A NEW LOOK AT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE AFRICAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA AND

Created: 11/17/1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

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SIJBJECT: ew Look at the Prospects for the African

Nationalist Movements in Angola and Mozambique*

SUMK.1RY

Portugal still faces no serious ismediate threat. In Angola, rebel allltary operations oreow ebb. guerrilla activities began in Mozambique inhr but they have not posed major military problems for Lisbon. In both cases, exile nationalist movercents are divided and weak, and neither has yet been able toignificant following throughout its territory. Both Insurgencies probably will be sustained, but neither is likely to get out of hand at least during the next few years.

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*uller discussion of underlying factors, see SNIE, "Short-Tern Prospects for the African Nationalist Movements in Angola andU. (sgW.ET)

I. ANGOLA

A. Tie Current Situation Military

1. African insurgency In Angola has decreased to aappears well within Portuguese ability to handle. efforts as tbe notionalists have undertaken haveto lose headway over the past eighteenbadly harassed guerrillas have been drivenewinaccessible regions of northern Angola. Althoughof ccxnbat "incidents" varies widely from monththey are generally declining in number andthe area vulnerable to dissident operations has shrunkmorehird of what it was three or four yearsMap). Action by the Africans consists largely ofof patrols or attacks on Isolated plantations orfor purposes of intiraidation or, increasingly, forPortuguese forces continue to take slight casualties,less thanilled per month, in their efforts torebel supply caches and hiding places and to cutof ccranunication to the Congo.

cf arms and ammunition hasand the Portuguese estimatenly aboutOO guerrillas are armed with modern weapons. camp in the Congo (Leopoldville) which wasthe Government of the Republic of Aogola in Exileno longer to be active; most of the arms endremained at the cam? were brought into Angola lastdesertions have increased. And the Portuguese haveto release several thousand men from the Volunteer Moreover, substantial numbers of refugees arecamps ic the Congo or from hiding in the Angolan bushthemselves to Portuguese authorities. Finally, aof economic recovery, particularly coffee production,

is apparent in areas where the rebels once briefly held sway. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that thehave failed to develop new footholds for guerrilla action in the still tranquil areas of central and southern Angola.

Political

rebel organizations back of the insurgencyappear to be in even greater disarrayear or Political skirmishing has continued within the nationalist

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organizations and among the exile nationalist "Leaders forfor international recognition. The dissatisfaction ofrank-and-file over setbacks in the field has focusedGEAE politicians. Eolden Boberto bas found it difficultcontrol of the GRAE againstn

rival nationalist group, led by two of Roberto's keywho had earlier defected frcra the GRAE, attempted forcibly to take over Roberto's headquarters in Leopoldvlile, only to be foiled by the Congolese police. Roberto's dictatorial attitude and his favoritism for his Bakongo tribe have cost him theof most of the ccaperotivcly email cumber of central and southern Angolan exilea in the nationalist movement.

1*. Roberto has also suffered telling political setbacks abroad. President Kaunda refused bis requestase in Zambia, and financial support from bis chief supporters, Nigeria ond Tunisia, has slowedrickle. More important, however, was the decision by the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Liberation Cecalttee toegree cf recognition and money for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angolahe GRAE'e only significant nationalist rival. Although most of these gestures were designed largely to display impatience

with Roberto personally and with his faulty administration of the GTLAZ, they cava inevitably effected tha preutlge and morale of tne nationalist movementhole.

5. Ihe only ailltary gain oa the nationalist side for some tine wa3 r stored by the smaller, Brazzaville-based MP LA which has established one or twoi1 bases in the Cab In da ax-clave. But even this modest advance failed to stimulateamong the tribes in the surrounding area. Like the GRAE, the MP LA remains badly factionalired. It still lacks anymilitary capabilities or forces in Angola proper, though it claims to have some 3CO adherents undergoing military training In the USSt.

