auspices, but its issuance was delayed, partly bywithin lllia's own party. The Plan calls forive percent rate of annual economicradual reduction ofapidof agricultural output and exports, an increase in the production of intetrncdiate goods (steel, pulp and paper, and petrochemicals)arge expansion in public power, fuel supplies, transport facilities, and newThe Plan calls for financing through the rescheduling of part of the existing external public debt and through new long-term and medium-term foreign credits,
' These price iiKteatcs, however, will he largely offset by recent wage niises granted workers In Hie transportation and other State enterprises.
2S. Much of the Plau seems sensible and well-adapted to the country's needs, but the fulfillment of its goals dependsery important degree on the willingness and ability of the government to legislate anderies ol painful anti-inflationary measures. These include reduction of the number of excess public workers, much greater restraint in the granting of wage increases, improved debt management, tighter control of the budget, and perhaps some further induction of non-essential imports. The administration's reluctance to go along with recommendations of this kind by the IMF will make more
cult the task of lining up the large amount of foreign financing envisaged for the Plan. Although Illia wilt almost certainly be able to renegotiate part of the heavy foreign debt payments due this year and next, such relief will not provide the new money needed to carry out tlie Plan.
aintenance of present economic conditions will necessitate official decisions which will Incur political opposition, particularly from the resurgent, labor-based, Peronist movement And the measures required to support any sustained and balanced pattern of economic growth will entail substantialrisks, specially in view of the political polari7ation apparent since the5 elections.
Wc believe that, in these circumstances, Illia will nottrong and vigorous economic program, but will continue his policies of compromise and adjustment. Inflationary pressure will probably continue to rise: wc estimate that the actual increase in cost of living will exceed die government'sercent goallie recent partial devaluation of the peso (In April) fromo the dollar, when the "parallel" or black market waso the dollar, Ls an example of the temporary, partial measures theis likely to take. Policies of this sort provide little cliance for sustained economic growth, but avoid decisions of the kind that brought the Frondizi administration's political demise. Nonetheless,onth-to-tnonth program could be adversely affected by certain variables beyond die adminbtration's control, such as unfavorable weather and fluctuations in world commodity prices.
B. The Political Outlook
Mfa's Political Prospects
Tlie gains of the Popular Union Party in the March electionsajor step forward In the reintegration of Peronists into the political system. At the same time it underlined the failure of Illia's attempts toizable number of Peronists into the UCRP. Tlie UCRPs leadership is still debating what strategy It should employ in the mondis ahead. Illia may have increasing difficulty in conttolling his own party with relation to the selection of new party leadership next fall and to politically unpopular measures such as economic stabilization. The administration will probably gain some legislative support from non-Peionist parties, depending on the issues involved, but some leaders ol these parties can be expected to oppose UCRP measures that seem to direaten the prerogatives of private business and commercial interests.
Most Peronist leaders recognize that the movement is on probation in its resurgence into the national political arena, Thus the more moderate elements, and particularly the neo-Peronist political leaders from the provinces, willto restrain the movement's extremist labor-based Congressmen and to actresponsibleowever, while cooperation between the Peronists and the admmistration might be feasible on certain issues over the next few months, such cooperation would be very difficult to maintainroad
front and would be virtually impossible in the months preceding ihe key7 provincial and congressionalhus lllia is likely to become even more dependent upon ed hoc combinations to secure passage of essential
lllia's delicate relations with both the congress and the military have been complicated by the crisis In the Dominican Republic, lllia was predisposed to support the US in that matter. He prepared legislation authorizing Argentine participation in the OAS peacekeeping force, but was deterred from submitting it by the vehemence and virtual unanimity of the congressional reaction against the US military intervention and by growing confusion regarding the actualhe Dominican Republic. This adverse congressional reactionnot only traditional Argentine opposition to such interventions, butresupposition that the US had intervened to suppress democratic elements and to sustain an unpopular military regime. If in the end the US should develop andolitical solution of the Dominican crisis that appeared to be popular and constitutionalist, much of this adverse political reaction would be assuaged, although there wouldard core of Argentine antagonism toward the US intervention, Meanwhile, however, Argentine military leaders in general have been frustrated by the disappointment of their strong desire for Argentina toeading role in the OASdesire promptedombination of their anti-communism with their professional pride, their interest in earning continued US military aid, and their jealousy of Brazil Some officers who have long regarded the lllia administration as weak and ineffectual now deeply resent its failure to acthis case and are less disposed than ever to make due allowance for its political handicaps. Indeed, there is some reason to believe tbat these officers are now seriously engaged inplanningoup.
