TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
L SOVIET POLICY TOWARD STRATEGIC DEFENSE
II. AIR DEFENSES
Warning and Control 5
Interceptor! 6
Surrace-to-Air Miiiflei 8
III. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES10
Defense of Moscow 11
Other Possible Deployment12
Prospects for Missile Defenses18
IV.ANT1SATEIJJTE DEFENSES13
V. CIVIL DEFENSEM
ANNEX; TABLES 15
IOC sr.crct
THE PROBLEM
To estimate tlie capabilities and limitations of Soviet strategic air and missile defense forces throughnd general trends in these forces
CONCLUSIONS
by powerful Western strategic attack forces,is sustaining Its vigorous effort to strengthen its defenses. that the Soviets are responding to those challenges tothai they can now sec or foresee from aircraft, ballisticand earth satellites. (Paras. IS)
Air Defenses
Soviets haveormidable capability againstattacking at medium and high altitudes, but their airprobably is still susceptible to penetration by stand-offlow-altitude tactics. The Soviets probably foresee littlein the bomber threat over the next ten years. To meetthey are improving their warning and control systemschanging thc character of their interceptor force throughof new high-performance, all-weather aircraft. Inthere are recent indications that the Soviets are nowAAA in some areas for low-altitude defense. (Paras.
Soviets probably will continue to improve and tos thc principal SAM system. We believe that theyan improved or new SAM system for low altitudea system would probably be deployed more extensively than Deploymentong-range SAM system probably is now
OCCP.LT
underway in the northwestern ussr and probably will be extended to other peripheral areas and to some key urban locations in the interior 11 )
ballistic missile defenses
nearly ten years, tlic soviets have given high priorityand development of antimissile defenses. we estimatehave now begun to deploy such defenses atcould probably achieve some capability as earlyore likely date for an initial operational capabilitywc do not yet know the performance characteristics ofor how it will function. )
soviets will almost certainly continue with theirto develop ballistic missile defenses to counter thethreat that will be posed by us strategic missilecannot now estimate with confidence the scale or timing ofabm deployment. we believe, however, that the sovietsabm defenses for major urban-industrial areas. bycould deploy defenses for someoreas containing athe soviet population and more than half of
antisatellito defenses
soviets could already haveimitedbased on an operational missileuclear warheadelectronic capabilities. we have no evidence that they have
' Lawtenant CcBcr-lF. Carroll. USAFi-eojroor Agency,john j. Deris. BV Assistant Chief of Staf, laCcOigcaoa, US Assay, aad MajorE. Thorn, i.hid of Suit. iMellifjance, US Air Force, believe that thestemming from analysis of available evidence does not penultoooSdeDtu to the spedSo calsstoa ofsysteavs being deployed iaThey acknowledge lhat available evidence doesan Juris, but thethe mtfmt saay be Intended tor defense against the aeredyeauatc threat.balance, considering all Die evidence, they believe it is mora Iftdy that the lyitrwiiat these sites ore primarily for defense against balluaic missiles.
Admiral Ridui L, Taylor, AasMtant Chkf of Naval OparaElons (Intauifeaei).of the Navy, aad lieutenant Ccaseral Marshal S. Carter. USA, Director. National Se-cunty Agency, do not concur tn the degree of confidence reflected In thb judgment Although they concur that the deployment activitymoreong range SAM system Ihsn an ADM system, they betiere that dte evidence at this time Is sudil fudgment Is
done so. In any event, we believe thai the Soviets would prefer toystem which could track foreign satellites more accurately and permit the use of non-nuclear kill mechanisms. We estimate that the Soviets will have an operational capability withystem within the next few years- We believe, however, that the Soviets wouldS satellite in peacetime only if, alongtrong desire for secrecy, they were willing for other reasons to greatly disrupt East-West relations.1 )
' Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of Stale, be-Ikvci (hat Iho Soviet* would conclude that tlie advene consequence* of dettrvying orUS utetlites in peacetime would outweigh the advantages of such an action. He therefore believes It highly unlikely that they would attack US latefhtc* In peacetime.
