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STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A coBeclion of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects Of intelligence.
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All statements of faci, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
ihe auihors They do noi necessarily reflect official positions or views of Ihe Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpreLiiions.
Proposed planning guide in four phases of 'national liberation" wart.
THE liVTFJJJCENCE BOLE JTN COUimaUNSURCENCTf Walter ftatmiiaiw
Experience during the past decade In Cuba, tike DominicanIndochina, the Congo, and otber tuch hot spots has beenenough to provide some ground tot geaeraliring about the role an mteJUgrnoe agency should play in. effort to combat "wars, of nationalhis is the field fn which VS. security is for some time to come, under conditions of nuclear stalemate, most likely to be challenged, as the Soviet Union. Red China, and Cuba exploit for their own purposes dissension, turmoil, and impatience for reform to Latin America, Africa, the Near East, and Southeast Asia. No set of rules can be universally applicable to all tbe diverse rituatioos that now exist and will arise, but an outline of thevilian clandestine service should take in helping meet thesecan at least serve as point of departure fn preparing toa particular one ofo suggest such an outline is the purpose of this article.
Cadre Phase
The Communist-instigated "war of liberation" beginshich the local Communist party or tbe local restdenturas of the KCB or Chinese or Cuban intelligence service are spotting,and recruiting candidates for guerrilla training and political indoctrination. When such an agent has been recruited be Is sent for his training to tbe Soviet Union, China, or Cuba, usuallyevious clandestineeruvian traveling to the guerrillaschools in Cuba, for example, may fly, using bis Peruvian passport, first to Paris, where his coo tacts from the Cuban intelligence service meet him and giveuban passport with which to travel Paris-Prague-Havana. Thebe bona fide Peruvian passport thus shows no travel to Ccromunist countries. After three to six months' training in Cuba he reverses these steps and returns to Peru as one of the bard-core cadres charged svith preparing tbe insurgency.
Courrfarinsorgency
In this phase six aspects of the ciandesttoe service mission can be specified:
To find out what persons and procedures are used in selecting carsdidates for training and then to peoetxate this spotting, assessment, and recroitrocot macrstoery in order to identify the cadres. This effort wiD include penetration of the local
Commirnist party. To (desztify and coimter, using coontermtclligence tcetinirnses,
csdre-phxse operations of the Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban mtefli-
gence ressdeoturas To expose publicly what the Commurdsts are doing and how,
and to show bow the people of the country can cot tribute
to resisting
To seelc by polWcxU-artion measures to orient and motivategoverrnnent to cooperate tn clandestine operationscadre buildup and ha preparations for combattingof the insurgency. This means that thehave or develop an effective security agency withand oountermteiligencc competence, sufficientlyliaison with the US. service. Ideally this agencytravel controls over all citizens goingconduct, if necessary, political-action programs to putthe coontry's anti-subversive laws. The governmentable to neutralize subversives not by sending thembut by putting them in
To help the country's military or police forces establish andrack guerrula-kilier rrnit to be deployed tactically in later phases. The unit ibould not exceed battalion sire,en; its strength should lie In the quality of its personnel, their training and leadership, and in its mobility, fire power, communications, and tactics.
Incipient Those
When the guerrilla trainee returns to his homelandsually tied into the sbeal Communist party or the Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban intelligence resfdentura to get funds and guidance in developing the support structure for an active guerrilla campaign. (Sometimes bis support and guidance come from an adjacentn thisphase tbe returned agent begins his rarocuresrient of weapons, anununition, and safehouses and settlesural area for his initial operations. Within this area heocation for his base camp
Counlerinturgency
and begins to cultivate tbe sympathies of the peasantry around It within radiusir-hour march. He will need these peasants for logistical support and tactical intelligence.
When tbe groundwork it completed, the agent moves in with five to ten cornpiuuons. After orienting itself in its surroundings, this incipient guerrilla band begins its political mdocsrinarioo of theand the terrorizing with raids and burnings of all who remain hostile. Gradually ft gains new recruits, trains aad equips them, and puts them into the field When it has grown to more thanen and survived what initial mearures the conventional military or police forces could take againstas matureduerrilla unit and completed tbe incipient phase.
In this phase, the VS. service, if feasible Jointly with theeats security agency, should undertake tbe foUowing kinds of operations:
Identify tbe giserrilla agent as be returns from framing or as soon thereafter as possible. Sources may be travel-control data or penetrations of the Comraurast party or recruitment mi-esotnery.
Identify rural and urban tafehouset established In support of the guerrilla program. This can be done through surveillance of the returningthrough penetrations, or throughnets set up in likely rural areas (see below).
Identify and block the guerrilla's channels for arms and ammu-niUoB procurement. This can generally be done by tbecustoms and border patrol forces. Intelligencewill help.
Survey rural areas suitable for guerrilla bonds aad gather terrain intelligence, with emphasis on such dungs as water sources, potential ambush sites, and possible drop zones for the guerrilla-killer unit Bear In mind that the guerrilla usually cannot operate fartherlx hours' march from his base.
Establish highly selective irdormant networks in potentialareasource of tactical mteUigence for the guerrilla-killer unit if guerrillas do begin operations there. Such acan be handled by the police units in tbe area la question, or some other apparatus can be set up for this essential Job.
Mount organized, professional civic-act ion programs to promote loyalty to the government among the populace of potential
Court re riniuc y
gucrrilta areas. Convince the people that steps arc bong taken to right social, economic, and pob'tical wrongs. Begin guerrilla-killer operations as soon as mfelligence mdicates the presence of an incipient guerrilla band. Tactics arepursuit, ambushes, destruction of tho base csunp, denial of water and supplies, and finally direct cotifrontatlonre fight. Nothing is so efleotive in stopping the development of guerrilla bands as esinsinating those who have fust finished brining and taken to the field for the first time.