lllia's limited room for maneuver within the constitutional framework will be further restricted, as7 congressional and gubernatorial electionsby military sensitivity regarding the political prospects of the Peronists. On present form, the Peronists,ree election, would be likely to win atlurality in Congress and the governorships of such key provinces as Buenos Aires andTo avert that, lllia would have to act more vigorously to create an attractive political alternative to Pcronism. Given both die character of his administration and the weakness of his position in Congress, it is unlikely that lie csn do this. Alternatively, he would have to devise some way to restrict Peronist participation in the elections. In deciding cn this, he
of tbe- Senate seats will fall vacantilling thesen most cases indirectly by vote of provincial legislatures, may impose certain additional strains, if the UCRP loses its present narrow Senate niapdty.
"These provinces, with the Federal District, makearge part of the important central-eastern section of Argentina, which, although comprising only one-third of the nationalhas three-(putters of the electorate. (SeeRegions and Population Distraction.")
will have io weigh not only the relative electoral prospects of the UCRP and the Peronists, but also the likely reaction of the Peronists to such restrictions and the likelihoodilitary coup if the Peronists are not restricted.
Subversive Potentialities
An incipient guerrilla operation discoveredemote area in north-western Argentina4 faded to win any popular support and was suppressed by the National Gendarmerie. Hardline Communist elements probablyonsiderable potential for sporadic acts of sabotage and terrorism, particularly in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, although they have yet to demonstrate this capability, Inhe Communists and Castroists have no significant subversive potential in Argentina except insofar as they may be able to act in conjunctionass reaction of frustrated and embittered Peronists.
4 Peronist labor leaders sought to foment public repudiation of tlie Illia administrationoncerted program of strikes and mass demonstrations. They hoped to make political capital of their championship of working class interests, no matter what tbe outcome. If the administration submitted to their economic and political demands, the political credit and advantage would be theirs. If Illia suppressed the movement byif the military were provoked to cast out Illia and take chargePeronists would have established their leadership of the massesepressive regime. Illia defeated this Peronist strategy, however,udicious combination of conciliatory measures, firmness in the maintenance of law and order, and avoidance of violent repression. Non-Peronisl labor organizations declined to support the Peronist campaign and tho participation of even the Peronist rank-and-file dwindled away.
Ifair opportunity to participate in7 elections, the more extreme Peronist leaders would almost certainly retaliate by again attempting to arouse the people against the governmentampaign of strikes and mass demonstrations. In this case, they might enlist more popular sympathy. Their initial objective would be to compel the government to permit theirin the election. Failing in that, the die-hard Peronist fringe might resort to terrorism and calls for popular revolution, The more moderate Peronist majority would almost certainly oppose such action as inviting violentThe security forces would almost certainly move in to suppress any Peronist threat to public order.
The Likelihoodilitary Coup
military remain the only element in Argentina actually capablethe constitutional government. Whether they will do soperiod of this estimate remains highly uncertain, depending almosttheir own estimate of the developing situation in Argentina.
General Onganin and the other officers now in control of the military establishment would prefer to preserve the constitutional regime, but, if they came to regard the Illia administration as intolerably mefTectual, they would act to reconstruct or remove it. This judgment might applyailure to cope effectively with either the economic problem or the Peronist political problem. Tlte military would also be highly sensitive to any imputation of softness toward communism, at home or abroad. It goes without saying that they would react strongly to any attempt to impair the unity, independence, and prerogatives of the military establishment.
A military coup might also be initiatedevel below the highIf, in that case, the present senior commanders concluded that they could not stop it, they might go along with it, in order to retain some control of die situation in the ultimate interest of constitutionalism.
If the military should conclude that the Peronists, under extremistwere likely to prevail in7 elections, they would first urge upon the government die necessity to restrict Peronist participation in the elections. If not satisfied in this respect, they would almost certainly intervene to impose their will, or to prevent or annul the elections.
There Is one contingency in which the military reaction might be more complex and less certain. If, during the next year Or SO, the Peronist leadership, or some elements of It, shouldeputation for reasonableness and moderation, some of die military might come to discriminate between "good" Peronists and "bad" Peronists and to tolerate the former. Others would deny the validity of any such distinction.eronist electoral victory under moderate leadership mightivision among the military, with some calling for immediate counteraction and others seeking to preserve tlieregime at least until the presidential electione cannot predict die outcome inase. There mighteriod of recurrent military crises, like that which occurred,
c General Party Doctrine ond Program
The UCRP stressed Ihe following points in3 campaign, has adopted them as integral perm of its program, and has already acted on certain individual(these are marked with an asterisk).
Repeal oi tho proscription* ot political parties."
Annulment of all petroleum contracts with loreign companies.*
Restoration of public confidence by payment of buck salaries andto retired state employees."
Establishment of an Economic and Social Council responsible forplanning."
Release from government control of trade unions associated with the OCT.*
Severance of Argentina's agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMP) if the agreement inhibits national economic development
Decentralization lo restore greater autonomy Io provincial governments and toore equitable distribution of wealth between the Federal Capital and the provinces of interior.
Granting to municipalities the right to limit the profits of public utilily companies while ensuring the communities belter public services.
echanization of the agricultural sector and Improvement ofto enable Argentine products to compete on more favorable terms in world murketi.
Tbe UCRP is opposed to communism and to Castro's Cuba and, in power, has cooperated with the US and other Western nations, despite its deep-rooted nationalist views. In and out of power tbe UCRP has been vociferous in its defense of Argentina's claims to the Falkland Islands (occupied since they tbe UK) and to territories in Antarctica.
he Peronists a. Origins
Tho Peronist Parly (PP) was formed by Geneittf Juan D. Peron from the various political groups Clint had carried him to the Presidency in6 national elections.eronist Women's Paitij was founded by "EcUa" Peron.nd the two parties dominated Argentine politics until Peron's overthrow inince tbe Provisional Government outlawed tbe Peronist) the Peronists have formed various political organizations that have been subjected to political proscription and reorganized under various names. For the5 election} the Popular Union (Union Popular) served as the principal vehicle for presenting Peronist candidates and programs. There are also various provincial parties controlled by neo-Peronists, generally more moderate than the trade unionist leaders elected as Popular Union
dales, and several extreme left splinter groups, formed by Peronists who would Forego participation in elections and attempt to selfe power by force
Leaders
In addition to the aging former dictator. Juan D. Peron, who servesallying point for the divergent Peronist groups and remains the idol of the Peronist masses, thereoterie of top leaders whose membership andhas fluctuated as Peron has sought to keep control in his own hands. These include Alberto llurbe. once Secretary General of Peronism's Coordinating Council; Jorge Antonio, Peron's partner in exploiting the Argentine treasury for their mutual benefit; Baulespected neurosurgeon who also wasGeneral of the Coordinating Council and was expelled for disobeying Peron's mstructions that Peronists vote blank In tlie3 elections; Augustoong-time leader of the Metallurgical Workers Union "nth moderate views and solid trade union support;nmiifli, Itead of the Textile Workersard-line "Insurrectionist" who was elected governor of Buenos Aires Province in the elections of2 which were quickly annulled; and Joseeteran leader of the Garment Workers Union who was Federal Deputy when Peron was In power and. as Secretary General of the General Confederation of Laboroderating influence within the Peronist Movement.
Party Doctrine and Program
The essence of the Peronist doctrine, Justicfalism, Is contained in Peron's own definition: "Neither right nor left nor in the center, but wherever the particular circumstancesn power, Peron followed liis prescription by granting organized labor extensive economic, political, and social gains and belaboring the US until deteriorating economic conditions forced him to seek awith the US and to lighten down on labor. His trumpeted Third Position" foreign policyrazenly opportunistic attempt to exploit traditionalpolicies. Although Peroiusm is basically anti-Communist and anti-Cashroist there are sectors of the movement that fear and hate the US even more than the Communists.
In its domestic policies Pcronism is essentially statist and opposed to the austerity-type programs the Frondhdnacted inwith the International Monetary Fund. While Peronist spokesmen now declare themselves favorable to foreign investment, they have attacked tlie petroleum development contracts negotiated under Frondizi, and make much of the need to preserve tlie "nationalovement with Its primary support in organized labor, Peronism's main emphasis is upou economic and social welfare measures designed to benefit Argentine labor."
"In addition lo dutiful tails for Pcrtms return the Peronist leaflets also Insist that Evita Peron'sfrom COT lieadriuarttri by the victorious anrt-Peron forces inrestored.
he Movement of Integration and Development (MID)
The Mooement of integration and Development (MID) developedplit over policy within the Intransigent Radical Civic Unionhen former President Arturo Frondizi sought an electoral alliance with the Peronists in the3 elections, Oscar Alende refused to go along and, having gained control of tho party machinery, did not withdraw his Own candidacy for the presidency. The Frondizi faction left the UCRI nnd formed the Radical In-transigenl Movement (MIR) which later became the MID. Its limited4 percent of the5 vote) is in middle class groups and is scattered throughout the country.
Leaders
Arturo Frondizi, tlie principal leader of the MID,omplex politicalobsessed with his mission to realize Argentines ecotiomfc and political potential for hemispheric leadership. Although his long opposition to Peron, while the latter was in power, and his courting of the Peronist masses after Peron's overthrow, have resulted in repudiation of Frondizi by both Peronists and anti-Pcronists, heoyal and even devoted personal knowing. Frondtzi's only slim chance of regaining power is an alliance with other, more popular, political groups.
Sylccstre Bagnis, once prominent in tlie UCRI, and Rogelio Frigerio, the alleged "grey Eminence" of the Frondizi administration, arc Frondizfs principal lieutenants.
Party Program and Doctrine
In general tho MID program defends the Frondizi adnunistration's policies, which stressed free-enterprise In the economic fieldoreign policy that was an admixture of basically anti-Communist and extreme non-interventionist views. The MID foreign policy is in the mainstream of traditional Argentine attitudes toward foreign relations, but its opposition to statism is the result of Frondlzl's own shift from hts former economic nationalist outlook during his term as the nations Cliief Executive. That shift reflects Frondizi's pragmatic analyses of Argentina's needs and his adaption of tactics to serve his primaryattainment of the eminent position to which he believes Argentina is entitled in Latin America.
The MID programlear alternative to tlie lllia administration's statist policies. It stresses the maximum use of free enterprise and private capital to achieve national development through industrialization, and urges restoration of the annulled petroleum contracts and conclusion of the Investment Cuaranty Agreement to facilitate an inflow of foreign private capital. The MID also proposes that the national budget be balanced by eliminating the deficits
of state-operated enterprises. In ils political planks the party emphasizesof full political freedom for tlie Peronists and their integration into national political life.
Notional Federation of Center Parties (FNCP)
The FNCP is the lineal descendeol of the traditional conservative parties that dominated Argentine politics46 and returned to power0 through an alliance with the military.ra is known as the "Infamous" period from the conservatives' resort to tlie widespread electoral fraud to keep in power. During the, the nationalof the conservative forces disintegrated, but the movement was maintained by provincial parties.ew provinces, such as Mendoza, Corrientes, and San Luis, where they won in the5 elections, the FNCP parties have regained considerable strength; elsewhere they have little effective popular support. The movement has respected leadership, but suffers from extensive.