ECCRcT-
DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET POUCY TOWARD STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES
I. Confronted by large and powerful Western strategic attack forces, tbe Soviets haveustained and vigorous effort to improve tlicir defenses. In tlie past several years, snrfacc-to.air missiles and Dsn* generations ofaircraft have been widely deployed Warning and control systemsen expanded and sophisticated. At the same time, the Soviets have pursued lln more advanced air defense systems. And lorecade they havearge-scale, high-priority program to develop antimissile defenses.
oviet expenditures (or strategic defense have grown steadilyn recent years, these expenditures have roughly equaled those for strategic attack, when the major buildup of strategic missile forces was in process. The USSRuch larger share of its military expenditures tu strategic defense duringeriod than did thc US. Manpower allocated to the strategic defense mission has also0 toen at present. This increase occurrederiod of large scale reductions in military manpower.
espite impressive improvements, however. Soviet strategic defensehave not overtaken increasingly sophisticated US attack capabilities. Thus, while the USSR hasormidable capability against aircraft attacking at medium and high altitudes, its air defense systemtill susceptible to penetration by stand-off weapons and to low-altitude tactics. Finally, tlie Soviets must realize that their surface-to-air (SAM) and mterceptor forces and the supporting warning and control elements of their air defensewould be highly vulnerable to attack by missile strikes which they would expect to be coordinated with an air attack against the USSR.
hile thc bulk of Soviet expenditures for strategic defense In tlie past few years has gone to air defense, the character of the US threat has changed. In assessing the future threat, the Soviets undoubtedly consider tbe most pressing problem to be the threat posed by massive and growing US ballistic missile forces, because this threat cannot now be met adequately by either pre-emptive attack or active defense. In addition, the threat posed by bombers has probably not diminished in Soviet eyes. Considering the forthcoming Introdixtion of advanced aircraft by the US, the Soviets probably foresee little reduction In the bomber threat into. Thc Soviets are no doubt also concerned with US activities in space which have military applications.
he Soviets must feel pressed to respond to these USasically deterrent strategy, they are now strengthening their forces for strategic attack, but they are not, we believe, attempting to achieve a
fiircc capability.* In building their forces for strategic defense, theye responding to thc challenges lo their security that they can now see amiballistic missiles, and earth satellites. The lieavy Soviet ea-|h'in!'tiirn (or air defense in the past servetrong indicator that the Soviets will accept the continuing high costs for strategic defense in the coming ycais.
million is thc responsibilityi' PVO Slranyhoseepuly Minister with the heads of thc ground, naval, air. and Strategic V'O Strany includes three major components, each of the key functions of the air defense mission. Lc, early iccplor, and SAM operations The commander of the also assigned tlie mission ol ballistic missile defense, irectly assigned to the PVO Strany, other Soviet forces the air defense mission arc also operationally available
II AIR DEFENSES ft 'Ihe Soviet air
(Anti Air Defense of of Defense, is ranked missile forces. Tlic which performs one warning andVO Strany probably In addition to forces which can contribute to this command.
he air defenses of the East European countries of the Warsaw Pact, although separate national systems, are coordinated with each other and with the Soviet air defense organization For most practical purposes, they constitute an ertenskm of the Soviet system. The East European air defense forces are equipped almost exclusively with Soviet materiel, and the USSR will continue Its policy of improving their capabilities. Although thc Chinese Communist air defense system still maintains some contact with thc Soviet organization, co operation betweeninimal.
Warning ond Control
B There arc now moreadars deployed at wellites In the USSR. These sites have at least two radars and many are equipped with five to seven sets. This deployment provides overlapping radar coverage of most of the nation; coverage is particularly dense west of the Urals and in peripheral areas. The density of coverage heightens the probability ofand frequency diversification provides some defense against electronic countermeasuresut. al the same time, the redundancy of radar coverage Increases thc load on communications and filter centers.
arly Warning. The altitude coverage of the Soviet early warning (EW) system exceeds the combat ceiling of any US aircraft. Under optimumthe Soviet EW system could detect and track aircraft flying at medium or high altitudes at. away from Soviet territory, and under normal
'Major General Jack E. Thomas. Aaststaat Chief af Staff. Inldllgeacc. USAF.reword the sentence at follows: "We batieva they wtl coaBam to adhere to rhe concept of deterrent force ao long as they remainetition of Aatcgic saferiorirr. but rheovietffort raiact the nocsabillty that Soviet leaden already are focusing on achievementoaiegic superiority whkti would enable more aggressive porrult ofolitical linu. peiliipi within the lime frame ol rJilt eitunite.-
top 5ccrct
conditions detection and tracking of enemy aircraft flying at nidi altitudci bt virtually assured at. However, an attacksupersonic aircraft and cruise missiles, because of their very high speeds, would reduce the warning lime provided by this system. The defection range ol thc EW system iireduced "gainst aircraft penetrating at lower altitudes. Moreover, even when detection of low altitude penctratorshc system is unlikely tu bv able to accomplishtimious (railing uf on intruding enemy aircraftat, ami it lias virtually no capabd.ly beloweci.
G'oumt-Conltollctt /iiicrteiif. About one-third ol the Soviet raihir iftcj ore capable cf ccsduci-ig(CCl) ufuatiuus. Ttrc effectiveness of tbe CCI system varies with altitude, range, and speed of the target. Against medium and high altitude targets, wc estimate that CCI range capabilities vary from about. depending on the radar employed at the site. We believe that most GCI radars employ moving target indicators or anticlulter techniques in order to improve low-altitude coverage However, low altitude CCI capability probably drops off sharplyeet and wo,Oil be almost non-existenteet.
Communications. The Soviet air defense warning and weapons control structureommunications network whichigh degree ofand flexibility. The most important development in air defense communications in recent years has been the spreademiautomatie-data transmission system. The ground-to-ground link of this system has probably been deployed extensively in the USSR and in parts of Eastern Europe. Origi-ivally believed to be associated only with early warning and interceptor control, the system probably is now being used to support SAM operations in someWe believe that the ground-to-air link has been deployed extensively in the USSR and is being used by Soviet forces In East Cermany, Poland, and Hungary. It is also probably being employed by one or two of the Eastair forces
Outlook. During the next tan years, the number of radar sites probably will remain steady or decline slightly. We estimate that the number of radar sets, however, depending on their age and serviceability, will be reduced from the present level perhaps by as much as one-half. The Soviets will probably deploy new radars designed to enhance low altitude and antijamming capabilities. We estimate that deployment of the ground-to-ground link of the semiautomatic data transmission system will be extended, and SAM units will be fully incorporated in the system; the ground-to-air link will be standardon all new interceptors. We believe that the Soviets are developing more fully automated systems for interceptor control which could become operational in the next year or two.
Interceptors
now areperations! interceptors in the PVOof them deployed to western USSR. Roughly half of the interceptor
SECRET
force ii made up of all weathernly about one fourth of the loier-ccptors are capable of Machhe remainder are older models, which entered service9 The Soviets could also count on employing in the air defense mission many of the fighters assigned lo Tactical Aviation. Time arcighlers in Tactical Aviation, the bulk of which are deployed in western USSR and In those Warsaw Pact countries where Soviet forces arc stationed.*
fVVuilie Soviets are now in Ihe caiiy stages of what nppeai> toarge-scale program to modernize thc interceptor force. We believe that they now have two new interceptors in production; ihe Firebar, which entered service4 and the Fiddler, which probably will enter serviceGhe Firebar probably is bong used for low-altitude intercepts, and tlic Fiddler is best suited fee long-rangehird new model, probably an improved all-weather interceptor of short or medium range, may go into production In the near future; this aircraft will probablyaaimum speed approaching Machf these three interceptors will piob-ablyervice by thc.
In addition to the intercept.ors now in production or likely soon to be, we believe that the Soviets are conducting an extensive development program for very high performance aircraft. An advanced all-weatlier interceptor with cruise speeds in theegion could be operational in the.
Armament Virtually all of the older Soviet interceptors and some of the current models are equipped wiih guns and rockets. Less than half of thc currently operational Soviet interceptors are equipped with air-to-air missilesor the most part these aircraft are limited to effective attack ranges of less than five nm. and all are restricted to tail chase attack tactics. We believe that tbe Firebar. Fiddler, and other new interceptors will be armed with improved AAMs and radars which will allow these mlerceptors to employattack tactics at effective ranges of more than
Capabilities. The Soviet Interceptor force has good capabilities against subsonic, andesser extent against strperscwuc aircraft attacking at medium and high altitudes, in daylight or under clear air mass conditions. The force has, however, limited all-weather capabilities and poor low altitude capabilities. Despite increased training In low altitude intercepts and attempts to employ the Firebar In this role, the problems of lead pursuit and till chase attack at altitudeseet, sod particularlyeet, remain severe. The Soviets probably also plan to use their Interceptors against air-to-surface missiles, at least as an interim measure,
'For performance ctiaricteiiltics of Soviet Interceptor! ami tighten, ana Annex.hacurnon of fighter aircraft not In PVO Strany units, see. "Capabilities of Soviet Ceneral Purpose Forces" (Secret.ctober IMS).
IS. Force LeoeU. The old model Soviet interceptors (Fresco, Farmer, and Flashlight) are now being retiredairly rapid rate. We believe thatby newer aircraft islightly less than one-for-one basis, arid we
expect this trend lo continue for the nest few year* Thin, we lookradual reduction in thc size of thc force throught shown in the following tabulation:
E5TIMATE0 INTKHCEITOB TOHCt LEVELS
Old
Curreal ami Kcr
Total
Wc believe that the uie of die forte will declineire neat ten years;U the force probably will have been reduced to about two-thirds of the current level.he force may level off or it may be reduced lurthcr. perhaps to about one lull tit. present force level'
utlook. As the number of newer aircraft in the force grows, itswill increase significantly, particularly under all-weather conditions and against attacks by supersonic vehicles- The newer aircraft will be equipped with improved airborne intercept radars and missiles and Soviet'EW and CCI capabilities will also grow, but low altitude intercept capabilities probably will remain limited throughout the period.
Surface-ro-Air Missiles
. SO,ystem. Wc estimate that as ofhere wereites in the USSR. We believe thatf these sites are oc-(tipked by operational units, and that the remainder are not manned or equippedermanent basis. These sites probably are Intended to augment existing defenses or to defend lower-priority targets. The Soviets will probably activate them in threatening situations, but we cannot determine which of these sites will be occupied at any given time. Although we expect the Soviets to construct additional sites of this type, we do not believe that they plan to increaseperational units above the present force leveL
he Soviets have continued to improve theystem; both the missile and the guidance radar have either been modified or replaced severalhose improvements increase the range of the system fromo about, raise the maximum intercept altitude00 feet, and lower the minimum intercept altitudeo about LSOO feet.* They have im-
'Major General lack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Stall,SAF, believes the reduction la IA PVO fighter farcer will not be as great as Is estimated. He woold aabttitutc Ihe following for ihe final twobeliev, that the ssa> of the force wai decline further ever the aait tea years;0 the force probably will have bean reduced Idircraft.he force may level of, butong-range totarceptorntroduced in ngmficant numbon. thc toul lire of the lA PVO may continue lo deciinc somawhat.-
' for performance characteristics ofnna. Table ISA-Ss eaported by Ihe Soviets n> countries outside the Warsaw Pact are earlier modeli, and thus have performance tharscteri!ties which equate to the systems original
capsbilitles.
proved flic accuracy ami (ho detection capability of tbe system and iti performance in an ECM environment Modifications are still being made and Operational
unit! continue lo be reerjuipped witb advanced models of tbe missile and guidance radar.eployed in peripheral areas in the USSll. and probably most ol those in the interior, employ improved versions of ihe miuilcs and guidance radars
ytfctn. We believe that dcploymcul of tlie SA-3ha* also nuncntu.il halt, and thatew new sites wore conxtrutlcde estimate Ihat lotal deployment of thu system now *land* atilcs. Deployment, usually in coniunction withites, is largely restricted to the peripheral areas of ibe USSR and Ihe cities of Lcningiad and Moscow. The alow and small deployment ol thetrongly suggests that it does notuch bcltei low altitude capability than that of the modifiedr of existing antiaircraft artilleryn addition, there are recent indications that the Soviets may be employing light AAA in some areas for low-altitude defense. Such employment would serve as an interim measure until development ofoved or more advanced systems.
