Created: 12/1/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

a historical rhiew program

TITLE: More On The Recruitment of Soviets

AUTHOR: Martin L. Brabourne




A collection ol articles on Ihe historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoroticol aspects ol intelligence.


All statements of Tact, opinion or analysts expressed in Studies ir. Intelligence arc those of

the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any olher US Government entity, past or present Nothing in lhe contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

A program for identifying andthe adversary! psycJiolagi. colly vulnerable fringe.


Andrew j. Twiddys "Recruitment of Sovietn favigcB-ating breath of fresh air to at least one much fntererted reader,ealistic appraisal of one of our key intelligence tasfa and an unencbanted review of past efforts with an original and optimistic approach to tbe future. Its community-wide dissemination in the Studies- wasorward move in striking the keynote, so to speak,enewed and broader examination of Soviet recruitments which would lift the subject out of its status as the arcane, esoteric specialtyelected few. It Is not out of disagreement with Mr. Twiddy but stimulated by bis refreshing treatment that this reader has tried to organize and pull together bis own parallel thoughts and experiences In the hope of continuing the conversation, theout loud" that Twiddy began. He believes be basto say, and perhaps thisurn stimulate others to Join die discussion.

the vulnerable target

We have for years studied so-calledhe "basLt forbe "motivation ofnd so on, and there is do question that we have learned something from these studies. That our efforts have somehow been wide of the mark, however. Isby tbe consistent failure of operational approaches based on the studies. It may be that we have lost sight of tbe forest, or perhaps more appropriately have failed, in our wandering among the trees,rcetve that we areorest at all What we are looking for is so evident, so perfectly obvious, thateme It has escaped our notice.

1 studies vra i,.

This single, simple, self-evidenthat the enormous act of defection, of betrayal, treason, is almost invariably the actarped, emotionally maladjusted personality. It is coiirpeuedear, hatred, deep sense of grievance, or obsession with revenge far

exceedingensity these emotions as experienced by normal, reasonably weH-rategrated and weUadjusted persons. Defection is atypical, and continued betrayal even more so: of the thousands, even tens of thousands of Soviets who have served abroad sinceew dozen have defected, and of theseew have worked in place for us as agents. Such acts in peacetime areanifestation of abnormalormal, mature, emotionally healthy person, deeply embedded in bis own ethnic, national, cultural, social, and family matrix, justx*iefa.

This general principle is illustrated In our eamerienoe with Soviet defectors. AH of them have been lonely people. All of those in the writers experience have manifested some serious behaviorixjco, as alcoholism, satyriasis, morbidsychopathic pattern of one type or soother, an evasion of adultwhich was adequate evidence for an underlying personality defect decisive in theirt fxild hyperbole to say that no one can consideroviet operations officer until he has gone through the sordid experience of holding his Soviet *friend's" head while ho vomits five days of drinking into the sink.*

'The truth of thisoday adequately recognized h> overt academic, iourrialiroe, and literary works. Oi the many reference that could be grren, Rebecca West'. MwWf of Trauon comes to nsfad. and Wffliim L. Shrew's The Trotter.fTt&aadytieaJ .Wrwlnt there ii Robert Lindner'sforssskgkai treatment, aad the beet ooe forowa syrtcnutic itudy and niidranandlng. Is Moslem Ceozdia's Tha Lattal and the Didoyat Warranty at.

"Our classified literature hai finally recosjnuxd tha fact, and articles in this Journal have rrfected theesson. See. for example. "What to Do withy John AnkerWd,, p.i

thai! not attempt an arudytfa of tbe degree to which thi* behavior may reflect gxOt and remorse for the act of defection. Suffice it here to observe that psychiatric study of aeveral of these defectors IdcntuW the alco-holic roinifcitations as merely one symptom of toog-rtandine personality difficulties of wbich the defection itself wu .natter.

What is the evident corollary of this ptopositjon? Simply stated, it Is that our operational efforts should be focussed against theweak, immature, and disturbed fringe elementsoviet colony. Systematic fishing In these troubled waters shoulduch higher probability of yield,eriod of time, than un-focusscd, mdiscrmiinate efforts such as have been made in the past This is the principle that has been so obvious as to escape notice.

heumber of conditions muit be satisfied before It can be ttanslated Into ao operational program. First is thewhether it is possible to recogoiie and identify these fringeby means of tiadltiortal and existing sources of infccmatioo. Do mures normaily available to us produce the kind of clues which would at least tentatively identify such potential targets? If so. the Best step Is to isolate and catalog these dues, criteria, and indicators of our targets. That dona, case officers and analysts have to be sensitized to rrxognbta that trrdicntrjrs, have to develop tbe outlook aod sophistication to seize oo them tn their observations and report them. Finally, access must be gained to tho targets so Identified, and officers must learn how to talk to them.

