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INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE SOVIET PROGRAM OF MILITARY AID TO LESS DEVELOPED
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Research and Reports
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contents
Sumary and
I. Beginnings of Soviet Military Aid
A. Milieu and Motivations
B- Decision to Go Ahead
Change in Military Doctrine
Receptivity in Less Developed Countries
Influence of Khrushchev
II. Dimensions of the Program
A. Extensions and Drawings
B- Composition of Military Aid
Equipment
Technical Assistance
.
of Distribution
and Terms
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III. Technique of Implementation
A. Organization
B- Negotiation, Agreement, and the Delivery Contract . Transportation and Delivery
IV. Evaluation of Soviet Military Aid
with Economic Aid
with the US Military Aid .
roblem and an Opportunity .
on Recipients
on National Security and Regional
Balances of Power
Resulting from Aid
V.
Page
A. Soviet Military Aid Agreements with Less
Countries, by Recipient,
une
Appendix B. Selected Military Equipment Exported or Obligated by the USSR to Less Developed
une
Appendix C. Discussion of Sources
Tables
1. Drawings and Repayments on Soviet Military Aid by Less
Developed Countries, by Year,
g. Drawings and Repayments en Soviet Military Aid
by Less Developed Countries, by
3. Selected Military Equipment Exported or Obligated byto Less Developed Countries; Types,une
Illustrations
Figure 1. Extensions and Drawings of Soviet Military Aid to Less Developed Countries, by
(Chart) following;
Figure 2- Components of Soviet Military Aid to Less
DevelopedChart)
Soviet Advanced Weapons Systems Delivered toby Less Developed Countries,following
Figure u. Soviet Military Technical Aid to Less Developed5 (Chart) following
Eafil
Figure 5. Extensions and Drawings of Soviet Military Aid to Less Developed Countries, by Recipient,
THS SOVIET PROGHAM OF MILITARY All) TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES*
Suamary and conclusions
During the5 through5 the USSR extended an estimated6 billion In military credits and grants toess developed countries of the Prce World. Six of these countries accounted for more thanercent of Soviet military aid commitments, as follows (in billion
United Arab Republic
Anns aid has contributed to the growth of neutralism in strategically located areas and haseneral image of the USSR as aanticolonialist power. Furthermore, the Soviet program has led to ties with military leaders in recipient countries, and these ties have influenced the formation of national policy In these areas to the detriment of the Wast.
hen the program began, large quantities of standard weapons were available at low cost ln the USSR because of the streamlining of the Soviet armed forces. Ac the programreat variety of ground, air, and naval equipment was sent to tho less developedincluding some advanced models not yet supplied to other Cunmunist countries. upplement to tbe shipment of arms, the USSR has trained0 foreign military personnel in the USSR and haa0 Soviet military technicians to recipient countriea,oat equivalent to aboutmillion.
In contrast to the Soviet economic aid program, the military aid program has been marked by rapid delivery, immediate impact, and swift development of rapport with military leaders in the less developed countries. Although military aid has accounted for less than one-half of total Soviet aid commitments to less developed countries, militaryvalued at twice that of economic goods and services has been
As for financial terms, the USSR has charged low prices and has made generous credit arrangements with recipient countries. Interest has
The estimates and conclusions ln this report represent the bestof this Office as
2 percent and the period of repayment has averaged ten years. The USSlt haa also provided discounts averaging *l5 percent deducted from the list price value6 billion. General economic difficulties,have forced acme recipients to seek an easing of terms and aof payments. By the endhe leas developedhud repaid aboutercent of on estimated arms aid debt of> billion.
From the Soviet point of view, the outlook for tbe military aid program ls encouraging. The major objective of thc program that of replacing Western with Soviet or neutralist attitudes in the lessareas of the Free Worldis being met for the most part. Further opportunities exist to expand the number of recipients and the kinds of weapons and technical support. From the recipients' point of view, the outlook for the program is also favorable. In most instances, their armed forces have shifted from Western to Soviet equipment and have graduated from simple to more complex armament. Ihe recipient countries will continue to seek arms and technical support, especially if the USSR remains circumspect ln using the military aid program for political leverage.
I. Beginnings of Soviet. Military Aid
A. Milieu and Motivations
Following World War II the USSR attempted indirect aggression in less developed countries of the Free World by encouraging rebellions in Burma, Greece, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines. After these failed, Stalin showed little interest in the less developed areas and became preoccupied with problems of economic reconstruction in the USSR and with the economic and political consolidation of Eastern Europe. During the later years of his life, Stalin seemed unable or unwilling to recognize the revolutionary implications of the newly won independence of former colonial areas in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and he branded such freedom as fictitious and the emergent nationalist leaders as "reactionary" and unworthy of Soviet support.
