OPERATIONAL CONTACTS

Created: 12/1/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

approved for4 cia historical review program

TITLE: Operational Contacts

AUTHOR: L. K. Bekrenev

VOLUMB:

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a collodion ol nriiclci on tho historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of Intelligence.

All suiemenis of fact, opinion or analysistudies in Intelligence are those of

ihe authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Govemmcnt endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

Soviel doctrine on the holding of meetings vrith agents.

OPERATIONAL CONTACTS'. rsekrenev

l'avxnl coofMCts wish sgeats are corditioocderies ol rautuaOy reUrod factor, amoog which tbe following are basic:

The rituation, maturity, aod rmpcrlance of the agento beby the tneetiog.

The protesslooal skil] aod the legal status of case officer aod agent The timing, duration, and place of the meeting. Prevailing operational conditions.

Qualify of the Agent

If an agent la sufficiently trusted and If he supplies valuablepersonal contact with him should be reducedinimum. For tlte IntervaU it suffices to worklan for either to summon the othereeting lo case of emergency.

1 Adaptedop Secret paper bsued try the Soviet Miliuuy-Dtpk^Oo Acsrtemy Par the esrearastaacas of Its Issue see SrWlu VuTteooa.Bsajsm

Even In meetingsested and reliable agent much attention Is paid to seeaarity as well as to tbe tuffiQmesvt of intelligencebut In working with an agent who has not been fuDy assessed and vetted, the prime emphasis fs put on vigilance andhe been planted by tbe local counterintelligence, are his rncAtves in agreeing to collaborate sirscere? Tho need for personal meetings with such an agent is increased, for they give the opportunity to assess him more completely. But the meetings must be conducted with caution.0 an officer assignedertainlanhtrd-crruntry meeting with an agent who had beenand hurriedly recruited and not thoroughly assessed.warned thef the need for precautionary ineasurea, and tn this it proved to be correct: the agent brought alongofficers to the meeting site. Tbe resident's application of precautionary measures and tbe case officer's observance of correct

operating teehftiqur- en route to tbe meeting made possible tbe de-fsectionerious provocation by adversary count erintemgenee

One should not neglect personal meetings with agents who are not sources of Important information. Agents performing rupport roles are also essential to the service and should be appreciatedoviet intelligence officer on an illegal asstgnment is supplied cover by an auxiliary agent, bis fate depends upon that agent

In general, whatever an agent's role in tbe intelligence net, personal contact should be made with him only when it isimpossible to manage without ft The number of meetings should be kept as low as possible, especially with sources of valuable infcarnation. This principle holds for all residencies and agentut particularly for residencies under legal1ountries wbich have severe counterintelligence practlces.

Purpos* of Mfeftngj

Personal meetings may be held to give an agent his neat assignment and Insertions forut, to trainradecraft or the use of technical or communications equipment, to transmit documents, repeats, technical equipment, money, or Cither items, or to fulfill several of these purposes- In actual practice several purposes are usually servedeeting In addition to Irs particular objectives more general needs can beeecing held for training purposes mayeans for clarifying biographic data on the agent or his views on various subjects. At every meeting with an agent one should study him and obtain new data on bis potential and talents, therebya better basis for Judging bis sincerity and deciding how much trust to place in him.

These various objectives require different kinds of meeting in terms of frequency, duration, and choice of time and place,

Proftsiuynal Skill

' WWtoMroOrdrincipal agent rathertaf cflVn(or arnelaaseaeL ban Tan.).

- -ax f>I

Success In face-to-face handling dependsarge degree on the professional authority of tbe handler, his knowledge of the business, the firmness of his will, his adherence to principle, and his ability to get along with people. Above all else is dedication to the assignmentositive resolve to achieve success and fulfill the assigned tasks

Vigilance In protecting one'i activity and mlentions not only from coonterintclugence but abo from the agenteveloped(he power of observation, aod an ability to retain theand assert one'i will tactfully.

Scene case officers lose tbe initiative during agent meetings bytirae discussing secondary matters or problems in no way related to the purpose of the meeting and end up falling to attain theor which the meeting bad been set up. Recently, forase officer from one of our residencies under Vega] cover was ashed touick coo tad with an agent In order to transmit to bfan Headquarters' decision that he should tmnsedlately leave the country because of impending danger. Instead of executing these Instructions immediately, the case officernooting to completelyconversation about the agent's status In the country, means of communication, legal docu mentation, etc Then be ordered tbe agent not to travel anywhere without his approval and set another meeting for six days laterl The resident bad to correct the situation irnnsediatefy.

There have been cases In which agents have actually refused to meet with officers who exhibited incompetence in matters concerning which they themselves, as specialists, were working In behalf ofintelligence. During meetings the case officers acted timid, were not serious, let their minds wander, acted stiff and formal, attempted to order the agents about, or did not show interest In the agents' problems. Or they did not give the agents satisfactory explanations of operational or contact problems, betraying thereby lack ofand at times confusion, wbich engendered doubts in tbe agents as to the security of working with them. Such conduct has often lost us die services of valuable agents.

Experienced case officers are made; not born. Experience isby practical work. New case officers, fust beginning to work at agent operations abroad, therefore have to bold personal meetings with agents. But they learn also by example, instruction, andIt Is necessary to Imbue them with professional skills and draw them gradually, starting with less complicated tasks, into the work of handling agents.

regal Status

There have been instances in wbich agents have refused to meet with case officers whose legal position in the country was Incompatible with their own situation. In particular, several agents have refused

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Optioiional Contacts

to have meetings with officers from our military attache apparatus because if discovered by outsiders or oounterinteUigence they would be mcriminated. The legal status of case officers and agents is of utmost significance for dandcstrnity, security of communications, and ability to make personal contact and must be taken into account in planning meetings.

During theur service suffered some bitter failures.ignificant degree theseonsequence of slackenedon the part of case officers in legal residencies and of their agents. The case officers would report that meetings had been carried out under favorable conditions and there had been no externaleillance. But testimony at trials would subsequently show that countCTTDta^eoce hadnly the time and place of meetings but also their duration and details such as who the participants were arid what they did, bow the officers were caressed, and in one case even the color of the wrapperackage that had been passed. There had obviously been surveillance which both case officers and agents had failed to detect

"These failures occurred, not because operational conditions were terribly complicated or the adversary counterintelligence service was so skillful, but because either tbe case officers or the agents liadto be vigilant at all times, mistaken the significance of cover and security, or done incorrect things. This was what enabled counterintelligence to arrest our agents and expel our officers from the country. At present counterintelligence practices are less severe in several of the eastern capitalist countries than ia live west, but that gives no reason to weaken vigilance there. Favorable elements jn any operational situation should be taken advantage of, but not by relaxing vigilance and security consciousness.

Under deep cover, which In Sovfc* practice Involves Gust ctocumcntstion.

Illegal residenciesand agent groups, not being subject toof the kind experienced under legal cover, can depend better oo having secure personal meetings. These can be held In aatmosphere and in some instances without dandestinity. La every country there live many "welcome" foreigners, tourismass phenornenon, business and family tics are widely developed; thus large human streams cross mtemadona! borders. No countryounterintelligence service with the capability to follow everyoot to say every local inhabitant, in its effort to identify officers and agents of foreign InteUigence services.

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docs not mean that mem ben of illegal residencies arected to any lurveillsnce. only that its incidence onreatly ir,iueed. Provided, of course, that they have not compromisedby mistakes or rash acts and so been placed under specialvation, counterintelligence does not follow at their heels. More over, they have greaterelecting cover stories, means of disguise, and other security measures, even to countries with tbe most revere counUiger.ce practices.

Choice of Case Officer

The legal status factor should be taken Into account in deciding what case officer Is to be assigned to cany out any particular meeting with an agent Initially, fa legal residencies, meetings with agents are carried out by the officers who assessed and recruited them.on the purpose of the meeting or the importance of tha agent they can also be held by the resident, his deputy,pecial case officer sent for this purpose from Headquarters.