Target CkatiuXtrittla

An InteUigence officer once observed that tbe only reliablefor treasonable espionage is hatred and thirst for revenge.It has been said that most traitors have been Impelled to their treason by dreams of power and glory. Who are the people that hate and seek revenge with such passion they commit treason? Who are the people that dream of power and glory and, not only frustrated in these dreams but perhaps even ridiculed in their daily lives,so bitter as to turn their backs on family, friends, and nation?

ecessary at this point to goittle(and vastly oversimplified) psychology. In this writer's opinion, the persons we are seeking are thosearkedly deficient or defectivepsychopaths, also calledat the other end of the spectrum those who may have an adequate (or perhaps overdeveloped) conscience but are hanjpered tn their life and work by Intense internaland prepiychotic perrxxcudities.

Tbe psychopatherson basically without scruples or one whose weak or defective conscience is eroded by tbe problems andof living and finally collapses under theireceptively charming and seemingly well-adjusted person, be can also be ao easily recognizable misfit, anonbiseler. He Is highly self-centered, even if he hides it with some degree of success. He Is Impulsive,ow frustration tolerance, hypersensitive, easily angered. He has an enormous need for prestige, status, recognition. He Is often highly arrogant He characteristically seeks revenge for real or Imagined slights. The revenge may be taken in coolly calculated actions to wreak the maxi-

See/ uif men!

mum damage or In Indisctiminate destructivelind lasliing out Sgt Dunlap, Col Penkovskiy, Joe VadacbJ, Aaron Burr. Rastvorov, Ceorge Blake, and Lee Oswald almost -erUlnly belong to Ibis type. Eleazar Upsky hasighly perceptive fictional account oferson In his story The Scieruitt, which Is well worth


The neurotic aad prerjaychctic are cuff ererrt from the prychc^ath. but eouaJfy tolerating from an operations standpoint' Here we have err-stional constellatiom characterized by inner conflicts, anxieties, and severe repressions or distortions of particular facets of the pcrsooabty. It Is to this category that Morton Croxdin's "abeoated" personality belongs. The raeurotic or prepiycbotic bas difficulty getting along fn life; in severe cases he Is Immobilized in bis Job or perhaps in his family relations. He may be severely repressed, or over-organized and rigid (the Puritan, foris ability to understand and get along with other people Is characteristically poor. He iswith his own pre*leans. He loses contact with other people to varying degrees, and be acutely feels need for such contact forand affection. He wOI be over dependent or over-aggressive. His personality distortions cause his unsatisfied needs to be experienced with much greater intensity than la "normal- people, andhese ovrswhelmingfy intense feelings which can provide the driving power for defection and espionage,*

VVhether theverly dependent (often shy, vridsdrawn, evenr overly aggressive, obnoxious, andhe retains tbe opposite tendency repressed, driven out of sight, so to speak, with greater or lessighly dependent person thus bas strongly repressed hostility and unsatisfied aggressive needs, wrdle the highly aggressive ones have rigidly suppressed dependency needs and are often most lonely persons. Tbe suppressed tendency, whether to depessdency or aggression, often splashes over Into overt behavior, giving the outside observer an impression of fncocntisteocy,or instability of character.

' The force of theae drive*I by an tneidetit In tha writer's handlingefector. Tha defector wu being -dried out" from on* of bis periodic alcoholic bouts and had been placed uodei aedatkm. The doctor ad-mteartered about tea rime. the dosage oonrsally suftdent toeraoo cold. TM,o^ge failed to put turn to deep,erelytm



Neurotic and prepsychotic pcxioni arc characteristically unable to evaluate friend and foe objectively. They systematically misread the motives and intentions of others, projecting their own problems onto people in the outer world. In aggregate all these attributes, while making their possessors difficult to work with, render many of them peculiarly susceptible to approach and development.

Finally, even in more normal people, we should look especially at the unique vulnerabilities of middle age. Tbe incidence of various types of emotional and mental breakdown fa highest in the middle-age category. Tbe period of life from say agen shows the highest Incidences of divorce, disappearance, alcoholism, mfidelity, suicide,probably defection, overt or In place.

Tbe reasons for this phenomenon are not hard to End. There Is the onset of decline from physiological peak; one's children suddenly are no longer children but young adults,harp realization of the passage of one's life; youthful ambitions and Ideals sufferand then sudden, brutal collapse; career turning-points occur at this time. The prospect of an imagnificant old age looms large end immediate Most men. according to numerous qualified sources, goomplete recvaluation of personal philosophy, religious and moral beliefs, and so on in thist fa the timean takes stock of his life, and the result Is Irecfuently traumatic in the extreme. This' so-called "middle-ages of exceptional importance from an Intelligence operations standpoint, since men ofr older are usually well advanced in their professional careers and highly enough placed to make them extremely interesting targets.

Symptoms and Sources

What precisely, then, should we look for in our scrutiny of source materials during the initial search for targets? The following sketches the outline of an indicator list; it is not, of course, complete or comprehensive;

Alienation in Interpersonal relationships. Lack of close friends in the Soviet colony. Evidence of coldness In personal relationships. Isolation, aloneness. Personality difficult to get along with.offensive, sullen, hostile. Feels discruninated against. Resentful Hypersensitive. Enemies in tbe Soviet colony. Ob-

"See Edmund BergW. The ftrootl of the UlddU-Aged Man (Cresset aod.


ject of either ridicule or contempt. Difficulties with co-workers or psychological isolatioo from them.