After Stalin's deathhe new leadership sought ways to free Soviet foreign policy from the rigidities then characterizing it. Moscow attempted to outflank the major centers of Western power by moving the area of its active operations to the lessractically all of which had emerged from colonial rule with active anti-Western sentimentas the most fruitful field for economic and military penetration. The USSR undoubtedly hoped that, if theWestern preeminence in these areas could be eroded gradually by an expanding Soviet presence, the USSR wouldeasure of influence and eventually, perhaps, political leverage. Along withaid, military aid came to be viewed by Moscow as an expeditious and relatively safe method of extending Soviet power.
B. Decision to Go Ahead
The initiation of an economic aid program'treludeomprehensive program of arms aid to less developedof the Free World. 5 the USSR began military aid shipments to less developed countries by proxy, using Czechoslovakia as onand the following year it started direct shipments. OnceSoviet arms aiduicker and more visible impact than the economic aid program and soon gained independent status as ainstrument of Soviet foreign policy among the less developed The decision of the USSR torogram of military aid to less developed countries was influenced further by three factors: hange in Soviet military doctrine, resulting in the availability of large quantities ofhe receptivity for thc aid in less developed countries;he personal Influence of Khrushchev.
1. Cnanfre in Military Doctrine
One consideration leading to the inauguration of aprogram of military aid was the shift in Soviet military doctrine
away from thc mana-troops concept thnt had characterised it sinceWorld War II. , changes In the Soviet military posture resulted in aubotontial quantities of arms becoming surpLus. The first large-scale reductions in militury manpower from the pea* attained during thc Korean War were announced by the USSR Realignment of the forces to increase their effectiveness in nuclear war by changes in organization and equipment, operational concepts, and tactical and strategic doctrine also was initiated in this period. In addition, new generations of aircraft, ships, and ground equipment, as well aswere being issued to the forcee, rendering obsolescent many older models that were in use at the time.
Military industry has alwaysavored high-priority sector in thc Soviet Industrial complex und as such hoc beenby etable production lines not subject to the continualreview aad interruption seen in the West. With nev models or series in production and with the surplus caused by the reduction and realignment of sjanpowcr, the USSR had quantities of older equipment beyond any reasonable requirement for mobilization. progress had been made in equipping the Eastern European Communist countries with these items, the losses of the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the Korean War had been made up, and the Inventory of available wcupona was well beyond what could be absorbed by prospective buyers. Military aid, then,seful alternative toequipment.
2. Receptivity Ir. Less Developed Countriea
^SR was not long lnarket for Its surplus
arms among the less developed natlona. Fifteen of theecipients of Soviet military aid had been coloniea, andod received theirsince World War II. Relatively small in terms of population (I'i have populations underost of them are governed by authoritarian regimes whose stability has depended and continues to depend on national nilitary forces. All were facedrood spectrum of problems bearing on political stability and economic viability and development. None of thea possessed the necessary equipment, technological ski lie, and industrial base to organize their armed forces without outside assistance.
Almost without exception, ultimate recipients of Soviet military aid Tirat sought arms from the West, and only after their requests were denied, did they treat with the USSR. Sometimes thc USSR solicited requests, and often its offers were rejected bythat feared antagonizing the West or becoming too involved with the USSR. Such countries included Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.
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3- Influence of Khrushchev
The military aid program began and evolved to Its present proportions during Khrushchev's leadership. Khrushchev waa personally involved in much of the military aid activity, from initial negotiations to the delivery of equipment. He traveled extensively to leas developed countries and received their leaders in Moscow on behalf of the program. Reportedly, he played the "generous uncle" role in some of thearguing against the obdurate Kikoyan. Invariably, his advocacy of the reciplent'a request produced results favorable to the recipient.*
Khrushchev was at first reluctant to publicize the Soviet nilitary old program, buterhaps ln response tostrident Chinese criticisms of Soviet lack of support for national liberation movements, he became less reticent about openly acknowledging Soviet deliveries of arms to less developed countries. Ho repeatedly boasted that the USSR had sent large quantities of weapons to the Algerian "patriots" frco of charge and asserted:'
We also afforded Indonesia, Yemen, and other countries considerable help in their armed struggle. We lent all our power to the support of the Egyptian people when they were faced with the necessity of dealing thc Imperialist aggressors an armed rebuff. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are actively helping the young national statea to strengthen their defenses and to establish and train armed forces to protect the Independence they have von from the Inroads of the imperialists. We Marxist-Leninists stand firmly on Lenin's positionwe believe that the peoples do not take up arms and shed their blood of their own free will. The violence of the colonial!ets forces them to it, andeople le forced to rise in armed struggle it lo the duty of all internationalists to give them every possible aid and support, 'lhat ie our position with respect to the armed struggle of the peoples for their national liberation.
