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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence6
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation In the Congo
SUMMARY
Foreign Minister Speak'a comment last November on Mobutu's coup is still applicable: the coup vas the "best thing that could possibly have happened; it remains to be seen whether it isood thing." President Mobutu and Premier Mulamba arear more energetic attack on the Congo's multitudinous problems than any of theirdid. They are trying to cut down corruption, to improve the country's foreign exchange position, to reduce unemployment and Increase agricultural production, to make the central government'smore effective ln the provinces, and also to keep up the momentum of the fight against the rebels. This wouldall order evenovernment with far greater resources at its disposal thanhas. Thus, notwithstanding the good intentions and the energy of Mobutu and Mulamba, the outlook for the Congo is about as bleak as ever.
II Mobutu and Mulamba have putabinet that compares favorably in ability with previous Congolese governments. To the extent that Its members' ideology can be determined, it is one of the most solidly Western-oriented since
2. Mobutulso trying to increase his leverage with the governments ln therovinces, which have always compounded the corruption andof the central government. To this end
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one provincial governor has already been convicted of misuse of public funds, and others nay beBoon. Mobutu and Mulamba have also begun to visit the provincial capitals on tours designed to strengthen LeopoLdvl1lo's standing with both the politicians and the populace at large.
The government ls alsooreeffort than any of its predecessors to cope with some of the country's economic problems. It ls encouraging the unemployed Congolese who have swelled the cities' populations since independence to return to their home areas. It is urging everyone to grow more food and ls trying to improve the transportfor both cash and subsistence crops. It is working to bring smuggling under control and istrying to ameliorate the chronic foreign exchange shortage.
Leopoldville's presence is gradually being re-established in the regions troubled by rebellion The rebellion in Kwilu Province led by Peking-trained Pierre Mulele is confinedew pockets of resistance in the deep forest. French-and Spanish-speaking mercenaries, helped by troops from Molse Tshombe's old Katanga gendarmerie and occasionally by Congolese Army (ANC) units and by local tribal militia, are slowly regaining control of the major towns and the roads and railroads of the northeast. Near Lakeouth AfricanNC force ls having much heavier going. Even here, however, the rebellion seems very gradually to be losing ground.
The insurgents' outside supportors,Communist China and Cuba, have grownwith the erratic fighting qualities of the rebels and the perennial squabbing among robol leaders. They have drastically reduced their aid, and Cuba at least has withdrawn most of its After rebel defeats last October, the Tan-zanian Government halted the transport of supplies already made difficult by the increasingof the Congolese patrol boats on Lake Tanganyika.
The rebellion will continue torain on the country's meager human and financial resourcesong time, however, and the wounds lt has caused
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will be alow to heal. The Kwllu revolt, snail though lt nay be, ia still tyingNC troops who must be paid and provided with logistical support. Economic activity ln this area, which used toconsiderable palm oil, remainstandstill.
the northeast the rebels can stillrelative freedom over wide stretches ofmuch of the area has re-entered the moneymuch of what little is produced is smuggledwith the connivance of local civil andofficials). Of the government forces inANC troops are only sporadically helpful,
and then only when stiffened by mercenaries or by Belgian regular officers assigned to the ANC. The Katangan troops, which have been ln the areaearAlf, want to go home, and the Fronch-speaklng mercenaries get along with neither ANC nor civilian officials. The Spanish-speaking unit of abouten has been quite impressive in the two months lt bas been in the Congo. Xt has clearedairly large area, working with locally recruited tribal warriors, and it is one of the fewunits to Rive much attention to civic-action programs.
a largo area of tbe eastern Congonortb and east from Albertvllle, thestill present an effective challenge to thegovernment forces. In part the loss ofmomontum ln this region is due to rapidin the South African mercenary unit, whosereportedly will not finish thoirmid-March. In part the government hasby very difficult terrain. In part thoat mining roads, with deleterious effectsthe ANC's transport and on its always shakyresponsible. At any rate, clearing operations
are more than two months behind schedule, with no sign of early improvement.
both tho northeast and the east,the past have often been supported by localmany of which have long histories sltherto central authority, of feudsor of friction within tribes. In someexcesses have alienated these people, butfrom the rebel cause rarely brings the
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people over firmly to the government's side. The traditional frictions, which existed long before the rebels arrived to build on them, will remain long after the rebellion per se is snuffed out.
The rebels apparently stillittle aid fromsources, for instance, state that some Ugandan border garrisons are willing to pass arms. Even if no help at all came in, however, the ANC would be hard pressed to cope with themuch less to maintain order in nominallyareas. Non-Congolese units thus will continue to bear the brunt of the fighting.
In civil affairs, Mobutu's programs are still little moreixture of decrees and wishful thinking. The tug of war between theand the central government has hardly begun; tours by Leopoldville leaders and arrests offiguresopeful sign, but it is still an open question whether Mobutu can make hisstick. To do this requires ansystem to keep up the pressure, and this is almost nonexistent. Since independence, relations between Leopoldville and the provinces have operatedetwork of tribal and personal alliances; to replace this with an Institutionalizedstructure would be almost revolutionary. Untiltructure can be set up, however, Mobutu will have to play Congolese politics according to its traditional rules. This means that the centralauthority will be limited essentially to what he and his trusted associates can personally exercise.
Given the paucity of civilian talent, Mobutu's chief instrument presumably will be the ANC, which
has rarely been tactful in its dealings with the Congolese populace or dedicated in its compliance with orders from Leopoldville. With very rare the ANC has shown no ability to fulfil an administrative function effectively: itsin Mobutu's program of economic mobilization, for instance, has so far been minimal. It seems reasonable to expect that onethe mainthe array:'s further immersion in theinternal affairs will be the further politio-ization of its officers, and that in the future,
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rivalries within the array and between military and civilian officials will be added to the endemic civilian political maneuvering.
politicians themselves have onlyand Incompletely suspended theirMobutu's efforts, some in his own circlefeathering their own nests: Financefor instance, is said to be shocking evenwith the blatancy of his corruption. Mobutu's cousin and his intermediaryact which does not addregime's image of idealism andpoliticos on thefar thebeginning to feel around cautiously forcaniable challenge to Mobutu.incensed at his proclamationive-yearterm for himself and at his reductionubber stamp for his decrees;also said to be restive at "drawing no morelegal pay." Parliament is scheduled toin March, and Mobutu is likely to havethe disgruntled politicians when they
get together.
The principal opposition figure is still former Premier Tshorabe, who is now ln Europe. Heto believe that the Mobutu regime will soon be weighted down by the problems confronting it,ln the next few months, and that he will be called on to save the situation as he was when the rebellion broke out He therefore does not seem to be actively plotting Mobutu's overthrow, Mobutu's fears to the contrary notwithstanding. He is, however, keeping up his contacts with Belgian interests and with his own political associates, and he probably is also seeing to the military defenses of his stronghold in southern Katanga. He has said he will be on hand when Parliament reconvenes.
Mobutu is an old hand at Congolese politics, and there seems toood chance that, backed by his trusted ANC units ln Leopoldville, he canto keep the politicians off balance. Making significant progress toward unifying and integrating the Congo is another matter, however. Given the shortage of administrative skills, the lack of money, and the endemic local rivalries, his or any other
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government vlll have trouble imposing its willthe country. tronger authority begins to emanate from Leopoldville, the Congo's economic, >litical, and social malaise is certain to continue.
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Original document.
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