Career Situation. Evidence or reasonable inference of difficulties in Job situation. Resentment of supervision, direction, interference Evasion of job respenxibuities. Lack of appropriate career Resentment of others* progression.

Family Sanation- Dihsculties in frortiry. Lack of wsrm reUtioruhip with wife, cJ-jldren. Resentment of wife, cfiOdrcn. IrasdeJity Awafdanoe or disregard offf-duty divcasions).

Uxt. Avoidance of farnily or other Scviets. Excessive oririkang. Infidelity. Wasting away time in trivial diversions. Having no physical sports or diversions. Predorninarioe ofover resporisiblfitles and obligations.

ggressive vs. submissive evaluation. Rigid andbehavior patterns. Anxiety and self-protective maneuvers Unusual shyness and cverdependency. Or anxious efforts to please, over-mbmissivenets. Preoccupied withcUr-iress I HljlljlHideas.

persemitive, feelingleasirr'hurt, unXtTacce^ tog to bUrne others, evade own reaponsihality. Arrogant,prestige- aod rtaruscceucsous, anxious to impress everyone with own rjrilliaoce and lmrx>rtaDce, Creat mood swings,evidence of low lelf-esteem or self-estimate. Constant criticism of others, fault-flnding. sarcastic manner, sarcastic or anti-social type of humor. Rigid, highly organirrd. Inflexible personality, or its opposite.

All of tbe above are relative questions; they call for qualitative evaluation of theiven Soviet relates to other Soviets. To make valid evaluations of this type requires persons, analysts and ease officers, who know and understand the Soviets as participants In their own culture and society. It requires mature, sophisticated, socially jciisitive, and observant persons who mingle and converseroad range of Soviets reasonably frequently anderiod of time.

Telephone taps and audio sources which provide coverage ofconversationsoviet colony, properly read, are aovaluable source of clues and leads bearing on the questions of interest Wives' personal clutter and complaints, the planning of social events (picnics, hunting and fashing trips,hat is

jjjd when the children become HI, wheo the boss insistsman leave bj, hinch lo come to the office, when people ere planningf these situations are among the Vand that provide occasion for perwnal commentary, for flashes of irritation, frustration, and anger, (or identifying persons who are disliked or isolated, and so on.

People who have business relations with the Soviets visit their offices frequendy and also attend parties and receptions- As recruited agents, rjvry can report on pecking Older, oa aarogance/snbinatsiveoeat, on tbe personal rrSnncr and personalty ofSoviets* and on warmth or coldness In In Ira personal lesatkmslUps, as well as moreobservations such as disparaging rem arts made by one Soviet about another, jokes and ridicule, flashes of Irritation and anger,In dealing with people, and so on.iven Sovietacquainted withontact and gains confidence In him, be may over time decide that the man Is no risk, regardless of what the security officer might say, and may mcreaaingfy confide in him. AH of these observations and confidences provide insight Into the Soviet colony and produce the hints and leads we are seeking.

Double agent operations can also, tn certain circumstances, produce similar mfoemstion.

Finally, there is direct diplomatic or social contact Numerousaccrueroad and continuing contact of this kind-Foremost is the short-circuiting of all the indirect assessment problems, problems occasioned by working through one or several tatermediaries; face-to-face meetings by trained intelligence professionals shouldfar more comprehensive end reliable Impressions. Second, tbe direct Amosiran-Soviet confrontation permits Individuals on each side to become acquainted with Individuals on the other and so dispels the numerous halo effects and stereotype conceptions that arise when the two arc isolated from each other. Third, if there Is informatioo already on hand leadingiven target or if it Is obtained from another source suchelephonet far easier, faster, and mora productive to undertake direct probing and development of htm and observe and evaluate at first hand his reactions. Fourth, It Isuseful, if not indeed essential toiven targetange of diverse personality types, for purposes of both assessment and development Finally, an mtesh'gence officer (andesser degree any US. government officer) can be much rnore fully briefed and guided thanhird national agent

Program Training

A thud prerequisite tor nuking an operational program of ourwe laid, wai to provide an enabling point of view tor case of-facers and analysts and serisrtixe thern to the indicators. One aspect of the problem is that most case officer, regard Soviet recruitmentsffl^^wfrp and simply refuse, in practice ifords, to give the required effort to tbe task. Thehat they do not recognire

himself do these things, it is of axirse uuiealirtic to expect him to give adequate guidance to his agents. The Oct result Isupervisor trying to runrogram must spend an Inordinate amount of time fn persona! debriefing, and guidance of these people. Some examples follow.

Three different officerseld station were successively charged with resportsibilrty for screening telephone Up prcdwtion. Tbey were given the criteria for selection, and examples taken from live material were repeatedly drawn to their attention. Yet time after time they all failed to notice mtercsting and possibly Importanthe material. One Hemeries of telephone calls indicatingiven Soviet was having serious marital problems, was drinking heavilyne occasion tluwing the embassylapnd was having difficulty in his workesult.ear liter new evidence .bowed the marital problems to be deep and durable ones He was of rruoc-iry ethnic origin, and hisreat Russian,him as representative of thisecond itemenior officer newly assigned to the Soviet embassyhimself with great arrogance, constantly using offensive and abusive language over tbe telephone and creating numerous enemies. (It has more recently been found that this same officer may be having not one but leveral affairs simultaneously within the Soviethird item missed. Two Soviet officers were reflected in Ukphone conversation as absolutely despising each other, to such an extent that they could not even be seated real to each other at an official function. FotsrtA stem mined In an operational development that was headingefectioney unknown was the relaticnshrp of the target with his wife Overt observation had suggested that it was the hoped for cold and perfunctoryarm feeling between them would probably vitiate the whole approach. Theewly acquired Up, establishedhadow of doubt that husband and wife were warm and Intimate,

Reports on social contacts can be equally frustrating from astandpoint. In reporting physical characteristics, intelligence off cos trained in anti-Soviet operations generally produce goodof Soviets they meet. But when It goes beyond the physical to observations on interpersonal relationships and psychological nubey rarely produce acceptable reports fn the sense of what is neededrogram of this kind One cancer who had flirtedoviet's wife recalled gleefully some weeks after the event how the husband bad bristled with antagemfsm fzora across the."room, obviously watching every move she made. This Incident had not been noted either in the written report of contacthe oral debriefing after the party.

Another Intelligence officer, speaking fluent Russian, gainedfrom the Soviets and frequently attended their get-togethers and embassy receptions. But this officer treats sccial/diplomatic contact as just that: his eyes are blind to behavioral nuances and bis ears are closed to anything except art, books, theatre, and to on. Nothing can be elicited from bun corscernlng which Soviet talks to which and Hi what manner, or which habitually wanders around alone andwith others. Superior In many aspects of bis fob performance, be teems tolind spot when ft comes to functioningpotter or developer. He will noteovieteventeen-year-old boy; but that this same Soviet Is very upset because the boys education is about to be broken off by conscription escapes him.

Another officer, reportingoviet had been in Loo (loo, failed to report that the London visitix month familiarizationin the embassy, which usuallyCB probationary tour. Met later by another officer, that Soviet turned out touiet, thoughtful, and seemingly impressionable young man; there was no such description In the original contact reports. With glowingbe now characterized bis experience In London as "the most wonderful six months" in his hse. The original case officer,of tins remark, saidnow that, he told meong time ago!"

These sad stories could go on, but the point is made: officers must be trained and serxrirized, and first of all they must be convinced that Soviets can be recruited andorth the process, easier with young officers than with older ones.

Access and Development

If we can ewarae this obstacle, the final retirement for making the program operational is gaining access to theuestion and knowing what to do when It iseasier said than done. Access isense the key question of Soviet operations. If normal social, business, and diplomatic Intercourse with tbe Soviets were possible, most of tbe problcsns to which this paper is addressed would not exist Many of tbe operational approaches and gimmicks which have been devised over the years have been efforts to evade or surmount restrictions on getting next to tbe target

Some of these restrictions are created by Soviet security practices and controls of one type or another. In addition to specific controlthe intense security udectrinatioo tbe Soviets get implants in them ruipicion and anxiety about any foreign contact So even when you succeed fn establishing an outside relationship with one or two Soviets, you usually findt leading nowhere unless you get Invited to their borne ground, where, paradoxically, youhance to break out of thehannel by assessing individual Soviets fn their own environment and observing their relationships with each other. Outside the Bloc practically the only place where this IsIs at Satellite or Soviet receptions, oresser degree at seme third national receptions. Invitations to these are therefore tbe first objective, regardless of whether you are seeking an opportunity fn person or trying to maneuver embassy officers, indigenous business-men or other contacts, or recruited agents of any nationality into promising situations.

Of equal importance with the Soviet restrictions are our own self-limitations. These result from general American attitudes towards the cold-war enemy, tbe reflection of this In the official climateby aneluctance on tbe part of Americanand even intelligence officers to consort with Soviets and East Europeans,eneral diplomatic ineptitude in dealing with them, often marked by the apparently Irresistible urge to be one up on them, embarrass them, and score at their expense tn order to look goodoyal aod clever American diplomat when tbe Political Counsellor reads the Memorandum of Conversation. Mora oo thisittle later.

Third-National and Iridigenout Agent*

be tact of this reluctance of the official American community abroad lo indulge in social conlact wilhatural course is to emphasize the alternative and complementary program of runninginto the Soviet-Satellite community. These may be American (Ixscruding staff agents under deepndigenous, or third-mtionals They may be persons already In business or other contact with the. Str.'i whomo>:pl, or they may be carefully selected -pigeons' whom we recruit, train, and then setodtrens where we hope the Soviets may be interested enough to cultivate them.

Tbe agent approach fa Indeed an essential part of anyprogram. Third-national agents. In particular,roader base for assessments and development, offer windows that mayruer view of certain targets than an American can get, andgive access to Soviet groups that, luoe trad* missions, are beyond reach through normal diplomatic channels. It does suffer, however, from certain Inherent difficulties. One Is that the unilateral coop (ion of people with established Soviet contacts ts replete with security hazards,igh probability of their being doubled by the local security service as well as by the Soviets, and thelimitations on the extent to which they can be safely briefed and guided. Finding them in the first place may require an extensive investigative effort, and then come operational maneuvers to screen, contact, and developear or more may thus be required to procureandful of such agents. And as noted, if we are doing this unilaterally we are operating in the same area and against the same targets as the local services.

The planting of agents especially recruited and trained for this purpose is an important program that takes even more time. Finding suitable persons, recruiting and training them, creating situations leading to contacts, and developing plausible relationshipsatter of song-term effort that should beufficient mass to make up for the likelihood of failures. After the laborious preparation the plant may fail to evoke any interest whatever from the targets. Or he mayelationship which the local security service then callsoIf he escapes these hazards, the time will still come in roost agent-mediated operations, though not in all, that an utelh'gence staff officer under viable cover


must be introduced toace-to-face assessment and possibly take over the development*

The citation of these difficulties in trying to maneuver agents against Soviet targets, alongonclusion that the percentage over time of yield from such operations will be low. Is not intended toessimistic or defeatist attitude regarding this use of agents. It Is intended as grounds for insurting that such operations must be partomprebeiisive, long-term, locussed program; and this isrogram that can be run with tbe left hand, so to speak, part-time, by officers assigned also to other duties whose product may be more frnmcdiatery tangible and gratifyinghief of station.

Broad and regular diplomatic contact with the Soviet colony Is the olher main approach to Ihe access problem. Against ItsurnitatioQS and dangers, ft offers the advantages of directpersonal acquaintance and familiarity, gradual development through conversations, rapid contact In any sudden opportunity for more direct approach,igh degree of control over what Is said to the target and bow ft Is said.

Tbe opportunity for this kind of contact is probably much greater than the accepted mythology allows. The Soviets are said to shy away from such contacts, to be prohibited from accepting mvitatioos, to mouth nothing but the Party line, to walk away if an Americaa approaches, and so on. Undoubtedly thisrue picture fn many places. In this writer's experience in one country, however, such beliefs, buttressedew casual experiences, had effectivelyefforts to cultivate Soviet bloc representativesonsiderable period of time, butetermined and prolonged effort was finally made It paid off handsomely, to everyone's surprise. The principal obstacles, it transpired, had been skepticism, indifference, and hostility within tbe American establishment

A truer picture would show that Soviet mtelligence officers and coopted workers are under Instructions to cultivate

' Thisaaed ta part rxponpodUoo, not here to ba dc^elopod. that dooing to consider Kriausly cWecttoo to rational* or toletligcnee acrviota of small powers.oviet begin* to think about treason, be Is going to think of either BriUln (along with some Cc*nmonwea!th countries) or the United States. Third-oatlaoal agent assessncob am In any case, lo this writer's opinion, not to be cxnrJdend reliable; that Isirst-hand profes-ssonJ assessment mart be obtained.

"dentiPcal'on' assessment, and transmission ofmoreover thai, as human beingsull and restrictive environment, they welcome such contacts, whatever their official aims may be. This truer picture would distinguish between intelligence officers and other Soviets, the latter are truly wary of friendly contacts with Westerners wkue under the eyes of their security shepherds and tend to avoid VVeSterners at receptions. Finally, willingness to engage in broad diplomatic contact, in all pro^bility, varies considerably from one Soviet embassy to another, depending on trie local situation, theof the ambassador and the intelligence rezfdents and so on. got we don't find out what we can do in *any particular place until we really try.

Thereariety of reasons why Foreign Service, USIS, and military attach* personnel and even intelligence officers under official cover are so often reluctant to involve themselves with Soviet bloc representatives. Some don't want It on their records that they have had Eastern associations; some imagine that the Soviets are ten feet tall; many feel that it's too much work with too little to show for it; someisceral distaste for Intelligence and just don't want to get involved in it Many officers are therefore also Indifferent to standing instructions that contacts and relationships be reported, dilatory in writing reports, and reluctant to be debriefed. And thereertain category of persons whose chief delight is to bait,and insult their Eastern counterparts.

For this latter there is no excuse. Yet time after rime one can seediplomatic, andcontacts: "All that guy could do was talk aboutust walkedthis ferk fastened himself to meeech,old himHe was soouldn't make any money withWhen he got gusby aboutsked him why they didn't take the same approach to disarmamentThat fat slob is tooas an Army officer for me to waste my time talking to him."

It must be recognized that some of tbe American inhibitions are not wholly without Jurtification. The KCB Is known to put at tbe top of hs priorities the cultivation of American officials in order to assess them, determine who docs what in their installations, attempt compromises, and rajpefully recruit. But this fact merely calls for dlscrinunation on our part In selectingofficers orwe encourage to cultivate and be cultivated by the l Soviets, and for care and realism in defensive briefings.

" *,

Many of the difficulties are often traceableingle underlying cause, an Indifference pervading tbe Individual establishment. The tone or attitude of an official representation is determined by the ambassador and his deputy. If the ambassador is indifferent,or hostile toward this intelligence objective, then ft it an uphill struggle all the time.ersonal basis one can secure the full cooperation of Foreign Service, USIS. and attache officers, batonly at tbe cost of time and developmental efforts which thou Id be invested rather fa operations against targets. The only solution visible to this writerontinuing flow of requirements andnot only from intelligence headquarters but also from the State Department emphasizing the Soviet operations problem. Until the US. Government addresses Itself fatcgrally to this problem, theeffort will tend to peter out In paper exercises.

Tactical Devices

The Sovietsighly disdplirved group, intensively irxloetri-nated. prevcaticm-nunded, keenly suspicious, insulated, tradwithm security controls and secret observation several orders of magnitude greater than anything to which we are accustomed They are prldeful aod highly sensitive to slight. At the same time, asmany of them arc extremely anxious for adventure and exposure beyond these narrow confines, and many are eager for acceptance and approval by Westerners and by Americans. This mixture of conflicting tendencies can produce fateresting results and points to operationally useful tactics.

Wliile Soviet relationships with the British and Americans (and some others) are under tight official control, those with othermay be, for diplomatic or other reasons, much more relaxed. Thus it may be unusual (as well as operationally undesirable)oviet toingleton invitation from an American but not at all unusual to see singleton Soviets at parties given, for example, by the Indians, the Iraqis, or the French. And athird-national party the singlet oo Soviet can be approached, conversation can Bow easily, andumber of such meetingseriod ofeal relationship and bond may develop. The Soviet ft in aof course, by the possible presence of Soviet agents at thereport the contact or not, or to slant the report, as he tees fit But the minute an attempt Is made to convert thisto an overt Soviet-American one. It comes into the purview of


the re rid rot and the security officer, and it will be either abruptly Irtmlnafrd or runontrolled mtelligence contact

wos or more, on the other hand, the Soviets will often accept irivitalioni from Britisher! andven during periods of international tension, especially to reasonably large parties orwhichiplomatie or official rather than personal and pointed tone- It is perfectly possible,eriod of time anduccession of large cocktaUparty meetingi. to conduct highly useful con vrrsationsshcacnven though otheV'ISovicts are charging around and perhaps watching dowry from across the room, flu'sevice that can be used at posts where there Is noto assist elements ol the diplomatic community, especiallyto meet their counterparts from other countries. Where there are organs like International dubs or Diplomats' Associations they enormously simplify the problem of meeting Soviets and (potting link,.

Most officersoviet establishment speak the local language, usually quite weU, and very few Americans speak Russian. It is often argued, therefore, that the Soviets will immediatelyussian-speaking American of being an intelligence officer and shy away from htm, so that in order to allay suspicion ft it better for American officers to speak the local language. This argument is fallacious on tluee counts.

First. In order not to start outosition of mferiority, the American should be able to speak the indigenous language as well as the Soviets do. In many places he usually isanir-month or one-year quickie course In one of the less common languages usually cannot compare with the product of tlse Soviet institutes, who may, moreover, be serving Ids second or third tour In the area. Second, the argument presumes that the Soviets will have nothing to douspected intelligence officer This is simply not true, any more than that we will have nothing to douspected Soviet Intelligence officer. Finally, there is the fact that manyare genuinely pleased tooreigner speak to them in their own tongue.ecent Soviet reception this writer had the pleasant experience of finding himself "receiving" his Soviet hosts: at one time there were seven Russians lined up to introduce themselves to their Russian-speaking guest, one third secretary even elbowing his way past the CRU deputy chief.

What to Say

Here are some observations, which apply both to direct contact and to the guidance of agents, on how to talk to Russians. Tbe first and overriding rule: Warmth, openness, smccrity,old, suspicious, cautious, uniesponsive person is greeted with coldness, suspicion, caution, and indifference- Second rule: Avoid polemics, political evangelism, criticism, one-upmanship. Third rule: Don't probe. Fourth rule: Show respect where respect Is due,1

Remember that the object of the esxsreistVb not*to pass theconduct political arguments, or cement international reUOons; it is to recruit Soviets. The Immediate purposes of the social contact are to build rapport, to elicit responses useful for assessment, to assist chosen targets to articulating grievances, to awaken resentments and anxieties, to plant ideas, to makeympathetichese objectives should be best served by crucstionlng and conversation on topics which we know from our many studies to be likely to stimulate anti-regime responses, tailored to the extent possible to the individual Soviet in question so as toesponsive note without giving cause for alarm.

Example No.oviet Army officer In assistant attacherank commensurale with age but passedumber of times for assignment as attache. Hero of the Soviet Union. Difficulthas chronically had difficulties with his chiefs and expresses contempt for them. Blunt, outspoken. Very high self-estimate Highly variable moods.

After rapport was solidly established, we would question him about and discuss the Soviet Army promotion system, what he would do after retirement, when he would make General, how it could be that those downs, his several chiefs, could be put in charge ofwhat kind of pull and connections they must have, what the future is for an officer who has wasted seven career years in attache assignments under chiefs who have given him bad fitness reports, and so on. We would make frequent allusions in various contexts toaspects. practice. These conversations were of

A Guide /or JisterrtewAig Soviet Escapees, Air Research and Development Comniatd, HRRI, Research Study No.his ts the best single handling guide or training manual for contacts with Soviets that the writer has run across. See also How Ihe Soviet Surrem Worts, by Bauer. IrJuuVa. sad Kluckhoho. available In both hard cover and paperback.

course progressivehat the targe! was never offended, and weurprisingly positive response. Thenir-month build-up we hit himisguised but definite approach. He backed away, but not without absorbing our point The rapport was not broken, and weeasonable belief that the conversations were never reported. No defection, no recruitment- but who knows, in the future, if perhaps the system should kick him hard in the teeth.

Esmenpte Ho.RU colonel, civilian journalist cover. Spotted and developed by third national agents. Difficultumber of other Soviets. Cultural pretensions. Pompous and oooceited, high self-estimate, but work actually marginal Self-indulgent Strongly dependent personality, would refuse to rebut political arguments. Drinking progressively more during his tour, toward the end approaching near-alcoholism. Under pressure would block up and become unable to express bimself. Marital situation unknown, although ample evidence of frequent friction with his wife. Constantly chafing against the "bureaucracy" Frequently in trouble with the embassy.

After development by agents, warmly accepted direct American contact, which confirmed ahnocttl aspects of previous IndirectHe was crude, arrogant oondesoending, constantly talking {aboutighly Insecure, aeeming greatly In need of alistener (ether Soviets apparendy wouldn't give him the time ofnfortunately, fust when the relationship was getting warm ha and the Soviet ambassadornrrunon passion for chess, which transported himondition of chronic discontentand unhappinesseventh heaven where all Immediatefor manipulation was dissolved* -

Our conversations with this Soviet were directed towardsense of tbe cultural ferment freedom, experimentation, andto be found In the West and particularly in the United States. We especially dwelt on the immense prestige, power, and Influence exercised by Western fournalists and commentators. We also fed back to him his own complaints about the cultural and intellectual

belief to theof using the Russian language seas lUraglhcorxl by Both tho mas andgood English, and be alsothe

local language. Asdrank, hcraever. be would revert (note and mora laHis wife also, on one occasionarty, after aeveiol hours of effort at being pleasant (ought as out with tbe plea, "Come sit and talk with me la Russian, Tea tared of apeakagS "

sterility ofrogressive effort to tic the terms of reference for this into his headquarters in Moscow and the local Soviet embassy.

Example No.oung Soviet officer was noted in the telephone taps, soon after arriving, to be laving serious difficulties with his wife and to be drinking very heavily. After raising cain on the town one night he was apparently severely reprimanded and assigned (as he still is) to minor embassyis parents were divorced, we learned, andhild he lived with his stejmTother ana^motherointer to one possible source of hishird-national agentogical business cover established contact with him,arm though unproductive relationship has resulted. (It is unproductive because the Interrnediary agent Is an unimaginative plod, unresponsive to requirements and guidance by virtue of Inability to grasp any subtleties whatever. But wc keep trying.)

The Soviet did make one interesting pointonversation with the agent, to wit: "Please don't invite me out. We are not like tlie Ccrmans or British or Americans and cannot accept an invitation just .like thatccept yourust obtain approval and forust offer explanation, provide Justifications, and so on. You like meike you, but it justorth it"

Our efforts to get additional means of regular access to this man have so far been fruitless. Recently, however, upon being introduced to this writer, he was talking within minutes about the sterility and boredom of existence in the confines of the Soviet colony. He isbored, curious, anxious to see and learn, chafing under embassy restrictions, and at least partially perceptive of tlie negative aspects of the Soviet system. He deserves further exploration, to assist him in tbe articulation of hit discontents and to discover whether his personality, political, and career problems are deep and strong enough lo provide fuelhanneled explosion.

These examples illuminate to some extent the generalization that the safest, most innocuous way to surface and cultivate anti-social tendencies and personal grievances, as well as plant ideas andsympathy, is by questions on certain crucial topics: "What is your promotionYou look very tired tonight, have you been working tooYou say you are bored and hate this place, but there is this and this and this to do, youery pleasant and beautiful Club, how can you feel thatWhy do you call diplomats worthlessHow can the Soviet Foreign Office

assignDMwhom we know the respondent hates] toesponsible post?"

Petition Virtues of the Inlerrogatioc

The utility of questions tn stimulating conversation, inIn causing inner turmoil (if that is what you want toinympathetic awareness is of mora thanvalue. The mind functions four to five times a* fast asso that even orsoer^he

respondent is Interested In what yon are laying, his attention and thoughts are continually straying, elaborating. Under less than the best circumstances, where thereanguage problem and theIs only mildly or even negatively Interested, his attention Is constantly wandering and the effectiveness of your communication can go well belowercent Addressinguestion, however, serves to engage almost his whole consciousness, prevents his thoughts from wandering, appeals to Ids ego, and communicates an interest in him and his optaioof.

In addition, the responses to certain types of questions can bein assessment; the so-called project ibe questions, requiring expres-sions of preference, interest, and the like, are an essential part of assessment For example: "Who is your favorite author {or fictionalVVhat do you hope to do when youWhat Is ft yon like best [or least] about living in such andWhat do you want your children to do InWhy did you choose the foreignYour work involves talking toot. do you likeWhy did youatellite representative! like the movie "Chance Meeting?"

Suitable questions are the most effective way to probe personally and politically sensitive topics and implant ideas without runisk of alienating the respondent or exposing your own priorA sure way to alienateo criticize the system, its methods and policies, etc, even if you know what you are talking about and even though tbe Soviet may agree with you. The better way to get him to think such thoughts Is to trigger them by seemingly Innocuous questions- "What do you do with yourHave you been dancingHave youDo you prefer to spend your time at your own Clubhese questions (and many more likeirectederson already chafing at tbe restricted and highly orgariixed Soviet embassy existenceact

known to you from otherill certainly provoke inner reac-tioni. no matter what the overt response is.1*

The Last Step

After all these many words we are still faced with the crucial problem of how this wltole process Is to be carried to tbe point of defection or recruitment, as tbe case may be.ense, to be lure, we can consider all we havetargets, establishing relationships with them, working on their frustrations, pressures, prides, andworth-while programmed work to Increase the probability of walk-ens. And that it will often be. Onlyost unusual and favorable case will an outright approach be made, and then only after every aspect has been studied and restudied atand in the field and tbe plan specifically tailored to Itspeculiarities, and risks.

But toypothetical case let us assume that we have arrived at the stage of considering an outright approach. We are workingovietefinitelyodd-bell of some type, neurotic,ossibly quite disturbed Wereat deal about himumber of different sources as well as through direct contact- He hasendency to relax and talk about hb personal problems with his American or other friend He has shown he has tbe nerve to side-step Soviet security controls, and we have strong grounds for believing thatot reporting hb conversations with us. We believe that we have detected anchange in hb relationship with other Soviets (which may not have passed unnoticed by them either).

"ThM digression, on the totexrogatrva was derivedtheory of saUa work.

a fict wbichurther ditiuulnri;rofaaaion ao highly

on pwsonal oowatct. paiicwalfaaaal banpeooe as oUaifaa

boa Qfenrboaa as has paid praesvaii* no aWawa'an to mrfc abaad lava* of rnd-avor

i.j'.Iuj. Tha aafca ranfesrton baa tteWetee/ applWid both

pragmatic (might and paychologtCnl maaroh to problem* of personal eflcctivene-a,

rapport, ttstrrperaonal Influence, tbe hard acO, and the soft. Insidious ar-lL It has

i level aboutaleaman both how bo ts to talk to people

and whato ny. with highly affective raauttt. saaual entitled Coif Call

Safia-Cby the National Saba Devssiopaaesrthe iaaat

tho wnter has teen oat the "cold approach.* (It coatbich couldn't

ba written ofoo.Cy bat wai at Iran income tax dosocnble.) Ehner Leaar-

man's Creafltw SrUfesgine manual on personal contact,o lhe

What do we do now? Here we should keep trt mind the very basic propositionan who defects it running away freer,too big for him to cope with,an who changes sides in place is fightmg hock against snrnething. Neither is being pulled to u, by personal magnetism or ideological attraction, even though these motives may appear as rafiorudizations. Our roleo continue to build up, in our contacts with him and perhaps by cUndertine Irritant actions on the side, these Inner pressuresunu At this rtage we' fry" to contribute to building taTitm the conviction thato hope tor him within the Soviet system. Now we can do what we could not earlier, try to channel and focus his resentment onto the top Soviet leaders, the apparatchlkl who surround them, or the system itself. Thene of pinning the blame for his intense personal dxmtfafartions on the regime, of directing histendencies, if you will, against It

tage of utmost interest and delicacy. Wa are not trying tooviet things which be himself knows better and feels more deeply than we. But we can build on, feed back to him. and focus feelings which he has already expressed. We all know bow toriend down when he is upset, we also know,lose friend, subjects to avoid talking about, not because be would get angry at us but because they would hit sensitive nerves and plunge him Into depression or trigger anxieties.he reverse of this latter course, in moderate and appropriate doses, that we deliberately porsue with our Soviet "friend.'

o far along as to question his own system and his relationship to it, we are not far from our ultimate goal. Once he begins to think of his rulers as bad or irresponsible or dangerous or corrupt or as surrounded, misinformed, and manipulate! by others who are like thatery close to the crossing.


It has been our thesis here that we doufficient basis of understanding to bring about recruitments and defections of Soviets. Our information sources, if they are properly used, are adequate to permit us at least an initial target selection; and if wo deliberately seek out "alienated" Soviets, the neurotic or sociopathic fringe, the chronically unhappy, the rrdstrts, we can rignincantry increase our probability of yield. We must, however, seek some means of solving

the overriding problem erf our own attitudes, of crvercoming ourand usdiflerence. If we do not. tbe future will be like the pan. and such successes as we achieve will be simply from luck: oror perhaps from our mistakes cancelling each other out

Original document.

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