ystem. Theystem, deployed only at Moscow, remainsThere are no indications that the Soviets intend to phase out the system in the near future. Theeployed duringtarge sites in two rings around Moscow, was designedefense against mass bomber attacks. Thc Soviets have since modified it, probably improving Its range and high altitude capabilities. In addition to theoscow's air defenses include somendites, and the Soviets may provide additional SAM defenses for Moscow. In any event, we believe that theystem will not be phased out during the next few years and possibly not until.
Long-Range System. The Soviets areew defensive system in northwestern USSR. It isAM systemange several times that of thee cannot, however, discount thc posiibility that thisis intended for ballistic missile defense."
" Lieutenant Cenaril Joseph F. Carroll USAF. Director. Defense Intelligence Agency. Major Central John J. Devta. Assistant Chief of Staff. InteUigence. US Aray. and Mi(o> Centraltlrini. Aaiistinr. Chief af Staff, IntaUlgcnce. US Air Force, believe that oW Beany uncertainties itemmlog from aoalysu of available evidence door notonfidenta* to the ir*ecifie minion at Use new defensive ryrtomi being deployed In northwest USSR. They acknowledge that available evidence doe*onclusion that live rites In Um northwest naay be Intended for defense against the aerodynanUc threat. Ilowcver. on balance, cceoidarlng all the evidence, BWy believeaor* Ifaty that the rnXenu beingt these (Ilea are prirnBrdy for defense againr! ballUtK musBea.
"Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, Assistant Chief of Naval Operation!epartment of the Navy and Lieutenant Ceneral Marshall S. Carter. USA. Director. National Security Agency, do not concur In the degree at eonfcienca raAectad in thi; pjdgment. Although they concur that the deployment actrvtty ft mereang range SAM lyrtem (hat an ABM system, they believe that the evidence at thuuchonfident judgment If premature.
top GCCOCt-
c believe (hat thc systemhange from an earlier system which the Soviets began to deploy nt Leningradhe earlier system probably was intended toapabilitymall unsophisticated ballistic missile threat and against aerodynamic vehicles as well. This comer* apparently was Mmndoncd prior lo completion of the three Leningrad comples.es, andof thc new system wasllhuugti we think that the Crilfcn missile wai Nilrndcd for use with tlie original Leningrad system, wc taruvot deterinme whether this new system willriflontypc mrvsile or some utlter which wc have not as yet identified. We believe that deployment of thc nnw system is underwayew other locations In the Sovietallin on the Baltic csas!herepovetsrth of Moscow. Two of thc Leningrad complexes oould be operational byhe third Leningrad complex and the other deployments in northwestern USSR could lieoome operational0 and the following year.
utlook. Although the present Soviet SAM defenses provide good all-wcatlver, medium- aod high-altitude protection against aircraft and air-to-surface missiles, they are deficient In long-range and low-altitude capabilities. Over tho next few years tbe Soviets will attempt to overcome these deficiencies. They will probably expand the deployment of their new long-range SAM system toarrier defense against bombers and long-range airto surface missiles in the peripheral areas of thc USSR and at some key urbanuch deployment would probablyotalomplexes and eoule-bc completedhe Soviets may seek to meet their requirement for very low-altitude capabilities with improved AAA. We believe it more likely, however, lhat they will develop an improvedew SAM system, although we have no evidence of such development. Deploymentew system could begin as earlys and would probably be more extensive than that for theystem.
III. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES
or the past decade, the Soviets have been assiduously working to develop defenses against ballistic missiles. ctivities associated with tlve Soviet program continue to be conducted at the large Sary Shagan missile teat center io central Asia. umber of missiles, radars and other systemhave been developed and tested over the years for both tactical and strategic systems. We believe that the Soviets have conducted an atrnosphcric intercept test program, and they have probably investigated exoatmosp^serictechniques as well. It seems likely tbat they have studied both point and area defenses and examined the feasibility of recession and barrage type intercepts. In the field of electronics, (hey have explored the advantages of using relatively low frequencies as well as those higher lo the spectrum; they have worked with large dish-type and phased-array radars. Thus, the scope and diversity of the program have been impressive, but the Soviets liaveexperienced many failures aod frustrations.
ion Grcrcm
TOP SECriLT
Despite the Um not have conducted atmospheric altitudes tempted full system we estimate that the syvtem tests (perhaps ur simulating ICBM such tcsti without our
ions of our collection, wc believe that the Soviets coufcT reew antimissile missile (AMM) firings to exo-ithout our knowledge. They probably have not at-involving intercepts at these altitudes.rc likely to carry out full anti ballistic missile (ABM) tiding use of nuclear warheads) against targets having eristics. Although the Soviets could conduct some knowledge, we believe that tlie chances arc good ili.it wc would acquire sufficient evidence to identify such testing in advance of the achievement of an Operational capability.
Ihe Soviets almost certainly have not as yet tested AMM* with nuclearlthough -the nuclear tests conducted at Sary Shagan in12 were not of this nature, the Soviets may have derived some data on thc destructive effects of exoatmospheric nuclear bursts from Ihcm. We know of no tests that they have conducted specifically for this purpose, but they could have acquired some information On tliese effects without our knowledge from underground tests.
Ocfense of Moscow
We estimate that the Soviets are now deploying an ABM system for thc defense of Moscow. We do not yet know tlx characteristics of thla system, or how it will function. We believe, however, that wc have identiiied some of its key elements. There are several huge radars in the northwestern USSR and facilities in the Moscow area which probably serve the functions of earlytarget acquisition and tracking, and missile guidance. In addition, it is possible that the Galosh missile, which the Soviets displayedswith the system.
The Soviets are constructing very large radars in the northwest, which probably are Intended to function as partallistic missile defense. These dual Hen House radars are being installed at Olenegorsk on the Kola Peninsula and at Skrunda on the Baltic coast, and could be operationalliese radars, developed at Sary Shagan. probably are phased-arrays transmittingelatively low frequency.n thc VHF band. They arc oriented inashion as to be able to detect ICBMs launched from the US toward most targets In western USSR; they will probably also be capable of detecting ballistic missiles launched by submarines In the Norwegian Sea and thc North Atlantic at targets in the Soviet northwest. We believe that these radars willallistic missile early warning function, and may provide some tracking and prediction data for use by AMM launch units. They will probablyecondary task of satellite detection and tracidng.
The Soviets areuge radar (Dog House)ifferent con6guration aboutiles southwest of Mocow. Although we know of no prototype for this radar, wc think it evolved from developmental work at Sary Shagan and that It toohased-array. It is situated so that the nortlicrn
top liccncr
face could scan (he ICBM threat corridor tooulhem face may be .iddcd which could scan the Polans threat from southern launch points. Wc think that this radar is intended to serveong-range acquisition and early tiirgct tracking facility fur any ballistic missile defenses in the Moscow area, and rould he operationals wilh the Hen Houses, the Moscow radar mayecondary function as partatellite detection and tracking system.
In addition to the Dog House, Ihe Soviets are continuing to workeries of "triads" located at some of the outer ringites inriad consuls of one large budding and two smaller ones, each probablyhili-type radar atop. We believe that the triads will provide final targetand missile guidance for the Moscow ABM system.
If Caloshimilar missile is to be used, the system is likely to be intended to perform exoatmosprseric intercepts at tanges up toiles. On thc other hand, thc Moscow system may be designed lo use another type of missile and to achieve atmospheric intercepts of incoming warheads. It is even possible that both types of missiles and intercepts are fanned for the; system. Regardless of the system's characteristics, we estimate that ballistic rnissile defenses at Moscow could achieve some capability as earlyut weore likely date for an initial operational apaWity
Other Possiblo Deployment
e have previously discussed defensive deployments at Leningrad which may have originally been intendedrsal-purpose system to defend against both aerodynamic vehicloi and ballistic missiles (see paras.. We presently estimate that the system now under deployment at the Leningrad complexes and the other similar complexes in the northwestern USSR is intended for air defense, but we cannot exclude thc possibility that Usallistic missileonsidering thc locations of these complexes, such an ABM system would be designed for area defensearrage-type, exoatmotphcrie intercept.
Prospects for Missile Defenses
The USSR will almost certainly continue (Isffort on antimissile defense. This effort will be directed generally toward countering thc increasingly aocshisticated threat that will be posed by US strategic missile forces. Whatever the present characteristics of the Moscow system, we believe that future defenses will provide for both long-range exoatmospheric Intercept and short-range Intercept within the atinosxibere-
We believe that over the next ten years the USSR will extend Rsdefenses beyond the Moscow area. The evidence is insufficient for us to estimate with confidence the scale or timing of such deployment or towhether point or area defenses will be emphasized. We believe, however, that the Soviets will deploy ABM defenses for major urban-industrial areas
" For dnseotlog views to this Judginent, see footnotesndo
ia
hey could deploy defenses for lomcoreasuarter of tlic Soviet [Herniation and more than half ol Soviet industry.
IV. ANTISAIElLire DEFENSES
he Sovi 'continue to acciuc the US of employing ita space vchiclei mainly for reconnaissance and espionagend their traditional concern lor military iccrecy gives the Sovicii an incentive to develop defenses against US satellites In addition, the Soviets are probably conenned that the US will eventually develop space weapon systems. They could already haveimited antisalellile capability based on an operationnl missileuclear warhead and on eaitling electronic facilities. We have nothat they have done so. In any event, we believe that the Soviets would prefer toystem which could track foreign satellites more accurately and permit the me ol non-nuclear kill mechanismi.11
Tbe Soviets areeries of large Hen Home radars, most ot which will probably be completed in the next year or two Tlic location* and orientations of these radars indicate that they are Intendedpacesystem. The Hen House radars at Olenegorsk and Skrunda and the Dog House radar associated with ABM deployment at Moscow probablyecondary role of space surveillance, and they are likely to be linked together with the other Hen Houses toatellite detection and tracking system.ystem would enable the Soviets to observe and track satellites during most of the passes over the USSR, It probably would allow the Soviets to predict tbe orbits and positions of non-Soviet satellites and space vehiclesigh degree of accuracyew crossings over the USSR, and thu* could provide the information required by an antisatellite system.
An antisatellite system employing these radars could use an existing missileudear warhead. Non-nuclear kill, on the other hand, wouldoming missile capable of eioatmospheric maneuver which could be developed in about two yearsecision to do so. Although we have no evidence of such devdopmcnt. it could be well under way without our knowledge. We believe, therefore, that at about the time the Hen Houses become operational the Soviets could have an antisatellite capability with either nuclear or non-nuclear kill Wo consider the latter more likdy because the capabilities of the Hen House radars appear to exceed that requireduclear kill.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we estimate that the Soviets will bave an oraerational antisatellite capabilityophisticated system
"Mr. Thomas I- Hughes, the Director ol Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believe* that the rationale presented In this paragraphovietprogram places undue emphasis on the Soviet concern over US peacetime satellite operaboni. He believes that the Soviets have been concerned more generally with die future of ipaotilitary environment. Moscow would wtah loontingency capability for wartime use against the bread ipeetrum of possible military space missions. These would Include systems for snilitary support, such as reeonnilwsnce. (MxnuWilflra. and navigation salefhtes. as wall as the peastbsUty of apacebcrne
line
tri attack. anned tjuciices. including thc risk of US satellite. Wc therefore believe in peacetime only if, along with
within the noil few years. Tho decisionse this capability inwould, however, confront the Soviet leaders with very serious problems Al-tltough they have displayed growing concern over US satellite operations, tin; Soviets would recognize lhal damaging orS satellite could stimulate Western military programs and capote their own satellites
were
US satellite would carry even graver const -retaliatory action against any manned Soviet hat thc USSR wouldS satellite
strong desire for secrecy, the Soviets
willing for other reasons to greatly disrupt East-West. CIVIt DEFENSE
ilitary control of Soviet civil defense has increased steadilyhen the program was shifted lo the Ministry of Defense. The ranks of the military officers assigned to civil defense staffs have also been upgraded, and the cuient head of the programarshaleputy Minister of Defense. During the same period, the Soviets have continued to implement compulsory training courses for the general public; we estimate that as many as ono hundred million Soviets have been exposed to instruction, and that many have been highly trained in basic civil defense procedures. In thea training, the Soviets have been emphasizing ways to conduct strategic urban evacuation andfAr homemade fallout shelters. They have abo created mobile units, or rescue columns, to provide post-attack assistance both in urban and rural areas. The effectiveness of these procedures depends on strategic warning. apathy on the part of the public has tended to reduce ihe plannedof this training.