Leaders
Emiiio Hanloij, President of the FNCP National Committee,espected moderate who generally has supported the Illia administration. On the other hand, Emiiio Olmos, the Conservative presidential candidatettacks Ihe Illia government's statist policies as anathema to Conservative principles.
Parly Principles ond Programs
Tlie FNCP lias consistently advocated limitations on state intervention In the economy, particularly in fields formerly open to privatealancedound currency, educational reforms, development of rural atfivities, protection of new industries, improved transportation facilities, and reduced taxes.
Traditionally the Conservatives have been anti-Communist and more closely oriented toward Western Europe lhan toward the US. Since World War II their ties with tlie US have increased and they havo become supporters for the imposition of strong sanctions on Castro's Cuba. In line with theirpro-US tendencies, die FNCP advocates renegotiation of the cancelled petroleum contracts with US companies.
Intransigent Radical Civic UnionOrigins
The UCRI resulted from the split in the old UCR following Per6n's overthrow and was itself split3 by the loss of the Frondizi faction (seche faction that supported Oscar Alende in3 presidential campaign won legal possession of the UCRI labelubsequent electoral court decision.
Leaden
Oscar Alende, UCRI presidential hopeful and former governor of Buenos Aires Province, is the party's major leader. Alende's presidential ambitions are probably responsible for the flexibility of his political principles. In view of the UCRI's poor showing in the5 elections, he probably willno opportunity toolitical coalition that appeared likely to further those ambitions. Celesilno Cehi, long-time Radical stalwart in TuCumanis perhaps Alende's principal rival In the UCRI. Gels! also is likely to be lookingolitical combination to further his own political ambitions.
Party Principles and Program
The UCRI isoderate, left-of-center party whose attitudes are more likely to represent Alende's opportunism than any fixed list of party principles. The party's statements generally are designed to appeal to economic nationaliststatist orientation. Nonetheless, the UCBI refrains from attacking the more moderate policies of its former caudillo, Frondizi, and opposes the lllia administration's cancellation of the petroleum contracts. It urges rapidand pays lip service to the ideaalanced budget without indicating clearly how these goals are to be attained. The UCRI has also wooed die Peronists enthusiastically, but with very little success. Although basically friendly to the US, the UCRI stress on its "Independent" position on foreign policy reflects its efforts to appeal to potential anti-US leftist supporters, Alende's own suspicions of US policy, and the influence of the traditional "independent" foreign policies of Argentine Radicalism.
ther legal Political Parties
There are several other long-established Argentine political parties with Strength in one or more provinces, but none of whom is likely to regain national prominence in the foreseeable future. The Progressive Democrats (Partldo Democrata Progresistaor example, was founded overentury ago, butominant position only in Corrientes Province, through its electoral coalition with the provincial Autonomist Party. Even with its support in certain other provinces the PDP securedercent of the total votenother moderate party, the relatively new Union of Argentine Peojilehe vehicle of former President Aramburu, lost heavily in5 elections. The UDELPA failed toingle candidate and lost the nine seats it had up for election.
Tlie Socialist movement in Argentina lias repeatedly been spUt since itsin. At present there are two Socialist Parties represented in the National Congress. Neither the Argentine Socialist Party (PSA) nor theSocialist Partyas much moreodicum of support in the metropolitan area (Buenos Aires) and virtually none outside of ft,
The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) is also split by factional Ism. It lailcd loingle one ol its candidates for the National Chamber of Deputies, losing ihe three PDC seats up for re-election. Its chances of emulating Ihe PDC successes in Chile arc remote indeed.
The various provincial parties of the interior that won seats in the National Chamber of Deputies are preoccupied with local issues and have almost no chance of broadening their appeal. Even if theyoalition they would have little chance of doing more than influencing close votes in the National Congress.
he Argentine Communist Party (PCA)
Thene of the oldest Latin American Communist parties (founded, has undergone recurrent repression, particularly ineriods. Although the decree outlawing it was repealed inhe Illia administration has kept tbe PCA from participation In national elections through Electoral Court decisions that the PCA could not qualify because of its anti-Argentine orientation and subservience to non-Argentine influence.
The PCA membersliip is estimated atnd8 its candidatesonstitutional convention receivedotes,ercent of the total vote. Its numerical strength is concentrated in the city of Buenos Aires and the adjoining metropolitan area, but the PCA does have some limiled support in several provinces.
The principal PCA leader is still Victoria Codovilla, party President and one of the party's founders, Jerdnimo Arnedo Alvarez, tlie party's SecretaryOrestes Ghloldt, Rodotfo Ghioldi, Victor Larralde, Benito Marlanetti, Vicente Marlschi, and Alcira do la Peha are veteran PCA leaders but no one of these appears to approach Codovilla's position of leadership.
The PCA draws ihe bulk of its membersliip from urban manual workers Ond lower middle-class white-collar workers. It also has supporters in professional and intellectual circles, including some university and secondary school students.
The PCA has closely hewed to Ihe Moscow line, as one of the most faithful and monolithic of Latin American Communist parties. Individuals and small groups disagreeing with Codovilla's policies and tactics have spilt off from time to lime without noticeably effecting PCA membership. These have included groups opposed to the anti-Perdn stance of the PCA leadership in, and more recent desertions of "activists" favoring the Castroite or Red Chinese approach to gaining power. Nevertheless, the PCA continues to plump for the parliamentary route In tlie apparent hope that it can inherit Peronist mass support
Splinter Groups
There arc two small pro-Chinese Communist organizations in Argentina, the Movement of Revolutionary Action (Movlmiento de Acrtdn Revcluclonarhnd the Revolutionary Vanguard (Vanguardlaoth groups are led by former PCA or Communist Youth Federation (FJC) members expelled for protesting the PCA lineis the Chinese Communists.
Tlie Trotskyite Communist Movementuch longer history and is more firmly established than the pro-Chinese Communist groups. The largestis the Trotskyite Labor Party (Partido ObreroIts most important leaders are Roberto Mtrnis, secretary general of the Party, Anger1 Fanjul and forge Posadas. Another Trotskyite organization Labors Word (Palabraperates within the Peronist movement and, unlike POT, is not hostile to the regular Communist Party. The Revolutionary Movement offt (MovSmiento Izquierdamore commonly known as PRAXIS,mall group, mainly intellectuals, seeking to provide guidance to the Peronists. All together, the Argentine Trotskyite movement probablyotal membership of
Rightist Groups
Since tbe0 kidnapping of ex-Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, In Buenos Aires, by Israeli agents and his subsequent execution in Israel, the latent anti-Semitism in Argentina has surfaced in terrorist actsagainst Argentines with Jewish ancestryneveral organizations have been involved, but the most influential ones are Tacuara, also known as the Nationalist Civic Union (Union Cinicand tbe Nationalist Restoration Guard (Guardian the main the members of both organizations are young men from middle and upper class groups. In addition to their anti-Scmiticism, both organizations are extremely nationalistic and seek to seize power by violence. Both reveal Nazi influence in their ideologies, organization, and braining, and have established paramilitary organizations.
Tacuara has been split by factionalism between two of its original leaders, Alberto Ezcurra Uriburu and Jose" Baxter. Although Tacuara membership is nominally Roman Catholic, it is more leftist In its orientation than the Nationalist Restoration Guard, whose leadership works closely with the Reverend Julioontroversial Roman Catholic priest long active in anti-Semitic circles in Argentina.
Neither organization has much prospect of seizing power by force, butave been able to create considerable disturbances and, in view of their anti-US orientation, arc capable of affecting US-Argentine relations by attacks on US installations and individuals.
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