OnU,onth before his ouster, heouth forum in Moscow that the USSR would supply weapona to "any
* On occasion, however, Khrushchev could be asegotiator as Mikoyon. AR Defease Minister Amir gaveist, of equipment sought by Cairo. Khrushchev, after examining it, said it was entirely too lurg*. He then toldtory of the legendary Crand Duke Nikolay who ordered the heaviest suit of armor obtainable, rode off to battle, and drowned because of the weight of the armor. Khrushchev ended by commenting that he did not want the UAR to become another Nikolay.
people fighting against any oppressors. many peoples have already von victory with soviet militarye said, and added, "if there arc any others who need weapons, we are ready to discuss the question in fraternal rashion and to give help."
since khrushchev's ouster indditionalwith established recipients (the uar and syria) have been signed, and rapid implementation of existing agreements is evident. moreover, aid to dissident groups in african countries whose governments the ussr does not support has been expedited. both of the present key soviet leaders, brezhnev and koaygin, were active in the arms aid program of their predecessorbrezhnevometime traveling salesman and kosygin as an administrator (kosygin, for example, signed the soviet-indonesian arms accord2 for the ussr). thus khrushchev's removal has left the soviet military aid program unimpaired.
ii. dimensions of the program
a* extensions and drawings
, czechoslovakia, serving as an intermediary for the ussr, began extendingillion worth of military assistance to affhanistan, the uar, syria, and yemen. the soviet military aid program began in its own right7 million in assistance was extended to afghanistan and syria (see ore0 million in military aid to less developed countries had beenby the ussr. 0 the ussr accelerated thisillion worth of assistance, and in the following year extensions0 million. hew extensions of military aid, however, dropped1 million?8 millionu, military aid cxtensione again climbed precipitately,7 million, reflecting extensive new agreements with afghanistan, india, indonesia, and the uar, as well as several smaller commitments. byumulative soviet military assistance commitments totaled an6 billion (the value of aid after applicable downpayments).
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in the period fromoilitary assistance accounted for less than one-half of total soviet economic and military aid commitments to theeveloped countries, but because it can be implemented so quickly, it constituted almost twice as muchactually delivered as that supplied under the more highlyeconomic aid program. byrawings amounted to an estimatedercent of soviet military aid commitments, whereasaid drawings constituted lessercent of economic aid extensions. although tapering off considerably since the peak0 million estimatedrawings have remainedigh level, totaling an0 million30 million4 at list prices (see
-sfcret
1
and Drawings of Soviet Military Aid to Less Developed Countries, by
Weaponry has been the major component of the Soviet military aid package, constituting aboutercent of the total value (see
SECRET
ponents of Soviet Military-Aid gito Less Developed Countries'^
l V
RIM
Ammunition accounts forercent and spares account forercent of tha total value.* Triese two components, like weaponry, are subject to sizable discount* from stated list prices. Other military-related equipmentchiefly vehicles, construction materiel, and naval auxiliary craftepresents the finalercent of total value. Thishowever, is not discounted and its period of repayment is shorter. Technical assistanceoviet advisers ln recipient countries andtrainees in the USSRormally is structured in separate contracts, which usually are financed outside of credit agreements and are not discounted.
* ThCBe data are based on Indonesian and Iraqi experience. Although lt may be argued that the proportions reflected in military aid to these countries may not hold for smaller countries or for countries with different military establishments, it is believed that, in general, theyeaningful order of magnitude.
r
1. Egui pment
Tbe equipment provided under Soviet nllitiry aid agreements has often been characterised as obeoiotc, and ouch of it is supposed to bave been delivered in various states of disrepair. The fact is,that about two-thirds of the total equipment provided to date is of types that still are in standard use in the Soviet armed forces, and of these, more than one-half are still ln current production in the USSR. These proportions should rise slightly as more advanced weapons systems are exported, although the proliferation of newer weaponry among established recipients will be balanced in part by exports ofweaponry whioh ensue as other countries Join the list of
Some purchases were inappropriateoint of view of tactics. Perhaps the best example is the light cruiserillion that Indonesia bought essentially for prestige purposes Most of the equipment, however, fitted easily Into the existing military framework.
Much of the equipment, although classified as used, has come directly from Soviet warehouse stocks and has never been used even in training.'1 Its delivered state generally has been excellent. What problems do arise ln regard to Soviet equipment invariably occur after the recipients receive it- Early ln the program mistakes occurred(Arctic gear was sent to the Middle East and Africa, weapons were sent without spares, and sout as the program progressed, efficiency improved. Currently the major problem Is spares. The USSR provides spares In tlie original agreement adequate for maintenance and most repairpecified period. Thc insistent demand by recipients for additional spare parts or major repairs is largely attributable to faulty storage procedures and frequent misuse of equipment and available spares-
A trend discernible1 is thc export of advanced weaponry to countries that had previously received only conventional arms. Only in part has this reflected actual need: tbe desire of the recipients for prestige afforded by modern weapons has been almost as inportont an element as the desire for security in the form of an effective military establishment. This desire for modern weaponry for prestige purposes has induced competition among recipients of Soviet military aid. Some of the advanced systems delivered to less developed countries have not as yet been exported to Communist countries.eflects the newer weapons systems ordered or delivered.