Case officers In legal renideodea, tn the course of recruiting agents, cultivate new contacts among local Inhabitants who seem to have agent poterrtial The development of such persons, on top of already recruited agents, brings an tacreasmg number of personal meetings and concomitant danger of detection. In order to reduce this danger and also improve the management of the inteUigence not. Headquarters splits off tbe most valuable agents of legal residencies and sets them up under illegal residencies or as agent groups reporting directly to Headquarters via illegal channels.

In illegal residencies and agent groups meetings are beld by the residents, their deputies, and the groupesident canrusted cut-out toeeting that has limited objectives such as transmitting materials. Despite tho favorable conditions In illegal residencies, meetings must be planned and held fa fullwith daridestine operational doctrine Holding them without professional planning is not permitted Each member of an Illegal residency or agent group must check constantly for clandestinlty and

for the security of his illegal status and make efforts to improve that status.

In principle It is undesirable to make frequent changes fa the person assigned to meet an agent It Is Utereforo important before assigning an officer to make contact with any agent, to think over thoroughly all tbe considerations presented above fa order to avoid

mistakes. From the point ot view of security, it is also improper to set up personal contact between the radio operator of an illegal residency and agents in its network. Only the resident must know the identity of the radio operator.

arallel security measure the agents of an illegal residency must not know the basic biographic data (name, nationality, addresses) on tbe resident, his assistants, or the cut-outs who effect thecontact For this reason it is better to use pseudonyms,In practice it Is not always possible. Under no circumstances should horizontal lines of personal contact be perrnitted, even if edhcVence to this doctrine necessitates excluding an agent fromactivity for some time Thisitally important rule,among valuable and trusted agents.

Headquarters is responsible for personal contact arrangements with illegal residents, group leaders, and singleton case officers or agents reporting directly to Headquarters. It sends out its case officers for this purpose, either illegally with foreign documentation or officially with Soviet documentation and an appropriate cover story. Thecan be held in the target country orhird country. In some cases the agent may be summoned to Headquarters and the business taken care of there, la that case it is necessary to expunge from the agents passport (or the resident's or groupll notations coo-ccrning his stay in the Soviet Union.

Choice of Place

Tbe choice of meeting place is of considerable importance and should be made deliberately and with foresight It has to lend itself to tbe objectives of the meeting, suit the positions in society of the agent and case officer, and satisfy security considerations. Meetings can be held on city streets, in parks, restaurants, cafes, leading rooms, or museums, out of town, in the suburbs, etc. The range of possibili-ties dependsarge degree oo the creative initiative of members of tbe residency, conditionedirm knowledge of the real operational situation, local conditions, and tbe structure and techniques of the counterintelligence and police forces.

Elements to be taken Into account include the severity of the country's admirustration, tbe sensitivity of the police force, the extent to which police and counterintelligence check local inhabitants, for-eigners, employees of Soviet installations, main highways, streets, and squares, and how well state and private buildings and transportation

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are guarded. Similarlyecessary to bear in mind tbe degree to which counteritttelbgersce and police agents are planted in enterprises and public buildings such as theaters, museums, libraries, aad rcstauranU. In addition to counterintelligence activity, one should conusl" pobce measure* for maintaining public order, particularly ihe cootrol of criminal elements and lesser violators of law and ijxaality. In the summeror esarnple, two of our illegals meeting abroad found themselvesistrict where tbe police wereoundup of such elements. -When they saw what was going on they took off. but could not get away without having their documeets rnrpected by the police. The dtuation would have been much worse for an ofScer under kegal cover meeting with an agent For prolonged meetingsecessary to choose places whichcannot observe. Frequently the agent is picked up at some predrteimined place in an automobile and taken for operational worklace chosen earlier that the agent himself bad not known about The agents own car can also be used for this purpose.est not lo bold conversations on operational matters In the automobile, forossibleecorder might be hidden in ft

Places for long meetings present fewer difficulties In illegal resi-dendes- Their members can meet in their own apartments. In hotels, or in cut of-town resort areas without any special risk of ruspicsou. But even in Illegal residencies the demands of dandestinity andmust be observed fn choosing meeting places. The localclimate and the status of the persons to take part in themust be taken into account

Thereater In residencies under legal cover. Mereest cither to have reliable safebouses or to deliver the agentto the official residency building. Tbeeriousmove Ifeasible, it is better to have Headquarters dispatch an officerhird country, either legally or illegally, for the meeting.

