SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CHEMICAL WARFARE

Created: 8/19/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Memorandum to Holders of NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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Soviet Capabilities and Intentions With Respect to Chemical Warfare

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF

OVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TOWARFARE (Secret,

New evidenceevision of the discussion of the Soviet toxic agent stockpile infe have now located"jdepots which we believe are devoted primarily to the storage of toxic agents; these have an estimated total maximum storage capacity ofons.uch depotsotal capacityons. These estimates of total storage capacity do not take account of other possible depots or of field storage on which we do not have conclusive evidence.

Five of these depots, with an estimated total capacityons, are confirmed toxic agent storage sites. Evidence of anof facilities at three of these suggests that present storage capacity is fully utilized or nearly so. In3 we thought it prudent to assume that the total toxic agent stockpile, both in depots and available to tactical units, was attons. The new evidence, which suggests full utilization of certain-confirmed storage sites, leads us to conclude that this stockpile is probably atons and could be considerably larger.

On this basis, we would revisef3 to read as follows:

A. Our evidence indicates that Soviet organization, equipment, stocks, training, and research aad development cm support substantial toxic chemical warfare operations.evidence of toxic-agent-production raUt or amounts in stock toeliable- esti-flKtfe-of-the-^calo-on which they could conduct these operations. Main

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reliance now appears to be on the very toxic nerve agents. Research and development arc continuing, including efforts to developlethal incapacitating agents.

e reaffirm the other Conclusions of NIGhich are reproduced below.

B- The Sovietsariety of chemical munitions for theater operations, butlieve that their useong-range strategic role is nut now pkiuncd.

and European Satellite forceside rangefor defense against chemical warfare, but they stillsatisfactory means of timely nerve agent detection. Civilare considerably lower than those of the military.

believe that the Soviet leaders think of chemicalessentially tactical weapons, but they consistently group themweapons as "weapons of masshethus probably consider them subject to the sameas those imposed' on nuclear weapons, and anytheir initial use almost certainly would be made atpolitical level

Soviet leaders almost certainly would authorize the usechemical agents by their theater field forcesimited war in which no nuclear weapons were beingwould probably not initiate the use of chemical weapons.

Original document.

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