* Review of the equipment estimated to have been in depots of the Soviet ground forces5 shows that in most instances the mount in storage greatly exceeded troop holdings.
The increasing complexity of modern military equipment necessitates increasingly higher skills for the people vho assemble, maintain, and operate the equipment. This has required the USSR torogram (complementary to the weapons aid itself) ofassistance embracing two activities: the training in the USSR of military personnel from less developed countries, and the sending of military technicians from the USSR to countries receiving military aid. Every recipient of military aid has received both types ofassistance. During the period5 toore0 individuals were involved in this two-way flow of personnel (see. The costs to recipient countries of the technicul services, training, travel; and maintenance growing out of the Soviet military aid program during this period totaled aboutmillion.
Technical assistance usually is carried in separategenerally financed outside of credit agreements and not Thc only known exception to this practice were four of the major Soviet-Indonesian agreements in which technical assistancerepresentingercent of the total value, were financed under medium-term credits. These four credits, totalingillion, covered the costs of training Indonesians in the USSR and the services of Soviet technicians sent to Indonesia and were to be repaid in Indonesian currency and/or convertible currencyeriod of ten years at an interest rateercent.
Since the inception of the arms aid program, more0 Soviet military technicians have been employed by less developed countries, with Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, and the UARfor more thanercent of the total. This program is estimated to have cost0 million. As Oforeoviet military technicians were present in less developed countries- These technicians assist in three functions: he delivery, asserably, and maintenance of militaryhc training Of indigenousin the operation and maintenance of equipment;he instructing in tactics of indigenous military officers ln staff and line units. Courses are established for the utilization of thc entire range of armaments from small arms to aircraft aod naval vessels. Soviet officers also serve as instructors in the major military academies of these countries. In their capacity as advisers, Soviet officers have played key roles in modernizing and reorganizing the military establishments of aid recipient countries-
As of0 military trainees from less developed countries had gone to the USSR for instruction costing
illion. More thanercent of the trainees were from five countriesAfghanistan, Indonesia (which sent nearly one-half of theraq, Syria, and the UAH- rainees were being trained in Soviet military institutions. Although Soviet technicians usually arrive following delivery of equipment, indigenous trainees invariably are sent to the USSR before the delivery of the weaponry ln which they are to be trained. These training programs
from six weeks to five years, with the bulk of the traineesin programs lasting lessear.
C. Pattern of Distribution
5 andhe Soviet Union concluded formal military aid agreements withess developed countries of the Free World (sec Six countriesfghanistan, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, and the UARaccount for aboutercent of all soviet military aid extensions (see The Middle East accounts for aboutercent of total Soviet military aid extensions; Asia, about 4't percent; and Africa, lessercent.
The initial tactic used by the USSR in providing arms tothat of utilizing Czechoslovakia and Polandow has been extended by the Soviet Union to new, less Stable situations. This change, which gained momentum4 and continuesnvolves the supply of arms not only bo existing regimes but also to dissident groupsountry and evenroup sharing powerountry (thc Greek Cypriots). The former intermediaries, Czechoslovakia and Poland, now have been replaced by thc UAR, Algeria, Ghana, and others. Although some of these recipients' activity in arms supply may be the result of unilateral decisions on their part, the formal agreements for the delivery of Soviet military equipment to these countries prohibited its transshipment to third countries without Soviet approval. For example, the Soviet-Indonesian agreement of1 stated:
The Republic of Indonesia will not without the consent of tho USSR formally or do facto transfer any equipment delivered under this contract, orits use by any third party. Thc USSR and thc Republic of Indonesia will take all necessary security precautions for the secrecy of correspondence and information regarding the . Only strictly confidential persons whose officialdirectly involve use of this equipment should have access.
The USSR generally provides low prices and generous terras to recipients of its military aid- Thc prices charged leas developed countries by the USSR vary with thc tyi* and quality of the equipment and the identity of the recipient country. Tableppendix B,om perison over time of list prices quoted by the USSR to variouscountries for comparable equipment5 throughTheoe list prices, although diverging at some points, are close enough to suggest that Soviet catalog prices are derived from cost ofwith differences reflecting timeeriod of time the price of an item tends to fall) and distance (the elipjitly lower prices quoted to Iraq compared with those to Indonesia probably depended heavily on lower coata of transportation). Beyondhird factorpolitical favoritismsay Influence the list price somewhat, but this factor cornea into play more in the discounting than In the price-setting stage of the negotiating process.
The discount from established list prices hao by now become an intrinsic feature of Soviet arms aid to less developedercent of6 billion extended thus far has been in thc form of discounts, including grants.* Although discounting probably ia premised on the asneoaaent by the USSRecipient's ability to pay higher prices, political favoritism also is seen in tbe variationin Soviet practice. Among leaa developed countries receiving military aid from the USSR, thc most favored nations In respect to tho proportions of aid ln the form of diacounts from list prices have beennd the UARercent). Two other recipiente (Yemen and India) reflect thc extremes of Soviet military aid practice. Aboutercent of the value of the arms provided Yemen has been written off, making this fledgling
republicrantee. On the other band, arms aid to India has
been conducted largelyo-diacount basis-
It nay be argued that weaponryparticularly conventional arms, which rapidly beccroc obsolescenthas no alternative use and
therefore that the USSR can afford to be generous in its pricing policies, nevertheless, the fact that the USSR currently exports advanced weapons systems carrying tbe same price and discount features
indicates that it views selective pricing as on Important political
technique in its military aid program.
Price ls only one lever that the USSR employs to further Its military aid objectives. The terms of military uidontain other inducements for recipient countries. niform 2annual interestrace period averaging three years before payments commence,epayment period averaging ten years characterize
* Although grants aay make entree in the short run easier, the Soviet Union probably viewe them as weakening thc ties produced by creditand resulting financial indebtedness.
the terms- Moreover, to the recipient hard-pressed for foreign exchange, the USSR frequently permits repayment in commodities or local currencies.
S. Repayment!;
Total repayments on Soviet military aid creditsre estimated at4 million,ercent of total(see Annual repayments on military aid Increased steadily,eak34 ofer year. In each of these two years,illionillion was repaid in the form of commodities, representing approximatelyercent of the annual exports of less developed countries to the USSR.
Table 1
Drawings and Repayments on Soviet Military Aid by Less Developed Countries, by
Million US
Net
434
rawings shewn are after applicable grants and discounts and re-flect the estimated debt obligations of recipients.
Despite thc generous terms provided by the USSii In its military assistance, thc arms debt accrued has taxed the fiscaL ability of many of the less developed countries. This has ledontinual process of renegotiation, which usually has resultedurther easing of terms. In some casea, thc USSR has written off part of the Indebtedness, and in others it has eased repayment schedules. rime example of the latter occurred in5 when the USSR agreed to reschedule the arms debt repayments or the UAR. The UAR, experiencing an acute shortage ofexchange lnequ*ated thc Soviet Union to postpone aLl
ailitary debt repayments for the In the ensuingthe USSR refused to postpone the repayments but did agree to reduce annual paymentsy more than SO percent (frcoi millionillion) and to lengthen tbe repayment period.
The repayment performance of the less developed countries to date hocixed one. As of the endhe less developed countries had repaidercent of an estimated arms debt of Jl.'i Thc repayment rate of individual countries has varied Of the prime recipients, Afghanistan, India, and the UAR have been the best to date, having repaid approximatelyespectively, of their accumulated arms debts. At the opposite extreme, Indonesia and Syria each have repaid only aboutercent of their indebtedness to the USSR, with Indonesia accounting for nearly one-half of the total outstanding indebtedness of all less developed countries for Soviet military aid. The repayments of each of thecountries4 are shown In Table 2.
Table 2
Drawings and Repayments on Soviet Military Aid by Less Developed Countries, by
Million US $
njo!
Indebtedness
Drawings shown are after applicable grants and discounts and re-fleet the estimated debt obligations of recipients. Cyprus andbars drawn negligible amounts but have mode no repayments.
Although the operations of the USSR in the realm of ailltaryhighly classified, it is known that the Soriet Chief Engineering
ubordinate to the State Committee for Poreign Eco-
nomic Relationss charged with overall responsibility for this activity. It acts as the "supplier" in military aid contracts, being charged with the distribution of military equipment and serviceo to Communist countries as well as to less developed countries of the Free World. Horeover, with the Directorate of External Relations of the General Staff, GIU oversees the Instruction of foreign military trainees in thc USSR.
Agreement, and the Delivery Contract
The initial negotiations for military aid are characterized by the visits of high dignitaries between the USSR and potential aidduring which they discuss broad areasroposed aid package. These meetings arc followed by visits by high militaryfrom both sides. An overall purchase agreementtypes and amounts of equipment, technical aaolutance, and training in general termsio then signedountry-to-ccuntry basis by appropriate governmental leaders.
During the next phase, the GIU takes over. Acting for thcsigns the delivery, or implementing, contracts aa "supplier,-the Ministry of Defensepecific branch of the armed ser-
vices signs as "customer" for the recipient, Types and quantities of equipment, terms, prices, and delivery schedules ore hammered out and agreed to by the GIU and representatives of the recipient country. These contracts usually are signed ln Moscow, but several have been signed in recipient countries. Subsequent requests for changes by the recipient must be approved by the GIU. If the requested change* go beyond the value specified in the agreement or If they affect advanced weapons systemsor example, the cancellation by Iraq of ita aurface-to-alr missile programhe GIU sends thorn upward for aby the Minister of Defense or by the Soviet Council of Ministers Itself.
and Delivery
In the next phase, the GIU, In concert with the Directorate of External Relations, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the Ministry of Maritime Fleet, arranges for the shipment of military equipment tocountries. Whereas the majority of lntra-Bloc shipments of Soviet military aid arc by roil, most Soviet arms shipments to non-Communist countries are by ship, thc majority originating in Black Sea ports. In recent years, Soviet cargoes of military aid have been
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vr-r -t
carried by ships of both the USSR and Free World countries- Deliveries by Soviet ships range from entire shiploads of military cargo carried by ships on tramp voyages to small consignments of military items mixed with cargoes of civilian goods on ships in scheduled line service that callariety of ports en route to and from the USSR. Sometimes, ships almost fully Loaded with bulk cargo such as coal will carry military vehicles as deck cargo. Free World ships carrying cargoes of military equipment usually belong to the recipient country or are chartered by the recipient from other countries. These ships seldom carry actual weaponry. Instead, they carry vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment having both civil and military uses that are consigned to the armed forces of the recipient country.
IV. Evaluation of Soviet Military Aid
with Ficonomlc Aid
Moscow's decision5 to provide military aid to the less developed countries originally focused on the same short-termas the economic aid program begun the year before: resence, developing ties, fostering neutralism, and stimulating economic relations through repayment obligations. The advantages of military aid compared with economic aid soon became apparent: stocks to draw upon, rapid delivery, immediate impact, and the enlargement of contacts with military leaders in less developed Much more than economic aid, military aidype of intimate collaboration that could involve taking sides in cold war disputes. As the Soviet aid and trade offensive matured, embroiling Moscow in the complexities and slow fruition of economic development, the arms aid program became even more attractive.
Military aid has another advantage over economic aid and even over diplomatic tactics with the regime in office. This advantage is that the direct recipient of military aid Is the military establishment, which must grow in power through the acquisition of equipment and know-how from outside sources. In promoting military aid, the Soviet Unionrowing appreciation that the real locus of power in many leas developed countries is the military establishment, and thc USSR openly acknowledged that, in terms of Communist objectives,depends on what forces gain control ofitally important instrument as the armythe champions of progress or [the] reactionaries.'
With the US Military Aid Program
Although much smaller in value and volume, Soviet military aid has some advantages over the US program. In an area where speed can be crucial, its arras aid is negotiated and implemented more rapidly than that of the US- The USSR has not restricted its aid to strategically placed recipients: it has given weaponry to any regime asking for it, and it often has solicited requests. Many of the recipients of Soviet
aid first tried to get arms assistance from the US and were discouraged by US reluctance to inject weaponry into sensitive trouble areas or by conditions placed on the use of such aid."
The most significant difference between the two programs is the factor of responsibility. The aim of US military assistance is the creation and maintenance of effective local military forces and their inclusion in the Western mutual defense system. Having undertaken the responsibilities of building stable alliances and relationships, the US hoped to strengthen or protect local economies from the disruptive effects of the military burden. The USSR, on the other hand, has had the advantage of far less responsibility in its role as supplier of arms. Its military posture does not depend on the effectiveness of the armed forces developed in the recipient countries and lt ls not concerned with specific levels of preparedness. Unlike the US, the USSR does not supplement its military aid with defense support. It assumes no responsibility for any adverse economic effects of arms aid Incountries end, indeed, may even welcome economic disruption from time to time.
C. Influence: roblem and an Opportunity
Ihe Soviet presence promoted by military aid bas evolved to vary-ing degrees of influence in some of the recipient countries. In only one known Instance, however, has this influence permitted the USSR to exercise leverage on any of theso countries.** The degreeovernment to Soviet influence has depended far nore upon
US Mutual Security Act, which governs the sale of military equip-
ment,ommitmentecipient nation that lt wiLl use such assistance "solely to maintain its Internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which itnd that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state." The provisions controlling grants are nearly the same but, in addition,equirement for continuous review by US representatives. Although there have been instances In which the USSR may have placed restrictions on the weapons it providedfor example, in the current Indonesion-Malaysion confrontationhere ls no hard evidence that it has done so.
** After the overthrow of the Kassem regime In3 the new Iraqi governmentituperative attack on the internationalmovement, began an intensive and violent repression of the local Communist Party, end stepped up military operations against the Kurdish dissidents. esult of these developments, the USSR first slowed the pace of its military deliveries to Iraq ln the spring and stopped deliveries altogether during the summer months. The effect of this stoppage of deliveriesIncluding desperately needed spare parte and ammunitionwoo an immediate diminution In Iraqi combat operations against the Kurds. Following protracted Soviet-Iraqi negotiations, the Iraqis ceased their anti-Communist propaganda campaign on thefront and reduced their repression [footnote continued on
the policies and disposition of each country's leaders than it has upon any possible leverage afforded thc USSR through its extension ofassistance.
There is no evidence that the USSR has ever sought base rights in any of the non-Communist countries that have received ailitary aid. Indeed, there Is little evidence of actual Soviet participation lnoperations or the recipient countries. The instances of Soviet crews
manning submarines during the height of tho West Irian crisis and Soviet personnel flying UAR bombers against Yemeni royalist strongholds provide
the unique exceptions.
Even the behavior of Soviet military assistance groups resident in less developed countries has been exemplary but aloof. Theirhave been limited to strictly procedural and housekeeping matters. The overall impression gained is that thc Soviet presenceiscreetly technical one having little if any political overtones. The USSR seems avare that, if it should attempt to use military aid as leverage for political purposes, it nightrogram which has usedSoviet resources and which has contributedignificant contraction of tho sphere of Western Influence among the less developed countries.
D. Impact on Recipients
1- Effect on Rational Security and Regional Balances of Power
As aoae of the less developed countries emerged from colonial status, they provided an ideal climate for Soviet offers of military assistance. Often left without even an adequate police force, thc new countries were eager to obtain arts for internal security as well as to protect their sovereignty and impress neighbors. At tbe same time, the emergence of tho now states was accompanied by frictions of every kind. Conflicts or tho bases for conflicts among neighboring countries and between new nationo end the former colonial powers existed lnifferences in approach to relations with excolonlal powers, nationalist rivalries, old territorial disputes, and tribal antagonisms. In many such cases, even relatively small shipments of arms could upset delicate regional balances of power.
Soviet military assistance accordingly bv been the primary vehicle forosition of influence in certain regions vital to Western interests. In the guise of an advocate of nationalgenerally anti-Western in character, the Soviet Union hasregional or local conflicts for the broad political objective of displacing or diminishing Western influence in strategic areas.
of local Communistu, and the Soviet Union agreed to resume normal mili-tary aid shipments. The exact degree of leverage that the Soviwt Union was able to wield in this instance ia difficult to assess, but the fact that military deliveries were used to pressure tbe Iraqis appears clear.
The timing of Soviet offers of arms almost invariablywith periods of tension between the target countryeighboring countryemberestern alliance. The Arab-Israeli tension, Yemen's conflict with the UK over Aden, Afghanistan's border dispute with Pakistan, and Indonesia's internal strife and territorial dispute with the Netherlands over West Irian presented primefor Soviet exploitation. In more recent years internal security requirements or tensions arising from disputes with neighboring countries have led to Soviet military aid for Algeria, India, Iraq, and Somalia.
The armed forces of almost all recipient countries have increased in size conspicuously, following initial receipt of Soviet arms aid. In several instancesfor example, Afghanistan, India, and Indonesiathe increase has approached or even Soviet military aid hasignificant ingredient in this growth.
5 the willingness Of the UAR toili-
tary agreement with CzechoslovakiaBervingoviet intermediaryresulted largely from the prevailing Arab-Israeli hostility and UAR-Iraqi competition for hegemony in the Arab world. The agreement opened the door to other Soviet activities in the Middle East, negated the Western embargo on arms shipments to thc Arab States and Israel,the effectiveness of the newly created Baghdad Pact, and setrolonged period of turmoil in the area.
In Syria, where anti-Western nationalism hadierce intensity, the opportunity for Syria to obtain large supplies of arms to defend Itself against hostile neighbors, particularly Israel, was seized quickly. Within months after the agreement of the UARyria also signed an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia. Soviet military assistance enabled Yemen to press its claim to Aden with military action against the British and also provided support for Afghanistan in its dispute with Pakistan over Pushtunisten. The availabilityarge volume of Soviet military equipment also initially encouraged Indonesia to threaten an invasion of West Irian if the Dutch did not relinquish control of the territory, and subsequently enabled Sukarno to mount his confrontation campaign against Malaysia.
Despite the inherent troublenaklng potential of Soviet arms aid, there is little evidence that the USSR has prompted major recipients of its aid to engage in hostile acts against their neighbors. Theof such aid nevertheless has served to exacerbate regionaland has encouraged extreme political and military activity that these countries otherwise might not have undertaken. Furthermore, Soviet military aid has injected the USSR into regional disputesthe world, with Moscow thusritical factor whereit would have had little influence.
Once begun, military aid tends to expand and continue. Trie USSR, like the US, has found that,rogram is begun, it isto stop. Soviet arms old hasontinuing need for ammunition, spare parts, replacements, and technical support. When on uncommitted country turns to the USSR for arms, it usually abandons its previous sources of materiel in tbe Vest and completely reoquipe Its armed forces vith Soviet weapons, thus placing complete dependence on the USSR for military supplies. Moreover, fledgling nations tbat have been attracted first by use of conventional arms inevitably desire more and better weaponry, and they match Justifications to the newwith facility. The USSR probably believes that, in some instances, if it abruptly ends its aidarticular country, it may leave that country more susceptible to an adversary than if military assistance had never been started. Stoppage of aidountry stillecurity threat, moreover, could project an linage of the USSR as no longer vitally Interested in the security of that country and, byother countries in similar circumstances.
The injection of Soviet weaponry has resulted In primesuch aa Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, and the UAR being almost completely equipped with Soviet equipment, and in other countries the process of replacing Western with Soviet equipment continues. Of the original recipients of Soviet military aid, only Morocco appears to be inclined to stop the relationship, and as late as't, even Morocco had to0 worth of spares to make itsighter squadron operational.
Soviet emphasis on training has been consistent with Soviet long-term goals in influencing the armed forces of recipients. Additional factors, however, have been the more complex equipment being sent to some countries and the extension of assistance to countries with very low levels of literacy and technical proficiency. Advanced equipment not only has required greater technical facility in the people operating and maintaining it but also hasigher level of competence from staff officers and unit commanders. In the countries that recently had been colonies, even where cadres of trained men did exist, thc cadres have been very small and training necessarily had to beginery low level. Military technical assistance thus has offered thc Soviet Union one of Its best prospectu for extending its influence in the recipient countries.
Military aid consequently has resultedependenceby moat economic relationships. ountry relying largely on the USSR for military equipment, spore parts, and technical aid must at least consider Moscow's views before embarkingenture hostile to Soviet interests. Reluctance of local military leaders to Jeopard!re their source of supply almost certainly has tempered sore political The Soviet Union, however, haa thus far been careful not to abuse this lever in its relations with recipient countries.
The USSR will undoubtedly continue to press anas assistanceariety of potential recipients. As the Soviet military aid program grows and proliferates, other less developed countries will becomeof arms aid. Possible future recipients in Asia are Burma and Pakistan; in the Middle East, Lebanon and Jordan; and in Africa, any number of new states. Present trends suggest that the USSR will expand the list of advanced arms and weapons systems available to non-Bloc customers and will provide the technical support and training programs that such complex equipment makes necessary. The Soviet Union probably hopes that this program will have particular influence onelements in the recipient countries and that such influence will promote Soviet aims, especially where the military ls likely to have substantial influence on the orientation of existing governments and on the choice of their successors. The USSR will provide direct arms aid only to reasonably stable regimes, preferring to permit fledgling powers and dissident groups to arrange procurement from original recipients of Soviet aid.
The USSR will continue to be punctiliousat least initiallyin dealing with recipients of its military aid. This will not prevent pressure from being applied by some of the recipient countriesfor example, almost certainly Indonesia and the UARfor further easement of repayment terms. Although the USSR will not write off any portion of its claims,urther manifestation of largesse towardit probably will acquiesceas it already has done in soae instancesto the extent of modifying original agreement terms to permit lengthier periods of repayment.
The USSR will not act in concert with Communist China in supplying arms to any less developed countries but, influenced by Peiping'sto Soviet influence, will provide arms, sometimes reluctantly, to certain recipients. ew countries probably will follow Cambodia's lead in mixing weaponry from both sources. Thc USSR, however, willto dominate the field.
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APPENDIX Ii
SELECTEDIIWBKT EXPORTED OR OBLIGATED BY THE USSR "TO LESS DEVELOPED
The rollowing tableomparison of list prices for selected types of military equipment and is an indication of the totalexported or obligated by the USSR to loss developed countries. Because the USSR used Czechoslovakia and Poland as intermediaries in the early. some of the data include Inputs from these two countries, but cost reflect only direct Soviet inputs. In thc Statusndicates that the item is in current production in thehat it is not in current production but is in current use,hat it either is being phased out of use or is obsolete. No differentiation is made between used snd now equipment; and in moot Instances, the year given is the year in which the initial contract was concluded.
The quantities noted after "Other" in the Recipient columnthc sua of deliveries to one or more countries for which price data were not available. The Total Equipment column indicates totals of priced aad unpriced equipment exported and obligated. The total for each recipient country listed may not be related directly to the list price for that piece of equipment, becuuse Hot prices varied over thc years and price data were not available on all equipment ordered.
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APPENDIX C
PISCUSSIOW OF SOURCES
This reportynthesis of available information on Sovietaid to less developed countries and has Involved the usearge number of documents. The nature of this report makes the inclusion of detailed source references impractical. Documentation of significant data is available, however, ln the files of this Office.
lfce best overall work on Soviet military aidontinuing basis Is the EIC semiannual series Aid and Trade Activities of Communist Countries ln Less Developed Arean of the Free World, SECRET,
Two other general works on the subject are CIA/RR ERAssistance by the Sino-Sovlet, June ndilitarythe Sovietthe Underdeveloped Countries of thc Free World, January omprehensive study of types, quantities, andequipment end items and of spares, ammunition, und vehicles, aaagreement terms of Soviet military aid to non-Bloc countries, lsInxports of Bloc Military Equipment toCountries: atalogje of Prices and Quantities, October
Among the shorter works used in the preparation of this studyCBU, Continued Momentum of Soviet Militaryu,CIA/RR CB 6WU,
Nev Developments in Soviet Military aia to iraq,, SECRET/
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Original document.
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