INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
BUILDUP OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FORCES CONTINUES AFTER RESUMPTION OF AIR ATTACKS
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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CONTENTS
Page
I. Hanoi's Political
II. The Infiltration of Personnel
III. North Vietnamese Capability to Sustain or Step Up
IV. The Present Combat Rate of Vietnamese Communist
Forces.
V. The Logistic
in Military Region
Routes in
VI. The Movement of
Military Region
Traffic in
VII. Relation of the Logistic Buildup to VC/PAVN
Terms of the Current Scale of Combat
Terms of Future Scales of Combat or
Increased
VIII. Developments in
a Base and Sanctuary
top SE
an Infiltration
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence
6
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Buildup of Vietnamese Communist Forces Continues After Resumption of Air Attacks
SUMMARY
the resumption on air attacks against North Vi namese have shown no weakenl tion to maintain the flow of South Vietnam. Hanoi radio pledged its all-out support South Vietnam. Private stat namese leadersl support the war in South Vie if necessary.
anuary of the US etnam, the North Viet-ng of their determina-men and supplies into ln recent broadcasts has to the revolution in emonts of the North Vict-llingness and ability to tnam foroears,
infiltration ol PAVN forces continues.
as manyoo men will lniiitraie South Vietnam between aid-February and the end of March. If this level of infiltration is confirmed, it will bring the total number of confirmed PAVN personnel in South Vietnam to0 It is also possible that other infiltrators are moving South; about half of the PAVN presently ln South Vietnam completed their infiltration without
: of lcci i' iThe DRV has an apparent capability of IraumiKandat0 men annually, or the equivalent ofegiments, without impairing the strength of its armed forces in North Vietnam.
miim-ism
IS)
hasecline ln tho aggressiveness of Communist military forces in South Vietnam since the end Although the total number of armed attacks increased byercent from December through January, the number of large-scale Communist attacks has been declining. Regimental strengthn November to 1 in December and none
in January. Battalion-strength attacks declinedn Novembern Decembern Recent Allied operations have disrupted Communist planning and thrown Communist forces off balance and made it increasingly difficult for then to mount mass surprise attacks.
There has bpen no abatement ot the logistic buildup since the resumption of the air attacks. Although daylight activity has been reduced, repair and construction programs continueigh rate. At0 workers are involved in theof lines of communication in Military Region IT. The productivity of these workers has been increased by the introduction of large amounts of equipment and construction materials. At least two new roads are under construction in MR IV, and an intensified effort to Improve Inland waterways and canals is also under way. Intensive reconstruction activity is also taking place in Laos. New road construction in Laos centers on the constructionhird by-pass around the Mu Gia Pass choke point, theew border crossing point south of Mu Gia Pass, and the improvement of roads and trails further south near the border of South Vietnam.
The Communists used the bombing pause tothe flow of supplies through Laos to South Vietnam. In spite of the renewed air attacks they have boen able to maintain this increased flow of supplies. Supplies moving into MR IV in January and February appear to be at the high levels notod in the last quarter There is apparently ahigh priority In the use of Inland waterand an increasing use of coastal water Truck traffic through Laos both during and since the bombing pause has been almost twice the level of the saneear ago. ons per day has been moved into Laos In January and February compared with an average ofons per day during5 dry season. Road watch reports in February indicate increasing use of the Mu Giarather thans the main route for this traffic.
ons of the supplios being moved daily into Laos probably are moved forward to South
Vietnam. This amount is tar in excess of present VC/PAVN requirements of someons per day. It is adequate to supportubstantial buildup of VC/PAVN forces and an intensification of combat, or to make significant additions to stockpiles in South Vietnam.
Recent photographycon- EI1IUI
firm the use of Cambodian terr^oryasa base andarea and as an infiltration route.
ay stations have been identified along an apparent infiltration route in Cambodia. Photography also seems to confirm prisoner reports of Communist warehouses and installations associated with PAVN infiltration and logistic operations.
Political Reaction
All political indications from North Vietnam since the renewal of the air attacks onanuary pointetermination to continue fullythe insurgents in South Vietnam with men and materiel. Or. IS February, for example, Hanoi radioongratulatory message to the Viet Cong armed forces on their fifth anniversary which pledged that the North Vietnamese will continue to "give wholehearted and all-out support to the revolution in South Vietnam in all fields, and will stand shoulder to shoulder" with the Viet Cong In fighting against the Allied forces.
Hanoi has never expressly admitted that it isaiding the Insurgents with arras and men. But implicit pledges of armed support, such as the one above, have become more frequent In the past year, during which timo regular North Vietnamese Army units have been deployed into the fighting in South Viotnara. In private, North Vietnamese leaders have continued to stress their willingness and ability to support and aid the war in Vietnamoears" if necessary.
Infiltration of Personnel
Additional groups of infiltrators have probably arrived in South Vietnam since the resumption of tho bombings of North Vietnam. Although this has not
NO FOREIGN D
been confirmed, there is indirect evidence that a
further influx is taking place or will occur
In late December and early January there was a
of in" dlcating possible infiltration operations.
interrogation of prisoners indicates that it has taken about six to ten weeks for most of the North Vietnamese Army elements who have infiltrated the South to complote their trek from the DRV, It is therefore probable that the infiltrating units
began arriving in South Vietnam inme two weeks after theof the bombings of North Vietnam. Based on past experience, however, it may be several months before there Is confirmation of the arrival of any new units since tho termination of the bombing pause. There was, forour-month delay in tbe confirmation of the entry of the first PAVN regiment in South Vietnam in
rs
If the entrydditional PAVNduring February and March6 is eventually confirmed, the total number of confirmed PAVNin South Vietnam will be 0 he presence of eight PAVN regiments and onebattalion0 men in South Vietnam has already been confirmed. US military authorities in Saigon (MACV) carry two otheren--asbut possibly present in the South.
Numerous reports from prisoners, defectors and captured documents indicate the presence of PAVN units in the South In addition to those noted above. The scarcity of information on these units, and the possibility of duplication with confirmed units, has prevented their acceptance in the possible category. The weight of the evidence and past experience,suggests that the presence of some of these units will eventually be confirmed.
The following are the confirmed, possible, andPAVN units in South Vietnam:
CONFIRMED
stdhth Regiment
33rd Regimenthth AA Battalion Quyet Tarn Regiment
Confirmed Strength
h Regiment ofth Division
Total Possible Strength
REPORTED
BATTALIONS
"B"th
h Div)
number of confirmed PAVN and all others,
Transp.
Inf
AA.
Inf.
dh0 Arty
or probable infiltrators through the end5
now slightly
III. North Vietnamese Capability to Sustain or Step Up Infiltration
DRV statements and reports of visitors to North Vietnam indicate that large-scale mobilization of manpower has been under way in the DRV this year. Most ofillion draft-age males in the DRV have now either been onrollcd in the regular arood forces, paramilitary organizations, or labor repair and maintenance battalions.
Hanoi will probably continue, at least to draw both on these mobilized personnel, and on regular North Vietnamese Army units for theto make up infiltration units. Subsequently, Hanoi will be able to draw on the remainder of the mobilized pool and on theales who reach draft age each year in North Vietnam. Of these, slightlyill be physically fit for military duty. Thus, the North Vietnamese should have no difficulty, from the standpoint of available manpower, in sustaining the atman rate of covert infiltration into South Vietnam which was maintained during the past year. This should still
leave adequate manpower for the strengthening of the DRV armed forces remaining in North Vietnam.
Hanoi should probably also have no difficulty, from theof training capability, in sustaining the infiltration rate There is considerable evidence that the North Vietnamese have been utilizing certain of their organic regular armyto provide the facilities and staff for training infiltrees There arenfantry regiments in the NorthArray, of whichre considered as reserve. ould be used to train infiltration cadre, although it is believed probable that only half of these regiments would bethis duty. our-month trainingAVN regiments, it is conceivable that the PAVN could train annually up toegimentsen each for infiltration. This would be on the order0 men. Unfortunately,information from prisoners and defectors in Southmakes it difficult to estimate the length of the present cycle with confidence. Some prisoners, for example, havethat they received only four to six weeks training.
IV. The Present Combat Rate of Vietnamese Communist Forces
HACV now carriesnemy battalions in the confirmed order of battle holdings for South Vietnam, including the PAVN units. It has been estimated that the Viet Cong in South Vietnam are capable of recruiting and training at least two new battalions,eplacements per month, This force would be in addition to the infiltrators which Hanoi is believed capable of training and dispatching to South Vietnam during the current year. In sum, it is believed that the Viet Cong/PAVN forces in South Vietnam could received from both sourcesate ofattalionper month
This rate of growth probably will beesult of Communist casualties. During each of the last two quarterst is estimated that the Communists sustained losses equivalent to someattalions0 men. If an Increased rate of combat by Communist forcesthis year, this loss rate could rise by as much as four or five battalion equivalents each quarter. Based on this figure and the estimated Viet Cong/PAVN input capability, the total
strength of Vietnamese Communist main force units in Southby the end6 could be in the neighborhoodat-
talions
5 each main force battalion is estimated to have engaged in combat an average of less than one day per month. Since the endtatistics from COMUSMACV suggest that the
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rate of large-scale Viet Cong initiated attacks has been declining even though there has been someercent from December to January) In the total number of armed attacks. Regimental-strengthdeclinedn Novembern December and none in January. Battalion-strengthn Novembern Decembern January. Moreover, since the November battle between US and PAVN troops in western Pleiku Province, there haseneral tendency for Communist units to avoid large-scale engagements with allied forces.
This apparont decline in Communist aggressiveness may well reflect previously noted patterns oferiod of rost and replacement followingcombat while positioning and preparatory measures areunder way for new large-scale operations. There have in fact been numerous indications ofransitional phase in recent weeks and months. detection of these developments and movements has permitted sevoral recent Alliedat least five major combined operationseries of South Vietnamese operations In theto move into suspected target areas with spoiling operations which have almost certainly disrupted Communist planning and thrown Communist forces off balance. MACV estimates that, these groundcombinod2 and tactical air strikes against Viet Cong baso areas, will make itdifficult for the Viet Cong/PAVN units to mass and retain the element of surprise.
There is no present evidence that theare abandoning their previous strategy of progressingore conventional army, or that they are breaking up divisional or regimental units Into smaller operational forces. Thus, for the immediate future at least, they will continue where favorable opportunities present themselves, to attempt to conduct large-scale though costly attacks. They will almost certainlyimultaneous pattern of widespread harassment and terror tactics.
If MACV's assumption is correct, the rate of expenditure of materiel by the Communist forces is likely to be determined more by the rate of force expansion than by an intensified rate of Communist-initiated combat in the next several months. another period of intensified activity, prior to or with the adventiet Cong summer campaign,
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DISSEM
TOPINE
cannot be ruled out on the results of Allied actions to date. eneral failure of recent Allied operations to trap and engage sizable Communist units, heavy engagement of Viet Cong forces by Allied troops may increase. This should mean that Communistwill be committed to combatate at least comparable to, if not above, present levels. It is also possible that, with increased instances of allied capture or destruction of food and ammunition stores, the Viet Cong may bo forced to draw down existing stockpiles.
Total Vietnitiated incidents of all kinds presently range fromeekly. ercent of these appear to be antiaircraft firing incidents, and at least anotherercent involve harassing fire with small arms or mortars. Armedhave beeneror the past twoost of them small-scale.
V. The Logistic Buildup
A. Activity in Military Region IV
At0 workers are currentlyin all types of construction on lines ofin MR IV. 0 areon new road construction in thea Tinh area. Dredging operations on inland waterwaysHoang Mai and Vinh continue with0 workers, an increaseince
The additional amounts of equipment and materials brought into MR IV during the pause in bombings have increased the productivity of these workers. It is believed new pumps for dredging are now being used on canal projects. Moreover,scrapers and mobile cranes were moved to the road construction sites before the Vietnamese New Year. Timber from logging camps in MR IV and cement from Hanoi delivered during January have augmented the stock of bridge repair materials.
In addition to the continued restoration of stream and river crossings on existing roads since resumption of the bombings, at least two new roads are currently under construction. One road under construction from Routeowards IA in the vicinity
-9-
of Ha Tinh will provide an alternate route to the southern part ofrom IA. Another road under construction west of Vinh proceeding north fromilly-pass of Vinh and parts of Routeorth of Route 8. The planned completion date for these roads wasut theconstruction resources obtained during the pause in bombing may speed up their completion.
All the river crossings on the Hanoi-Vinh rail line wero restored to some form of limited capacity service during the pause in bombing and attempts are now being made to increase the load carrying capacity of these crossings. The temporary rail bridge at Qui Vinh was originally restoredapacity ofross tons per rail car. Work crews are now strengthening this temporary structure to allow loads up toross tons per car. Other rail bridges along this line that have been restored temporarily are probably being reinforced for greater capacity.
Although dredging work on canals and inland waterways in MR IV is done annually, the present level of effort indicates an intention to make greater'use of this system of transportation.efforts continue on canals and inland waterways between Thanh Hoa and Vinh. These rivers and canals often parallel existing roads, and thus willa natural alternate route if the roads are interdicted.
B. Supply Routes in Laos
The increased bombing of supply routes in Laos during the pause in bombing of North Vietnam forced the Communists toreater amount to restoration work on roads and stream crossings. New road construction continues, however, with the emphasis upon by-passes around the Mu Gia Pass choke point and improvements to trails farther south near the border of South Vietnam. econd section of the original by-pass of Mu Gia was completed into the east of Routend clearing operations are now under way for another by-pass west of the choke point on Restoration of stream crossing on Routeorth of its junctionontinues. Additional by-passes have been completed around the Tchepone River Bridge on Route 9. Although there is
w'OP
NO FOREIGN DTSSWpU^
evidence of rapid repairridge ont Nape Pass, it is believed that the routes through the Mu Gia Pass area are considered by the North Vietnamese as their major supply route to South Vietnam.
A new road was observed under construction in late Januaryortheasterly direction from. Although Its final destination cannot be determined at present, it could eventuallyanother border crossing from North Vietnam south of Mu Gia Pass. Further south there is road construction under way between Chavane onnd Routeast of Attopeu. This construction involves the improvement of an existing trail net; and recent track activity indicates the work may be complete, thus providing aboutiles of motorable road farther south on the supply route.
VI. The Movement of Supplies
the pause In US airon North Vietnamese cargo ship, which normally travels between North Vietnam and China, visited the port of Ben Thuy. Onanuary twohort tons of rice, coal, and oil in eleven hours at Bon Thuy. Additional cargo handling equipment was roquested for Ben Thuy port. There were additional Indications during January that large barges and lighters were being towed to Ben Thuy from the Haiphong area by seagoing tugsegular basis. Although it is difficult to quantify the amount of traffic that moved into Ben Thuy from Haiphong and possibly China during January,
it would appear that the over-all level of monthly coastal water traffic moving into MR IV increased substantially in January over5 level. In February pilots have reported sightings of numerous cargo barges and motorized cargo junks both north and south of the Vinh area, indicating that the high level of traffic probably is continuing.
curious, and perhaps significant,is the possible transloading of supplies from Chinese Communist ships to small North Vietnamese watercraft headed for MR IV. During recent months Chinese merchant shipping patterns to the DRV have deviated from the normal pattern. At least two Chinese ships are known to have offloaded cargo at Cam Pha and Hon Gal, both coal ports that normally do not handle general cargo, and then proceeded to Haiphong to pick up cargo. The possibility that irregular Chinese shipping patterns and Northefforts to supply MR IV are related is strong, but at this point it is not possible to state with certainty thatupply system is actually in operation.
rail traffic on theecofvT^inue^^iJaiuiaryevel at least equal to and probably much greater than that observed in5 when0 tons were moved south by rail. Through rail traffic was restored on the Hanoi-Vinh line during early
ox cars were reaebruary.
January and daily through trains were operatingThanh Hoa and Vinh. observed in the Hoang Mai
of traffic in it did in December.
an additional is line in the
:ram cars may near future.
The tramway operating between Due Tho and Tan Ap apparently movedons January, about the same amount as
Thero is no indication as to how much tonnage was carried by inland waterways or trucks in January or thus far in February. However, 1 2SYrs
t the North namese were continuing toigh priority during January on development of inland water transport to keep supplies moving into MR IV.
LAOS
)
N'O FOREIGN
Photography taken during the pause ln US air strikesigh level of truck traffic on Routesnd IA leading toward Laos. Althoughebruary revealedilitary vehicles within the Mu Gia Pass area,elatively few trucks have been sighted by pilots in February. While it is not possible to quantify traffic by inland water and truck transport ln MR IVanuary, it would appear that the level of activity is at least as high as ln December,
B. Truck Traffic in Laos
During the bombing pause in North Vietnam fromecember throughanuary, bombing on the routes in Laos was increased considerably. the level of Communist truck traffic moving south on Routesotal ofrucks perthe average ofrucks per day moving south ln this area during the same period one yoar earlier, Since the resumption of bombing in North Vietnam onanuary, coverage ofas been so incomplete that it is impossible to estimate with any degree of confidence the levol of truck traffic moving south on this route. ew days of coverage during February of the new Mu Gia by-past road, however, indicates that southbound traffic entering Laos is probably continuing at about tho same level as during January (See Chart for day-to-day traffic on tho Panhandleased on the information that about half the trucks observed on the by-pass were identified asapacityons, it is estimated that the trucks carried anons compared with an estimated averageons per truck one year ago. Thus, truck traffic ln January and thus far lnmay have carried betweenndons per day compared with an average of aboutons per day during5 dry season.
Onebruary the first countoad-watch team of truck traffic on the new Mu Giabecame available although villagers hadreported that trucks were movingy-pami in the area. From the by-pass trucks can move west onr possibly onhich may be truckable, or south on Routes. (See the attached map). In January an average
rucks per day was observed moving west onn averagerucks moving south onnd an average ofoving south on. Thus far in February about the same level of traffic has boon observed on Routeut dally coverage of Routeas reportedly revealed no trucks moving south andew trucks moving north. Coverago ofuring Fobruary has consisted ofew hours on some days betweenndebruary on the northern part of the route and only three days on the southern part of tho route near Route 9. Thus tho destination of the trucks observed on the by-passbe determined. Some could have moved west onut it is more likely that they moved downnobserved. It is also possible that they could have stopped at supply dumps before reaching the locations of the observers.
VII, Relation of the Logistic Buildup to VC/PAVN Requirements
A. In Terms of the Current Scale of Combat
The external requirement for logisticfor the VC/PAVN main force units under thelevel of fighting is estimated to be aboutons per day. Even if the scale of fighting does notsignificantly, there are Indications that the requirement for external logistic support willgradually The reequipping ofVC main force battalions with the new familymm.weapons, the Introductionm. mortars into main force units, and the use of PAVNartillery units in South Vietnam will increase the daily requirement for ammunition and to somethe requirement for other supplies.
The actual amount of tonnage moving through the Laotian Panhandlo since the latter partas probably averaged fromoons per day. The Communist troops stationed in the area of Laos south of Routeuring5 dry season probably required an average of aboutons por day of logistic support from outside sources. During the summer and fall5 additional numbers of troops wore observed moving south into this area of Laos, so the present daily requirement may actually be more thanons. Thus an excess of aboutoons
NO FOREIGtTTHSaEM
probably is available for movement to South Vietnam. This excess is substantially more than the estimated present daily requirement ofons and ismore than sufficient to take care of thefire power presently being introduced into Communist main force units; as well as providing some stockpiling for future operations or requirements during the rainy season.
B. In Terms of Future Scales of Combat or Triereased"Forces
If the total strength of VC/PAVN main force units in South Vietnamattalions by the end6 and combat remains at essentially5 levels, the daily requirement for external logistic support will be in the order ofons per day. Since the Communists are presently moving into or through Laos an amount of tonnage well in excess of this requirement they could support this level of buildup and fightingustained basis.
If the total strength of the Communist forces in South Vietnam increasesain force battalions and the level of fighting increases to the point where each battalion is fighting once in every three days, there wouldubstantialln dependence on external sources for logistic support. Under these circumstances the requirement for external logistic support would increase toons per day. To bring in this amount of tonnageustained basisong period of time wouldeavy burden on the Communist logisticin North Vietnam and Laos. We believe, however, that the throughput capacity of the Laotian route system Is atons per day during the dry season.* Also, because of the conservative nature of the joint US/UK methodology used for computing road capacities, it is quite possible that more than
the rainy season the throughput capacity drops toons per day.
ons per day can be deliveredustained basis to the South Vietnamese border if themake an all-out effort.
These road capacity estimates are for sustained movements of at leastays duration, and they make no provision for crash movements or for various field expedients that the Communists have often employed in the past. For example, when short-term operational movesays are considered, the roadmay be doubled or even tripled. At any rate, it is evident that the current and projected drycapacity of the route system through Laos is much more than adequate to provide for the amount ofrequired by Communist main force units in South Vietnam even if the level of these forces increases by nearlyercent and the intensity of combatcalo of more than ten times its present level.
Developments in Cambodia
A. As aand Sanctuary Area
There is some evidence that the Viet Cong have been able to use Cambodiaovert base and sanctuary area since at
lere
were also Indications that the Viet Cong have used small bases as stations for an infiltration route along the South Vietnamese border, partly interritory to reach tbe VC Eastern Nam Bo. area (now des:
III
Two groups of traders that traveledVietnam across the border to the5 and6 reportednumbers of Viet Cong troops on the trip. from these tribesmen have not always beenbut this information may boecent analysis of aerialthe area. Photosart of this areasome trenches have been dug. Aerialalso show numerous trails along thefrom the general area of Camp Lehich are believed to indicate Vietbecause there are not many natives lnand the trails are too well used toonly by Cambodians. The border areafrom Camp Lo Holland has not been subjected
D. As an Infiltration Route
Recent photographic analysis shows aof roads and trails, which may be or soon will be motorable, leading south fromos to the tri-border area of Cambodia. This network may connect with the infiltration route taken by some PAVN infiltrators. Tho routes probably lie on both sides of theouth Vietnamese Information received from interrogation of Communist prisonors has given some details of those infiltration routes and of Communist storage areas in Cambodia and South Viotnam.
In the spring5 some PAVN personnel reported that they infiltrated through Cambodia from station to station, the first two stations being aboutiles apart and the rest about iles apart. All six stations were in Cambodia within ten miles of the South Vietnamese border, three of them north and three south of At least four of these stations are in areas that photomterpreta-tion indicates may be used by tbe Viet Cong. Two are in areas not yet thoroughly analyzed by the One infiltrator said he received rice at each station. At the station just north of Routehe infiltrator reportedly observed one rice storehouse and, at the station Just south of two rice storehouses and an underground ammunition dumpmm. and mortar The infiltrator traded with Cambodians along
the way. At one place he reportedly sawambodians carrying rice to the storehouse.
Another Communist prisoner who rallied onctober during the fighting at Plel Me alsoCommunist installations in Cambodia. He said one warehouse was located ateters from the Cambodian border at the point where the new road extending south from Routepproaches the border. He claimed that the Viet Cong had received permission from the Cambodian authorities to construct buildings in this area. He said that once when an American reporterthe road into the area, the Cambodians had told the American that the warehouse was to support the Cambodian military post nearby. riangular strongpoint and buildings that could be warehouses at the end of the road.
This same prisoner had received orders to carry food (rice, dried fish, powdered milk, etc.) from the warehouse at3 across the border toew miles northwest of the Chu Pong massif. Duringaysen each made threeay carryingilos per trip, tootal ofetric tons to the Viet Cong forces. Another warehouse area in South Vietnam contained0 meters hidden in the forest andhatched huts of about 3x5 meters for guard units.
EOlflll
_ two groups of three traders traveled fromisi
Soutn Vietnam to Ratanaklrl Province and observed large numbers of Viet Cong troops in Cambodia. The route reportedly traveled by the traders would have taken them near one of the way stations used by the infiltrators, to Lomphal, and near Chu Pong Mountain.
E1GN DISSEM
TOP SECRETS-TRINE
Original document.
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