e calculate that there are aboutillion fallout shelter spaces available for the urban population, or roughly one space for every five dtydwellers. Most of these shelters were built riuring, when new public buildings and apartment houses were constructed with special basements for civil defense purposes. Since thehe Sovieti have severely curtailed their urban shelter construction program, and we have no evidence to indicate that Ihey areesumptionajor shelter construction program They have,probably made some provisiorss for including shelters in certain publicnow under construction. In view of the program's emphasis on urbanand rural self-reliance, we believe that tho Soviei leadership does not expect the present civil defense program to provide significant protection for moremall portion of tbe population. Although the Soviets might during the decado resume Uxge-aeaue shelter construction, we think that other demands of Soviet resources, particularly those for advanced weapon systems, will preventevelopment.
" Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Inrelllgenoe and Research. Department of State, bclievea that thewoold conclude that the adverse cemaeaucaec* of destroying or damaging US latdLtci tn peacetime would outweigh ihr advantagra of pjch an action. He therefore believes rt highly unlikely that they would attack US satellites la peacetime.
ANNEX
TABLEOVIET INTERCEPTORS AND FIGHTERS:
ESTIMATED CHAILACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE IN AN AIR DEFENSE ROLE
TABLEOVIET SAM SYSTEMS:
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
TABIC i
INTERCEPTORS an11 FIGHTERS: e
IN AN Al
MAXIMUM
I MATED CIlAlEACTEIIISTICS AND i'KIIKOHM ANCK DEFENSE HOLE
him
z'
nHAHEM
ni/Rocket*
'
cu
AM*
AM*
-
'
.i .
lit..
a
Tail
A Mi
Minimum apcoda and combat ceiling* bavo been calculated in<i. u) aad cannot be1.il on Umrofile.
SovietatcrccsMor* equipped wH* arsrc&nraefcupaUI.tr to awake faitoreepta, -IU.eroctivcracaa, In dynamic dlmb agaunt aubaonlc target* at altitude* on tin order0 fort ilnWI CCI direction
With external fuel.
' Search and track performance* denote rancs
'iki do not require radar guidance: UKTtforc. vbual attack caa Ui uaadc at tbv cttcctiie ranee
There areFilters and no Pi*hbed* In the PVO Strany; both aircraft, ho-etrr, aren laree iiunilar* >i. Tactical AviaUon units. Theaelongthe Improved Tactical Fighter, are included In the Ublc liecauK of their capabilities aa interceptor*.
Note: In addition an advanced all-weather Interceptor withitced* la Hievu*oi.3GU" attack capability could be operational In the.
ta.uu: 3
soviet samstimated cn/.nAcrsr.icT:
AND PERFORMANCE
Per Site Mai,mum Operational Raoer (on)Effective AlUtwdcloJmum Efleetive AlUtadeSimultaneous Tarsal Haodllne. Ca-
paollySite Itale ot I nultaoeoua Fire Par Site Warhead
0 20
E 1
C
About
(dual) About 12
l
HE
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: