6
HISTORICAL RESfEBf Rft
Office of Eastern European:V
Btn-fwm of
iwp^rtBflot of ateto Door Bay:
& accord vith tbe Interest* expressed by you during oar discussion onsked our people to look Into tl* ousotlon of Oorlet Woe aid policies tovard the DiW. The results of their research end analysis are Incorporated In the attachedfortet BIoq Aid to tba JXiYi Evldenoe of rotomlsa srri
Although data were too fey sod scattered toaflnltlTe, ccamtry-by-oouatry oaeessxeot, the evidence vmaauffleieut to porsdt aof general exclusions to be drawt regarding the poUdee of the Blochole, with supporting exaanlea froni lndlrldnml ffioc countrlea.
Sincerely,
Director Hasearca nod Iteporta
Attecontoti Aa stated.
cc; Mr.colrt Toon, SOV/EUR/stotc
6
1. The Size and Character of Soviet Bloc Aid
5 Soviet Bloc* military and ccononic assistance to thc DRV increased sharply, and is believed to have totalled somevhere in the range0 million, by far the larger part ofercentwas Gupplied by theilitary, assistance, inr OGelevel-to an estimated lastNew economic aid extended,two-yearmounted.-to0 million.
..More'tuan four-fifths-of Soviet^iaiiitary. aid deUverieod^?de'fense;equipment^missiles sites, anti-aircraft artillery, and .Other major assistance included at-least to-oddaircraft delivered by the USSR and ceveral thousand trucksthc Soviet Bloc, largely by the USSR. Ihc chief contributionvas envincreased. supplyend
ouple of million dollars. Last year these countries also provided thc DRVew million dollars in email arms and ammunition.
* The term "Soviet Bloc" io used here for convenience ratherfor, descriptive precision to lump together, the USSR and theEuropean
Germany, Hungary, Poland, and
New extensions or economic aid grew rapidlylthough the total is believed to have been well below that extended in several of the yearn prior Relatively little is known about theof last year's aid. The evidence available, however, suggests that it may have consisted in large part of materials and equipment made necessary by the war, such as those needed to restore and maintain transport, power, snd major industrial capacity. In addition it is believed that morehousand Soviet Bloc technical personnel, probably four-fifths of whom were from the USSR, were assigned to duty in the DRV during-the yeari^toreover-three'.ho USSR, Hungary, and Rumaniaformally agreed to defer repayment on certain debts owed them by the DRY.,'.
Assistance to Horth Vietnamnlike that in any previous year, included commitments by every country in thc Soviet Bloc. This broader participation of the Bloc in assisting tho DRV. reflectsoving pressure'on these countries toproof of their 'support for Horth Vietnam's'military effort-against the United States. Although the Bloc countries substantially raised the level of their commitment to the DRV last year, the total value of their assistance was nonetheless small in terms of their individual and Jointorhe Soviot Union supplied the less developed countries of the Free World with more than twice as much military equipment (by estimated value) as it supplied to the DRV in
2
the same year. Similarly Soviet economic aid extended to the Free World5 was about twice that vhich the USSR is believed to have extended to North Vietnam. The East European, countries, which extended only token quantities of economic aid to the DRVxtended0 million in such aid to the Free World's developing countries during the same period. 2. Tokenism and Dissension
Sincefficials of the DRV haveumber of statements that could ba interpreted as suggesting that .Hanoi, may have wanted more support than it vas getting from the Soviet Bloc. Moreover come of the Soviet Bloc's leaders have appeared to be at pains to justify the extent of their assistance to North Vietnam.
DRY officials have, on almost every occasion, expressedfor the aid received. After the conclusion of talks with the -Russians in December, for example, the DRV delegation "warmly- thanked" them for "this valuable and effectivehe'-development1he economy and consolidation of the national defense potential of tne DRV." The DRV's leaders have nevertheless given what appear to he
veiled hints on tho inadequacy of Bloc assistance. In July, for example,
if
the DRV ambassador to the USSR,peech in Moscow in which he conveyed thanks for pact aid, and expressed confidence that
17 See Appendix II for other DRV statements of gratitude for Bloc aid. Sources of citations in this paragraph are FBIS, "Survey of Cunmunist Bloc Broadcasts" (hereafter referred to as "Bloc Surveyssues ofuly and Ihnd FBIS Dolly Report on the Far
3
the USSR "vill continue to accord atill more active and consistent support and aid." The DRV's CP Firnt Secretary, LoDuan, speakingisiting Party delegation from Hungary last October said, "much help. Including aid ln arms, ishen added that the DRV "got very much of thia" from the USSR, China, and other socialist countries. Ia Ko Chi Minn'sanuary open letter to all Communist countries, he stated that, given the intensified US aggression, he firmly believed that these countries vould "extend increased support and assistance toct struggle" of the DRV.
A number of East European loaders have attempted to Justify the low level of their material aid to North Vietnam by relating it to their countrien1 limited economic capabilities. lost summer President Dobi of Hungary asserted in several speeches that his country was providing the DRV vith "every moral, political, and materialwithin Our modest capabilities." An identical line was taken by the Bulgarian Party First Secretory, Zhlvkov. ZJ
Both Soviet and East European officials have called attention to the difficulties involved in organizing, coordinating, and supplying foreign aid to North Vietnam. Although much of this comment Is thinly-disguised criticism of Chineseiscussed belov, at least part of it appears to be unrelated to the polemic with China.
|7 More extensive source references for this section appear in Appendix-I.
U
For example tbo beadigh-level Hungarian party delegation said, upon returning froa thc DHV, that the group hod sought ways to enke Hungary's assistance "aore organised and norcnd that this could be done in the future "vith tlio aore precise knowledge of the requirements of the Vietnamese comrades." Soviet officials, too, have hinted at the enormity of tho logistics problem involved in aiding thc DRV. urther difficulty, perhaps more invented than real, vas suggested by East Germany's Gerbart Elsler, who vas asked why the GDR had not assigned skilled technical personnel to assist North Vietnam's industry. Elsler answered that East Germany vas seeding people to the DRV vho could be useful, and noted that "there is no point in our sending people vho probably vould not be able to work successfully under the climatic conditions there."
In tha liprlug5 thoro vera indicationsburp Sino-Soviet dissension concerning thc flov of Soviet aid through China to tlie DHV. Inoviet official visiting Outer Mongolia accused "countries vith comxi borders" of hindering the flov "even of military equipment'" to North Vietnam. ?J These charges vere rade. more explicit in November, when Pravda contained tjlie assertion that Bloc aid "vould have been more effective if the CCP loaderehip had not given up unity of action." olish military spokesman in December accused the Chinese
iscussion of the Sino-Soviet open polemic over Chinese obstruction of aid deliveries, see FBIS Bloc Survey, of. and FBIS Special iiuppleaent on, from vhich information for thia paragraph was taken.
3
of "torpedoing all the attempts of the socialist camp to coordinate aid to the DRV."
Intelligence information supports the Soviet Bloc charges that China hampers deliveries of Soviet supplies to the DRV. Both China and the DRV, however, denied that Bloc deliveries had been.obstructed; indeed, Pham Von Dong took the occasion of Shelepin's visit to Hanoi to state that the "aid of tho USSR and other socialist nations has been transported to the DRV according to plan."
In late December the Chinese again publicly assailed the objectives of Soviet aid, and disparaged Its quality and size. The Russians "were said to bc aiding tbe DRV in order to gain the leverage necessary "toolitical deal with the Unitedut tbe aid supplied "has consisted in large part of obsolete equipment discarded by the Soviet armed forces, or damaged weapons cleaned out from theThe Chinese further asserted that the Soviet goods they have transported.to Vietnam were far from conmensurate with Soviet strength, and should boundred tiiaccf .
57 Information in this paragraph is derived from FBIS, Bloc Survey,-, and from the New York Times,.
6
The USSR's rcoponoe to such charges has been to continue asserting its intention to provide North Vietnam vith "all necessary assistance" and, more recently, tome of tho assistance extended. In November, for example,ome five months after tho factthe USSR acknowledged its role In supplying the DRV with SAM sites. Shelcpln, responding to Chinese charges that the USSR was capitulating toat every opportunity, perhaps vas Indirectly referring to limited old to tbe DRVanuary speech in Hanoi, when he spoke of tho USSR's obligations throughout the world, and noted that Soviot military strengthrop to all progressive forces in thee also referred indirectly to the internal needs of the Soviet economy, pointing out that the further economic grovth of the USSR "meets thc essential interests of all revolutionary forces." 5/
East European officials generally have not made extravagant claims regarding tbe scale of their material aid to the DRV; Indeed, East European propaganda, has tended to avoid giving information on concreteaid comadtments, and instead has stressed the moral and allegedly popular support given to the North Vietnamese people in their struggle.
Some of tho factors that.any be responsible for the Soviet Bloc's failure to commit inoro rasourcon to the DRV are discussed belov.
57 Reported ln FBIS, Trends end Highlights of Communist Bloc Broadcasts,.
I
3- Rationaleiwlted Commitment
Although no Conmunlat official hue yet admitted publicly that the war in Vietnam la anything otherital cause for every member Of the Communist camp, thc evidence discussed above suggests that, in fact, the Bloc no far has madeimited commitment of resources in support of the North Vietnamese. The level of thc commitment seems toonoral Soviot Bloc policy of restraintis the war In Vietnama restraint based on several related fears on the part of the Russian and East European leaders-There appears to bo first ofeneral reluctance to Involve their countries more deeplyistant and unpopular war from which they stand to gain nothing. ealistic appraisal cannot, however, be publicly voiced, because each Bloc country must maintain the pretense Of. solidarity vith the DRV.
pointed up the dilemma facing all of the Soviet Bloc's leaders: they know that tho United States "is not wrong in every ut they "cannot be objective in judging the Vietnameseecause they then ore "vehemently attacked by Communist China." 6/ An indirect hint that old to the DRV has less than the full support of Hungary's petople vas givenpeech by Jenos Fock, whoEveryone is mistaken who assumes that in the question of
8
assistance, the Hungarian working people ore In disagreement with tho government.*
Closely linked to this reluctance to become further involved in supporting North Vietnam ls the concern of Soviet Bloc regimes over their own countrios' generally unimpressive economic growth. In spite of the cries of Bloc leaders, however, that their aid resources are being stretched, tbe token assistance so far provided the DRV seems hardly enough to cause any noticeable disruption in the economic life of the Bloc. ore legitimate concern is the future claim that the DRV might moke on.Blocarticularly in the eventapid escalation of the war. ,
The Soviet and East Europeanave even more vital reasons to fear escalation of tbe conflict. For the USSR, escalation could leadangerous confrontation with the United Statesawhich the Soviet leaders appear eager to avoid, jj The Bloc's leaders also are aware that escalation might lead the DRV ultimately to seek Chinese Intervention, vhlch would be ahaost wholly inimical to Soviet and East European policy objectives, both in the Communist camp and in the Free World.
Micro is also evidence, .that the East European regimen realize that the Vietnam issue is currently jeopardizing their chances to gain more favorable economic and other relations vith the USA. Moreover should the war be intensifiedegree compelling these countries to make a
jj for example, the Current InftclllRenco Digest.
9
really heavy nllitary cceaaitaent in Vietnam, they would betheir flourishing economic ties vith US allies in Western Europe an aroa of for greater in-porUance thun tho USA to Eastern Europe's major economic objectives. This may veil beinorin Eastern Europe'a Vietnam policy; it is largely through improved economic relations vith Western Europe, hovever, that Eastern Europe can hopo to overcome its technological backwardness and to modernize its Industrial structure. Credits, licensing arrangements. Joint industrial ventures, removal of trade barriers, package trade deals-*all these significant benefits that Eastern Europe has begun to enjoy during the past several years could be quickly nullifiederious acceleration of the war in Vietnam.lie Bloc's limited coenitment cay also reflect in.part thc DRV's limited capacity to absorb material aid, particularly complex modern weaponry. Offers of certain other kinds of aid, including specific typeG of East European capital equipment that the Horth Vietnamese felt unable to install in good time; apparently have been declined by thc DHV. 2/ That Horth Vietnam has wanted additionalhowever, is indicated by the DRV aid-seeking missionsthc Sino-Soviet camp in5 andithin six months of the preceding scries of aid osrecmenta. From this second
round of talks thc Korth Vietnamese obtained additional apparently small commitments of both financial and material assistance. (See Appendix HI). It is quite possible that the results of US bombing5 led to the need for additional material help. Whatever may have prompted the second mission, it suggests that the Bloc's aid to the DRV isimited, ad hoc nature, andoordinated, long-range program. As noted earlier in this paper, the public appeals by north Vietnamese officials for additional aid, as well as the apologetic line taken by some Soviet Bloc nations concerning the volume of assistance being provided, further suggestap may exist between DRV expectations and the Bloc'sso far. Thc precise nature of this gapif, indeed, it does existis not known. It is possible that the focus of apparent DRV concern over aid lies more in the future than in the past; that North Vietnam's leaders have sought assurances that an escalation in thc level of fighting will bring forth aincrease in the level of Bloc assistance. There are nohovever, that these assurances have been met.
il
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: