SC No.5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence5
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Probable Effects ln China and TaiwanRC Attack on the Mainland
Without massive US support for tho GRC across the board, Including direct military participation lo the operation itself, Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to land on the South Chins coast, cut tbe main linos of communication between China and North Vietnam, and seize Kwangtung Province has very little chance of success.
A Kwangtung Expeditionary Force (KEF) launched frco Taiwan and relying on unaided GRC capabilities would be small. adius ofiles tho Nationalists are believed capable of potting fournd supporting them for perhapsays. At any greater distance from Taiwan GRC capabilities would bo sharply reduced. Tho GRC task force would have to overcome determined opposition by Communist motor torpedo boats and light patrolthe typo that sank two Nationalist ships off the coast south of Klnnen on 6
The GRC air fores could provide only marginal air cover for assault elements landing on the northern coast of Kwangtung and probably only Intermittent support south of Swatow (sea map showing GRC air force radius of action). Ones on the beach, GRC troops would be face to faco with vastly superior CoBtaunlst ground forces.
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In the Canton Military Region alone the Chinese Communists have moreegularInfantry, artillery, andIn five armies. In addition the Communists have six border defense divisions in this area. These units, and the bulk of tbe more heavily armed regular troops, are deployed on or near the coast where they would be immediately available to oppose GRC landings. Communist troops would have air support from fighter and bomber units which, although probably inferior to GRC air force in quality, would have theof fighting from nearby bases and would have numerical superiority, (see map)
Unless one assumes that major Chinese Communist military units would immediately defect and join forces with tbe GRCwe consider extremelysuccessful hit-and-run commando raid in strength is tho best result tbat could be hoped for. Bven this wouldhancy operation which could easily turnebacle Involving the destruction or capture of the greater part of the attacking force. The repeated failure of small-scaleman) butcher and bolt raids by GRC commando teams between2 andoints up the risks of attempting coastal landings.
The net effect of these raids, of which there were3 anduring the following year, appears to have been to improve Chinese Communist detection capabilities. Tbe teams encountered only the first line of Communist coastal defense, local militia and Public Security units. These forces displayed no inclination to cooperate with theteams, which were killed, taken prisoner, or driven offatter of hours. We have no reason to believe that the end resultarger operation by unsupported GRC troops would be substantiallyalthough it might take more time.
If the GRC succeeded inizable force ashore, local defense units would probably resist to the best of their ability in an effort to buy time for the deployment of regular troops. These would
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be quickly concentrated and committed to contain and ultimately to destroy the invaders. There is little doubt that Communist troops would be able to achieve this objective. The PLA is an effective combat force, well trained and heavily Indoctrinated. It performed creditably in Korea, demonstrated its ability to fight and win during0 campaign against GRC irregularby Special Forces units sent fromin Burma near the Chinese frontier, and more recently in2 border war with India.
The private GRC estimate of tbe chances for success in an operation lacking US support isnot very different froo our own, and it seems clear that Chiang Kai-shekore ambitious scenario ln mind. inimum he probablymassive US backing for the operation up to tbe beach, with tho expectation that If things do not go well once his troops are ashore tbe US will enlarge its commitment by direct participation (at least ln the air) in the campaign on tho mainland.
With US naval and air support up to the water's edge tho prospectsRC landing in force would be considerably better, but the outlook for success in the ultimate objective of seizing and holding all or most of Kwangtung Province is dim at best. Even the largest expeditionary force the GRC could muster and put ashore with US assistance would be heavily outnumbered by the reinforcements tbe Communists could quickly deploy from the strategic reserve to back up their forces already ln place ln South China.
3 the GRC workedetailed plan for an amphibious attack against Kwangtung. navy, and airbulk of the entire Nationalist military establishment. keleton garrison force of regular troops, strengthenedall-up of reserves, would be left behind to defend Taiwan and theIslands. The plan was carefully reviewedop levelcommittee which included Admiral AlanUS Ambassador inCOHUSTDC Vice Admiral Charles Nelson.
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Examination of tho proposed operation revealed serious deficiencies in many key areas. The GRC did not have enough amphibious lift for theor trained crews to aan additional landing ships if these were provided by the US. The Nationalist navy lacked sufficient ships for beach preparation and fire support missions. They did not have enough tactical aircraft with the range required forand close support missions, nor an adequate pool of trained pilots to replace combat losses. All the armed aervlcos were found to be short of trained specialists, especially keyfor logistics units required to support sustained operations. Tbe total GRC deficit la all categories of supply needed for tha operation amounted toilllonalf tons.
Admiral Melson commented that if thesewere eliminated the GRC expeditionary force could probablyeachhead and take over the port of Swatow but would be unable to break out of their initial lodgement withoutfrom US troops. It la questionable how long GRC troop morale would hold up if the expeditionary force remained bottled upwatowhe senior officers and NCO's in the GRC armed forces are mainlanders and would probably remain strongly motivated. The majority of the rank andercent of the riflemen in theTaiwan-born, have no stake in reconquering mainland China, and might lose heart quickly under continuous heavy pressure.
The Communists would react swiftly to cope with an invasion. Tbeand army ofillion men, is tbe backbone ofilitary strength. Nearly one third of this force is already deployed along the China coast from Shanghai to the DRVtotal ofen. These troops Includeegular Infantry divisions, nine artillery divisions, one armored division, andorder defense divisions. Forces In the area of the GRC landing would be committed at once to blunt the initial thrust and contain the Invasion until reinforcements Instrength could ba deployed froai tbe strategic reserve In north and northeast China.
The Communist troop build-up In the Taiwan Straits area during3 provides sore indication of the speed with which additional forces could bo brought lo. Apparently in response to what Peiping Interpretedossible threat of US-supported action by the Nationalists, tbo Communists aoved mix infantry divisions and ono artillery division into Fukien Province ln about one week's tine, raising the order of battle strength there. (see up)
Additional air support for defendingforces ln Kwangtung could probably bewith equal speed. During2 build-up four fighter regiments were deployed to backup fieldsatter of days. Chinese Communist air strength now within operational range of the Kwangtung coastet fighters andet light bombers. This force could be augmented in short order. Peipingotal of ' jet fighterset light bombers and there are at least seven unoccupied but usable airfields In South China to which additional air regiments could be deployed, much of the Chinese Communist air force Is obsolete by Western standards, but would nonetheless be effective against invading troops lacking local superiority.
Tho GRC beliefarge-seals invasion would trigger mass desertions from the ranks of the PLA appears to have little basis. The armed forces have always received preferentialand continuous, high pressure political indoctrination. Bven, ths years of greatest popular unrest on the mainland during and Just after the "leap forward" economic disaster there was no evidence of significant disaffection in the PLA. Apart from0 Chinese prisoners of war captured inof whom were one-time Nationalistsleeted to go to Taiwan rather than return to Communist control lnhere havo beenandful of low level defectors from the armed forces. Moreover, soldiers are seldom tempted toictorious standard, aod unless the Nationalists were able toeries of surprise defeats on Communist forces from the outset of thoass turnover of major Communist units appears very unlikely.
GRC hopesopular uprising which would hamper the Coasranlst defenders and aid tbe Nationalist cause also appear illusory. All our evidencethe stato of popular attitudes ln coastal areas of southern China indicatesarge-scale Invasion would notevolt at the present time.
The degree of popular disaffection that exists in the mainland population is sometimes exaggerated by observers outside China. There was considerable unresthen several successive crop failures created serai-starvation conditions in many areas. Recent travelers and refugees from southern coastal areas, however, consistently report that the food situation there has Improved substantially.
Communist Instruments ofpolice and public securityare basically loyal to the regime. Low-level party officials bear the brunt of public censure for regime failures and have been subjectedarsh new "purification" campaign during the past year. Their morale has probably dropped but extremely few have defected, suggesting that their situation has not yet destroyed basic loyalty ln this key group.
Southerners in general have always resented governments of any kind Imposed on then from the north, and probably see little to choose between the Communists and tbe Nationalists. They have many reasons to dislike the present regime, with Its stifling political controls and record of economic failure, but by all the evidence the Chinese Nationalists still remain deeply discredited ln their eyes.
Tbe GRC could, therefore, probably expect little or no help from the civilian population. At best the majority of the people would remain neutral while tho issue was ln doubt, waiting to throw ln their lot with the winning sldo. At worst, the population might be convinced by Communist propaganda that the landingoreign Invasion by "imperialist" forces and rally patriotically behind the regime.
Communist military reaction would probably not be limited to simply repelling tbe GRC invasion in Kwangtung. Tbo Offshore Islands would almost certainly come under military pressure. Heavy artillery attacks would probably be the first step, followed by an attempt to seize some or all of the islands if the Communists concludeduick victory over reduced garrison forces was possible. Large-scale amphibious attacks on Taiwan itself would probably not be attempted but commando raids might be launched from the mainland against military Installations clearly associated with the GRC attack. GRC naval installations in the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands and at Tsoying, and port facilities in Kaohslung might be targets for such operations. The Communists might also attempt to bomb airbases in southern Taiwan used by the GRC air force to support the invasion forces. In any such attacks, however, the Communists would probably try to avoid actions which would Increase the enmity of the Taiwanese population.
One of Peiping's major objectives wouldbe to turn the Taiwanese against the Nationalist government and if possible topatriotic" revolt against the GRC and its "imperialist masters" in the VS. Communist propaganda would portray the GRC invasionuthless exploitation of Taiwanese "comrades" to serve the interests of foreigners.
The Taiwanese population holds little love for mainland Chinese of any political coloration and has no sympathy for Communism. For this reason, Peiping's callsising to "reunite" Taiwan wltb the mainland would probably have little appeal. It seems likely, however, that the combination of military reverses which would discredit the GRC leadership and mountingwould increase dissldence among tbe populationoint which would gravely threaten the stability of the Nationalist government. Morale of the ruling aainlander elite, sustained in part by the dream of eventual return to the mainland as conquerors, would almost certainly plummet.
Poiping would exploit the invasion attempt domestically to strengthen its position by appeals
to Chinese patriotism, seeking to re-awaken enthusiasm for regime programs across the board as partational effort to repel foreign aggression. Victories over the attacking forces would be played up asof Communist power, and new proof that Mao's dictum "all imperialists are paper tigers" is correct. Abroad, Chinese Communist propaganda would seize on an unsuccessful OS-supported GRC attack to bolster the idea that Chinese hegemony in East Asia is the "wave of the future." At the Bame time, Peiping's propaganda would underscore the threat to world peace created by "OS aggression" in order tothe U3 and stimulate deterrent pressure on Washington from US allies and neutral nations.
The Chinese Communists could be expected to back up menacing propaganda statements charging that the US was starting an "Asian war" by troop movements and other threatening militarydesigned to show that Peiping was capable of enlarging the conflict at any point along an arc extending from Korea to the Indian Border. It Is probable, however, that Peiping would hold off on any such escalation and concentrate on destroying the GRC landing force or driving it into the sea.
Original document.
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