Here are some of the mistakes sometimes made by case officers of legal residencies. Tbey bold meetings fa) restaurants and other public establishments located near hotels aod bouses where employees of Soviet Installations, sometimes even the case officers themselves, reside. The service personnel In such establishments know theof Soviet dtizem. Some of them may be counterintelligence agents, and in any case they may spot our officereeting and report to the police or the counterintelligence service. Other

Contacts

meetings are held near guarded compounds and governmentwhere more intense surveillance is maintained than elsewhere.

Some case officers use the same site for successive meetingi over an ertended rjeaiod of time. Others hold meetings in their own or the agent's apartment, scmetimes taking along their wives to order toamily friendship. These fail to realize thatloser relationship than legitimate business relations and uriquestionaWy win not escape notice fa these days of intense cvamterinteUigeDOe activity

Timing. Duration, Frecfuency

In the matter of timinglways necessary to bear in mind the currentlicy objectives of the Soviet government so that tnese will not be prejudiced by any unfavorable Incident arising from the operational conUct Ifny such risk the rr-rcting should be postponed until another time. This applies to meetings with agents that are poorly assessed or insufficiently tested, particularly If there is doubt of their bona fides. It applies also when thereos-nrnhry that the case officer will be under surveillance as he leaves for the meeting. This corttideration should be borne in mind by case oSkers of illegal reside, but especially by those tn residencelegal cover.

Governments of capitalist countries sometimes pursue political ends by having counterintelligence set up special provocations againstofficials and catch them meeting with agents or agent candidates. The object may be to compromise Soviet foreign policy, strainrelations, or strengthen tbe political position of the capitalist grrvernmeof, especially if it Is currently trying toilitary or antidemocratic law through par Lament. Sornetimes thisone against tbe opposition of the counterintelligence service, for thedetention of the Soviet officer may frustrate its effort tohorough study of his contacts.ule provocations against our officers are associated with an international or internal politicaland they are even mounted against officials who have no connection with agent operations.

Meetings should be kept as short as the transaction of the business allows. The case officer and agent must not be togetherurpose. They should not waste time discussing matters having no substantial relationship to tbe business at hand. This does oot mean that one should talk to the agent only about business In dry bureau-

Optralionol Contacts

erotic language. Sensitivity (nwiidi the agent's Interests mustIf (be situation pennitx, be should be heard out evenwhich were not anticipated when the meeting waswhich have an operational relationship and can influencework. But be should not be permitted to deflect the talklabyrinth of secondary, mngnifkant topics. The ease officertbe initiative in his own hands, and be must remembereetingroper and businesslike manner cuts down

Frequent meetings with the >ame agent are unwise, especially tf heested and reliable one producing important secret In/nrrnabon. Meetings with such agents can be reduced to one orear, or even fewer, held whenever possible fn third countries. Routine transactions can be taken care of through ocnpersonal forms ofWHh more ordinary agents It should not be necessary to meet oftener than once every two or three months Theseare of special importance for residencies under legal cover.

Operational Condition*

It should be taken as axiomatic that Soviet intelligence officers under legal cover are subject to counterirateQJgence scrutiny In all capitalist countries, moat effectively to those with severe countermtelligenceIn some European and eastern countries the counterintelligence effort is not as Intense as In the countries of the Anglo-American bloc, and the operational situation Is thereforeut this seeming ease never Justifies reduced vigilance and security-consciousness on the part of case officers and agents. Flaps still occur In countries where the operational situation appears to .be relatively favorable, and analysis shows that flaps do not depend on the complexity orof the operational tituatioo but arc traceable to deficiencies in tbe camouflage of operational acrrvity, sUckening of vigilance, and neglect of cover and dandestinity.

In capitalist countries of tbe east that have comparatively nrudl countcrinlelligeoce apparatuses, the activities of our legal residencies still do not necessarily go without observation. Theprograms of such countries as the USA, England, and France are also extended to those eastern countries and seek to undermine and compromise the favorably developing relations between them and the Soviet Union. The capitalist counterintelligence services exploit in this effort all the national peculiarities of which the east has many.

This ttctic of adversary countcrtatefligcxice carries possibilities of great unpleasantness for us.

Because of tbe opera lional conditions now prevailing in capita bit countries, mteLageooe officers, especially those in residencies under legal cover, must seek out and apply tbe most reliable forms and methods of camouflage and cWestrnity when meeting personally with agents. Although the holding of personal meetings has been rendered difficult for them, with proper study, good planning, and careful execution it can be sutxesasYiL Counterfatelligeaoeof rjcrsonnel nsTSc^rfct installations abroad is not so tight oras to make operational activity impossible.ule ft is intermittent and Is shifted from one case officer to smother and even to persons that have no connection with agent operations. Aservice does not possess the means for interruptedin all places at all times In aU cities; it uses various systems, and observation teams do not work around the clock in all places. Once, one understands the working patternsarticularservice, obstacles erected by ft can be circumvented.

An agent with whom personal contact Is mamtalned must beby his case officer with the qualitieslandestineHe must be invested with the ability to cammifiage hirnself, to exercise vigilance, to determine whether he is being observed by counterintelligence. He must have the ability to spot surveillance at his place of work or outside bis place of work, especially whenfor an operational meeting.

Agents" carelessness or inexperience in matters of security has often resulted in operational flaps. Some agents have failed to attachto the circumstance that someone, often an acquaintance or friend, began to show intensified Interest in them before theThey ignored changes in their icbtionshlps with CO-workers and friends. They did not wonder about the appearance of new faces In their milieu. Some agents, because of inexperience or in aviolation of security rules induced by personal rashness, have failed to check for surveillance when going to en operational meeting. Some agents go to operational meetings unprepared, without thinking out their future actions In advance, and have not planned whatpatterns to exhibit while en route to the meeting place Or In its area. Some have approached our case officers at places notas meeting sites, have telephoned the case officer at his office and discussed personal contact arrangements, or have showed up Inat the Soviet installation to see the case officer.

Regardless of how ikHlfiil andase officci may be, he can come to the attention of countermtelligence if one of bis agents violates operational rules deliberately or neglects them because of fncsrierieoce. Furthermore, the agent's attitude toward cover aod dandestinity when meeting with bis case officer coo tributes to some degree lo the over-all assessment of his sincerity and honesty inwith Soviet intelligence. Some agents, of course, work honestly with us without adhering to the basic rules of security on the premise that no kind of surveillance it being directed at them. Nevertheless the case officer must always consider the agent's attitude toward security and train and indoctrinate him accordingly. He must seek out tbe reasons for every deviation by the agent from the norms of behavior be bas laid down.

eeting

The preparationeetingone by the handling case officer with tbe guidance of the resident or his deputy. It begins with the meetings objectives and tasks. Including specific problems to be resolved with the agent, the ways and order of their solution, and operational or personal problems which the agent may have and which should be settled at the meeting. If tbe meeting place and time previously selected are not suitable for the accomplishment of these tasks or for current operational conditions, thenroper to make changes. Tbe agent should bedvance by non-personal contact or at the agreed time and placerief contact The latterhe better tf the scheduledirinunent; it avoids confusion and possible broken contact. If it is possible that surveillance ofancer may endanger tbe meeting, then he can be replaced by another handler.

The case officer most study the operational climate on the route of travel and In the area of the meeting place- He must be prepared to take correct stock of the situation on the spot and In case ofmake the proper security decisions. Some case officers panic when complications arise in the operational situation In the vicinity of the meeting place. Some officers suspecting surveillance either continue according to plan, attaching oo significance to theiror completely abandon tbe rneeting without activating planned measures to get to the bottom of the situation. If the latter, tbey frequently bead for the automobile lhat brought them to the meeting area Instead of going home, thus giving counterintelligence the oppor-

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Contorts

lunity lo identify another uitdligence officci, tbe one it tbe wheel of* the puked automobile. Another mistake is for the case officer. Instead of leaving tbe meeting areaoute designed to avoid encountering the agent, toirection that results in corifronta-tioo with hint Not suspecting dangerdentaJ]y, the need for danger signals is not alwaysbe agent goes right up to the case officer; and countermtelLgence has caught them In contact.

The plan will Include reaffirmation or replacement of agreedarrangements and Bgnalj, the cover story for the inert lug and the sequence of actions to be taken to substantiate It, assessment of the personal qualities of the agent and observation of fail behavior, the sequence of actions to be used to checking tbe operational climate in tbe rneeting area beforefiand and afterward, and fn case ofheck on the agent's hooeaty. It wul delude the sequence of moves to be made In the event the agent does not appear or if computations arise while the case officer Is en route to the meeting area,tbe meeting site, or actually with the agent Finally, it wul Include arrangements with tbe support elements assigned to provide security for the meeting and the danger signals agreed upon.

After be bas thought over and clarified all of these elements, the officer shouldritten outline of his plan and schedule ofTins will belp him to resolve all problems and accomplish his mission completely and clandestinely in the briefest possible period of time.

Secure frit

Tbe departurease officer for an agent meeting is critical when he Is under legal coverapitalist country with stringent counter-btelli^ence practices, ftepniabous can be made approximately as

Several days before tbe scheduled rneeting tbe residency, usingmeans and other available assets, studies the status of the case officer with respect to the pesence of ccunterwt exigence surveillance. Also studied are the couotrsintelllgeoce personnel and technical assets being used against the Soviet installations, especially tbeofficers assigned to follow the given case officer. Trial exits of the case officer into tbe dty are made in order to determine the nature and extent of surveillance. Similar exits arc. taneously by other case officers in order to determine as completely as possible the mterrsfty of surveillance and to see whether the mm-

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ssets assignedhe given officer are withdrawn and reassigned to follow the others.

The case officer who is to hold the meeting "trains"personnelabitual dairy schedule of movements to orderthe edge off their riguance. It may be useful to deviatedairy pattern sometimes fo order to test how thepersonnel react, but one should never "play" with thaagents and tease them by actsA'

On the basis of data collected by these measures steps are worked out for the officer toecure exit Into the city to hold the meeting (or to forewarn tho agent If be oUseovrrsystem of signals Is agreed upon and an appropriate distribution of security and support personnel is worked out- For the latter. Other case officers and technical personnel tn the residency arc co-opted, one* not subject to intensive counterintelligence surveillance.

For the exit itself various techniques of csunoufiage aren one case, talks indicating the case officer was fH were held severaltimes during the dayelephone known to be tapped by tbe counterintelligence service. The sUte of his health was beingagain over the telephone at the very time when be was leaving his borne to meet an agent, so early that surveillance teams had not yet started to work. In another Instance the officer was hidden In an automobile and driven by two other members of the residencylace where one of the two was taking driving lessons. Theagents, who for some time had been used to watching this car leave for the driving lessons, now trailed ithile and then fell for the cover story and discontinued surveillance

party" was arranged in the apartmentase officer who was scheduled to meet with an illegal. Counterintelligence, believing the cover story and supposing that all residencysubject to surveillance were safely assembled in this one place, relaxed vigilance. Taking advantage of their relaxation, the "host" went outecret exit, held his meeting, and returned the same way. He resumed entertaining bis "guests" and then conduct ed them down to the street before the very eyes of the counterintelligence agents, leaving tbe impression be had been in the apartment with his comrade* all the time.

In order to weaken surveillancease officer who Is about to leave for an agent mooring, otlwr members of the residency are

imi" lent Into town in order to disperse the strength of theteams and distract their attention. The invention of successful

camouflage devices depends on the use of initiative and resourceful-

ocss in the light of tbe specific concrete situation.

Surveillance en Route

Automobiles and resiliency members on foot can be used for signal- ng danger to the case officer goingeeting Tbeytaro statiortedfjfcil at {rearranged points, the men perhaps making calls from specified telephone booths. Everything is calculated as to time and place. The case officer may be required to gotipulated pointiven time or beiven place In order to observe what kindignal Is set op there. If oar automobile, for example, were parkedpecified point, this would signify that the ease officer was under surveillance and should not keep the rendezvous- In working out such safeguards they should be so calculated as to warn the case officer In time for him to call off tbe operation before making contact with the agent-Secret technical devices are used to detect surveillance oo case officers going to an agent nsswting.* Carefully selected residency employees can also be sent out to text operational conditions along tbe handling officer's route, at particular points to be passed, and In the area of the meeting place This must be dona, however, without attracting superfluous persons into the meeting area and without drawing counterintelligence attention to it In some cases suchare coordinated on the spot with residents of felloworgans.' Sometimes employees supporting tbe meetingase officer with an agent are subjected to more Intense surveillance than the case officer himself and so pull the counterintelligence "tails" along after them to tbe meeting. In this fashion security support Is converted into its opposite, and the operation has to be called off.

The case officer departingequired to chockwhether bender surveillance. If be fa, he mustthe survcillants by bis actions that his trip Into town has no Intelligence connotations; that is, he must act In conformity with the approved cover story or its alternate. He must also try to shake off the rurveillantj. ot proper, however, to let it be evident that

' Presumsbly the rnomtorini- ofacUos. the KCB.

be is trying to shake them off. especially if the mating isaluable agent Obvious efforts usually do not work Oo thethey charge the atmosphere around the case officer and bring on counterintelligence reinforcements.

Tbe officer can go on to tbe rneeting only after careful checkingfully certain that there is do surveillance. Whendiscovered and when It is Impossible to get away from ftahould-sahrj, abort the

The Meeting

Upon meeting the agent, the case officer first tells him the cover story for then* being together and then establishes arrangements for future contact After that the business specified In the meeting plan can be taken up. If the plan caQs for the return ol intelligenceto the agent, these are given to him Immediately. But if it calls for the case officer to get materials from the agent, it is best for bun to take them at the last moment, just before the meeting ends. Then, when couotermtelligence activity is severe, be must get rid of them as quickly as possible. For this purpose supportor other members of tbe residency are sometimes stationed at predetermined points In order to take them from him.

Various techniques are used to effect tbe transfer of intelligence materials. They can be thrown into the open windowarked autcmobue. They can be passed outside of town between two cars fas motion, one overtaking the other and running side by Ode with itrief span Heavy suitcases containing radio gear, for example, can be banded over In this way. Or the exchange can beunder the pretext that one car is helping the other make repairs. Under present conditions, however. reskJencics under legal cover should receive and pass materials whenever possible via non-personal forms of communication with the aid of technicalequipment "

After the meeting has ended the case officer may, if specialhas been obtained from the resident, check on the actions of the agent by discreet, unnoticeable lurveillance. This practice obtains when something in bis behavior and performance gives rise to suspicion.

aaauttetnamlIu&dxr.

Upon return to the residency the case officeretailed oral report to the resident, and If asked heeport tor transmittal to Headquarters including his own comments and conclusions. The resident adds his comments before sending it

Under Better Conditions

Meetings with in agenthird country roe planned andin compliance with all the recmirernenci of cover and clan-destmity applicable "to agent meetings evecywnerV This applies especialryeadquarters officer has traveled there with Soviet documentation to hold the meeting.hird country, however, the operational climate Is more favorable in that theand police agents do not know the identity of either the case officer or the agent Moreover, neither the case officer nor the agent has acquamtances among the local populace, with whom an encountereeting would be most undesirable. The agent feels more confident andircumstance whichoreand thorough exartursatfon aod resolution of tbe business at hand.

A third country is usually chosen that has less stringentpractices. One where the operational situation permitseeting with less risk of cliscovery. The case officerri.eshird country Illegally, wtth foreign documents rJon, enjoys stiD more favorable conditions, not only for meetings but also for noo-dandestine association with the agent The two can even live in the same hotel.ase officer meeting an agenthird country must carefully adhere to all the rules of clandestine intelligence operations.

In illegal residencies and agent groups, meetings with agents should etinfoem to the same requirements, even though conditions areand security measures normally do not have to be carried to such lengths. Tbe establishment of personalllegal residencies and agent groups is under the control of Headquarters, and residents end group leaders report on meetings to Headquarters through their communications channels.

Meetings with an agent swirnooed from abroad to Headquarters enfoy the most favorable conditions of all, heldafehouse andalm atmosphere which provide the opjsortunity to thrash out problems thoroughly and resolve pending operational matters. Such meetings establish conditions for definitive checking and assessment of the agent, should this be necessary. They entail, however, acute

problems of security and cover, especially wl>ea the agent li quarteredotel with other foreigners. Hi* contacts with Soviet officials mult oot become known to outsiders, especially bis Own countrymen.e arrives with false documentation, he should be quarteredafebcuse only, and be should oot appear in those places where citizens of bis country might meet him His cast from the USSR alio requires serious attention. He cannot take an airplane or train on which acquaintances might happen to be traveling.

Condutioni

Despite Its obvious vulnerability, personal contact in agent opera-ooni if unavoidable It must be used most ntensfvefy for recruitmenttumber of advantages over cither modes of agent communication. It facilitates the exchange of materials, the assessment of potential agents, and agent mdocrrinatidn and training. Iteans of direct supervision, which is estraordlnarily important and necessary In intelligence operations, erpeeially in the protection of the network from penetration by provocateurs and counterintelligence agents-It Is used primarily within residencies. It Is also used byfor communication with agents, group leaders, and illegal residents, especially in peacetime. It can seldom be the means of delivering urgent intelligence reports, however, and thereforeeacetime arrangements for radio and other forms of oon-personal communication with Headquarters must be established.

Much Is demanded of case officers making personalexcellence in operational preparedness, personality, education, and general cultural development, knowledge of specialized matters on which the agents are working, ability to detect lurvrauance. ability to grasp quickly the content and significanceiscussion and make correct dear ions on matters broached by agents, and skill In avoiding compromise of self and agent when danger threatens.

Because of the complexity of modern operational conditions, the possibilities for personal contactarget country are rignfficarrtly reduced and in some Instances diminatcd completely. Personal

contactaluable agent should take placehird country or at Headopxarters.

Under present conditions the number of personal meetings between agents and case officers under legal cover should be reducedhis end can be achieved by the amalgamation of agents into

groups or illegal residencies, by cutting ofi group leaden and illegal residents irons oootaet with legal residencies, and by training illegal case officers at Headquarters to send out for meetings. The indispensable residue of meetings in residencies under legal cover are feasible if the essential measures of security and cover are taken.

Because plans for personal contacts depend on tbe particularpurposes, and local situation, much freedom is granted to residents in this respect Yet control and supervision byever completely absentrecisely the central intelligence apparatus which can and must, by study of experience with personal contacts in all strategic intelligence operations, substantially aidto set up arrangements that conform with mod on operational conditions. Headquarters officers, residency officers, and those who are In inteUigence training establishments must develop the highest creative initiative and resourcefulness in the quest for secure agent coenmunk*Ikons, tn fitting these to actual operational problems, and in the application of tbe latest attainments of Soviet and foreignand technology.

Original document.

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