Operational Phase
If the guerrilla irsovtaoeot Is successful. In spite of ell countrawsu-ujcs tsJcen during the cadre and mdplent phases, in establishing several bands of twenty or more men each In some region. It haseal threat to the country. In this operational phase, the guerrillas try to coosolidata their control of tbe region. Though they keep the individual bands compaxtmcntcd, they coordinate their activitics so as to make the maximum political and tactical impact on the area. They may thus drive the government forces out of the area completely; at least they break down the government's control over it at night Area corssotidation, in turn, enables the guerrilla to expand his supply mechanism. Improve his collection of tacticaland obtain new recruits for bis units.
This, fn essence, kt the tactic Fidel Castro used so successfully when be went into the Sierra Macstra. It is also what the FALN did ia Falcdn state tn Venezuela. The longer tbe guerrillas can keepin one area, the more Wtety they are toolitical and operational base there and then break out to other areas. When they get to the point that they can move with some freedom, at battaboo level in an area, the operational phase of insurgency gives way to one of covert warfare.
I>iring the operational phase, the US. clandestine service aod the boat government need to take the following actions:
Intensify the effort to got intelligence on the guexrulas" strength,
disposition, and plans. Step up counterintelligence operations against the guerrillas'
logistic support apparatus. Mount psychological operations to keep the pto-government flame of resistance alive In giicrrilkeontrolled areas.ortion of the psychological effort should also be targeted against the
cy
insurgents themselves, offering tbcrn renabuuUtioo If they(Those who do should be seal to training center*mati politicalavic-aotion programs tn tbe areas adjacent toguerrillas bold In order to prose to tbe populace Insustained cooperation with the grrvernmeof willbetter and freer ecooonic and social way of life thancan
Step up the number and fa tensity of gurrrGTa Icfirr operations, using the killer unit at maximum capacity toire fights. Give victories wide publicity In all media throughout the country. If the guerrillas are receiving logistical supportontiguous country, aod if their supply depots there can bo identified, mount hit-and-run commando raids against them. Whether the orjrraTsandos are drawn from the military establishment of the country in question Or brought in for the purposehird country, they should use bandit cover in order to provide for plausible denial Nevertheless the raids, fn addition to their primary objective of destroying the depots, are intended to call attention to tbe supplying nation's mterfercc.ee in tbe affairs of Its ndgbbor. Establish population controls, giving priority to districts adjacent to the guerrilla area. The key Item to the control system is an identifkatioo docurnent Issuedimited time to aD residentsiven area. This census certification, as It were, not only makes it more difficult for guerrillas to pass themselves off as innocent local farmers during the daytime butoint of departure for systematic counterintelligence
Organize popular self-defense forces,reas' militia, inadjacent to the guerrilla areas. Controlled by themilitary establishment aad properly motivated, these forces can contribute to containing the guerrillastrategic hamlet program, creating strong points for protection of the people and as bases for offensive operations. Bring the conveaticaxal military forces into full may in large sweep and exKarcIcmeot operations mounted in coordination with unit As the guerrillas are dispersed
s*aa*er
by the sweep and are heading for safe areas the guerrilla-killer force can both set up ambushes and engage in hotWith Its superior training and equipment it shouldoutrun and outfight the scattering guerrilla.
Covert Warfare Phase
When the Insurgents get to operating in battalion strength In two or more large regions and running raids and tenor into other areas In preparation for expansion, when pitched fire fights are held between them and tbe government's conventional troops and the latter begin to suffer heavy losses,uerrilla-killer force of battalion size Is no longer adequate, then covert war Is in full swing, exceeding the scopeivilian agency's paramilitary capability. This means that the VS. military establishment must begin to provide theforces with large amounts of equipment and send out advisers to work with them at company level.
In this phase there is still, however, more than enough work for. dvilian service to do:
Provide airlift capacity, usually under commerrial cover, to move government forces and supplies to combat areas or to bring In mercenaries as combat troops or as advisers. Furnish demolition technicians and other instructors for expanded
training programs among the government forces. Continue and expand intelligence collection, counterintelligence operations, psychological programs toense of national unity and purpose, civic-action enterprises, and "bandit* raids on adjacent-country supply depots.
Conventional Warfare Phase
When the enemy decides that bis strength Is ruffident to confront the govexnmcnt forces in decisive battle, as at Dieo Bleu Phu, and the United States decides to intervene in this overt conventional warfare, then the VS. manpower needed can come only from tbe defense establishment At this point the civilian intelligence agency's resources In the country are put at tbe disposal of the VS. military commander. At his direction they will carry out intelligenceoounterTOtclligence operations, and covert psychological and political programs. Their paramilitary operations will be redirected to raids and harassments, the promotion of escape and evasion, and the development of resistance nudei in the enemy's rear.
Apologia
Faced with almost any concrete situation, this general statement will be found at many points inapropos. In some ways it it too uxomptcte, in others too inclusive. It is not meant to imply, for example,S. clandestine service should direct overtor civic action campaigns if the appropriate VS. agencies are there to do these things. But in some rimes and places It must.
The outline calls for tome actions that have been tried tn tha past in concrete situations and have failed. But It may be the situation, not the course of action, was wrong. -Or maybe the actions were carried out less than perfectly.
Tbe outline concentrates on the rural aspects of insurgency. This does not mean that urban terrorism is of little importance. But 'wars of national liberation' must take and hold territory if they are to succeed, and there is established Doctrine competent to deal with urban terrorism as an adjunct to insurgency.
We hope, as we said, that our generalizations may be usefuloint of departure. But if the essay even contributes to Incusing thought on the problems that occasioned it, it will, despitelimiiaii.ini.urpose.
Original document.
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