B. Prospects

In the Congo, Tshcmbe's ouster undoubtedly boosted hopes for better days both in the GRAE and tbe MPLA. We think it unlikely, however, that the nationalists will get much help from the Congo. President Kasavubu has long held seriousabout Roberto personally, as well as about his Angolan military venture. Ease of Roberto'sendska, Mobutu, perhaps Adoula, almost certainly will extend moral

support, and probably provide saall amounts of Congolesematerial assistance, to bis cause. But ve tcinkwillairly short rein on arms trafficCongo, aod will also avoid Congolese commitments oraid to the nationalistKa'cda

has his hands full of problems arising "out of the "Southern Rhodesia question, and for some considerable time be Is un-likely to permit the Angolans toase In Zambia, particularly as he probably believes he must keep open the possibility of using the Eenguela railroad through Angola if rail traffic through Rhodesia is cut off.

7. Nor is the OAU, despite Its fiery resolutions, likely to provide greatly increased support for the beleaguered nationalists. The Accra meeting, for exsnylo, did so more than request Africans to facilitate movement of men andfor the "liberation" movements. There has also beenAfrican pressureserger of the rival exile organizations. There is no reason to believe that these efforts will be any mere successful than earlier CAUendeavors with competing Mozambique and Southern Rhcdeslan exile groups.

8. In these circumstances, it will be very difficult for Roberto to uvr.id becoming the chief target of critics from all sides. Ihc. removal of Tshcmbe, who was Roberto's prime

excuse for the GRAE's inability to work up steem, places the GRAE leader in en exposed position if he now falls to deliver. Although his hold on power will continue to be shaky, on the whole we consider it unlikely that Roberto will "soon beeither by the bulk of the Angolan rebels or by theAfrican leaders. Heertain prestige as the most prominent figure among the nationalists, and the MP LA is unlikely toufficiently attractive or effectiveto the GRAE. However, given his ineffective and unimaginative leadership, Roberto is unlikely toreater following among the non-Bakongo tribes In Angola unless thererastic improvement in rebel military operations.

9. There is no evidence that the Ccfcmunist powers are prepared, to intervene in any decisive fashion. Their efforts to exploit the situation are greatly complicated, by African rivalries and formidable problems of distance and logistics. Thus the nationalist cause probably will continue to stumble along, receiving Just enough arms and funds to sustain sporadic

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guerrilla activity but counting no real threat to Lisbon's

dcdnationonsiderable time to come.

U. MOZAMBIQUE

The Current Situation

Military

10. Nationalist forays from Tanzania and Malawi inu marked the outbreak of guerrilla violence in Mozambique. The main center of disaffection lies in theplain, stronghold of the warlike Mskonde tribe vhich straddles the Tanzanlan border. The other area of significant dlssidence is in the far northwest, reachingLo miles Inland along Lake Syase, convenient to guerrilla thrusts free Tanzania both overland end by water (see Map). ew upsurge of guerrilla harassment lsst summer caused some concern among the Portuguese in Mozambique. However, Portuguese military operations were stepped up, and Lisbon's greatly superior forces seem now to have brought this rebel flurry under control. Indeed, it is important to note that the scope and intensity ofare still veryisbon claims to have suffered

onlyilled in action between June and September. Ibe nationalists can, however, roam about large stretches of sparcely settled countryside cutting roads, attacking native vis and gm^'i administrative or military posts, and con-cuctirg small-scale sabotage. But, even though.smalldetachments are subject to ambush, military convoys move freely through the Infiltrated zones, and the roads ore kept reasonably free of mines and attacks.

11. To be sure, the nationalists have improvedcapabilities and enhanced their prestigethe past year or so; Tanzania'* decision

provide operational bese3 and military trainingurning point in this respect. In particular, the guerrillas' newly developed ability to sustain modest operations within Mozambique has provided somethingsychological boost for them. But nationalist gains should not be overdrawn since they wereonsiderable extent facilitated by Portuguese deficiencies. The Portuguese seem gradually to bemany of these shortcomings, and to be improving their counter-guerrillaapitalizing on tribaland overall military performance. Lisbon is giving

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greater ettenttoc toob lens, troop strength has been Increased by(up, and construction of airfields and other military installations in northern tozaabiqua la being pushed. In these circumstancea, despite some Increase in violence, the guerrilla forces have enjoyed little success in enlarging the area ofsabotage and terrorist activity in the more populous and economically Important area of southern Mozambique, or enlisting much support from tribes other than tbe Makoade.

