IMPLICATIONS OF A CERTAIN US COURSE OF ACTION

Created: 6/4/1965

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IBRARY

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

IMPLICATIONSERTAIN US COURSE OF ACTION

NOTE: This is Ihe esUmate. No further versions will he published.

Submitted by the DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

A> Indicated5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

CONTROLLED DISSEM

Submitted by the director of central intelligence The following Intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, AECandNSA.

Concurred in by Ihe

united states intelligence board

on unewere the Director of

Intelligence and Research, Department of State: the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency: the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB; and the Director of Ihe National Security Agency. The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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FICIAl USE ONLY TEIY

i

WARNING

Thlin taint demotion effecting the Notionol Detente of the United Stotet within the meaning of the eteionogeSC.. theoition of whkh in any monnef to on unaurho'iied penon it prohibited.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ll5

SUBJECT: : IMPLICATIONSERTAIN US COURSE

CF ACTIOH

TIE PROBLEM

To estimate Comnunist reactions If the US doee not attach the surface-to-air missile uitas, light boetbers, and fighters recently furnished to the DRV by the USSR.*

DISCUSSION

1. Since April, the soviet Union has been furnishing to Northariety of weapons. Among these the most important are about, some vlth limited all-weather capabilities, three SAM sites under construction near Hanoi, and eight light Jet

* Reactions If the US does attack are considered in SHIEProbable Ccemiunist Reactions to Certain USOP SECRET, Controlled Disoenination, Sensitive,

bombershich have been ferried across China to Phuc Yen airfield sincefey.

2. We think this program of military assistance una Initiated to deter the US from extending its air attacks to the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. In the Coarrnnl nt view, the deterrence would rest not so cucb on the combat capabilities of the weapons as on the manifestationeepening Soviet commitment. In effect, Hanoi and Moscow are hoping that this new program, added to other pressures on US policyomestic and worldill dissuade the US from extending air attacks northward* The Soviet program of military assistance alsoart of Moscow's effort to Increase Its influence, relative to that of Communist China, on the Hanoi regime*

Chances of Further Buildup

3- If the US refrained from extending air attacks northward, though the Soviets would probably continue to augment North Vietnam's air defence capabilitiesy providing additional SAMs, AAA, radar, andhey might not increase the supply of offensive weapons much beyond present levels. The USSR and the DRV might conclude that they had already succeeded in establishing an effective deterrent and judge that significantly greater numbers of weapons such as IL-2Qs vould only raise the chances of eventual US attacks on key targets north ofh Parallel.

h. Or. tbe other bond, the supply of Jet Liiiht bombershanoa in the character offviot old vhich may pointarger buildup. Those uircruft Give theapability to atrika oceinat targets inth Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. Tl* USSR alao realises thatighly charged issue during the Cubon missilo crisis, and that tho U3 insisted upon their removal while permitting Cuba to retain defensive systems, Ir tho U3 tacitly accepted then, Moscow and Innoi might conclude that sn Important test bad been passed and that they could extend tbe buildup of offensive weapons without incurring unacceptable ricks. In this event, they vould probably expect theirefenses, noecame operational, to reduce US reconnaissance andurther buildup.

Possible Use of the

5. We think it unlikely that tbe DRV now intends to use IL-2Ss in offensive operations. Hanoi would almost certainly calculate that this action wouldS retaliation which would probably not be United to the airfiolds supporting tho operation of tho bombers, vfcreovcr, we think that the general line of DRV strategy still la to concentrate on the guerrilla war in tho South which thoy expect to win, and not themselves to take the initiative in widening tlto war.

thebo aircraft would widen theffensivecircumstances might arise in whioh Hanoi chose to use them. we cannot exclude the possibility that, even now,to try an individual raid against some psychologicallyas Da HangS aircraft carrier.

Political Implications

Whatever the Ccmmunlsts' precise intentions at present, US acceptance of the present buildup would be encouraging to them. They would probably Infer that the US, at least for the time being, had accepted certain limitations and ground rules in the bombing of tho DRV.

The Chinese would be concerned by the probable increase in Soviet influence in Hanoi, but at the sane time they might be reassured by the anticipated hardening of DRV determination to carry on without negotiations. They would also be somewhat relieved of theirthat the US would escalate the war to bomb targets in China.

The Soviets would probably view their Involvement as now somewhat less dangerous, although still not without risks, and they might be encouraged toore rigid position with the US. At tho same time, the Soviets almost certainly still hopeegotiated settlement and might see the US inaction as inoroasing the prospects of negotiations cn terms favorable to the Communist side. But Hanoi

would probably conclude that tho war in tho South could bo pressed with no Greater risk to key areas of the DRV. Any DRV disposition to nc0otlotc arising out of feora of attacks on the Hanoi -Ha iphonfj area would be lessened.

Original document.

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