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E-T

12* Moreover, the nationalist movement still suffers from grave organizational weaJcneBses and divisions. FREUMO, led by Eduardo Mondlane, is still the predominant nationalist organization, though it suffers from periodiceslgnatiocs, or expulsions. However, MondlaneS-educated Intellectual who haaenuous relationship vlth the Mekondes, and it will be extreraely difficult for him to build up dedicationolitical cause among these largely primitive tribesmen, many of whom work or live In Tanzania or Kenya. In general, the rebels still seem capable only of frightening scattered and Isolated settlements in the north, keeping the Portuguese military busy with patrolling, and

inflicting minor casualties. Frellcc's claims that it will soon move its base Into Mozambique appear unrealistic. It ia perhaps core significant that Mondlane, never enthusiastic about starting hostilities, contends that the "war" may last for twenty years.

Political

ondlane has doubts regarding his own future In Frelioo. Like Roberto, he continues to be regardedymbol of political unity, but he is not well knowneader in the north where the fighting is centered, and opposition to him has grown among other Prelimo figures who consider themselves closer to Mozambique's tribal peoples. None of these Individualsmuch personal prestige or following, however.

Ik. Mondlane continues to seek aid from West and East toalance. In practice he has receivedsmall amounts both from Communist states and the OAU'g Liberation Committee. Meanwhile, Frelioo'a rivals among the exile nationalist organizations lack the capacity to threaten its leadership either In terms of external support or political

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following." Id these circumstances, Mor-dlane seeos Likely to hang on to his job for setae time, largely because be has established credentialsationalist in African and other circles abroad.

through inertia or feer_of.?ortuguesedo at Mozambicans still appear to have littlethe nationalist cause. The round-up off the African cocBunlty in Lourenco Marquesyear seems to have quashed potential opposition lncenters. Meanwhile, though the "war" is obviouslyLisbon (some fcOjCOO troops are presently stationedandt appears to have primedsluggish economy aod most present trends Indicate

a strengthening and steady growth therein. Tourism, trade, and foreign investment have all registered increases

B. Prospects

the guerrilla outbreak and the improvedand experience of the nationalists, we do not foresee

Frellmo's most Important rival at the moment is the Lusaka-based CGREMO (Mozambique Revolutionary Council) recently formederger of five small exile groups, which together have scant political or military assets.

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a security situation arising which the Portuguese cannot handle for at least the next three to four years. The Portuguese cannot entirely stem the Infiltration of men and supplies, ond some African states and the Ccrncunlato vill continue to back the nationalists vlth training, arms, and cash. But the insurrection Ic the north probably can beperhaps even reduced as in Angola, as the Portuguese bring more assets to bear. Of course, Lisbon's problems could be greatly complicated if the revolt in Angola should take on nev life, oradical regime should come to pcver in Malawi. Even than, however, the nationalists wouldong, uphill struggle before they could effectively challenge Portugal's military or political position in Mozambique.

III. THE LONGER TERM

17* Over the much longer tern, Portugal's prospects for holding on to Mozambique and Angola in the face of basic African trends remain unpromising. Meanwhile, however, Roberto, Mondlone, and most of the other nationalist leaders probably will resign themselves to tbe current state 'of affairs, striving to preserve their places whileecisive

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"break In tbealazar'a death, or harsher OS policies toward Portugal, which they believe would alter the situation swiftly and pooGibly propel them into power. During this period tbey will continue both to importune and tothe West, and the US willriucipal target cf nationalist fulalnatlono.

FCR THE BOARD CP XATICKAL ESTIMATES:

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KENT Chairman

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